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Preface
The two-lane concrete Maharlika highway connects Cagayan Valley with the national capitol of the
Philippines, Manila. During an election rally in Isabela in 1992, former President Corazon Aquino
pledged 50 million US$ for the reconstruction of this road; the southbound lane leading to Manila had
been crunched into a rubble of concrete by the heavy trucks carrying lumber and grains out of the
Region for twenty-odd years. The north-bound lane to Aparri remained in better shape but could hardly
be used by traffic during the months of March, April, August and September. During these months,
farmers bring their bags of newly harvested rice and corn to the highway in the early morning hours,
empty them, spread and turn the grains over all day and sweep them back into the bags in the evening.
Four months per year, the artery of Cagayan Valley's economy turns into a huge solar dryer,
irrespective of traffic laws or regulations.
Economie life slows down wherever one turns left or right from this road. To its west are the
sleepy, rural towns where the Region's rice, corn and tobacco is produced. To the east is the rugged
Sierra Madre range; only the first 20-30 kilometers can be entered through a dusty ride on a Jeepney
or passenger truck. Beyond that point, the territory of the indigenous forest tribes and operators of
powerful bulldozers and logging trucks begins. When this research on the deforestation of the Sierra
Madre got underway, in 1990, we starled here, entering inside the forest as deep as we were permitted
to go, and looking for hunters, chainsaw operators, rattan gatherers and farmers in the mountains. Five
years later, I had returned to the Maharlika in search of explanations for the activities taking place
inside the forest.
The structure of this dissertation more or less reflects this chronological order. After establishing,
in Chapter one, factual and normative dimensions of tropical deforestation as a global environmental
problem, and a brief exploration of wider theoretical elements of potential relevance for this case study,
in Chapter 2, we meet the Sierra Madre deforestation problem more or less the way I did, on my first
road journey from Manila to Cabagan, in Chapter 3. This chapter presents basic facts and figures about
the Philippines and Cagayan Valley Region and establishes the temporal and spatial dimensions of
deforestation in the northern Sierra Madre in the 1950-1990 period. Chapter 4 describes the principal
activities taking place inside the forest, that contribute to the degradation and loss of forest cover. The
fifth and sixth Chapter deal with the role of the Philippine government; after a description of the most
important policies pertaining to Philippine forest management, and of the actors engaged in their
formulation and implementation, answers are sought to the question why so many policies are almost
systematically distorted, evaded or simply ignored at the implementation level. Chapter 7 searches
historica! roots of state-facilitated corporate access to the Philippine forests, by examining relevant
politica! and admimstrative legacies of the Spanish and American colonial periods Chapter 8 is an
attempt to give historica! dimensions to the second important cause of deforestation in the Sierra Madre,
the conversion of logged-over forest into farmland by forest migrants. Via the Region's settlement
history, and an assessment of farmland scarcity in the lowlands, we encounter motives of people in the
lowlands and the nearby Cordillera region to leave their place of origin and establish new settlements
inside abandoned logging concessions. The ninth Chapter returns to the forest lands, dealing with the
fairly recent development of the increasing cultivation of cash crops here, notably hybrid corn, and
seeks to answer the question why migrants are shifting away from a more subsistence oriented farming
strategy to the adoption of this new erop. The tenth chapter is a synthesis of the insights gained in this
study.
In 1988, Joost Maus and Erick Schieferli carried out CML's first case study of the Cagayan Valley
Region and produced a report that became an indispensable source of information for researchers
working here. A year later, the Cagayan Valley Programme on Environment and Development went
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underway, starting a long period of intensive cooperation between Filipino and Dutch students and
faculty, and deepening our knowledge on several issues raised in that first study. Likewise, I hope the
data, insights and, probably most importantly, the questions raised in this dissertation will also serve
others engaged in research and development work in the Sierra Madre in years to come.
XV
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Chapter l
Tropical deforestation: a preliminary exploration
1.1 Introduction
The problematic nature of tropical deforestation appears beyond dispute. All over the
world, policy makers, activists, scientists and concerned citizens are devoting time, effort
and resources to battling the continuing decline in global forest cover. The tropical
rainforests are the icon, so to speak, of this heterogeneous community of forest
conservationists. This is not surprising, for who can deny a sense of loss when confronted
with images of wildlife and forest peoples fleeing from the ravages of the forest fires in
Kalimantan and the Amazon? In our minds, we compare this image with the way these
forests should be, the way most of us in the Western world first encountered them, usually
in television documentaries: lush, green paradises full of exotic sounds, plants and animals.
This, together with a personal or institutional mix of other considerations, such as solidarity
with the indigenous forest people, or a general respect for the earth and all its creatures, is
why viewing deforestation as a problem implies adherence to a certain set of norms. These
norms have been shaped largely by the way we relate to these forests. In the following
section, I will show that the normative basis for our valuation of deforestation as an
undesirable development has altered, and indeed varies considerably among those directly
or indirectly involved in forest management. Following an overview of the factual
dimensions of tropical deforestation, sections 1.3 and 1.4 examine these facts in relation to
a set of aims of environmental policy, and the way s in which tropical forests contribute to
the achievement of those aims. Therewith, I also address the values behind my own
determination - by means of this study - to help make deforestation a thing of the past.
1.2 The changing nature of the deforestation problem
If forests could write a history of the world, they would probably not have a good word to
say about mankind. With the exception of indigenous forest peoples living inside large
contiguous forest tracts, people have al way s had the tendency to conquer and dominate the
unknown, dangerous world surrounding their settlements. Forest removal was invariably
associated with a process that the history books generally refer to as civilization. From the
Mesopotamian kingdoms, through the Greek and Roman empires, and well into the
nineteenth century, control of forest areas was a key factor in geopolitical shifts and an
indispensable resource in the acquisition of wealth, culture and military power. The need to
supply ruel for shipbuilding, the smelting of copper and silver ore, and Rome's 900 hot
baths exacted a heavy toll on European and North African forests. In turn, forest depletion
often led to cultural and military decline (Perlin 1991).
Throughout the colonial era, wood remained a strategically important resource. One of
the major sources of conflict between England and its North American colonies, for
example, was the use of the extensive white pine forests in the eastern states, source of the
finest ship masts in the world. To put an end to the unregulated lumbering activities of
colonists, England restricted access to trees over 24 inches in diameter, which were
reserved exclusively for masts for the Royal Navy. Lumbering was one of the main sources
of livelihood for the settlers, and a prominent sawmill operator in New York warned that
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enforcing restrictions to local access to timber would "be of very pernicious consequence to
the subjects, put them into extreme convulsions and disorder and divide between the
affections of His Majesty and his people..." (Robert Livingstone (Colonial 19-1701:237-
238) cited in Perlin 1991:291). Eighty years later, American independence dispossessed
England of the main storehouse of timber for its navy and merchant fleet. In response, from
the early nineteenth century onwards, England began to replace wood with iron in
shipbuilding and the construction of waterwheels and bridges, making use of its extensive
coal reserves (Perlin 1991:327). While America's decision, another one hundred years
later, to assume governance of the Philippines was driven by domestic and geopolitical
rather than resource motives (Bootsma 1986; Karnow 1989), the presence there of over 16
million hectares of pristine, heavily stocked rainforest offered a welcome relief, after
nineteenth-century industrialization had left the United States severely deforested (Richards
and Tucker 1988:4). From 1900 to 1914, the United States doubled its import of tropical
timber, much of which was destined for the East Coast, where it was used in the production
of cabinets (Laarman 1988, see also Chapter 7).
The twentieth century saw a fundamental change in the reasons behind the perception of
deforestation as a problematic development. Until then, forest degradation and depletion
had led primarily to military and economie' problems for the nations who managed these
resources. But gradually the continuous degradation and loss of forest cover came to be
seen as problematic by countries which were not themselves facing shortages of essential
forest products. As forest cover in economically ad vaneed countries stabilized, the loss of
tree cover accelerated in the boreal forests of Siberia and the moist forests of the tropics
and subtropics. Increasing scientific insights into the global ecological and economie
importance of these forests gave rise to a new conception of these ecosystems as the
common property of mankind. A second shift in the perception of deforestation was the
increased awareness of the importance of non-tangible, environmental objectives in the
defmition of its problematic nature. While economists worldwide are still "farfrom able to
apprehend, let alone comprehend, the entire range of values implicit in forests" (Myers
1996:163), current concerns about the loss of tropical rainforests are rooted in their role as
repositories of biodiversity and regulators of the global climate. Increasingly, the culture
and lifestyle of indigenous forest peoples has become part of the set of normative principles
by which the conversion of tropical forests into other land uses is perceived as problematic.
Thus in the striving to end the decline of the world's rainforests, the ancestral rights of its
original human inhabitants are today largely undisputed. The timber trade underscores the
international dimension of the current loss of global tree cover (Laarman 1988; Nectoux
and Kuroda 1989; Barbier et al. 1993); earlier internal market checks on the depletion of
forest products have all but disappeared under the growing influence of world markets. The
international supply of forest products prevents the depletion of forest resources in
individual countries from driving up local prices to levels which would stimulate interest in
conservation and plantation forestry among policy makers and private investors Under these
circumstances2, many developing countries extract commercial timber from their forests in
Awareness of the ecological values of forests speaks from Plato's description of an ideal Attica, which contams
hills covered by a vast forest canopy, preventmg soil erosion and allowmg the surroundmg lowlands to hè "enriched by the
yearly rains from Zeus " and providmg all the nearby "distncts with abundant springs and streams". (Plato, Critias: 111
cited m Perlin 1991:93)
In other words. in a situation where there is unrestricted trade, global production more or less matches demand.
and the resources of the country do not represent a significant share of the global timber trade. The trade debate is
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order to generale scarce capital for investments in other sectors of the economy (Vincent
1995). Whether this is a rational strategy from an economie point of view depends largely
on the margin between the public share of private benefits gained from deforestation and
the environmental and social cost generally associated with it. The view that tropical
deforestation is the inevitable consequence of the need to jump-start developing economies
long upheld an unproductive "environment or economy" dichotomy in the international
debate about ways of achieving a more sustainable management of tropical forests. This is
reflected in an editorial comment on the 1992 Earth Summit in the Far Eastern Economie
Review, where the standoff between the industrialized nations and tropical timber
producers with respect to the protection of rainforests is reduced to a wealth issue.
"The richer people are, the cleaner they want their air and water, the more pnstine they want
their forests - and the more they are wüling and able to payfor the benefits"
(Far Eastern Economie Review, June 1992)
Thus the current owners of the world's remaining forest areas tend to perceive international
initiatives aimed at the conservation and sustainable use of these resources as contrary to
their economie interests. This has led to the present tendency to define the benefits of forest
conservation and sustainable use all the more in economie terms, recognizing boundary
conditions such as national sovereignty and the globally recognized need to redress the
political and economie inequalities characteristic of the post-colonial world order. Barbier
et al. (1994) propose offering compensation to timber-producing countries for the
implementation of sustainable forest management systerns, the cost of which they estimate
at between 0.3 and 1.5 billion dollars annually. Whether realized through tax or revenue
transfer schemes, such an economie compensation package has clear political implications,
including the need for an internationally agreed system of monitoring and enforcing the use
of these revenues for investments in sustainable forest management, and concerns over
economie competition between timber producers from tropical and temperate forests
(ibid:289-294). Other compensatory measures, such as the establishment of a Global Forest
Fund as proposed by De Groot and Kamminga (1995:92), targeted financial aid, and the
current negotiations over an international Forest Convention are alternatives to a trade-
based approach to the current over-exploitation and clearing of tropical moist forests. Thus
during the twentieth century deforestation has been transformed from a local or regional -
pnmarily industrial - resource depletion problem into an international political issue.
For the first time in the history of mankind, new sources of energy, building materials
and economie opportunities enable us, in theory, to break with our long tradition of
building civilizations on deforestation. Quite in contrast, however, forest clearing and
degradation have continued to accelerate. The fact that in the year 2000 an estimated two to
three billion people worldwide will still depend entirely on wood for their fuel and
construction needs (Brown 1991; FAO 1994) illustrates how unevenly access to these
resources is distributed, both within and between national economies. While half the
world's population still lives close to the subsistence level, multinational timber, oil and
mining companies in both tropical, boreal and temperate regions have gained access to
extensive tracts of sparsely populated old-growth forests to service the needs of consumers
in the urban and industrialized areas of the globe; and urban wealth and rural poverty
continue to be the two faces of deforestation in modern times. Hence, to understand - and
find solutions for - the current deforestation, we need to study the interactions between, on
discussed in turther detail in section 2.2.3.
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the one hand, non-forest society, where patterns of access to resources and income are
instituted, and, on the other hand, the actors and activities inside forest areas which are the
cause of the continuing degradation and decline in global forest cover. The present case
study, which focuses on these relations, may be seen as a response to the call made by
David Kummer at the conclusion of his statistical analysis of deforestation in the postwar
Philippines:
"Deforestation is most appropriately studied by a multidisciplinary approach which emphasizes
the socio-economic and political environment in which the actual process of deforestation
occurs" (Kummer 1992:155).
1.3 The degradation and loss of tropical moist forests: f actual dimensions
1.3. l Deforestation defined
There are two - often sequential - processes which together constitute the continuous
degradation and loss of global forest cover: the extraction of timber and non-timber forest
products beyond their natural productivity rates, and the clearing of forest vegetation for
other land uses. Some scholars currently study ing this process of change adhere to the
defïnition proposed by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, which
maintains a strict distinction between these two dimensions, limiting deforestation to "the
complete clearance of tree formations (closed or open) and their replacement by non-forest
land uses" (Grainger 1993a; FAO 1990; Jepma 1995; Lanly 1982; WRI 1996). This
defïnition implies that selective logging, hunting and other interventions, such as road
construction by oil companies, are not part of deforestation, since these activities cause
only temporary modifications to the composition and structure of a forest, and do not entail
conversion to a non-forest land use.
For several reasons, a representation of deforestation as the equivalent of forest
clearing, for agriculture or plantation establishment, obscures the fact that extractive
activities and forest clearing are in fact closely related to almost all deforestation contexts
(Jepma 1995; Kummer 1992; Repetto 1990). Desiccation of the residual forest biomass
after large-scale selective logging and road construction in Borneo and Sumatra is widely
acknowledged to have aggravated the extensive fires that ravaged the tropical moist forests
of Borneo and Kalimantan in 1997 and 1998. While satellite imagery shows that slash-and-
burn agriculture is responsible for two-thirds of the forest areas lost each year through
conversion to other land uses (Myers 1996:159), the indications are that the loss of biomass
in tropical forests is occurring at a significantly higher rate than the loss of forest areas
(Houghton 1995, National Research Council 1993)3. In sum: an empirically founded - and
solution-relevant - defïnition of deforestation must address the role of both forest clearing
and extractive activities. For this reason, more encompassing defmitions have been
developed which take into account both the dimensions of 'forest disturbance' and
conversion into other land uses (Myers 1984; Johnson 1991; Schmink 1994). The
Based on a companson of surveys carned out m 1973 and 1987 in penmsular Malaysia (Brown. Gillespie and
Lugo 1991) and on estimates of changes in tropical forest biomass between 1880 and 1980 in Southeast Asia as a whole
(Flmt and Richards 1994). the overall loss of biomass was found to be about 60% greater than the volume that would
resuit from forest clearing alone. confirming that "as more forests were cleared for agriculture, logging and fuetwood
horvest mcreased proportwnally (Houghton 1995:274-275).
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complications already caused by regional variation in forest defmition and classification4
complicate further if the variable of forest quality is also taken into account. The
assessment of changes in forest conditions requires more and smaller-scale data on such
aspects as fragmentation, biomass volume and health, the intensity and naturalness of
management measures, and the extent to which recent human activity has altered forest
structure and species composition. This study follows the mainstream approach of
distinguishing "forest clearing" from 'forest degradation", but tries to capture the
interrelatedness of the two dimensions in practice. The comparatively small scale of this
case study, and the decision to adopt a single indicator, i.e., crown cover, for both
dimensions makes it feasible to defme deforestation as the combined changes in natural tree
crown cover and extent over a given period of time. The following definitions are used:
Forest clearing is the complete removal of existing natural forest vegetation and its
replacement by other forms of land use.
Forest degradation is a temporary or permanent reduction in the percentage of the
crown cover of existing natural forest vegetation (after Grainger 1993a).5
The second defmition is not sensitive to the other indicators of forest condition referred to
above. On the other hand, crown cover is both a reliable and a practical indicator of forest
disturbance, which makes it possible to use aerial photographs and satellite imagery to
assess deforestation rates and patterns. In this case study, therefore, "deforestation" refers
to changes in crown cover as the combined result of forest clearing and degradation, and is
defmed as: "a human-induced or natural reduction in - or even the complete removal of -
tree crown cover in a given natural forest area over a given period of time". In this
defmition, the replacement of natural tropical moist forests by industrial tree plantations is
regarded as part of the deforestation process (see also Sargent and Bass 1992). The
defmition includes those losses in forest cover that are partially if not fully attributable to
natural phenomena such as typhoons and the El Nino phenomenon.
These definitions do not contain multi-interpretable criteria on the permanence or
reversibility of man-made or natural modifications to forest condition and area. Nor are
they based on normative or multi-interpretable variables such as the impact such
modifications may have on 'capabilities to fulfill particular social, economie, aesthetic or
ecological functions' (Schmink 1994). In accordance with the approach proposed by the
Problem-in-Context Framework (see section 2.3.3), this chapter opens with a factual
assessment of whether there has been a loss of forest cover and condition over a certain
period. Once the factual dimensions of tropical deforestation have been established,
separate normative and impact analyses are presented, on the basis of which this
development may be regarded as problematic.
7.3.2 Factual dimensions of tropical deforestation
In 1995 the total area of natural forests, composed largely of native tree species, plantation
forests and other wooded land was approximately 3.4 billion hectares, or about 27% of the
The FAO/UNEP Tropical Foresl Resources Assessment Project (1978-1980) distinguished 4 categories of tree
plantations and 17 classes of natural woody vegetation. ranging from undisturbed productive broadleaved forests to
shrublands.
"Forest degradation is a temporary or permanent dctenoration in the density or structure of vegetation cover or
its species composition"(Grainger 1993a: 46)
6 chapter l
total land area of the world (Greenland and Antarctica excepted). The FAO uses separate
definitions of forests for developed and developing nations: in the former, they are defmed
as 'land with a minimum tree crown cover of 20%' and in the latter as 'planted and natural
ecosystems with at least 10% crown cover of trees and bamboos'. On the basis of these
definitions, developing countries, which represent 58.9% of global land cover, harboured
56.8% of global forest cover in 1995. Over 60% of the world's forests are located in seven
countries: the Russian Federation, Brazil, Canada, the United States, China, Indonesia and
the Republic of Congo (FAO 1997).



















As Table 1.1 shows, temperate forests constitute the largest part of the global forest cover.
The boreal forests of the northern hemisphere comprise 1.3 billion ha, more than half of the
temperate forest area (Myers 1996). Tropical moist forests still comprise around one-third
of global forest cover. Other sources (Myers 1994, 1996,;WRJ 1996) adhere to lower
estimates of approximately 760 million ha.
TROPICAL MOIST FOREST
The two main forest types found in the tropics, rainforests and moist deciduous forests,
together comprise the so-called tropical moist forests, defmed as "evergreen or partly
evergreen forests, in areas receiving not less than 100 mm of precipitation in any monthfor
two out of three years, with mean annual temperature of 24-plus degrees and essentially
frost-free" (Myers 1980); the vast majority of these forests are broadleaved, but
needleleaved and bamboo forests occur in the humid tropics. Whitmore (1984, cited in
Grainger 1993a:34-35) distinguishes fourteen different types of tropical rainforest
ecosystems, which can be divided into three main categories: dryland, weiland and
montane.
The two most extensive forest ecosystem types contained in the dryland rainforests
category are the evergreen an semi-evergreen rainforests. Evergreen rainforests are found
in climates without a pronounced dry season, mostly in Southeast Asia and in certain places
in South America where rainfall is everdy distributed. Most of the rainforests in the
Amazon and Central Africa are of the semi-evergreen type, which occurs in areas where
there is a short dry season. Some of the canopy-top and emergent species are deciduous,
and one or two species are either dominant or very common in these forests. In even drier
climates, rainforests are replaced by tropical seasonal or open dryland forests.
Of all the tropical moist forests, the evergreen rainforest reaches the greatest height,
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biomass and species diversity6. Dipterocarp forests are characteristic of the evergreen
rainforests of the Southeast Asian region. Mature trees reach a height of 40-50 metres and a
diameter of 2-3 metres. Buttresses as high as 7-8 metres add stability to these trees, which
often have rather shallow root systems. Dipterocarp timber has excellent mechanical
qualities combined with a hardness that permits easy processing. Commercial stocks of 80-
100 m3/ha occur in eastern Sabah, while areas with more than 3OO m3 of extractable
hardwoods per hectare have been recorded in the Southern Philippines. In South American
and African rainforests, an extractable volume of 30 nf/ha is more common (Whitmore
1995:11). Thus it is not surprising that Southeast Asian dipterocarp timber have dominated
international timber markets throughout the twentieth century. Theses are presently
regarded as the forests under the greatest threat (Jacobs 1981).
In principle, dipterocarp forests can be sustainably managed under a selective logging
regime. Since the dipterocarpaceae flower and fruit gregariously (two or three tunes per
decade), there is an abundance of young seedlings to grow a new erop of timber after a
carefully implemented selective logging operation. The opening of the canopy produces the
higher light intensity that these seedlings need to develop into mature trees. The residual
stand will regenerate well, provided the degree of opening is controlled, logging damage is
minimized, and competition with non-commercial species and climbers is managed. Due to
sub-optimal supervision in the implementation of technical prescriptions towards that goal,
however, few dipterocarp forests in the region have actually reached a second cut (EIA
1996; Hurst 1987; Plumwood and Routley 1982; Repetto 1988).
Whitmore (1995) describes two other members of the tropical moist forest category that
occur quite extensively in the Malesian region. Heath forests are found on poor, podzolized
soils in South Kalimantan. As they consist of a high density of slender, relatively short
trees, these forests are of little commercial value. Once damaged or exposed to high-
intensity sunlight, the thin humus layer on top of the sandy subsoils quickly oxidizes,
creating white sand and open shrubland (ibid: 9). Malesia also has considerable areas of
peat swamp rainforests, with high volumes of commercial timber. Once cleared of their
vegetation, the peat soils under these forests require careful management to prevent them
from dry ing and oxidizing into unproductive areas of high acidity and low fertility. And
finally, mangrove forests occur in coastal zones with salty or brackish water. Large areas
of these species-rich and multi-functional systems have already been reclaimed or converted
into industrial fishponds (Fiselier 1990).
EXTENT, LOSS AND DEGRADATION OF TROPICAL MOIST FORESTS
The first serious efforts to obtain an approximate idea of the extent of global forest cover
date back less than two decades. Earlier global and regional forest surveys, carried out by
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization between 1948 and 1976, were based
on inventories of data provided on paper by the countries themselves. For a variety of
reasons, including differences in the systems which each country used to define and classify
its forest formations, changes in forest area recorded in these initial inventories reflected
Whitmore (1995:7) calls attention to the link between the extent of the various forest types and their biological
richness and diversity The Amazon has the highest number of species but is also the most extensive, several times the
island of Borneo. Accordmg to the same author. a better method of assessmg species richness is to establish small
inventory plots and count the number of tree-species with individuals larger than 10 cm in diameter at breast height. By
that measure, Southeast Asian rainforests are richer than those of Latin America and the Canbbean. These, in turn.
contain more tree species than plots mventoned m Africa. It must be kept m mmd that such ranking is based on limited
msights into the biological diversity of tropical moist forests.
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progress in the quality of national databases rather than the quality of local forest
management (Lanly 1983). Between December 1978 and July 1981, FAO and the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) jointly conducted a comprehensive survey of the
world's tropical forest resources (Lanly 1983; Wyatt Smith 1987). This survey, which
covered 97% of the total land area of 76 countries, the majority with a tropical monsoon
climate and situated in the belt between the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn, was the fïrst
to make extensive use of imagery produced between 1972 and 1978 by the Landsat l and 2
satellites, radar images and, to a lesser extent, aerial photographs.
The 1980 survey revealed that the world had a total of 1,200 million ha of tropical
broadleaved forests, 990 million of which had not yet been altered by large-scale
mechanized logging operations. Based on legal and physical cnaracteristics, more than two-
thirds of these primary forests, or 670 million hectares, were classified as 'commercially
productive'. In 1980 a mere 41 million hectares, less than 5% of the world's rainforests,
were in protected national parks7 and reserves (Lanly 1983; Wyatt Smith 1987). Brazil,
Indonesia and the Democratie Republic of Congo together own more than half the world's
tropical moist forest (see table 1.2). The proportion of Africa's tropical moist forest cover
within the Democratie Republic of Congo rose dramatically, indicating high deforestation
rates in other African countries with smaller forest areas (Grainger 1993a:40).
Table 1.2, which summarizes the results of the 1980 and 1990 surveys by region, shows
the countries which manage the world's largest tropical forest areas. While large-scale
logging activities and forest clearing were widely believed to cause an annual average loss
of l % of global tropical moist forest area8, this effect was effectively overshadowed by
improved remote sensing techniques. These reveal larger areas of forest with each survey
undertaken, as witness the results of the 1980 and 1990 global forest surveys carried out by
the FAO. In spite of accelerating timber extraction (especially in Southeast Asia) and forest
clearing (in South America), the 1990 survey set the total area of tropical forests well above
that established a decade earlier. Because of the inaccuracy of the 1980 survey, the annual
deforestation rates presented in the last column of table 1.2 do not correspond to the
differences between the areas of tropical moist forest recorded in the 1980 and 1990
surveys. They appear to be estimates based on regional and national surveys in the period
1980-1990.
Singh (1993) and WRI (1996) report a global area of tropical lowland rainforest of 718
million ha, close to the estimates used by Myers (1994) and Whitmore (1995). The
difference between that figure and the aggregate result of the 1990 FAO survey is in the
large areas of moist deciduous forests, comprising 40% and 74% respectively of the moist
forest of tropical Latin America and Africa which were included in the most recent FAO
survey. This area is composed of an amalgam of moist forest ecosysterns with a crown
cover that ranges from a closed climax canopy to the threshold value of 10% woody
The largest part of the world's 4,500 nature parks and reserves, together comprising 480 million ha. was not
established until after 1970. Half of these (2,253 sites, covering 240 million ha) are located in the tropics (Reid and
Miller, 1989 m Brandon and Wells 1992:558)
Dykstra (1992) shows the tropical moist forest areas opened up annually for timber extraction. In addition to the
10 to 17 % of the areas that had been logged earlier, his data lead to a total area of opened for logging between 1961 and
1991 of just over 100 million ha. That figure is in keeping with global production volumes of tropical timber Annual
round wood production in 1987 amounted to 150 million m3. a fourfold increase since 1960 (Jepma 1995:37) On the basis
of the production data presented by Jepma, approximately 2.5 bilhon m3 of round wood was extracted from tropical
rainforests worldwide between 1960 and 1987 If that figure is combined with the average extractable volume of 30 m3
/ha given by Whitmore (1995:11), the resultmg logged-over area approximates the one derived from Dykstra's data.
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vegetation cover which, according to the FAO defïnition, qualifies an area as a tropical
forest. Therefore, understocked and degraded forests are included in the FAO estimate.






















































































































* Between brackets the cumulative areas of undisturbed productive and unproductive broadleaved tropical moist forest,
provided by the same source (Lanly 1983:310, table 5)
** Other Latin American and Caribbean countnes that lost extensive areas of tropical moist forest cover between 1980
and 1990 are (by order of surfaces lost) Bolivia. Venezuela. Colombia, Paraguay, Mexico and Ecuador. In the Asia
Pacific Region, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, India and the Philippines follow Indonesia. Moist forest
losses in the Democratie Republic of Congo are matched by those of the combined states of West Africa,
followed by Zambia, Tanzania and Sudan.
Further efforts to clarify and resolve the inconsistencies between two global forest surveys,
and the large differences between these estimates and those of Myers (1994) are beyond the
scope of this study. The next FAO global forest resources assessment, scheduled for the
year 2000, may help to resolve some of these questions. In the absence of more accurate
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data on the extent and condition of the world's remaining rainforests, it is perhaps advisable
to conclude that all estimates converge towards a total area of tropical evergreen and semi-
evergreen rainforests of between 800 and 1000 million hectares. The three major biomes
where tropical moist forests occur are (Whitmore 1995:5):
I The Orinoco and Amazon Basins in Brazil (400-600 million ha)
11 250 million ha in Southeast Asia, primarily Malesia heartland
III 200-250 million ha of mainly deciduous moist forest in the Congo basin of Central
Africa, extending westward towards Guinee.
Originally, tropical rainforests are believed to have covered about 1600 million hectares
(Sommer 1976). The loss of rainforest is largely a recent development. Based on national
forest inventories, an estimated 450 million hectares of tropical forest cover were cleared
between 1960 and 1990 alone, and rates continued to increase between the 1960s and the
1980s (NRC 1993; WRI 1996). During the 1980s, the rate at which tropical forests were
cleared was 36% higher than during the late 1970s (FAO 1993, cited in Palo 1994)
Depending on defmitions of forest cover and deforestation, estimates of the current
annual loss of tropical forest range from 0.8 to 1.8 % of the total global stand (FAO 1992;
Myers 1994; NRC 1993; WRI 1996). Table 1.2 shows the large differences in deforestation
rates between countries. The Philippines and Thailand had deforestation rates of 2.9% in
the same period (WWF 1996). This comparison of national deforestation rates gains in
significance when relative rates are translated into absolute areas. For example, Brazil's
relatively low deforestation rate of 0.6% means that it loses between two and three million
hectares of rainforest every year. Worldwide, between 10 and 15 million hectares of
tropical moist forest are cleared annually, an area roughly the size of the U.S. state of
Carolina, or three times the size of the Netherlands. It should be noted here that this area
does not include the approximately five million hectares of old-growth9 tropical moist
forests logged every year (Dykstra 1992 in EUROFOR 1993).
The odds on survival are most favourable for the world's largest contiguous forest areas
in the poorly accessible and sparsely populated areas of Kalimantan, Irian Jaya and Papua
New Guinea, Central Africa and the Amazon (Myers 1996). However, Asian and European
timber companies are increasingly investing both resources and manpower into creating
goodwill among the governments who own these areas, with a view to procuring long-term
timber concessions (EIA 1996; Rice and Counsell 1993). For example, in 1991 Barama
Ltd, a joint venture of Malaysian and South Korean logging and trading companies, was
granted a 25-year license to log 1.7 million hectares of tropical moist forests in Northwest
Guyana10. Similar wholesale agreements are either under negotiation or have already been
signed in Surinam (Colchester 1995), western Brazil, Papua New Guinea and the Congo
basin (EIA 1996). Pressure from other developments, including road construction,
I have consciously avoided the use of the term 'virgm' forests. As the ancestral use of these ecosystems by
indigenous forest peoples is gaimng international recognition. and archeological fmdings add evidence of early natural and
man-made modifications to rainforests (Boerboom 1982, Grainger 1993a), terms hke primary and virgin forest are no
longer accurate I distinguish old-growth forests ( not logged;, residual (logged recently) and secondary stands (maturing
logged-over, natural-production forests).
As in most Asian timber concessions, these licenses are give-away deals in which only a fractmn of the financial
value of the resources accrues to the nations concerned. The Barama concession was granted a ten-year tax holiday and
timber royalties, to be paid in local currency, to the equivalent of US$1 for every cubic metre of timber extracted. worth
ISOUSS in the international market in 1994 Smce the level of the royalty was fixed for a period of 20 years, this royalty
will deel me with the devaluation of the local currency (EIA 19%)
tropical deforestation: a preliminary exploration \ \
industrial plantation development and mineral exploration, is unlikely to ease much in the
decades to come. With less than 10% of the world's rainforest enjoying any degree of legal
protection, it is unlikely that the global loss of tropical moist forests will cease in the near
future. The following section examines a normative framework in the light of which these
developments are widely regarded as a cause for concern.
1.4 Normative side of the tropical deforestation prohlem
"The immediate and long-term consequences of global deforestation threaten the very
survival of life as we know it on earth. Indeed, the scale of deforestation and its impact now
represent one of the gravest emergencies ever toface the human race" (WRM 1990:26)
The question of whether something should be done about the accelerating pace at which
tropical moist forests are being cleared and degraded around the world is answered
differently by different persons, depending on personal, institutional or disciplinary factors
which themselves cannot be seen in isolation from one's position and one's stakes in the
process. Hence, the cause of the accelerating degradation and loss of tropical moist forests
is not only a lack of "international consensus on how to protect forests" (WRI 1996:xiv),
but also a divergence of opinion on whether protection is necessary, and at what cost. As
Palo (1990, 1994) and Grainger (1993a,b) argue, countries or regions endowed with large
forest resources may see deforestation as part of a national land-use transition engendered
by national economie development. The deforestation histories of Europe, which lost 60%
of its original forest cover, and North America (20%) appear to confirm the validity of
such an 'evolutionary' perspective (Grainger 1995).
The scope of this research does not permit me to examine in depth the validity of an
analysis defining a singular path via deforestation to development, or of using the example
of the industrialized world as evidence of the existence of such a path. The forests of the
Netherlands had by-and-large been depleted well before the industrial revolution. Here,
forest decline had already led to high fuelwood prices during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, but instead of leading to the establishment of forest plantations, high fuelwood
prices spurred the use of alternative energy sources, such as peat, and later coal. In the
final chapter of his Standard work on the forest history of the Netherlands, Buis (1985)
links deforestation in this period to opposing views and interests between, on the one hand,
a newly emerging urban bourgeoisie, which no longer depended directly on forests for a
living, but was increasingly attached to their aesthetic and environmental functions and, on
the other hand, the landed gentry and its clientèle, who perceived these resources as either
financial assets or basic needs" (Buis 1985:895-919). In the absence of consensus, forests
lacked effective protection and were eventually sold for financial reasons, with the
exception of a few private domains.
There are similarities between this pattern of conflicting valuations of forests throughout
Dutch history and the contemporary differences in the valuation of tropical deforestation on
a global scale. The industrialized world, not economically dependent on exports of primary
commodities, is interested in rainforests for their recreational, medicinal, biological and
emotional value, and for their perceived benefit for the global climate. Governments in
One conclusion that the author draws about the history of Dutch deforestation is that the first managed forests to
be cleared were those owned and managed by absentee members of the local nobility "who no longer depended directly on
these resources and saw them merely as financial assets" (Buis 1985:902, translated by GT).
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developing countries value the immediate economie advantages of turning forests into liquid
capital, and perceive forest clearing as part of the structural transformation which is
inherent in economie progress.
As long as this international disagreement lingers, any concerted international policy to
protect forests, for example, through a global forest convention, will remain beyond reach.
The market offers an alternative route to sustainability. From a neo-classical economie
perspective, forest degradation and loss come to a natural halt once the scarcity of forest
products pushes prices up, stimulating efficiency and investments in forest plantations
(Hyde and Seve 1991, cited in Palo 1994)12. In this 'weak sustainability' perspective, in
which natural capital can be substituted by man-made capital, "deforestation can be
economically sustainable when the process yields new productive assets, or unsustainable
when forest resources are depletedfor short-term profil (Horne and Palo 1995:19) and
....should be replaced by sustained-yield forestry from that point where social marginal
opportunity costs of deforestation exceed the respective marginal benefits achieved through
deforestation" (Pearce and Markandya 1989 in ibid:2l). It is only beyond this turning point
that forest clearance becomes "excess deforestation", problematic because it causes net
economie cost to the societies concerned. Palo and Horne (1995) emphasize that economie
value must be attributed to non-timber forest productivity, including carbon sequestration,
biodiversity, watershed protection and other ecological functions for downstream areas.
These can then be incorporated into a cost-benefit analysis to determine the optimum
deforestation level. Sustainability, then, is not limited to ensuring that revenues earned in
the clearing of natural forests are used either to develop forest plantations13 or to invest in
another sector of the economy, which can take over as the engine of the economy once
forests have been depleted. By defining sustainability as "a continuous inter-generational
increase or status quo in human well-being" (Horne and Palo 1995: 21), objectives related
to the quality and length of life are added to income and employment. Moving closer to a
strong sustainability perspective, in which forests themselves have protection value,
market-based initiatives are underway as well, such as timber certification, the growing
demand for 'green' capital investment opportunities, and the increasing attention to
achieving forest protection through trade and investments in sustainably produced forest
products (ICCO, in press).
This is probably as close as the economie and the ecological defmitions of unsustainable
deforestation have come so far. Since the publication of the IUCN/WWF/UNEP World
Conservation Strategy in 1980, the world's leading conservation organizations also link
sustainable development to conservation initiatives (Robinson 1993). The WCS led to the
internationally funded development of National Conservation Strategies in 50 different
countries, and to the implementation of a host of Integrated Conservation and Development
Programmes, in which sustainable livelihood options were developed to mobilize local
support for forest conservation. Neither these programmes, nor the planning "mania"
(Sayer 1995:6) triggered by the FAO's launch of the 1985 Tropical Forest Action Plan
produced substantial gains in forest protection (Brandon and Wells 1992, Sayer 1991). On
If productivity rates were pushed to their potential levels, just over l million hectares of tropical moist
production forest could, in theory, produce the natural annual volume mcrement of today's 3.3 billion hectares of natural
forest (Poore 1994, cited in Sayer 1995:13)
These authors also recognize that plantations cannot fully replace these values, particularly those pertaining to
habitat functions for biodiversity (Sargent and Bass 1992: Sayer 1995).
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the contrary, the various National Forestry Action Plans often served as political tools for
national governments to open large new logging concessions in old-growth natural forest
areas designated as conversion and production forests (Colchester and Lohmann 1990). The
impact of Timber Certification, the most recent effort to pursue forest protection through
economie incentives, has yet to be assessed, but aside from the general problem of
monitoring and enforcement, it will again hinge mainJy on the criteria by which logging is
defined as sustainable and thus certifïable.
Encompassing defmitions of sustainability such as the above, and the much-quoted one
introduced by the Brundtland report (WCED 1987)14 conceal, rather than help to resolve
the conflicting views held by different scales and sectors of the world community regarding
the balance between conservation and development (Sayer 1995:5). The political
achievement of having found a compromise definition for a term that recognizes the need to
integrale ecology and economics into human development must be complemented with
practical principles that enable stakeholders to agree on the valuation of tropical
deforestation and its environmental impacts.
This approach, whereby decisions on resource and nature conservation are turned into a
numeric balance of costs and benefits to mankind, entails risks of its own. First, the
willingness - and capability - of people to pay for the non-timber products, functions and
values offered by forests varies considerably with time and place. Second, there is the
constraint of our current limited level of understanding of the services, products and values
represented by forests, their scarcity levels and the price we are willing to pay. With the
exception of the extensive studies devoted to localized hydrological impacts of logging and
forest clearing (Bruijnzeel 1990; Bruijnzeel and Critchley 1994; Critchley and Bruijnzeel
1996), little is known about how changes in forest area and quality influence these non-
timber functions and values. For example, what is the minimum habitat and population size
of a species that may possibly produce new medicines or food products in the future?
Unknown species, as well as less attractive or even undesirable flora and fauna have less
value, and hence less chance of surviving. It remains to be seen how many of the 1.8
million species we know today (l million insects, 250,000 plants, 9,100 fishes and 4,170
mammals (Gadakhar 1992:43) have sufficient recreational value - for how long and for how
many consumers? - to save them from extinction. How much global forest is needed for
their local and global climate functions to work, and how many centimetres of sea level rise
can be convincingly attributed to each percent of global tree cover lost? In other words,
there is in practice no clear line between non-problematic deforestation and 'excess
deforestation' (Horne and Palo 1995), because we cannot weigh the marginal benefits
achieved through deforestation against all the marginal opportunity costs of deforestation,
including those in the realm of the above, largely unknown, forest functions. And, beyond
that, how would we value the rights of forest creatures to exist without somehow being
functional for humans? Finally, who should in fact be the evaluators? Is it the abstract 'we'
of humankind in general, or are there special places for special people? The latter option is
related mainly to the ancestral rights of indigenous forest peoples. While the appropriate
response to the various rights claimed by forest peoples around the world may still be
subject to debate in each of the countries concerned, there is little dispute about the
legitimacy of the basic claim that most of the world's rainforests were originally the
economie, spiritual and emotional home of indigenous forest-based communities, bef ore
"development that meets the need of the present without compronusing the ability of juture generations to meet
their own needs" (WCED 1987:8)
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modern, written laws enabled legislators and educated groups to appropriate those
resources (Caufield 1982; IWGIA 1996; Kingsbury 1995; Lynch 1986).
1.5 Functions and values of tropical moist forests
Hence in forest valuation it is the functions concept which is generally adhered to, whereby
sustainable forest management can be defined as:
"the management and use of forests and wooded lanas in a way, and at a rate, that maintains
their diversity, productivity, regeneration capacity, vitality and their potential to fulfill, nowand
in the future, relevant ecological, economie and social functions at local, national and global
levels without causing any damage to other ecosystems" (quoted from EC Council Regulation
3062/95, 20/12/1995, cited in European Commission 1996:82)
It would be beyond the scope of this study to attempt to list all the products, services and
values that tropical forests provide, together with the most recent insights into how these
are affected by forest degradation and clearing. A recent attempt by Costanza et al. (1997)
placed the total cash value of all services and natural capital of the world's tropical forests
at US$ 3.8 trillion. While this amount is probably impressive enough to help justify greater
budgets for forest protection, efforts such as these also run the risk of giving a replacement
value to forest functions, suggesting that they can be bought with capital. Moreover, it
could prevent local forest users, who often have little cash income, from retaining access to
products for which they may have no substitute. Less fundamental weaknesses involved in
expressing the value of forest products and services in monetary terms are the above
mentioned limitations to our knowledge of these functions, the highly site-specific nature of
productivity where forest products and services are concerned, variations in local market
and trade structures, and incomplete databases on these variables (De Beer and McDermott
1989:148-156).
To define the normative dimensions of the tropical deforestation problem, it is
necessary to have a qualitative notion of the contributions these ecosystems make to human
well-being. By way of illustration, I will examine those functions of tropical forests that
generally serve as a basis for international concerns about the degradation and loss of
crown cover in tropical moist forests.
ƒ.5.7 Hydrology and climate functions
MICRO CLIMATE: REGULATION OF THE WATER AND ENERGY BALANCE
Deeper root systems enable trees to pump soil moisture up from deeper soil layers than
other types of vegetation. Under conditions of adequate and evenly distributed rainfall, a
closed canopy tropical forest consumes approximately l ,000 millimetres of water per year
(Bruijnzeel and Critchley 1994:14). The greater surface roughness of the crown canopy
facilitates air turbulence and thus water removal from the vegetation by the atmosphere. In
this marmer, 50-75% of local rainfall is recycled within the Amazon basin (Salati and Vose
1984, cited in Houghton 1995). At the level of individual forest areas, countries or regions,
the high evapotranspiration of tropical moist forests cools down the micro-climate. Once a
forested land use is replaced by a more open vegetation of annual crops and grasses, local
soil and air temperatures rise. The effect of local temperature increases due to reduced
evapotranspiration, a cooling process, is amplified by decreased cloud formation and higher
exposure to sunlight.
troplcal deforestation: a preliminary exploration 15
In the Amazon basin, the climatic impact of total forest removal is expected to be stronger
than global warming effects; model simulations of that scenario suggest that such losses
would be irreversible, with local temperature increases of around 2.5°C, a 30% decrease in
evapotranspiration, and 25% decrease in rainfall (Nobre, Sellers and Shukla 1991, cited in
Houghton 1995:284). A similar effect is to be expected in equatorial Africa. More
uncertainty remains as to the relative importance of changing land use and temperature
gradients with surrounding water bodies vis-a-vis the large-scale interactions between the
oceans and the atmosphere that appear to be the main driving force behind the monsoon
rains of Southeast Asia. Small-scale deforestation and forest degradation events are not
believed to significantly alter local precipitation patterns (Bruijnzeel 1986; Oosterberg
1997:9)
GLOBAL CLIMATE: CARBON SEQUESTRATION, TLYWHEEL' FUNCTION
Since the mid 19*" century, an estimated 300 giga tons (billion metric tons, GT) of carbon
have been released into the earth's atmosphere, one-third as a result of land-use changes
and two- thirds from the combustion of fossil fuels. The total volume of carbon currently
held by the atmosphere is 750 GT (Houghton et al. 1990; Woodwell 1993, cited in Myers
1996:158) . The greenhouse effect of atmospheric carbon is that it allows short-wave
sunlight in more easily than it Iets long-wave, earth-heat radiation out; normal
concentrations thus add 33°C to the earth's surface temperature, a condition which is
fundamental to the existence of life on earth (Houghton 1995:264). As more carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases (methane, nitrous oxide and chlorofluorocarbons) are released,
concentrations rise, enhancing the normal greenhouse effect; average global temperatures
are expected to rise by 1°C between now and 2025, and by 3°C up to 2100, which is
warmer than it has been for the last 1000 years. As minor as these temperature changes
may appear, the significance of such shifts is probably best illustrated by earlier
temperature changes in the earth's geological history. During the last glacial period, for
example, when large parts of America and Europe were covered by ice, the average
temperature was only 6"C lower than today (Kroonenberg 1992:57).
Forests are the world's largest carbon storehouse. Accounting for 65% of the world's
carbon sequestration potential (Zak 1995, cited in Myers 1996:158), their plants and soils
hold 1200 GT of carbon, more than all the world's proven fossil reserves (Nilsson 1996,
cited in Myers 1996). Tropical moist forests hold approximately one- fourth of that volume;
if all the remaining tropical moist forest were to burn down, this would release an estimated
100-300 GT of carbon into the atmosphere. The 'flywheel effect' of the carbon mass stored
in forests refers to a positive feedback loop that could be set in motion by the release of this
reserve into the atmosphere: dessication, die-off and longer dry seasons in boreal forests of
the Northern hemisphere, most affected by temperature rises, would increase the incidence
of fire in these forests, where half the world's forest carbon is stored, further increasing
atmospheric carbon concentrations. Methane releases from melting permafrost and tundra
areas in the same region would accelerate the process still further.
At the moment, forest fires worldwide (but mostly in the tropics) contribute about one-
fourth of the approximately 8 GT of carbon added to the atmosphere every year (Houghton
1995). To offset these releases alone, very large forest plantations would need to be
established:
"Perhaps as much as l.5 BMT carbon could be accumulated annually in woody biomass ifhuge
areas were to be replanted; This strategy would reduce total emissions of carbon to about 6.5
BMT. Requiring an enormous amount of land, energy and expense, such reforestation would
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accumulate carbon only while these forests were growmg. Once grown, theforests would hold,
perhaps, 150 BMT carbon but would no langer withdraw carbon from the atmosphere.
Reforestation would stabilize atmospheric concentrations of CO2 only temporarily, at best"
(Houghton 1995:281)
Therefore, protecting existing forests against fires is a more cost-effective approach to the
problem of global warming than the establishment of new plantations. The main function
that forests perform for the global climate is the storage of a substantial carbon stock,
which has the potential to add considerable impetus to the global warming processes (Myers
1989; Houghton 1992). The enhanced greenhouse effect is in the first place an industrially
related environmental problem, which cannot be solved by planting trees. Because of the
world's continuing reliance on fossil fiiels for economie growth, linie progress has yet been
made in efforts to arrive at binding international commitments to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gas. Even the most progressive proposals forwarded to the 1997 Climate
Conference in Kyoto would have achieved only a fraction of the 60% reduction required to
stabilize atmospheric concentrations at their current level.
The possible effects of rising carbon concentrations and temperatures on tropical forests
are presently the subject of debate. While some authors predict an accelerating natural
contraction of tropical moist forests due to changing rainfall patterns and the aridification of
equatorial areas (Caufield 1982; Sorensen 1994), others draw upon the earth's geological
history to argue that global warming might in fact allow tropical moist forests to expand
northwards and southwards. The origins of tropical moist forest go back to the Cretaceous
period, around 100 million years ago, when carbon dioxide levels were 10-25 times current
levels (Boerboom 1982; Kroonenberg 1992). When the earth's climate began to cool down
in the Oligocene, tropical rainforests receded from the Northern and Southern Hemispheres
to their current limits in the equatorial belt. Outside the present geographical boundaries of
the tropical rainforests, only species resistant to cooler, dryer climate remained in the
forests of the moderate climatic zones, that developed here from the Cretaceous period on.
Thus a return to the climatic conditions of that era might allow the tropical forests to regain
some of the terrain lost in the recent cooler periods:
"maybe we should see the Cretaceous period and its greenhouse climate as the period in which
anything was possible, when the sky was the limit. A genene explosion in the greenhouse-earth,
the proliferation of life forms of which has gradually been tempered by the cooling down of the
climate in the Tertiary and the glacial periods of the Quarternary" (Kroonenberg, 1992:59)
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of this argument, not least because it exudes what
appears to be geologically founded optimism, the time-scale involved is of an entirely
different order than the pace at which temperatures are now rising and forests declining;
current tropical deforestation rates will decimale the world's remaining rainforests to a
fraction of their remaining area within the next century. In the same period, global
temperatures are expected to rise by one ruil degree Celsius, i.e., ten to fifty times faster
than at any point in time since the Ice Age, 15,000 years ago (Sorensen 1994). Because a
large part of the world's genetic diversity is safeguarded inside these forests, many of the
ingredients for a 'genetic explosion' or an expansion of tropical moist forests will have
disappeared by the time a more conducive climate for these forests could develop outside
their present confines. Rapid temperature increases aggravate the potential impact of
climatic change on biodiversity, as life-forms do not have sufficient time to adapt,
especially in the high-diversity rainforest ecosystems, where the competition among species
is most intense and specialized reproduction strategies have been developed by species in
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response to this competition (ibid). Even if the problem of species extinction did not exist,
the recovery of these complex ecosysterns would take centuries. Due to their heavy reliance
on internal nutriënt and energy cycling, rainforests are among the most fragile of all
ecosy sterns (Caufield 1982; Myers 1984); a rise in global temperatures amplifies the above
mentioned impacts of forest clearing on the local microclimate as a result of lower
e vapotranspiration.
7.5.2 Watershed functions
"Of all the environmental effects assodated with logging, it is probably the hydrological
changes which are the most misunderstood' (Bruijnzeel and Critchley 1994:12)
The claim that downstream droughts and flooding are aggravated by tropical deforestation
is as popular as it is disputed (Oosterberg 1997). Anyone who has personally experienced
the changes in the micro-climate that occur when one enters a cool forest with springs and
running creeks after hours of hiking through the cogon grass and silted creeks of the lower,
already denuded mountain slopes would readily underscore the longstanding claim that
tropical moist forests have a beneficial effect on local and downstream hydrology.
Nevertheless, scientific evidence gathered so far shows that watershed objectives are not
always compatible with forest conservation (Bruijnzeel 1990; Hamilton and Pearce 1987;
Sayer 1995).
If we limit the present discussion to the two mam hydrological impacts associated with
deforestation, i. e., increased flooding and more frequent downstream water shortages, there
is general consensus that deforestation per se does not lead to either a lower water yield or
increased peak flows during heavy rain. Paired-basin experiments in Malaysia show that
watersheds produce 40 to 70% more water after forest clearing, but this occurs primarily in
the baseflow or the normal subsurface flow released from the watershed's groundwater
table (Bosch and Hewlett 1981, cited in Oosterberg 1997). Due to reduced
evapotranspiration, deforested watersheds tend to have higher watertables and yield more
subsurface runoff, provided the forest soil is not disturbed. Increased stormflows (the total
volume of water released by the watershed) rather than higher peakflows (the maximum
instantaneous discharge during the rainstorm) cause the more frequent occurrence of minor
flooding events in downstream areas, but this effect is more difficult to attribute in the case
of larger flooding events and in watersheds larger than 1000 hectares; large watersheds
attenuate the effect of peakflows because of their storage capacity in river channels and
floodplains (Oosterberg 1997:36).
Problems of soil erosion and downstream sedimentation, which commonly accompany
forest removal and clearance, have a more significant hydrological impact in watershed
areas. The use of heavy machinery disturbs the leaf litter and root mat characteristic of
undisturbed forest, causes soil compaction and exposure, which in turn increase overland
flow and surface erosion (Bruijnzeel 1994). During the rainy season, poorly constructed
logging roads turn into deep erosion gullies; in order to make these roads passable again
during the following harvesting season, bulldozers scrape off layers of soil every year and
open up new stretches in places where land slides and local waterways have made them
unpassable. Slash-and-burn farming in sloping areas leads to further exposure, and the loss
of organic matter and soil depth. But even such minor forest modifications as the removal
of undergrowth from a natural forest or forest plantation increase soil erosion.
Hence, the watershed function of forests is related primarily to their role in soil
protection and the indirect effects of soil degradation on the water balance, rather than to
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their direct effect on water yield. Consequently, the key to watershed protection lies in the
conservation of forest soils and their hydrological properties (Hamilton and Pearce 1987).
Logging natural moist forest in watersheds inevitably affects the soil stabilization functions
that natural forests provide, at the cost of higher evapotranspiration losses and lower
downstream water yield. As sediments carried from logged-over forest areas accumulate in
downstream waterways, water yield initially remains low due to regrowth of the residual
forest, only to increase with the gradual removal of forest vegetation and, eventually,
conversion to farmland. Prolonged severe soil degradation affects infiltration and
groundwater recharge and causes the lowering of dry-season river flow often reported by
local observers (Bruijnzeel 1989, cited in Oosterberg 1997). Even when this baseflow is not
significantly lowered, the river's increased sediment load reduces the flow and quality of
water intakes for downstream irrigated farmlands, affects wildlife and fïsheries by
disturbing the ecology of the river system and coastal waters and exposes downstream
productive lands and population centres to increased flooding risks and -damage. During
extreme rainfall events, the combined impacts of increased stormflow, heavy silt loads and
other forest debris being transported downstream by the water in a watercourse already
partly obstructed by earlier sediments combine to produce serious flooding in downstream
areas. In the 1992 floods of Ormoc City, Leyte, these factors came together at several
locations where bridges had been built across the river. Blocked by a mass of debris and
soil transported downward from a heavily degraded watershed, these bridges instantly
turned into dams which blocked the river at several points, exacerbating the flooding; there
was extensive material damage, and over 8,000 people perished.
7.5.3 Biodiversity15
"Tropical moist forests are byfar the richest biological units in terms of genetic diversity and
byfar the most threatened by human activities..." (WCED 1987:150)
One of the rundamental values of tropical rainforests for life on earth is that they represent
the bulk of life forms that we know: although they occupy only about 8% of the earth's
land surface, they host 60% of all plant and animal species. Adopting the number of tree
species with individuals larger than 10 cm in diameter at breast height (dbh) recorded on
small forest inventory plots - a widely used indicator for overall species diversity -
Whitmore (1995) illustrates the biodiversity function of tropical rainforests as follows:
The whole of Europe north of the Alps and west of the Commonwealth of Independent States
hos 50 native species and all of eastern America hos 171. By comparison, small sample plots of
tropical rainforest commonly have 100 species (and many have more than 200) of trees at least
10 cm in diameter at breast height per ha " (Whitmore 1995: 7)
Essentially an indicator of both the number of species as well as the number of specimens per species in a
particular area. the term biodiversity captures the variety of life on earth. i.e., the diversity of genes. species and
ecosystems:
Genetic diversity refers to the variations within or between populations of the same species.
Species diversity is a measure for the number of different plant and animal species (including micro-organisms)
in a site or habitat, as well as the number of individuals per species.
Ecosystem diversity values the variety of ecosystems, habitats, forest types, or commumties, each of which is
composed of a distinctive set of genes and species, and distinctive elements of soil and climate (EC 1996:71)
See (Angler 1994) for a cntical view on how this defimtion of biodiversity mfluences the ranking of tropical rainforests
vis-a-vis other ecosystems, such as the deserts, grasslands and temperate forests outside the equator, which contain many
families rather than species.
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Another example is the 'La Selva' Forest Reserve in Costa Rica, which covers less than 15
km2 and contains more species than the whole of Great Britain's 243,500 km2. Because of
its extraordinary size, the Amazon basin, several times the total area of Borneo, hosts the
largest number of known plant and animal species; in one site in Peru, 300 tree species
were counted per ha.; in Manaus a stunning 500 different tree species were counted in a
plot which measured 20OO square metres (Fittkau 1983, cited in Hoogmoed 1992). Given
their relatively small size, the Asian rainforests are regarded as even richer in species and
diversity, followed by the Neotropical (American) rainforests and certain plots in Africa.
Obviously, this does not mean that the loss of African rainforest is less problematic than
deforestation in Asia; each of the word's major tropical forest areas has its own unique set
of forest types and endemic species.
From the point of view of biodiversity conservation, priority should be given to those
forest types and areas that have already undergone a sharp decline, are still threatened by
further degradation or clearing, and which harbour a large number of endemic species or
families. Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka have the highest recorded rates of
endemism (World Rainforest Movement 1990:16). This high rate of endemism, combined
with a marked reduction in total forest area and continuing threats of forest degradation and
clearing, mean that the Philippine forests are generally counted among the world's ten top-
priority 'hotspots' for biodiversity conservation (Myers 1988, cited in McNeely et al.
1990:87). Other areas where 30-40% of biodiversity remains, located in less than 5% of
the original area are Madagascar, the montane and Atlantic forests of the Amazon, New
Caledonia and peninsular Malaysia. All the above ratings are based on incomplete data; to
date, only an estimated 20% of the world's plant and animal species have been determined.
The current rate at which species are lost is thought to be as much as 40,000 times faster
than in recent geological times (Schücking and Anderson 1991). If unabated, the greater
part of the software of life on earth will be erased before it has been discovered, let alone
understood by mankind.
To a certain extent, therefore, biodiversity conservation is an end in itself; in that it
protects life as we know it. But the maintenance of species, gene and ecosystem diversity is
already serving the more anthropocentric final variables of human material and immaterial
well-being. Many sectors of modern society benefit from the gene pool provided by
rainforests (and other ecosysterns), including the pharmaceutical, food and cosmetics
industries. An astonishing 98% of erop production in the United States is based on species
from outside the US (Caufield 1982); in the 1970s, a wild, fungus-resistant maize species
from the forests of Mexico enabled American maize growers to overcome a major plant
disease that had caused losses of over two billion US dollars. When the arabica variety was
affected with the coffee-rust disease, rainforests also provided an alternative species for
coffee-growers in Latin America. With an estimated 85% of the world's food supply
derived from only eight species, our vulnerability to disease can be reduced only if we
maintain a reservoir of remedies for possible new diseases in any of these crops.
Worldwide, the estimated commercial value of medicines derived from wild organisms was
estimated to exceed 40 billion US dollars per year (BP 1986 in WCED 1987:155). Forest-
based and rural people in the developing world rely on the collection of medicinal and food
plants from rainforests for their subsistence; waxes, dyes, resins, oil, wax, fibres, fish,
game and other extractive products provide local communities with the means to obtain
market commodities through exchange (De Beer and McDermott 1989).
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the factual and normative dimensions of the loss and degradation
of global forest cover, in particular the world's tropical moist forests. The nature of the
deforestation problem has altered considerably over the years. In the twentieth century,
what was initially a clearly defined internal resource depletion constraint that directly
threatened the survival of civilizations has become a global environmental issue. As
concrete as the grounds for its problematic nature were in the past, so controversial are its
dimensions at present. There is still considerable uncertainty about the extent of global
forest cover, degradation rates and total loss. Even more divergence has been noted in
international perceptions regarding the question of whether deforestation is a cause of
concern, and if so why? Hardly any of the effects of deforestation on the local hydrological
balance, the global climate, human health and biodiversity have been defined convincingly
enough in ecological, let alone economie terms, to precipitate a breakthrough in the
international resolve to protect the forests. Furthermore - again, in contrast to the past - the
problem now appears to be of least concern to the countries in which the world's forests are
situated. All these considerations together have made global deforestation into one of the
most elusive environmental problems of our time.
Moreover, we now know that tropical forests have multiple functions for the various
fmal variables identified in this chapter. They contribute to the hydrological balance which
sustains the local climate; they protect watersheds from erosion and downstream areas from
excessive sedimentation; they retain a considerable amount of carbon which, once released
into the atmosphere, would further exacerbate the greenhouse effect; finally, and perhaps
most important of all, they constitute a significant portion of global biodiversity. In view of
our limited insight into their economie value, the precise links, and the area/utility
relationship of most of these runctions, adherence to the precautionary principle is advisable
when it comes to defining sustainable forest management, in order to minimize the danger
of the known and unknown functions of these ecosysterns being further jeopardized. All
deforestation, defined here as the combined effect of forest degradation and clearing, is
bound to affect one or more of these functions on a global level, and will be defined here as
problematic or unsustainable. Because of their complexity and vulnerabüity this is
particularly true of the rapid decline in the global area of natural tropical moist forests
which we have seen in the past 50 years, irrespective of their location or the size of the
areas lost in relation to the overall local and global forest cover remaining.
If we were to value the impact of forest clearing on the basis of the effect on individual
countries, regions or pro vinces alone, this would not take into account the global cost of the
rapid deforestation in the world's major forest areas within Siberia, Canada, Indonesia, and
the Congo and Amazon basins. In such local or national perspective, the environmental cost
of decreasing natural forest cover in these areas is externalized, or rolled off to mankind as
a whole and future generations. On the other hand, defining deforestation as problematic on
the basis of global environmental functions only may encourage free-riding behaviour by
the less forested countries, whose smaller reserves cannot perform as substantial a role in
many global functions. The value of the world's forests is based on the mix of functions
that all tropical moist forests produce, each area in accordance with its size, degree of
naturalness, the richness, diversity and endemicity rate of its species, and its services to
other land uses. Hence a minimal condition for sustainability at our current state of
knowledge would be the stabilization of natural forest cover at the 1990 level.
The question remains whether not only clearing, but also human activities which modify
these ecosy sterns should be defined as problematic. From an ecological perspective, the
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answer is probably negative. Most of the world's rainforests are not static, unpopulated
ecosysterns: for thousands of years they have undergone man-made and natural
modifications, gradually developing into the multifaceted natural and modified forests we
know today. The ancestral claims of forest peoples testify to the longstanding utilization of
these ecosy sterns by mankind. Small-scale forest utilization, the introduction of fruit trees
and traditional slash-and-burn methods, and a carefully implemented selective extraction of
timber can maintain - and even enhance - the productivity of particular forest functions.
From a socioeconomic point of view, however, large-scale corporate logging and mineral
extraction in large areas of public forest land have proved less compatible with the
maintenance of forest cover than the small-scale forest uses by communities residing in or
near these resources. Hence, as a preliminary thesis, we may conclude that the social and
ecological sustainability of human modifications to natural forest cover can onJy be
precisely defmed on a case-to-case basis, that it tends to be more problematic as the scale of
the activity increases, and as those who make the decisions on that activity are physically,
culturally and economically less directly dependent on the natural resources in the area
concerned.
Given the fact that local sustainable management of tropical moist forests serves not
only local, but also global final variables, responsibility for the financial and economie
burden of sustainable use and conservation likewise needs to be globalized. International
concerns about the future of the rainforests will gain in credibility if the world community
is willing to compensate tropical forest countries for the lost opportunity to put forest
products and lands to immediate economie use, and for the cost of implementing
conservation projects and sustainable management systerns.
Chapter 2
Theoretical elements and approach
2.1 Introduction
What more is there to be said about tropical deforestation? Ever since the 1970s, when the
decline of tropical moist forests became an international issue, its origins have been repeatedly
described in a host of NGO publications, policy reports, scholarly articles and books. The
general tenor was that large-scale logging, road construction, human migration from crowded
regions to the empty forest lands, slash-and-burn agriculture, new ranches, mining and oil
drilling all contributed to the continuing degradation and loss of these fragile ecosysterns. By
the time I began on this book, a great many studies had already been dedicated to each of these
causes and the various sequences or combinations in which they occur. The main conclusion
to be drawn from a broad selection of these studies is that the results thus far are either
inconclusive or contradictory. The debate continues on such issues as whether or not logging
contributes to deforestation, whether slash-and burn-farming is compatible with forest
conservation, whether roads facilitate forest migration or, conversely, are necessary to enable
forest migrants to switch to permanent market-oriented farming, and whether government
interventions in markets for land and timber slow down or stimulate deforestation, to mention
but a few of the unresolved issues in the deforestation debate. And while the polemic goes on
among researchers, policy makers and activists, more tropical forests are logged and burned
every day. Without overestimating the influence of science on developments in society, it is
true to say that the division and polarization that still characterize the field of deforestation
studies have hampered rather than helped the search for effective solutions.
One of the causes of controversy, emphasized by authors such as Grainger (1993a),
Kummer (1992a), Myers (1980) and Palo (1994), is the paucity of comprehensive and in-depth
case studies linking deforestation to its wider context. General causal theories of tropical
deforestation that focus on one of the elements mentioned above may well find compelling
evidence of correlation. However, when such global findings are translated into generic
solutions, location-specifïc factors are bound to limit the relevance of those solutions. In other
words, the global environmental problem of tropical deforestation requires a location-specifïc
approach to analysis, explanation and solution. Does that mean that there are no valid general
theories and that we might as well deal with the problem on a case-to-case basis? Not
necessarily. Interdisciplinary case studies contribute to the development of relevant general
deforestation theory by " documenting interactions of people.... with the tropical forest... and
making these interactions intelligible by showing the situations in which they occur." (Vayda el al.
1980.188). In a comparative perspective, such theory may consist of common 'actors' fields'
(see section 2.3.3) and patterns of decision making that lead to forest clearing and degradation
which are probably best explained by sets of common ecological and sociocultural factors.
Keys to sustainable forest use are not found by singling out a single factor for use in
comparative studies, but by simultaneously examining - and dealing with - decision making
patterns observed in comparable contexts. As vague as that may sound, the practicality of that
approach will, hopefully, surface as we proceed to examine the context of deforestation in the
Sierra Madre.
Finally, before proceeding to a brief overview of influential theories on the causes of
tropical deforestation, I should mention a third aspect in which a case study such as this
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complements studies focussing on a single issue or factor. Individual personalities or specific
ecological conditions, may play a decisive role in a specific deforestation context As these
mdividuals, communities, or ecological changes enter a local deforestation actors' field in a
specific position or at a particular point in time, when the seeds of their values and ambitions
fall mto a dynamic social environment, such as the post-Marcos Philippines they may
sigmficantly alter past developments and help to avert trends that might be expected on the
basis of general theory. Case studies, in other words, not only enable us to understand the
)f the dominant deforestation process, but also allow us to make the acquaintance of
some of those rare mdividuals who have managed to prevail over context and theorv a
actually make a difference.
Factors of influence on tropical deforestation
This section examines the four causes of tropical deforestation that are covered most
sxtensively m the literature: population growth, poverty, large-scale timber extraction and
trade, and the role of government policies. My review does not intend to be as comprehensive
as the work of Brown and Pearce (1994), for example; rather it inventories the key arguments
and assumptions underlymg those theories. One drawback of discussing these perspectives
sequentially is that by the end of each subsection we are back where we starled since each
factor represents a separate area of deforestation studies, in which the influence of that factor
is estabhshed m isolation from others of potential relevance. On its own none of these focuses
offers a ruil explanation for the degradation and loss of tropical moist forests By going over
the main arguments pursued in these different areas, I will construct a set of theoretical
elements of potential relevance for this more comprehensive study of one particular
deforestation context. In this way, I lay the foundations for the discussion in section 2 3
centnng on the contnbution that this study hopes to make to the existing body of knowledee
on tropical deforestation.
2.2. l Population growth
"Unlike the case with non-human species, little can be said about human population-
environment interrelanons until details oftechnology. social organization, and culture
are brought into the discussion....When they are speafied, and notionally held
constant, well defined economie consequences of demographic change can be
discovered and their implications for ecological stability gauged." (McNicoll 1990:
The continuous increase in the number of people inhabiting the earth is widely held to be a
problematic development for the global environment. Authoritative policy docurnents such a
the Brundlandt report and 'Agenda 21', adopted dunng the 1992 Earth Summit (Nat
Research Council 1993; World Bank 1990; Myers 1988; ADB Ŝ Ŝ S
importance of demographic change for forest clearance. One approach by which the population
dimension has been statistically hnked to deforestation consists in static cross-countrv
comparisons of population density and forest cover (see, e.g. Palo et al 1987) Many of these
exercizes fmd negative correlation between higher overall population density and forest,
(Grainger 1993; Pa.o 1987 1994; Cruz et al. 1992). Fig 2Tshows the sSca coïe at"n
between forest cover and the loganthm of population density on 23 observations datine
1956 to 1989, in 13 tropical forest countries in Asia.
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Fig.2.1 Correlation (R=-0,76) between forest cover and population density: 23








population density (mh./km'. log. scale)
Comparing population density and forest cover data from 35 industrialized countries also
produces fairly strong negative or non-linear correlations, especially when exceptional cases like
Japan, Finland and Sweden are excluded (Palo 1994:51-53). In most countries of the
industrialized world, high population densities and low forest cover are a historical legacy, with
population size stabilizing and forest areas gradually increasing in the postwar period. In most
tropical forest countries, by contrast, both population growth and deforestation are still in full
swing. A more dynamic approach, in which changes in population growth, and the corresponding
changes in population density, are related to changes in forest cover, also produces statistically
significant correlation factors (Grainger 1986, 1993b; Palo et al. 1987).
Absolute population growth and population density are the variables most commonly used
to measure changes in population pressure (Kummer 1992a). These are not consistent variables,
as scarcely populated forest areas may experience rapid population growth and still have a very
low population density. Another problem with the use of undifferentiated statistics on population
growth and density is the 20-year lag time between birth and the time when a proportion of these
male children actually start farming on their own (Billsborrow 1997). Likewise, efforts to
correlate changes in forest cover to changes in average national, or even provincial, population
densities mask the variations which often exist between urban and forested regions. Changes in
per capita farmland area (Grainger 1993b), or forest migration rates as a percentage of rural
population increments are probably more meaningful variables. Likewise, as the authors
themselves also note, the ratio of deforested area to total forest area would be a more valid
deforestation indicator for correlation analysis. Data limitations have as yet prevented the use of
these more realistic variables.
Studies in this realm generally work with national statistics, and hence include all population-
related changes in the national land-use pattem in their analysis: direct interactions at the forest
frontier, where a growing number of poor farming households clear rainforests for agriculture,
as well as more indirect effects of the increasing demand on the part of the population as a whole
for timber, fuel and food in a particular country or region, or even at the level of the world
economy (Grainger 1993a:94-95). It is widely recognized that a growing population is neither
a sufficient, nor a necessary condition for deforestation to occur. Palo, for example, presents a
model which distinguishes seven 'direct local agents' of deforestation. However, population
growth is considered to be the principal driving force behind these agents as well, by creating
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more demand for food, clothing, energy, shelter and services related to health and culture:
"Population density appeared to be a key independent variable in 'explaining 'forest cover as
a dependent variable and a negative proxy for deforestation." (Palo 1994:45)
For many years, perceptions of people as the problem were particularly resilient among
traditional foresters, who had grown up with the classical definitions of forests as "plant
communities, predominantly of trees and other woody vegetation, growing more or less closely
together" or "areas managed for the production of timber and other forest produce, or
maintained under woody vegetation for such indirect benefits as protection ofcatchment areas
or recreation " (Ford-Robertson 1971, cited in Palo 1987:57). Natural forests are uninhabited
tree stands that must be scientifically managed, either through rotational clear-cutting or through
selective logging. Deforestation was presented as a problem caused by people upsetting a
sylviculturaJ regime (Dove 1992; Eccleston 1996; Wiersum 1997, see also section 7.3.2). During
the past fifteen to twenty years, however, the social aspects of forestry have gained increasing
recognition.
Even though in many tropical countries forest cover tends to decrease as the population
increases, this is not necessarily perceived as a development destined to end in total deforestation.
Grainger (1993a,b; 1995) sees tropical deforestation as part of a universal socioeconomic
development path, in which population growth plays an essential role. In his view, after a "forest
mining phase", which all forest countries go through as part of a national land-use transition
associated with economie development, tropical countries eventually pass over into a "forest
transition" phase, during which
"socioeconomic factors, particularly population growth and economie development, are the driving
farces for changes in national land use morphology. These lead to increased demand for food and
timber, which are supplied by increases in agricultural area and/or intensity and in the logging rate
respectively" (Grainger 1993b: 77)
Equilibrium is induced by scarcity, once a critical per capita forest cover (of approximately 0.1
ha.) is neared. From then onward, the exploratory, profit-maximizing 'mining' phase is gradually
replaced by a management-oriented phase, after which forest cover may stabilize or even
replenish. A similar interpretation is offered by Horne and Palo (1995), who argue that
sustainable development goes hand in hand with a national land use transition that includes
deforestation, particularly in countries with a high forest cover, since economie development
implies structural transformations within the economy. In practice, there are few examples of
tropical countries that have actually built better economies using the capital raised by
deforestation, or where population growth rates decreased as a result of deforestation-induced
economie progress. Many tropical forest countries are still characterized by weak and
predominantly rural economies and by the world's highest fertility rates.
Other studies in this field take the neo-Malthusian position that population growth itself is
the root cause of an ever increasing discrepancy between what the earth can produce and what
mankind demands from it. Direct intervention in the population factor, through extension work
and incentives for family planning, is seen as the key to solving the problems of natural resource
depletion and environmental degradation (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1991; Hern 1990, cited in Arizpe
and Velasquez 1994). In developing countries, where a relatively large share of the population
depends directly on local resources for a living, that view appears to be confirmed with every
new survey on population numbers and forest cover, leading to pessimistic projections for the
future: "given the demographic momentum built into population growth processes in the tropical
countries, andeven allowingfor expanded'family planning programmes, population projections suggest
that in those tropical countries where economies appear likely to remain primarily agrarian. there will
surely be progressive pressures on remaining forests, extendingfor decades into the future" (Myers
1991:22, quoted in Jepma 1995:146)
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The way the argument is phrased here, the facts can hardly be disputed. Without the
deforestation-based economie development foreseen by Palo and Grainger, urban industrial and
service sectors cannot absorb the growing population; agricultural expansion into forest areas is
then a major option in order to accommodate the basic needs of a growing number of people.
Neo-Malthusian and political-economic views of deforestation meet in their valuation of the
environmental impacts of the globalizing world economy. The increasing incorporation of
tropical forest countries into world markets means that much larger populations have access to
local volumes of timber and agricultural products, which are now shipped from the tropical to
the developed countries, and from poor rural to wealthy urban areas in the tropical countries
themselves, in order to service food and construction industries there. Rudel (1994) hypothesizes
that the incorporation of rainforest areas into national and global consumer markets is probably
the dominant deforestation mechanism in large, contiguous forest areas, while agricultural
encroachment by a growing number of poor farm households is particularly relevant in smaller
forest pockets.
That view is a response to the criticism by Kummer (1992a) that the most massive
destruction of tropical rainforests takes place in the world's least populated areas of the Amazon,
Borneo and Sarawak. On its own, therefore, the population variable has only a limited role in
explaining deforestation, certainly in the world's largest rainforest tracts. The Philippines,
according to Palo an " illuminating case of population growth and deforestation" (l 987:117), was
the subject of what Kummer calls the first quantitative study to conclude that population pressure
is not an important explanatory variable in tropical deforestation (ibid). The author calls for other
national and subnational case studies to examine the explanatory value of population growth for
changes in forest cover in other countries, and repeatedly emphasizes the need to contextualize
the results of such studies
"In short, while population numbers anddensity are rapidly increasing in the Philippines, it is more
important to understand the context in which this is occurring... While population obviously plays
a role in tropical deforestation (somebody is cutting down the trees), a discussion which ignores the
context in which population growth is occurring is incomplete..." (Kummer 1992a: 147-148)
Analyzing deforestation on the basis of population statistics alone disregards differences between
countries with comparable population densities, in which local culture, laws or government
incentives have led to different percentages of forest cover. While theoretically it may be
necessary to temporarily keep other factors constant in order to build population deforestation
theory, there is a chance that this approach will draw attention away from other causal factors,
such as differences in wealth and consumption. As the richer part of the population in the
developing world embraces the lifestyle and consumption patterns of the industrialized world,
encouraged by advertisements from Western companies and their local subsidiaries, the birth
rates of the poor are targeted as a principal cause of environmental degradation. A more
fundamental criticism of this school of thought is that it is based on a negative perception of
people as problematic organisms in the earth's ecosystem, rather than as human beings with the
potential to be value-driven, intelligent partners of nature. In that vein, a more interesting way
to look at fig. 2.1 might be to focus on the positive deviations from the general trend, and
examine what makes these countries different from others.
Demographic trends gain in explanatory value if they are not severed from their context along
with other variables, such as the distribution of land and income, urbanization, industrialization
and land-use techniques. Billsborrow (1997) carried out a detailed study of the relation between
population and environment in Latin America, combining an analysis of overall land use and
population statistics in selected countries with a survey among 419 carefully selected households
who had migrated from the highlands of the Andes to the lowland rainforests of eastem Ecuador.
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One of the findings of this study was that in this case, as in Latin America as a whole, the total
area of erop land changed little as the population grew. Rather the loss of forest areas translated
into an increase in pasture area servicing the growing urban and international market demand for
meat. The study also revealed that the concentration of agricultural land ownership in the place
of origin was as significantly related to forest migration as population growth. However, a cross-
examination of demographic land use and environmental statistics in 85 tropical countries found
no statistically significant correlation between land distribution pattems and the rate at which
new agricultural land was opened up (Billsborrow and Goeres 1994b).
Without venturing any further into the population/environment debate as it has evolved over
the past decades (for a concise overview see Arizpe et al. 1994), suffice it to say that in this
otherwise polarized field there appears to be a consensus that the population dimension can
neither be understood nor managed in isolation from its broader socioeconomic context.
2.2.2 Poverty
Forest migration is the link via which deforestation is perceived to be related to poverty. Low
income and a lack of economie opportunity, often combined with rapid population growth, are
assumed to drive rural youngsters away from their place of birth to farm lands cleared from
their original tropical moist forest vegetation (Myers 1984; Whitmore 1984; Watters 1971,
cited in Rudel 1993). Before examining this factor in more detail, we can point to its
limitations: in the sparsely populated great rainforests of Latin America and Africa, where
human interventions concentrate on large-scale mechanized logging, mining and the
establishment of ranches and plantations, poverty can have little if any explanatory value for
the deforestation problem. Especially in large, inaccessible tracts of rainforest, poverty-induced
resource extraction and agricultural expansion may play a role in deforestation, but mostly as
a sequel to or a side-effect of logging, road construction, plantation development or land
speculation by better-off actors (Brown and Peace 1994; Kartawanata and Vayda 1984; Klein
& van der Wal 1997; Plumwood and Routley 1982).
While neither poverty nor population growth alone form a sufficient condition for forest
migration, the two factors tend to reinforce each other: people who fmd adequate income and
well-being in the place where they reside can afford better education, have access to health
services and do not need to have large families in order to secure old-age income. Marginal
and landless rural households are more vulnerable to financial, climatic or physical setbacks
that may force them into a vicious circle of postponing investments in the productivity of the
land, declining productivity, and declining agrarian income:
"it is now widely accepted that the links between poverty, high population growth and
environmental degradation are circular and mutually reinforcing. Investing in people, which
reduces poverty and population growth, is an urgent moral imperative and is essential, in the long
run, for arresting environmental degradation. For many of the poor, earning more income or
accumulating need assets means mining the scant natura! resources accessible to them" (World
Bank 1994b:103)
And yet, this two-dimensional view of deforestation as the result of a rapidly increase in the
number of rural poor has a limited theoretical reach in the explanation of migration and
agricultural expansion into tropical forests. First, a forest-based livelihood is hardly something
to look forward to. During the first years after settlement, the terrain is uneven and difficult
to cross, accessibility is limited, there are a host of Hfe-threatening illnesses, with no health
services to speak of. Rudel (1993) illustrates the physical and psychological burdens of living
inside the forest by means of one case of lowland-migrants who, after arriving in the Amazon,
called their new settlement Tristeza, or sadness. Billsborrow, in the same survey referred to
theoretical elements and approach 29
above, found 66% of migrants responding that their lives had improved in the Amazon, mainly
because they now worked land they considered their own (83 percent of the migrants came
from haciendas in the highlands). However, they had not colonized the forest on their own,
but settled near a road opened by an oil company. The transportation services offered by this
road enabled 85% of these migrants to produce for the market (Billsborrow 1997). In other
words, in these large, inhospitable rainforest tracts, the entry of poor people seeking a
livelihood hardly ever takes place in isolation from larger capital-driven interventions, such
as road construction. The completion of the Belem-Brasilia highway in 1959, for example,
attracted tens of thousands of settlers. By 1978, the population along the road had risen to 2.5
million, up from 100,000 10 years before (Caufield 1982). Such major road construction,
logging or mining projects also help to explain the 'fits and starts' characterizing clearing
progresses in large forest areas. The clearing pattern would be more gradual if it were only the
result of a steadily growing number of poor rural youngsters gravitating towards the forest
frontier (Rudel 1993). Poverty and increased population pressure thus have a more direct
influence on the deforestation of small forest fragments in the vicinity of agricultural areas,
where land scarcity is feit, than on large, inaccessible bodies of rainforest. The investments
in roads, transportation and credit required to build up a forest-based livelihood on
inaccessible, heavily forested land are beyond the capacity of most individual migrant
households.
Poverty can be more adequately related to forest migration and clearing if it is linked to the
overall sociopolitical context of income inequality and state interventions. Rudel proposes a
theory that is based on the dual concepts of 'immizerization' of the poor and 'growth
coalitions' between elite groups and state institutions. The first concept is based on the fact that
many tropical countries are characterized by a combination of economie stagnation and rapid
population growth. Where this occurs, industrial and urban areas cannot absorb all the rural
out-migrants. Immizerization then intensifies, as a growing number of job-seekers lowers
wages. When this is combined with high and structural socioeconomic inequities, poor people
have few alternatives but to seek a livelihood in unoccupied forests. However, people with
minimal or insufficient access to key economie means such as land and capital, are hired by
companies, or by richer fellow migrants, as wage labourers. In many developing countries,
members of the elite have direct access to members of the legislative and bureaucratie
institutions. In what Rudel calls a 'growth coalition' with the elite, the State mobilizes public
funds for the construction of roads, in order to stimulate the economy through private
investments in these areas. This, in turn, facilitates the entry of labourers and the mobilization
of forest products and lands for immediate economie purposes.
Rudel's theory comes close to the kind of alternative causal chains that case studies can
produce, alongside the more conventional approach of comparative statistical analysis focusing
on one or a small number of factors. The concept of a growth coalition between the State,
business and the wealthier citizens may be seen as a crude version of a deforestation actors'
field. This perspective turns the State into the principal decision taker (called the 'lead
institution' by Rudel), companies and rich farmers into allies of the State in the attainment of
its economie growth objective, and marginalized people into the workers engaged in converting
forests into land uses with more short-term, tangible economie benefits.
Once migrants have settled inside the forest, Rudel observes, the pattern of economie
differentiation prevailing in their place of origin is replicated. Citing the colono system
(Roberts 1975), they argue that migrants who settle inside the forest first tend to hire those
who follow, and who naturally have a less favourable piek of land to develop into farms. The
fields of the last migrants, located at a greater distance from the road, are not fully developed.
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as these people are busy working as wage labourers on the lands of the p,oneers often in
exchange for personal loans. Eventually, pioneers may even be able to leave the management
of their first farms entirely in the hands of those who followed them, and open up a new farm
deeper ins.de the forest, for example in response to rurther road construction Hence •«««»
breeds succes in tropical deforestation" (Rudel 1993:22), and not the poorest but the bette
migrants are the prime movers in forest clearing. To keep this process going, state or corporate
enterpnse must take the lead in achieving their common economfc growth object^ by
constructing farm-to-market roads. The waves of forest migration that follow each time these
roads are opened or extended mward may explain the staggered nature of forest clearing in
Latm America. These theoreücal insights, gained during the study of a deforestation case
the Ecuadonan Amazon, where an oil company hired a staff of 90,000 for oil exploration are
also relevant for the deforestation actors' field of the Sierra Madre
We must therefore conclude that uncontextualised poverty - or wealth, for that matter - has
ittle explanatory value m tropical deforestation. In a continuously mtegrating world economy
the former contmues to comcide with the latter: while the buymg power of national and
international markets creates a continuous demand for food, timber, oil and mmeral< rur
poverty continues to be a common feature of the countnes exportmg those raw matenals
compel ing margmal farmers to follow compames and p.oneer setters ,nto the fo e '
Especially m the case of large forest bod.es at a great distance from markets, tropical
deforestation is a sequential process whereby migrants venture mto areas made accessible by
large-scale extractive activities which are often onented towards national and international
markets. I will now bnefly examme a number of views on the role of large-scale tronie-
timber extraction in explaining tropical deforestation.
2. 2. 3 Corporate timber production and trade
INTERNATIONAL TIMBER TRADE
Large-scale mechanized logging and other forms of corporate resource extraction are often
cited as the prmcipal cause of tropical deforestation (EIA 1996; Hurst 1987 Plumwo
Routley 1982 WRM 1990). In 1992, 139.9 million m> of trop.cal hardwood sawnTd" n"
logs were produced m member countnes of the International Trop.cal T.mber Oreaniz
(ITTO), around half of which was destmed for the export market. In l98^K£™oTof
all tropical hardwood l amber was produced by six countnes: Indonesia, Malaysia Phüippmes
Papua New Guinea, Brazil and Ivory Coast. A further eight countnes bnng the iou Z 90Ï
Colombia Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Costa Rica, Burma and Thailand Ten yea s
later, all African producers except Ghana and Togo reported significant declme^n lo
5' PUa ̂  GU'nea' Thail3nd' and ' B»*- a™ 993 9BV 80 ' ' -6 of the global production of tropical timber was produced by Malavsia
Indonesia, Brazil and India (Barbier et al. 1994).
Based on a regression analysis of the relationship between timber production and forest
clearance, Barbier e t al. (lbla:219) conc.ude that "tndustnal roundLd p^
posutvefy relatedwth forest clearance in the troptcsfor the 1980-1985 penod : e
levelsof tndustnal roundvood producnon leads to tugher rates of forest loss"'
accordmg to the authors, this does not mean that placing restnctions on the 1ducp icai ~
management in the tropics. On the contra
-market failure' Hm.ts the profitab,l,ty 5
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enterprise from investing in improved forest management In the perspective of these and other
authors (Bourke 1997; Vincent 1992), an unrestncted t rade in tropical timber would enhance
the profitability, and thus the sustainability of the logging industry:
"By adding value to forestry operations, the trade in tropical timber products could act as an
incentive to sustainable production forest management - provided that the appropnate domestic
forest management polides and regulations are also implemented by producer countries" (Barbier
et al. 1994:286).
In my view, the validity of this analysis is limited, first, by its reliance on economics alone.
Naturally, profitability is a key condition for sustainability; in any sphere of enterprise,
companies have little reason to safeguard the future of an activity that does not produce
comparatively attractive short-term returns on their investment. On the other hand, past
experience offers few cases - in the forestry sector - where these investments were made by
concessionaires managing profitable timber extraction and trade licenses in the tropics. In other
words, profitability may be a necessary condition, but it is certainly not a sufficient condition
to bring about a longer-term orientation in the tropical timber industry. Almost without
exception, this industry continues to be characterized by restricted access, rent capitalism'
(Yoshihara 1988), informal and insecure tenure, and a strong imbalance between government
claims on natural resources and government capacity to manage these resources (Southgate
1989:8). But even if the industry were not marred by imperfections such as these, it remains
to be seen whether an unregulated international trade in tropical timber would slow down or
accelerate tropical deforestation, for the following reasons:
1) Major timber producers of the 1970s, such as the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia,
have been criticized precisely for not charging high enough fees for the extraction of timber
from public forest lands. The windfall profits that concessionaires were able to make in this
"bonanza atmosphere" (Repetto 1990:21) sparked a timber boom throughout the tropics,
but especially in the rich rainforests of Southeast Asia, and invited grab-and-run
participation in the industry by people with little or no expertise in forestry.
2) An unrestricted global timber trade stimulates countries with comparatively minor forest
areas - and thus little influence on timber prices in the world market - to deplete their
forests without any indication of approaching scarcity. This allows processing industries
to buy cheap timber from the international market or directly from other countries
following the same path. Pursuing this argument a bit further, prices would only begin to
rise once a shrinking global forest cover was no longer be able to supply global demand.
By then, the world's forest area would have been reduced to a smaller area than that
needed for functions other than timber production.
3) The increasingly transnational character of forest industries takes away the need to respond
to local resource scarcity. Following the example of transnational companies from
industrialized countries during the colonial and post-colonial periods, logging companies
from the Philippines, Malaysia, Korea and Indonesia have already gained access to large
rainforest concessions in new frontier areas in Papua New Guinea, the Congo basin and
the Guayana shield.
4) In spite of its unquestioned profitability, the timber industry often serves as a means to
accumulate capital for investment in non-forestry enterprises (Schwartz and Friedland
The term rent refers to the "difference between the economie value of a government favour and what the recipiënt
ofthatfavour actually paysfor it to the government. and/or to hts benefactors m government" (Yoshihara 1988:68). Rent
capitalism occurs when politica! leaders use their influence to provide relatives or business associates with protection from
foreign competition. concessions. licenses. monopoly rights or government subsidies.
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1992; Rice et al. 1997). Tropical hardwoods are a commodity with a long-term investrnent
horizon. On the basis of business considerations alone, capital investments in a slow-
growing fixed asset with little alternative uses but timber production are unlikely to become
a more attractive business proposition than investments in, say, industrial shares, currency,
or consumer- oriented industries. Moreover, these investments cannot be liquidated until
near the end of the investrnent horizon, when the trees have reached their commercial size.
The problem of a long-term investrnent horizon is confounded by the uncertainty
surrounding the commonly practised leasehold tenure of companies on public land.
Since the 1970s, using the growing influence of the mass media on public opinion and politics
in Western market economies, conservationists and non-governmental organizations have been
able to raise the level of awareness among consumers concerning the environmental impact of
logging and mining activities in the tropics. As a result, the demand for tropical hardwoods in
Western markets has fallen (Udanga 1991), and the common cry in timber markets is "too
many products chasing too few orders" (Adams 1996:18). To regain the moral acceptability
of their product among consumers, timber-producing countries and companies have become
increasingly interested in ways of communicating their environmental policy to consumers. The
recent drive towards the certification of tropical timber not only offers consumers a quality
Standard that rewards long-term planning on a per-concession, or per-country basis; it also
gives producers a new option to escape from the longstanding glut in prices for tropical timber
in the international market. For governments and industry in the South, certification is an
opportunity to show environmental commitment without sacrifïcing the freedom to put natural
forests to economie use. In this manner, it is hoped, the international trade in hardwoods
extracted from natural stands of tropical moist forest can become an instrument to stimulate
sound forest management practices in the production of tropical timber.
ROADS AND LOGGING TECHNIQUES
In theory, the mixed natural forest concessions of the tropics are managed under a selective
logging system, intended to enhance the growth and yield of commercial timber by improving
the forest structure and species composition. The selective extraction of timber from natural
old- growth forests 'wakes up' the climax vegetation, by opening the top-crown canopy,
allowing more light to penetrate to the lower canopies and thus facilitating the development of
seedlings and young trees. In practice, less than one-eighth of one percent of all tropical
production forests reach the stable condition of sustained-yield management after the first
selective cut (Rice et al . 1997:35).
An exhaustive critical assessment of the practical validity of this theoretical rationale is
beyond the scope of this initial overview. Sections 4.4, 5.2.2 and 7.3.2 examine the technical
aspects of the Philippine selective logging system, and how it was applied in the Sierra Madre,
in more detail. Here it will suffïce to note, first, that this approach often sterns from a view of
forests as uninhabited national economie assets, rather than as part of nature, or as the home
of forest people. Second, the selective logging concept provides the above mentioned 'growth
coalitions' between national governments and corporate enterprises with a scientific rationale
for an activity which, in most cases, turns age-old ecosysterns into private goldmines.
Investments in the long-term viability of natural tropical timber concessions are hardly rational
in fmancial terms, first, because of the slow growth of the main commodity produced -
tropical hardwoods (Cruz 1982) - and second, because of better economie opportunities in
other sectors of most developing economies, where capital is scarce and interest rates are high
(Rice et al. 1997).
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In the most common institutional setting where selective logging takes place, i.e., through
large-scale timber extraction licenses granted by national governments to privately owned
logging companies, the chances for a favourable growth and yield of residual forest stands are
largely set by two technical variables in the logging operation, vz'z. road construction and the
level of sophistication in the planning and implementation of the actual felling of the trees. The
management implications of constructing roads between population centres and rainforests have
already been discussed. Once traditional forest peoples have become legally alienated from
their ancestral resources, the distant, urbanized government officials now managing those lands
have difficulty in monitoring the transport of people and goods along these roads, let alone in
restricting forest access to people directly associated with the company and within the period
that the company is permitted to operate. In the exceptional cases where that level of control
is indeed achieved, there may be some doubt about the social desirability and sustainability of
the means used.
The second variable, the management of the logging operation itself, encompasses a wide
range of technological options to rninimize deforestation. Research has been devoted to logging
and extraction techniques that minimize damage to residuals, the forest floor and the soil by
using different transport vehicles (e.g., Caterpillar tracks instead of tyres), or by minimizing
the density and extent of the network of logging roads through the use of high lead cables and
even helicopters in timber extraction (Chua 1996). An example of efforts aimed at more
sophisticated selective timber extraction systems is the CELOS management system currently
in use on pilot sites in the Guayana shield and in the 'Mil Madereira' concession in Amazonas
state, Brazil (Sarre et al. 1997:3). CELOS, first developed in Surinam by De Graaf (1991;
1996) of Wageningen Agricultural University may be seen as the computerized optimization
of forest management, using the principles of selective logging. The first step forward is to
build up a GIS-based forest inventory, which contains the coordinates and key characteristics
of all trees and their location in the concession. An optimization model provides extraction
rates, felling and skidding directions per tree and other sylvicultural treatments necessary to
arrive at the optimal productivity of the computerized forest ecosystem. Because of the tight
fit between the forest model and the real stand on the ground, CELOS-based prescriptions have
a high degree of precision and reliability. Extracted volumes are smaller than in unregulated
timber concessions. If all felling and skidding is carried out in accordance with the
prescriptions of the model, damage to the residual stand becomes a function of logging
intensity (i.e., volume extracted per hectare).
The instrument of timber certification aims at creating a win-win solution for tropical
deforestation, which allows the large-scale extraction of timber from natural forests to
continue, while saving these forests from further degradation and loss. While certification and
market incentives are likely to stimulate governments and the timber industry to adopt more
careful forest management systems, such as CELOS, the following factors restrict the
likelihood of these systems being replicated outside the scientifically supervised field trials
where they are currently practised. First, there is the element of cost. Unlike these
experimental concessions, which are subsidized by international aid and 'green' investment
funds in Western countries, the bulk of logging operations is carried out by ordinary private
enterprises for purposes of profit maximization. The establishment of a computerized database
of the forest stand, combined with the more restrictive, long-term extraction regimes compared
to conventional, less regulated logging systems, would lower the immediate profitability of
corporate logging operations (Rice et al. 1997) Moreover, there is little security that future
returns on these investments will accrue to the investor, since most tropical timber concessions
are only temporary rights to extract natural resources from public land.
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Second, in many cases, the policies and institutions through which governments of tropical
forest countries supervise conventional logging concessions have proved ineffective (see
section 2.2.4). The monitoring and evaluation of more sophisticated management prescriptions
will pose even greater demands on government resources and capabilities to see to their proper
implementation. National and local institutions representing the public interest must have a
legal mandate - and credible authority among private stakeholders - to oversee the actual
implementation of operations plans and to take punitive measures against violators. Unless that
basic condition is met, old practices of unregulated logging, concealed behind the window
dressing of management plans, will continue to take place, and the practical role of well-
intentioned technological innovations will remain as ephemeral as that of their less
sophisticated predecessors.
Third, a careful logging system, such as CELOS, causes lower levels of damage and
disturbance than conventional logging operations, but over a larger area. Lowered extraction
intensity means that concessions must be expanded, if the investments required are to be
economically feasible. In addition to ecological impacts, such a large-scale requirement also
has sociopolitical dimensions, since logging concessions often take place in areas also claimed
by local users, including indigenous forest communities.
Box 2.1 Solomon Western Islands Fair Trade (SWIFT)
In cooperation with the United Church of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, forest-based
groups in the Western province and the province of Choiseul in the Solomon Islands have been
developing alternatives for the large-scale logging industry, which rapidly expanded in the islands
after 1988. One of the main goals of the initiative was to ensure that a larger share of the market
value of the extracted timber would accrue to forest-based communities. In the early nineties, the
SWIFT company was established to handle the marketing of timber produced by these communities.
Since it offeris a considerably higher price per tree, forest communities are encouraged not to offer
their lands and resources to corporate logging companies, but to join the SWIFT company and
handle the management of their forests themselves. After being trained in fields such as forest
inventory, the preparation of management plans, monitoring and evaluation, and timber processing,
participating groups can apply for loans to mvest in necessary equipment and facilities. The company
as a whole, including lts Dutch subsidiary SWIFT Hout bv, is owned by the 300 participating
groups, who together manage 800,000 hectares of tropical moist forest. ICCO, a Dutch co-financing
organization and the Rabobank, a cooperative bank, together fmanced the establishment of the Dutch
branch.
The company adheres to the strict regulations qualifying timber for certification by the Forest
Stewardship Council, and in February 1997 the company was deputized by the FSC to monitor and
evaluate adherence to the certification criteria by its own producer groups. The SWIFT initiative is
supported by the Dutch branch of the World Wide Fund for Nature, Friends of the Earth the
Netherlands and Novib.
Sources: ICCO leaflet. April 1997; SWIFT folder 1997; Article "Solomonseilanders rooien bomen
met pen en papier" Esther Hansen Löve in de Volkskrant, 20/5/97, pagje 2.
Finally, the high level of technical sophistication characteristic of the computerized
management systems poses a banier for effective participation by local people. Technically less
sophisticated and smaller-scale initiatives, such as the SWIFT programme in the Solomon
Islands (see Box 2.1), build upon the capabilities of local communities to manage forest
resources in a sustainable way, ensurmg that communities earn a greater share of the market
value of their timber. This would appear to offer a more reliable socio-economic foundation
for the wise use of tropical forests in the longer term.
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2.2.4 Government policles and -institutions
The importance of governments as actors in tropical deforestation is reflected in the fact that
80% of the world's closed-canopy tropical moist forests are located on public lands (Lanly
1982) and are thus the property of the governments of the countries involved. Nevertheless,
in my view, the conclusion that "throughout the world, governments largely determine how
forests should be used" (Repetto 1988:16) overestimates the capability of government
institutions in the developing world to control the appropriation of public resources by private
actors, both local and international. A relevant assessment of the role of governments in
tropical deforestation must transcend the level of policy content, and analyse the process
through which these are conveyed and implemented at the interface of government officials and
others in the actors' field. I will follow that same sequence here.
Cernea and Bromley (1989, cited in Southgate 1989:7) argue that environmental
degradation is, in fact, a manifestation of an institutional crisis. According to this view, this
crisis arises from a pronounced imbalance between the government claims on the forest on the
one hand, and the resources and capabilities to manage these resources on the other. However,
taking the example of major tropical-forest countries like Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia, the
argument that governments of developing nations are still too poor to be able to afford forest
conservation flies in the face of the impressive economies these countries have been able to
make. In fact, only the poorest of the world's major tropical-forest countries, the Democratie
Republic of Congo did not experience rapid deforestation in the past few decades.
The problem that most of the world's tropical moist forests are managed by ineffective,
poorly funded, understaffed and powerless institutions is, therefore, not only the result of an
absolute lack of resources, but also of a low priority given to the objective of sustainable forest
management (see also section 1.2). To these governments, tropical forests are, first and
foremost, potential market commodities which can buy economie progress and political
stability.
In a cross-country statistical analysis of economie indicators and deforestation, Kahn et al,
(1995) found a significant correlation between developing countries' relative rates of
deforestation in the period 1965-1985, and their public debt service as part of GNP or total
export earnings per one million inhabitants. In the 1980-1985 period, in particular, developing
countries experienced both rapid deforestation rates and marked increases in public and foreign
debts (ibid:ll&). A possible explanation for this correlation, in their view, is that the
governments of developing countries had to sell tropical timber in the international market in
order to earn foreign exchange for debt service payments. On the basis of this explanation, the
authors predict that a 10% debt relief for tropical forest countries could result in a 3%
reduction in deforestation rates. Inman (1991), however, arrivés at the opposite conclusion,
maintaining that the influx of foreign capital during the 1970s actually sped up tropical
deforestation rates, by enabling developing country governments to construct infrastructure.
A decade later, when a large public debt had been built up, economie crisis and forced austerity
in public spending slowed down deforestation rates in the tropics. In that interpretation, debt
relief - unless linked to specific conservation activities - could even result in increased forest
degradation and loss. Thus revenue scarcity at the level of national governments offers neither
an adequate explanation nor effective solutions for tropical deforestation (Pearce et al . 1995)
Gillis and Repetto (1988) and Bautista (1990) summarize the problematic influence of a
number of policies which commonly guide private access to public rainforests, in the tropics
as a whole and in the Philippines in particular. They point to the following problems.
- The temporary nature of timber licenses, granting private businesses with exclusive
leaseholds access to large forest tracts. The investment horizon in mixed natural forests or
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Second, in many cases, the policies and institutions through which governments of tropical
forest countries supervise conventional logging concessions have proved ineffective (see
section 2.2.4). The monitoring and evaluation of more sophisticated management prescriptions
will pose even greater demands on government resources and capabüities to see to their proper
implementation. National and local institutions representing the public interest must have a
legal mandate - and credible authority among private stakeholders - to oversee the actual
implementation of operations plans and to take punitive measures against violators. Unless that
basic condition is met, old practices of unregulated logging, concealed behind the window
dressing of management plans, will continue to take place, and the practical role of well-
intentioned technological innovations will remain as ephemeral as that of their less
sophisticated predecessors.
Third, a careful logging system, such as CELOS, causes lower levels of damage and
disturbance than conventional logging operations, but over a larger area. Lowered extraction
intensity means that concessions must be expanded, if the investments required are to be
economically feasible. In addition to ecological impacts, such a large-scale requirement also
has sociopolitical dimensions, since logging concessions often take place in areas also claimed
by local users, including indigenous forest communities.
Box 2.1 Solomon Western Islands Fair Trade (SWIFT)
In cooperation with the United Church of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, forest-based
groups in the Western province and the province of Choiseul in the Solomon Islands have been
developing alternatives for the large-scale logging industry, which rapidly expanded in the islands
after 1988. One of the main goals of the initiative was to ensure that a larger share of the market
value of the extracted timber would accrue to forest-based communities. In the early nineties, the
SWIFT company was established to handle the marketing of timber produced by these communities.
Since it offens a considerably higher price per tree, forest communities are encouraged not to offer
their lands and resources to corporate logging companies, but to jotn the SWIFT company and
handle the management of their forests themselves. After being trained in fields such as forest
inventory, the preparation of management plans, monitoring and evaluation, and timber processing,
participating groups can apply for loans to invest in necessary equipment and facilities. The company
as a whole, including its Dutch subsidiary SWIFT Hout bv, is owned by the 300 participating
groups, who together manage 800,000 hectares of tropical moist forest. ICCO, a Dutch co-financing
organization and the Rabobank, a cooperative bank, together financed the establishment of the Dutch
branch.
The company adheres to the strict regulations qualifying timber for cenification by the Forest
Stewardship CouncU, and in February 1997 the company was deputized by the FSC to monitor and
evaluate adherence to the certification criteria by its own producer groups. The SWIFT initiative is
supported by the Dutch branch of the World Wide Fund for Nature, Fnends of the Earth the
Netherlands and Novib.
SÖUISES: ICCO leaflet, April 1997; SWIFT folder 1997; Article "Solomonseilanders rooien bomen
met pen enjjapier" Esther Hansen Löve in de Volkskrant, 20/5/97, page 2.
Finally, the high level of technical sophistication characteristic of the computerized
management systerns poses a barrier for effective participation by local people. Technically less
sophisticated and smaller-scale initiatives, such as the SWIFT programme in the Solomon
Islands (see Box 2.1), build upon the capabüities of local communities to manage forest
resources in a sustainable way, ensuring that communities earn a greater share of the market
value of their timber. This would appear to offer a more reliable socio-economic foundation
for the wise use of tropical forests in the longer term.
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2.2.4 Government policies and -institutions
The importance of governments as actors in tropical deforestation is reflected in the fact that
80% of the world's closed-canopy tropical moist forests are located on public lands (Lanly
1982) and are thus the property of the governments of the countries involved. Nevertheless,
in my view, the conclusion that "throughoul the world, governments largely determine how
forests should be used" (Repetto 1988:16) overestimates the capability of government
institutions in the developing world to control the appropriation of public resources by private
actors, both local and international. A relevant assessment of the role of governments in
tropical deforestation must transcend the level of policy content, and analyse the process
through which these are conveyed and implemented at the interface of government officials and
others in the actors' field. I will follow that same sequence here.
Cernea and Bromley (1989, cited in Southgate 1989:7) argue that environmental
degradation is, in fact, a manifestation of an institutional crisis. According to this view, this
crisis arises from a pronounced imbalance between the government claims on the forest on the
one hand, and the resources and capabilities to manage these resources on the other. Ho we ver,
taking the example of major tropical-forest countries like Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia, the
argument that governments of developing nations are still too poor to be able to afford forest
conservation flies in the face of the impressive economies these countries have been able to
rnake. In fact, only the poorest of the world's major tropical-forest countries, the Democratie
Republic of Congo did not experience rapid deforestation in the past few decades.
The problem that most of the world's tropical moist forests are managed by ineffective,
poorly funded, understaffed and powerless institutions is, therefore, not only the result of an
absolute lack of resources, but also of a low priority given to the objective of sustainable forest
management (see also section 1.2). To these governments, tropical forests are, first and
foremost, potential market commodities which can buy economie progress and political
stability.
In a cross-country statistical analysis of economie indicators and deforestation, Kahn et al.
(1995) found a significant correlation between developing countries' relative rates of
deforestation in the period 1965-1985, and their public debt service as part of GNP or total
export earnings per one million inhabitants. In the 1980-1985 period, in particular, developing
countries experienced both rapid deforestation rates and marked increases in public and foreign
debts (ibid:ll&). A possible explanation for this correlation, in their view, is that the
governments of developing countries had to sell tropical timber in the international market in
order to earn foreign exchange for debt service payments. On the basis of this explanation, the
authors predict that a 10% debt relief for tropical forest countries could result in a 3%
reduction in deforestation rates. Inman (1991), however, arrivés at the opposite conclusion,
maintaining that the influx of foreign capital during the 1970s actually sped up tropical
deforestation rates, by enabling developing country governments to construct infrastructure.
A decade later, when a large public debt had been built up, economie crisis and forced austerity
in public spending slowed down deforestation rates in the tropics. In that interpretation, debt
relief - unless linked to specific conservation activities - could even result in increased forest
degradation and loss. Thus revenue scarcity at the level of national governments offers neither
an adequate explanation nor effective solutions for tropical deforestation (Pearce et al. 1995)
Gillis and Repetto (1988) and Bautista (1990) summarize the problematic influence of a
nurnber of policies which commonly guide private access to public rainforests, in the tropics
as a whole and in the Philippines in particular. They point to the following problems:
~ The temporary nature of timber licenses, granting private businesses with exclusive
leaseholds access to large forest tracts. The investment horizon in mixed natural forests or
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forest plantations often lies beyond the validity of these licenses, creating uncertainties that
discourage a long-term view on the part of the licensee. In the Philippines, the average
period during which licensees actually held onto their concessions was only 9-10 years,
while the actual term of the lease was 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. According
to the author, "the early voluntary return ofleased lands may reflect the capacity oflicense-
holders to exhaust the standing timber within their concession area, as well as their lack
of interest in replanting and sustaining yield" (Bautista 1990:78).The privileged, non-
competitive nature of the licensing system aggravated the wasteful use of forest resources.
Forest revenue policies, intended to enable governments to capture the public share of the
value of the natural forest stand, were generally inadequate. Bautista (1990) calculated that
during the 1960-1985 logging boom in the Philippines, forest charges accounted for less
than 5% of wholesale value. De Los Angeles (1982) demonstrated that logging companies
made a 137% profit in domestic log sales, and 264% for exported logs. The common policy
of setting forest charges on the basis of extracted volumes alone encouraged high grading
and did not encourage concessionaires to adopt more careful feiling, yarding and hauling
techniques (for an examination of this issue, see section 5.2.2).
— Tenure policies that recognize the claims to ownership of those who cleared the land of its
natural forest vegetation. This general principle, which applies in nearly all tropical
settings, rewards forest clearing, and even acts as an incentive for speculative land clearing
(Utting 1994:238). Tenurial insecurity, on the other hand, contributes to an unsustainable
use of land and resources by discouraging private investment in the long-term productivity
of the land, whether for tree-growing companies or for migrant farmers (ibid:243; Lynch
1992; Dorner and Thiesenhusen 1992)
- A fourth area of policy concerns the rural areas in the vicinity of tropical forests. Faced
with limited employment opportunities in manufacturing, services and processing
industries, and slow or ineffective land reform, many poor and landless people have few
feasible alternatives to logging and forest clearing as a means of making a living. Two-
thirds of the increases in erop production in the Philippines between the mid-sixties and
the mid-eighties were achieved by means of agricultural expansion into the forest frontier
(Bautista 1991:10).
- Finally, there is the category which includes logging bans, log export bans and
protectionism-inspired tariffs levied on unprocessed forest product imports. Southgate
(1989), Gillis and Repetto (1988) and others argue strongly against the effectiveness of such
policies (see 5.2.2). In Ecuador, for example, a log export ban made the internal timber
market entirely dependent on agricultural colonists for its supply (causing a rapid increase
in chainsaw imports). In other cases, log bans led to economically non-rational investments,
such as the construction of processing plants - in order to remain in the timber business
despite a ban on exports of raw logs - or to the displacement of large-scale mechanized
logging and its negative environmental impacts on surrounding countries where such a ban
was not yet in place.
A great deal more could be said about the influence of forest policies, and the role of weak
forest institutions, and weak governance in general, in the global degradation and loss of
tropical moist forests. Instead, I have opted to examine the role of forest policies and actors
only after providing a more detailed description of the Sierra Madre and its forest policy
context. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the background and implementation of Philippine forest
policies in detail. In my description and analysis of particular policies and institutions, and
discrepancies between the formal content of particular policies and their interpretation in the
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field, I will draw upon additional theory in the fields of development administration and
political science. Taking into account the above lessons from other country cases and
comparative studies, I will examine whether there are additional insights to be gained from a
perspective that disassembles the encompassing term 'government' into the actual actors that
represent the State at the various levels where policies are formulated and implemented.
2.3 Contribution, approach and methodology of this study
2.3. l Background, aim and objective
It is clear from the previous sections that considerable scientific work has been devoted to
describing, analyzing, explaining and thereby helping to solve the global environmental
problem of the loss and degradation of tropical moist forests. And yet, as deforestation
proceeds unabatedly in most tropical countries, only a few elements of a commonly accepted
theory on the causes of and the solution to this problem appear to have risen above the level of
debate:
- In most cases, notably in large contiguous forest tracts, large-scale corporate extractive
activities trigger the deforestation process. In the densely stocked dipterocarp forests of
Southeast Asia, the first corporate activity was usually large-scale mechanized logging.
Plantation establishment, oil exploration, state-sponsored transmigration and the
construction of hydroelectric cum irrigation dams are other examples of pioneer activities
('lead agents').
- The construction of roads and the removal of the heaviest biomass by logging companies
facilitates the conversion of residual forests by migrants from nearby rural population
centres.
- Common features of rural society in developing countries, such as rapid population growth,
poverty and a limited range of livelihood opportunities, stimulate the movement of people
into accessible forest frontiers.
- Government policies either explicitly stimulate the conversion of forests into other land
uses, or appear to provide a sound legal framework for forest protection, but fail when it
comes to implementation.
Beyond these general points of agreement, consensus ends. This leaves us with such basic
questions as: Does secure land tenure enable migrants to start making investments in
sustainable land uses, or will the possibility of gaining private titles to public land also
encourage land speculation and speed up forest migration? Does road construction into forest
lands complicate conservation efforts or are roads a necessary condition for more sustainable,
market-sensitive land uses? What can policy reform do in an administrative context, where local
government officials constantly need to weigh their loyalty to the public interest against
personal security and progress? Further scholarly work is required to find more defmite
answers to these and other questions on tropical deforestation. Billsborrow and Geores argue
for an explanation of forest migration and deforestation at a lower level of aggregation,
preferably the household or farm level, where decisions on resource use are made and where
Jully multidisciplinary collaboration in both the data collection in the field and in the analysis -
involving ecologists and social scientists altogether - can be most useful and is most needed"
(1994b:132). In the conclusions of his deforestation study in the Philippines, Kummer also
recommends the conduct of more detailed studies on the complex issue of deforestation:
"The almost complete lack ofrigorous studies of tropical deforestation at the national level or below
seriously hampers our ability to make any general statements regarding tropical deforestation or,
indeed, to conceptualize the process adequately" (Kummer 1992a: 141)
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During my stay in the Philippines between 1989 and 1995, as coördinator of the Cagayan
Valley Programme on Environment and Development (CVPED), I gradually - and more or
less accidentally - discovered the importance that developments in mainstream society had for
people and forests of the Sierra Madre mountain range. In December 1989, when I arrived, the
new administration of Mrs Corazon Aquino had just survived one of the most serious military
coup attempts since the 1986 EDSA Revolution, which ended two decades of authoritarian rule
by the Marcos regime. The timber- extraction and timber-processing industry, despite having
lost its close ties with the office of the President, continued to operate at full speed in Cagayan
Valley. It was only after 1991, when the newly appointed regional executive director of the
Department of the Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in Cagayan Valley forged an
alliance with the Philippine army, that corporate logging went into decline here.
Another significant development in mainstream society was the rapid growth of the
Philippine NGO community, which led to a fundamental reorientation within forest-related
legislation; this generaled international assistance to facilitate a turnaround towards community-
based forest management and the recognition claims to ancestral domains in the uplands. This
coincided with the growing economie importance of the agricultural sector and its affiliated
service businesses. Lowlanders who built up capital in the corporate logging industry responded
to its declining social acceptance by investing in these sectors. By the end of my term, I
witnessed the establishment of new poultry and pig-raising bio-industries in the region,
culminating in the establishment, in 1997, of a large integrated stockfeed and livestock
production facility in Echague, the former tobacco capital of Isabela. Seeing the increasing
number of hybrid maize varieties and chemical fertilizers in the uplands, I realized that a new
phase in the longstanding history of mobilizing forest lands and resources for lowland
development had begun.
While some of the studies mentioned earlier in this chapter do indeed feature links between
deforestation and policy developments or demographic changes in mainstream society, there
is a relative paucity of integral case studies focussing on a specific deforestation case and its
wider political, sociocultural and economie context. Deforestation studies carried out in the
Philippines have thus far focused on national-level policies and economics (Bautista 1990,
1994; Boyce 1993), and national and provincial statistics (Kummer 1992; 1995). In addition,
the analyses of Vitug (1993) and Broad and Cavanagh (1993) offer detailed inside accounts of
the politics involved in the Philippine logging industry and the associated social inequity and
environmental degradation respectively. The latter study is essentially a compilation of local
accounts by Palawan, Bataan and Bukidnon, Mindanao, and others, so that no detailed study
of a local, or regional deforestation case has thus far been conducted in the Philippines.
The Cagayan Valley continues to be a near terra incognita within Philippine studies. With
the exception of the early monographs written by Spanish Friar Julian Malumbres (1918) and
Edilberto de Jesus's standard work on the Spanish Tobacco Monopoly (1980), very little
scientific work has been published on this region, or on the Sierra Madre mountain range.
Therefore, in addition to making a contribution to the general body of knowledge on tropical
deforestation, the present study also aims to lay the groundwork for future research projects
to be conducted in the region. A fourth and final rationale to opt for this particular focus was
its compatibility with my other responsibilities as CVPED coördinator. I will return to this
point in my discussion of the research methodology.
The overall aims of this study are to contribute to a better understanding of the
deforestation problem in the Sierra Madre, and to facilitate the development of more effective
strategies for the protection and sustainable use of natural forests in the Cagayan Valley
Region. The question of whether the findings in the Cagayan Valley case are relevant for the
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explanation and solution of tropical deforestation in other contexts can only be answered
through comparative studies, a task which is beyond the scope of this research. Conversely, it
is possible to see the relevance of certain general theoretical elements, such as those discussed
earlier in this chapter, for the clarification of deforestation in the case of the Sierra Madre.
The theoretical objective of the research is to establish causal links between the use oflands
and natural resources in theforest lands and the socioeconomic andpolitical context oflowland
society in Cagayan Valley. A methodological objective of the research is to experiment with
the use of the 'problem- in-context (De Groot 1992) as the theoretical framework for the
interdisciplinary approach which this theoretical objective demands.
2.3.2 Research questions
The central question that this study aims to answer is:
"What was the influence of the politica! and socioeconomic context of Cagayan Valley
on the activities that were the direct cause of the deforestation of the northern Sierra
Madre in the period 1950-1995?"
To answer this question, the following sub-questions are addressed:
First, on background and problem anafysis
1) What are the factual and normative dimensions of the tropical deforestation problem?
2) What has been Üie rate and pattern of deforestation in the Philippines and the northern
Sierra Madre since 1950?
Then, the actor-oriented chain of explanation, which starts inside theforest:
3) Which activities lead directly to the degradation and clearing of tropical moist forest in
the northern Sierra Madre; who carries out these activities, what motives do they pursue
in doing so, and what options do they have in pursuing these motives?
4) Which actors outside the Sierra Madre exert influence on these activities? What are
their motivations and options?
5) What relevant laws and policies does the Philippine government pursue regarding the
management of forest lands and resources?
6) How do local government officials, both appointed and elected, participate in the
implementation of these laws and policies in Cagayan Valley
Next, in a more system-oriented style of discovering underlying causes:
8) What are the most influential historical origins of the contemporary role of government
officials in forest management?
9) What is the role of changes in population density, access to farmland, and access to
credit in contemporary migration to the Sierra Madre?
Andfinally, a number of future oriented questions:
10) How does the increasing cultivation of commercial crops, such as hybrid corn, on
upland farms in the Sierra Madre relate to the political and economie interests of
government actors, banks and other lowland-based interest groups?
11) What are the implications of the growing importance of commercial farming, in this
socio-economic context, for future forest cover in the Sierra Madre?
The structure of the dissertation reflects the sequence in which the material pertaining to these
questions is treated. The first chapter defined the area and distribution of the world's tropical
forests, approximated the rates at which they have declined in recent times, and identified a
normative framework in the light of which tropical deforestation may be defined as
Problematic. The following chapter (3) zooms in on the extent of the Philippine deforestation
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problem, then introduces the Cagayan Valley Region and presents findings on changes in total
forest cover and the distribution of various forest cover classes in the northern Sierra Madre
between 1950 and 1990. Chapter 4 describes the primary activities directly responsible for
these changes, and analyzes the motives behind these activities and the actors involved.
Chapters 5 and 6 describe relevant government policies with regard to these activities, the
bureaucratie and political context in which these policies are implemented in the region, and
analyze the causes of distortions in policy implementation. The different positions of, on the
one hand, appointed officials in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and,
on the other hand, elected officials representing the groups and individuals whose interests are
potentially affected by forest policy, play a central role in this analysis. Chapter 7 explores the
nistorical origins of the state-facilitated corporate logging industry in the Philippines. The last
two chapters take a closer look at the causes of forest migration and of the increasing
production of cash crops, particularly hybrid corn, in upland farms in the Sierra Madre. The
book concludes with a synthesis of the insights gained in this study.
2.3.3 Approach, methodology and limitations
"....documenting interactions of people...with the tropical forest...and making these
interactions intelligible by showing the situations in which they occur." (Vayda et al .
1980:188)
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
The questions at the heart of this research require a conceptual framework that facilitates an
interdisciplinary approach. To establish factual changes in forest extent and cover, for example,
theory and skills from the disciplines of geography and forestry are essential. Insights into
biology, ecology, hydrology and economics are important if we are to answer questions on the
problematic nature of deforestation. Explanatory research into the human activities causing the
problem draws from theories and methodologies employed in both the social and bio-physical
sciences. Only when these disciplinary questions have been studied as a single cohesive object
of research will it be possible to speak of an interdisciplinary dissertation. The problem-in-
context (De Groot 1992) offers a conceptual framework that will help to defme problem-
relevant monodisciplinary questions and structure them into an interdisciplinary whole. De
Groot defines interdisciplinarity as:
"More than one discipline working on an empirical or normative science problem, at a case-
study or more theoretical level, leading to a result that is significantly more than the sum
of the disciplinary contributions." (ibid:40)
I will confine myself here to a brief explanation of how the Problem-in-Context method
approaches environmental problems and organizes interdisciplinary studies on their nature,
causes, and solutions. This will allow me to introducé the key concepts used in this study. For
a full discussion of Problem-in-Context (PiC), the reader is referred to the original source.
Environmental problems, or disturbances in the relationship between people and the
environment, are social, not individual problems. Hence, the environmental impacts of a
particular human activity are only defmed as environmental problems "once larger social units
(groups of people, orgamzations, institutions) consider these impacts so negative as to quesüon
the desirability of that activity, the intensity or scale at which it is carried out or the technology
employed in if (Udo de Haes 1989:23). Following this definition, the description and analysis
of particular environmental problems require research into both their factual and normative
dimensions. Fig. 2.2 shows how PiC operationalizes this basic definition of environmental
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problems as fact-value contradictions (the flashes in the diagram) into two causal chains: on the
left is the empirical chain of impacts, on the right the normative chain of tolerable or desired
values related to these impacts. Both chains can be constracted in an upward direction, i.e.,
starting from a particular human activity, for example overgrazing, and working towards the
final norms and impacts that defme its problematic nature, for example economie and
biodiversity losses. If conducted the other way around, the analysis starts from a final variable,
e.g., the protection of biodiversity from the impact of global warming. From here, we move
downward towards the intermediary variables of greenhouse gas concentrations and ultimately
to the human activities causing their emission, such as motorcars, forest burning or paddy rice
cultivation. These activities then have a factual side (e.g., actual or predicted rates of burning)
and a normative side (e. g., the allowable rate of burning). The latter is called the environmental
capacity, that is, the capacity of the environment to process or deliver what a particular activity
demands from it.
The normative defmition and analysis of the environmental problem is followed by an
explanation of the social and biophysical causes of each problematic activity. Action-in-
Context, the PiC component for the explanation of the social causes of environmental problems,
begins with the identification of actors involved in this activity. De Groot defines actors as
"social entities are actors with respect to a certain action ifthey exercise a significant decision
making power on that action" (ibid:310). Primary actors carry out the problematic activity
themselves (e.g. the forest migrant), secondary and tertiary actors are those people, groups or
institutions that influence the options and motivations of these primary actors (e. g. the forestry
service).
In the case of the Sierra Madre, where the majority of forest migrants arrived as logging
company employees, the question arises of whether they or their employers are the primary
actors in the deforestation problem. One might argue that these forest-based company workers
did not autonomously decide to enter the forest in order to make a living from timber-cutting,
but rather were sent there by people outside the forest and were in fact on their payroll. On the
other hand, almost from the moment they entered the forest, labourers became forest migrants
with alternative options (upland agriculture, garnering of non-timber forest products) designed
to generate cash income. Traders, an important category of people with regard to the last
subquestions in this study, present a similar challenge to the 'actor' concept. Do traders really
have "significant decision- making power" as regards the products delivered to them by lowland
farmers and forest migrants, or are they merely being compensated for communicating market
prices to producers, in order to meet demand with supply? In that perspective, trader demand
for hybrid corn is the translation of an increased consumer demand for particular products,
e.g., for meat and dairy products. Traders, then, have too little decision-making power to even
be considered actors in the deforestation problem or the underlying processes. A similar
argument could be made for politicians, who are essentially doing what voters elected them to
do, or for field officials paid to implement policies designed by others. In fact, following this
line of reasoning, all actor-oriented approaches in the social sciences could be "abstracted away"
into a systems-oriented, structural approach. Considering the micro-level of this study and the
added insights to be gained from a perspective that recognizes the decision-making capacity of
all parties with personal or institutional stakes in the resources of the Sierra Madre, I will
interpret the actor concept generously. Actor-ranking starts at the cutting site, and goes on until
we reach anonymous groups like the urban consumer, or the world market, in other words,
factors that influence options and motivations in the actors' field.
The clarification of activities in terms of social causes is complemented with a natural
science explanation of the capacity of the environment to support that particular activity: if
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actual timber extraction is higher than the natural sustained yield, what ecological, biological
or other biophysical factors determine this environmental capacity, and can these factors be
manipulated? What are the more structural biophysical characteristics of this area that place
structural constraints on interventions in land use or timber yield (climate, geology)? The
questions in this study do not require extensive research into such ecological questions; this
does not mean that I consider research in these areas as less relevant. My attempt, in Chapter
4, to explore the sustainability of the three activities most directly responsible for deforestation
reveals the paucity of essential ecological data, without which the design of practicable
alternatives to these activities is far from efficiënt.
Thus, this case study entails a fully developed Action-in-Context explanation of tropical
deforestation in the northern Sierra Madre. Causal chains of interacting actors together form
the so-called actors fields (see fig.2.3): these are built up by identifying and describing the
primary activities and actors of relevance for deforestation in the Sierra Madre. To understand
why these actors carry out these activities, their motives are researched, as well as the range
of alternative options by means of which these motives might also be pursued. Questions
pertaining to the reasons why, as we have seen, primary actors choose the problematic activity
in preference to other options lead us to secondary activities and actors. Following this basic
principle of progressive contex.tualiza.uorf (Vayda 1983) actors' fields are built up by
continuing this process through further inquiry into the options and motives of secondary,
tertiary and subsequent actor groups. As relevance leads us farther away from the primary
actors, lists of options and motives become less exhaustive. Each element of the causal chain
may require deeper, probably monodisciplinary, studies to understand its precise influence. For
example, if forest migrants claim they do not make investments in soil and water conservation
because of a lack of tenurial security over the land, the issue of tenure (or of cultural or
economie influences on land use) may require further inquiry.
Structural factors that influence options and motives perceived by the actors themselves,
such as economie inequalities, political context or historica! influences may be researched more
deeply as they are encountered. The same holds true for possible alternative options that we,
as outsiders, may see as relevant for the problematic activity, but which are not yet seen as such
by the actors' themselves. This process of alternating analysis and explanation at the overall
level of the actors field with detailed selective studies of particular elements, steered by
problem relevance, is a major attraction of the Problem-in-Context approach. Instead of trying
to capture deforestation, or the context in which it occurs, within a predefined model or system
with certain socioeconomic, biophysical and other sub-systerns, PiC uses elements of a defore-
station context as they are encountered, provided they can be clearly linked to problematic
activities. To maintain the focus of the contextualization , I construct the actors' fields step by
step, from a first sketch to a more detailed representation of particular relevant details. Time
and resources determine whether one proceeds from a first sketch of the actors field for a
problematic primary activity to a more detailed study that may require inputs from a smaller
number of disciplines.
"Progressive contextualization mvolves a focus on significant numan activities or pe ople-environment interactions
and the explanation of these by placinR them mthin progressively wider or denser contexts" (Vayda 1983:265)
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INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The Cagayan Valley Programme on Environment and Development (CVPED)
Between December 1989 and January 1995,1 resided in Cagayan Valley, as coördinator of the
Cagayan Valley Programme on Environment and Development (CVPED), operated jointly by
Leiden University (RUL) and Isabela State University (ISU), the Philippines. The aims of this
collaboration were to:
- contribute to the growth of environmental science as an interdisciplinary field of research
and education for developing countries
- to contribute to the research and education capabilities of RUL, notably the Programme for
Environment and Development of the Centre of Environmental Science, and the ISU
College of Forestry
- to stimulate and participate in projects contributing to the sustainable development of the
Cagayan Valley region and to the safeguarding of its natural heritage.
Partnership was a leading concept in the management and implementation of the programme.
The organigram gave both parties an equal say in marters of project management at all decision
taking levels, so as to ensure that both partners could see their ambitions reflected in the
activities of the joint programme. Each annual plan of operations had to address the research
and education agendas of both institutions. For CML, the main output from the programme was
measured in terms of the students supervised and the theoretical gains, preferably through
international publications. ISU had a more practical orientation, and here the programme was
seen as a vehicle for its own institutional development and as a means to intervene in the
deforestation process. The ability to create and accept compromises was the key to discovering
compatibilities between the expectations of the two parties with respect to their partnership.
Consequently, neither CML as an institution, nor I as the Dutch coördinator of the programme,
could pursue a straightforward problem-oriented research activity, structured exclusively
according to the Problem-in-Context framework. In the same way, the ISU College of Forestry
could not gear the project fully to its own priorities in forest utilization, sylviculture along a
systems-oriented approach. We decided to focus our research activities on the Sierra Madre,
rather than on the Cagayan Valley Region as a whole, and to take the deforestation of these
mountains as our central environmental problem.
One of the main activities of CVPED was the conduct of joint research projects by teams
of Filipino and Dutch graduate students. At this level, too, research partners had to arrive at
a negotiated middle ground of proposals which had often been bred in contrasting academie
traditions. As the initiative to set up joint research teams often originated in the Netherlands,
the ISU students often still had to be selected and their research proposals developed, while the
Dutch students had already arrived in Cagayan Valley. During the fieldwork, the Dutch
students did not have access to the services of an interpreter, but depended on the willingness
of their counterparts to translate for them. The Filipino students, often several years older and
with some years of experience in government agencies and the private sector, could not always
be persuaded to accompany their Dutch counterparts into the forest for prolonged periods of
time. The Filipino students, in their turn, found it difficult to deal with their often impatient and
straightforward counterparts (Van den Top and Arano 1992; Persoon 1997)
The Joint Agreement for the establishment of the programme was signed only a few months
before my arrival in the Philippines. The first years of my term and that of my fellow
coördinator Dr. Roberto R. Arano, were therefore devoted largely to developing the CVPED
as an organization, establishing interna! management procedures and solving problems
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associated with the cooperation between people of different cultures, disciplines and paradigms.
To establish working relations with line agencies, local government authorities and local NGOs
in the conduct of the research, it was also necessary to communicate our identity to these
partner organizations, both inside and outside the region, and to establish working relations
with them. The Cagayan Valley, and the Sierra Madre in particular, was then still considered
a stronghold of the New People's Army. In order to conduct research work here, extensive
consultations with military and local government authorities were necessary. Both to promote
awareness of the programme and its activities, and to generale feedback from a wider audience
of scientists and policy makers, we organized Work Conferences in 1991 and 1994. Both
conferences had a considerable spin-off in terms of the institutional and development objectives
of the joint programme. The first such conference took place in 1992, when a considerable
portion of the northern Sierra Madre was included in the list of priority sites covered by the
National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS). A fmancial grant from PLAN
International in that same year enabled CVPED to build the first phase of an Environmental
Information Centre for the Cagayan Valley Region. Four years later, the EIC was developed
into a full-fledged training facility, when the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs charged
a consortium of local organizations led by PLAN international to implement a five-year project
to enhance the protection and sustainable use of the Northern Sierra Madre NIP AS site,
comprising some 330,000 ha of dipterocarp, mossy and mangrove forests and coastal
ecosystems along the Pacific shores of the Sierra Madre. In 1997, CVPED and PLAN received
another one million US$ dollars for the USAID project for community-based action and
research in the regeneration of grassland and residual forest areas. The programme
commemorated its tenth anniversary during a third conference, organized together with PLAN,
in September 1998.
Data-gathering, data-processing and write-up
As will be clear from the above, CVPED was not a pure research project, especially during the
initial years of creating its institutional basis and generating wider interest for the conservation
opportunity represented by the Sierra Madre As a result, the research output of the programme
depended largely on the joint student research programme; until October of 1994, the month
after our second Work Conference, my fïeldwork inside the Sierra Madre forest had been
confined to visits to the research locations of the students. My permanent presence in Cabagan
made it possible to personally supervise all fïeldwork of the more than 40 Dutch students and
25 Filipino counterparts who participated in the CVPED joint research between 1990 and 1994.
This also enabled me to develop the research programme in line with my own learning in the
field, and to check whether interesting findings in one location were also encountered in other
areas. During my years as programme coördinator, many of my field visits had to be confined
to a few days, so students often stayed in the field for considerable periods of time. This gave
them an intimate exposure to the activities taking place there. Since the students came from
various scientific disciplines, their participation presented a unique opportunity to build up an
integral case study. Much of my own interdisciplinary interest and background, dating from
my studies in Tropical Land and Water Use and Management at Wageningen Agricultural
University, was nourished by the supervision of MSc students from just such a variety of
disciplines.
I have tried to maintain maximum clarity about the contributions that individual student
researchers have made to the information contained in this book. Wherever data originate from
student reports, this is indicated, so that it is always clear where the balance between my own
findings and those of the students lies. In addition, the methodology used in the individual
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studies can always be retraced in this manner. Through the close cooperation between Filipino
and Dutch students and supervisors, student findings have been closely and repeatedly
examined in the course of our research, during presentations at research seminars in Cabagan
and Leiden, and during the writing of their reports. After the first year of comparing and
analyzing the data and findings presented in the student report, a four-week stay in Cagayan
Valley in 1996 enabled me to re-visit some of the locations where students conducted their
research, to verify their observations and observe the changes that had occurred since their
fieldwork there.
My position, mobility and relatively long stay in the region gave me the time and
opportunity to meet a wide range of secondary and tertiary actors, to discover which of them
could be relied upon, and to build up a long-term relationship of trust with them. While my
stays inside the Sierra Madre remained limited during my term as coördinator, my 'fieldwork'
took place in the offices and homes of policy makers and agency officials in the lowlands,
during meetings of the Regional Development Council, at the birthday celebrations of the
Governor and Congressman, and late-night working sessions with colleagues at the University.
The many perspectives of forest use that I was exposed to in this manner continuously
overthrew earlier hypotheses and added new questions about the people and processes
propelling deforestation. In this manner, the set of questions contained in this study evolved
between 1989 and 1994, as can be seen in the various versions of my research proposal that I
developed during this period. The last three months of 1994 were dedicated almost entirely to
interviews with key informants, fieldwork in the Sierra Madre and the lowlands, and the testing
and execution of a survey on the role of informal credit in upland and lowland farming.
Research assistants completed the survey during the following year, after my return to Leiden.
Between February 1995 and March 1996, I developed a preliminary dissertation outline and
wrote draft versions of the various chapters. A great deal of time was also spent on a literature
study focussing on tropical deforestation and the sub-themes covered by this study, such as the
forest policies and public administrative system of the Philippines, its social history (with
special reference to that of the Cagayan Valley), as well as studies on land reform and informal
credit from other parts of the country. I became a member of a group of PhD students at the
Centre for Asian Studies in Amsterdam (CASA), which proved to be an energetic forum for
the mutual exchange of insights on the various dissertation outlines, draft chapters and papers.
In the course of writing this dissertation, I produced a number of papers for conferences
relevant to my study. These papers, two of which have thus far been published, each reflect the
stage of development that this book was in at the time the papers were written. My paper for
the second Philippine Studies Conference, held from April 13-15 1994 at SOAS in London,
represents a first sketch of the context in which deforestation in the Sierra Madre takes place,
and highlights the problematic interaction between administrative and elected government
officials in the implementation of forest policies (Van den Top 1994). The EUROSEAS
conference, held in Leiden in June 1995, led to an article which may be seen as the first effort
to capture the entire argument which is constructed in this dissertation. This article draws
attention to the interests of lowland actors in gaining access to conunon property resources in
the uplands, and examines the reasons behind the inability of the Philippine state to isolate itself
from these interests (Van den Top 1998). Eight months later, I presented the historical
dimensions of contemporary deforestation during the fifth International Conference of
Philippine Studies in Hawaii. This article, published a year later (van den Top 1997), is the
initial synthesis of Chapters 7 and 8 of this dissertation, but was written before I travelled back
to the Philippines in March 1996 for a final one-month period of fieldwork in Cagayan Valley.
After the Conference, I spent two weeks studying the literature at the Hamilton Library of the
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University of Manoa, Hawaii and several days at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
The following two years, between June 1996 and June 1998, were dedicated to final data
analysis and the write-up of this dissertation.
A few words are now in order regarding the geographical information component of the
present research. My role in the production of the spatial images and tables of deforestation
patterns in the Sierra Madre between 1950 and 1990, lay in the design of the questions to be
answered by the analysis, and in the supervision of GIS students and experts engaged in
processing an idea into the accurate data you will find in the next chapter. The idea behind this
component of my study was to add an extra dimension to the commonly accepted variable of
forest conversion as a deforestation indicator. As I explained in Chapter l, the consequence of
that limited view is that extractive activities are no longer directly associated with deforestation.
In reality, however, the deforestation process is a continuüm that starts with extraction and ends
with the replacement of degraded forests by other land use; in the words of Ewel (1978, quoted
in Kartinawata and Vayda 1984:119) "to say that deforestation resultsfrom the action of the
peasant farmers is analogous to say ing that the vulture which struck the lethal blow killed the
dying hor se".
The students were asked to compare aerial photographs of the Sierra Madre taken between
1949 and 1952 (scale 1:40.000) with a second series made between 1980 and 1981 (scale
1:60.000), and SPOT satellite images produced by the Swedish Space Agency in 1987. The
SPOT data were interpreted on the basis of their printed image, and did not involve the use of
digital analytical methods. Existing land-use maps, topographic maps provided by the National
Mapping and Resource Inventory Authority (NAMRIA, 1:250,000, Nrs 2504,2506, 2508) were
used as reference maps for the interpretation. The 1950-1990 period is well suited to a study
of the influence of forest product extraction on forest cover, as very little forest migration took
place at this time and forest degradation may therefore be attributed almost exclusively to
extractive activities.
The first part of the study covered the Western slopes of the Sierra Madre, and used five
forest quality classes in the interpretation (Clement and Van Dijk 1994). The most important
variable determining the classification was the percentage of forest cover, but the interpretation
also took into account whether this forest cover had been disturbed by road construction,
whether there were signs of erosion, the percentage of forest cover that was recovering from
slash-and-burn farming, and the degree to which natural forest had been replaced by fruit trees
and plantations. The second study, conducted in 1995, opted for a singular classification
method, in which the sole variable was tree crown cover (Roest 1995). Interpretations
pertaining to the Western slopes were now integrated into the interpretations of the Pacific
slopes of the Sierra Madre, producing an overall insight into changes in crown cover during
the period 1950-1990. In late 1997, CML provided a small grant for GIS assistance in the
completion of the analytical work to be done using these basic data. Together with Mr. Paul
Langeveld (Intcompas Inc., Amsterdam), comparative overlays were made of the 1950, 1980
and 1990 maps, after these had been resampled into new vector files, based on UTM
geographic references. At this point, we had three vector maps with 14 classes of vegetation
cover, including mossy forest, mangroves, and several cover percentages of dipterocarp forest.
These maps were rastered into l ha grid cells, and reclassed into the 6 types of vegetation cover
shown in the legends. Forest cover change maps were then made by comparing the values for
all grid cells between 1950, 1980 and 1990, resulting in the deforestation maps presented in
Chapter 3. The only areas that have been compared are those analyzed in all three years; these
represent 750,000 of the approximately one million hectares of forest still found in the Sierra
Madre in 1990. Changes in forest crown cover were specified by forest cover class, providing
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an accurate spatial image of how much forest was lost and how much was degraded to lower
forest cover classes during the period studied. Other map themes, such as the road map and the
location of timber concessions were also digitized, offering preliminary possibilities to link
changes in forest cover to the construction of logging roads, and the management of specifïc
concession. More information on the resulting maps and images is provided in Chapter 3
(section 3.4).
Limitations and relevance of this study
The main limitation of this research probably lies in its breadth, both spatially and thematically.
In essence, it entails a case study on a regional scale that aims to develop an overall insight into
how deforestation in the Sierra Madre is related to the wider context of socioeconomic and
political change in lowland society. As for the spatial dimensions, the Cagayan Valley Region
is an area approximately the size of the Netherlands, with a wide variety of ecological, social
and political landscapes. My observations and interpretations pertaining to the area as a whole
are therefore not exhaustive and are no doubt biased towards the situation in Isabela province,
where the CVPED programme is based. For logistical reasons, the distribution of student
studies over the region has likewise been to some extent biased towards this province.
Moreover, my closest contacts with many of the lowland-based actors described in this book
also developed in the province and town where I lived. Nevertheless, I am confident that the
processes described in this research are fairly typical of the Cagayan valley region as a whole.
Moreover, Isabela represents the greater part of the forests contained in the Sierra Madre, as
well as nearly half of the region's inhabitants, and may be considered the economie and
political centre of Cagayan Valley. The administrative capitol of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where
all the regional offices of central government line agencies are located, is only 35 kilometres
from the town of Cabagan, where CVPED is based. Often this made it possible to relate
developments in Isabela to those in Cagayan and the other provinces of Region 02.
The challenge to maintain an interdisciplinary perspective in this case study made it
necessary to gain an understanding of issues to which I had had only a limited exposure before
this study. My training in Tropical Land and Water Use and Management at the Wageningen
Agricultural University helped me to deal with the agronomy of upland farming and carabao
logging. However, as I tried to answer questions related to fields such as historiography,
development administration and economics, I was forced to maintain a descriptive emphasis and
limit my own theory-building to the application of theories developed by others, applying them
to this particular case. As a whole, however, the study maintains a fairly straightforward social
science focus, with an emphasis on the qualitative socioeconomic, historica! and political causes
of deforestation. Less attention is paid to the bio-physical and spatial aspects. Where possible
I try to substantiate important qualitative insights with quantitative data.
The overall aim of this research was to contribute to our understanding of the tropical
deforestation problem by developing a detailed regional-level study, which focuses on the role
of non-forest society on developments in the forest lands. Some of the elements of the
comprehensive perspective that such a study produces require further research. One such
element is the access to, and management of, informal credit in relation to the livelihood
strategies of poor rural households. In Chapters 8 and 9, I present a preliminary thesis on the
role of this element in forest migration and the production of cash crops in upland farms.
However, the quantitative evidence underlying this thesis calls for in-depth follow-up studies
to confirm, modify or reject my analysis. Other areas where more research is necessary concern
the role of field officials in the implementation of government policy; while my conclusions
regarding 'accommodated access' in Chapter 6 appear to be supported by the findings of
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Bloemink (1990), Buizer (1993), Hoekstra (1992), Huigen (1997), Noordhuizen (1996) and
Van der Werf (1993) in Cagayan Valley, they are crucial enough to the policy process to
deserve further verification. And finally, my historical chapters may also be seen as a first
effort to establish an overall image of the environmental history of Cagayan Valley. A larger
investment of time and energy is required in the area of local history, through archival work
and direct interviews with old people, priests and scholars in the region, in order to verify my
interpretation of the influence of historical legacies in contemporary resource use in the
Cagayan Valley Region. In fact, one contribution that a study like mis can probably make to
science, outside of integrative environmental science theory, is the discovery of relevant new
topics for further study.
Another limitation was the result of my partial reliance on data collected by MSc students
participating in the CVPED programme. Because the Sierra Madre fieldwork was part of the
training process of these students, the data collected vary considerably in quality and
completeness. At the same time, it must be noted that the more than sixty Dutch and Filipino
students whom I supervised durmg my time in Cabagan produced a substantial database, which
made it possible to be selective in my choice of material to be used in this study. The joint set-
up and the teamwork necessitated by the student research may have taken its toll, in that it
required time and energy to build interdisciplinary and intercultural bridges. But it also created
an environment of discussion and mutual feedback on methodology, data and results, positively
influencing the quality of the fieldwork and student reports.
A final limitation of this study is its lack of comparative context, against which the broader
relevance of its findings could have been assessed for other areas in the Philippines or other
tropical forest countries. The Cagayan Valley, with so much of its original forest cover still in
place, its low average population density, the strong presence of the New People's Army until
1995, and perhaps the influence of the CVPED programme itself on developments in the area,
is of course only one of the many types of regional settings in which tropical deforestation takes
place. This study does not provide comparative insight into the deforestation process
worldwide. Rather, by focussing exclusively on the Cagayan Valley, I hope to provide the
scientific community with a thorough case study, in which more general theoretical elements
on the causes of the global deforestation problem, some of which were briefly discussed in this
Chapter, are placed in one particular context, for the benefit of other, comparative studies. And
last, but not least, this study may contribute insight and inspiration for the benefit of those
directly engaged in activities aimed at securing a stable future for the magnificent forests - and
people - of the Sierra Madre.
Map 3.1 Philippines, geographic location
K P H I L I P P I N E S
Chapter 3
Meeting the Sierra Madre deforestation problem
3.1 Travelling North
On a rainy day likc this, OUT overlaad trip from Marula to Cabagan will take even more than the usual
twelve hours. We will probably be slowed down in the Dalton pass, the narrow passage that separates
Cagayan Valley from the National Capitol Region. After passing San José, Nueva Ecija, we come around
the fiïst bend heading up into the mountains. Soil from the adjacent slopes covers the concrete roadway.
In tracks where the concrete has not yet been covered by mud we can see how heavily cracked the road
is, especially on the opposite side. Robert explams that this is because trucks are fully loaded on their way
to Manila, bringing grain, logs and lumber from Cagayan Valley to the capitol, returning empty to the
unpopulated and poor northern provinces. In the bends in the road, the embankment is being slowly eaten
away by the silt-loaded water of the river. Reconstruction works go on continuously to re-route the road,
repair bridges and resurface the largest cracks. One of the signboards saying "Caution: road under repair"
keeps us waiting for hours, as the single lane that is still to be concreted, and over which traffic in both
directions now has to pass, is blocked by a sixteen-wheel truck. In trying to take a sharp bend, the rear
wheels of its trailer have caused the collapse of the soaked slope. Part of the top layer of cargo carried
by the truck, bags of rice, has slid from the trailer, revealmg the second commodity that was hidden
underneath: reddish brown lumber. Below, mud slowly creeps down from denuded slopes, covering parts
of the imgated terraces lying near the nver. Robert jokingly asks me "do you take sugar in your cqffee?",
for that is what the river belpw reminds us of as its brown waters rush J>y^
3.1.1. Philippines, facts andfigures1
• The Republic of the Philippines is an archipelago consisting of more than 7,100 islands,
with a total land area of 300,000 km2; 92% of this land area is contained in the 11 largest
islands. The northernmost 'Batanes' island group lies approximately 240 km south of
Taiwan, while the southern most 'Tawi Tawi' group lies only 24 km from Borneo (See map
3.1). With its 141,395 km2, the Luzon island group is the largest of the Philippines -
roughly the size of England - followed by Mindanao with 101,999 km2 and the Visayas
(Samar, Negros, Panay, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol and Masbate), Palawan and Panay together
comprising 56,606 million hectares. At 34,600 kilometres, the Philippine coastline is the
word's longest, exceeding those of Greece and the United States together.
• The climate is generally hot and humid, but with strong spatial and temporal variations;
Northeastern Luzon has two climate types: type 3, with a short dry season between
November and May and type 4, with an even distribution of rainfall through the year.
Rainfall is brought by two main monsoons, the Northeast monsoon, which brings in cool
winds from the Asian mainland during winter, and the southeast monsoon which brings
warm, humid air and heavy rainfall between June and September. In 90% of the country,
at least 1780 mm of rain falls annually. Temperature ranges between 20 and 35°C, with an
average of 33°C
• The country lies within the 'Pacific Rim of Fire', a belt where 80% of the world's active
volcanos are found and a considerable share of all earthquakes take place; it is situated on
the Philippine fault and near the Northwestern Pacific, where many typhoons originate. Not
surprisingly, the Philippines is more frequently hit by natural disasters than any other
Sources: Bankoff nd; NSO 1995: PNA 1996-7; Van der Veen 1997
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country. Between 1900 and 1991, more than VOO na ai ra l disasters (typhoons, earthquakes,
volcanic eruptions, droughts, floods and landslides were recorded here (Bengco 1993, cited
in Bankoff nd:6). Every year, some 20 typhoons pass the archipelago, especially the
northern parts of the country (between 11 and 13° N). Mindanao and the Visayas, where
the largest corporate agricultural plantations are, were also hit in 1991 and 1995. In July
1990, the Philippines experienced its heaviest earthquake this century, the two shocks
registering 7.7 and 8 on the Richter scale. A year later, it was hit by the world's largest
volcanic event to take place this century, with the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Other recent
volcanic eruptions were those of Mt. Taal (in 1965) and Mt. Mayon (1984).
Formally, the Philippines gained independence from the United States on July 4, 1946.
However, the official date for Independence Day is June 12, 1898, when General Emilio
Aguinaldo signed the official manifesto declaring the first Philippine Republic, and
agreeing to its temporary administration by the United States (Constantino 1991).
Between 1990 and 1997, the Philippine population grew by approximately 2% per annum -
down from 2.5% in the 1980s and 3% in the first decades after independence - reaching
70.6 million in 1997. In that same year the average population density rose to 253
persons/km2. The fertility rate is 3.7, life expectancy 66 (male) and 70 (female). The
literacy rate (1990) is 93.5%. Urbanization rose from 32% in 1970 to 37% (1980) and
43% (1990). In 1996, 56% of the Philippine population resided in urban areas (PNA
12/6/97)
The country has a 24-member Senate and a 199-member Congress with representatives
from its 15 administrative regions and 76 provinces. The local autonomy of the political
subdivisions (provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays), as well as their entitlement
to an equitable share of the proceeds from the utilization and development of national
wealth are recognized by the 1986 constitution, and operationalized by the 1991 Local
Government Code. The Cordillera and Muslim Mindanao regions enjoy administrative
autonomy within the Philippine nation-state.
Gross National Product in 1992, at current prices, was 1,374,588 million Pesos, or US$
55 billion. In 1992 sectoral contributions were as follows: services 45%, Industry 33%,
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ADB 1988:80
* includes an estimated 25,000 km2 of inhabited upland areas (grasslands and brushlands) classified as A&D (sec
"Includes quames. riverbeds, built-up areas, lakes and marshy land. coral rcefs, silted latcs etc.
agriculture, forestry and fisheries 22%. Per capita income in 1992 was 21,329 pesos, or
approximately US$ 850 at 1992 prices and exchange rate. The income distribution pattern
of the Philippines ranks among the most inequitable in the world; between 1956 and 1985,
the richest 20% of the population consistently earned more than half of the country's total
income, compared to 3% for the poorest 20% (Boyce 1993).
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TaWe 3.2 Distribution of croplands (Philippines) (Source NSO 1995)
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.... As our trip finally continues, we pass people sitting under makeshift roofs and in small houses
alongside the Highway, smiling and waving at us. They do not seem to be the least worried about the
safety of their shelters, built precariously close to the edge of the rushing river. On the opposite side of
the road we see their newly opened piece of land. It has not yet eroded; the cabbages and com look green
and healthy on the dark soil. Thin wooden poles for the construction of houses are for sale here, as well
as bundies of firewood, charcoal, orchids and other products collected from the remaining patches of
forest around us. We need to drive extra carefully in places where people have settled along the road;
their children are as playful as they are numerous; a httle boy sits on top of his small, wooden imitation
of a logging truck; three teenagers ride a cart which is tied to a smoke-belching truck slowly creeping
uphilj. The free ride is not just a lot of fun: the cart carries three drums of water...
3.1.2 Profile of the Cagayan Valley Region2
The five provinces of Nueva Viscaya, Quirino, Isabela, Cagayan and Batanes, an island group
located 600 kilometres North of Aparri (halfway between Taiwan and the Northeastern tip of
Luzon), together comprise the Cagayan Valley, or Region 2. The Cagayan, at 353 kilometres
the Philippines' longest river, runs in a northern direction (see map 3.2). lts 27,000 km2
watershed is bordered by the ridges of the Caraballo, Cordillera and Sierra Madre mountains,
the natural southern, eastern and western boundaries of the Cagayan Valley Region. In the
North, where the river discharges into the Babuyan Channel, its mouth is 2 kilometres wide
during the dry season. lts maximum discharge in the past two decades was approximately
14,500 m3/s. (by comparison: the maximum recorded discharge of the river Rhine between
1976 and 1991 was 10,000 mVs. All its major tributaries, except for the Ilaguen river, enter
the Cagayan from the west.
The valley's monsoonal climate has a dry season from January to June, and a wet season
during the Southwest monsoon, from June to September. Due to orographic rains, the lowlands
receive considerably less precipitation than the surrounding mountain areas. The Pacific slopes
of the Sierra Madre receive around 2,500 mm per year, its peaks doublé that amount, while
annual rainfall in the lowlands averages 1,600 mm. Much of this volume falls during the
typhoons that regularly pass the region during the rainy season, with wind speeds of 70 to 230
km/h. The mean annual temperature is 26.6°C, ranging from 32.6 °C in May to 22.2°C in
January. During the winter months of December and January, prevailing winds from the
northwest bring in cool air from the Asian mainland, occasionally causing day temperatures
to fall below 20°C. The relative humidity is 70-90%.
Looking eastward from the Cagayan river, the Valley's characteristic sequence of land-use
types becomes visible. First, the region's oldest farmlands situated in the floodplains: fertile,
alluvial deposits permanently cropped with rice, corn and some smaller crops, including
Sources: CVPED 1992. NEDA 1991, Maus and Schieferli 1989. Oosterberg 1997
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peanuts and tobacco. Then, the rolling plain and plateau areas, level to gently sloping dryland
farms and grasslands bordering the lower slopes of the surrounding mountain formations: the
hill lands have a more pronounced undulation, including rugged cuestas. Forest patches, shrubs
and grasslands dominate here, with some wet-rice farming in mini valleys with alluvial
deposits. And finally, the forested mountain lands of the Sierra Madre, rising to 1500 metres,
exceeded by only a few peaks, such as the 1852-metre Mt. Anacuao. The western slopes of the
Sierra Madre mountains are more gentle than those on the Pacific side; overall, 40% of the
region's lands have a slope steeper than 30%.
Table 3.3 Cagayan Valley land use (1988, hectares)
(Source: NEP A 1991)
Total land area, Region 2 2,684,062








- Built-up areas 44,606









_ National parks 8.258
corrected tor mcon.sistencie.s in onginal data
Military, civil reservations. wilderness areas
As we pull over to have lunch in Santa Fe, I count the sixtieth truck loaded with lumber that we have
encountered on our way up north since early this morning. A ply wood "Notice of Particulars" anached
to one of the logs says that the truck carries 35 cubic metres of Red Lauan, or Philippine Red Mahogany
and that the shipment's origin is the UTLI concession m Sta Ana, Cagayan. Belching clouds of black
smoke, the old truck struggles uphill through these bare mountains. carrying its precious load towards
Manila....Going north, we pass the grasslands of Nueva Viscaya. The paths that the cows always follow
give the viewer the impression that the people of this province neatly comb the grass on the hills every
day. Fire has blackened some of these grasslands, while on others, fresh young grasses have begun to
sprout after the fire. As we reach the boundary of Isabela Province, the road is temporarüy surrounded
by a dense tree-like vegetation. The signboard at the side of the road says that this is a Reforestation
Project of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. I ask the driver to stop the vehicle.
Looking through the first rows of Ipil Ipil trees, I can see three elderly people working hard in the sun,
clearing die slopes of their last vegetation. Small piles of leaves and branches are burmng here and there.
Two huts with roofs made of grass have been built inside this part of the Reforestation area. Some of
the people see that we are watchmg them and wave at us, smiling...
THE CACAYANOS
Considering its 2.7 million hectares (roughly 70% the size of the Netherlands), Cagayan Valley
has a small population of only 2,536,035 persons (1996). With an average population density
of 94 persons/km2, Cagayan Valley is the Philippines' second most sparsely populated region,
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after the neighbouring Cordillera Autonomous Region. The population is distributed over the
various pro vinces of the region as indicated below:





























































































The population is unevenly distributed over the total land area of the Region: 82% of the
population live in the provinces of Cagayan and Isabela, most of them in the lowland towns
and barrios near the Maharlika Highway, along the banks of the Cagayan river. This,
combined with the region's low urbanization rate of 25%, means that the scarcity of land is
greater than the average population densities in table 3.4 would suggest. Essentially, the
Cagayan Vailey is divided into an intensively used and quite densely inhabited 20-kilometre
strip along the river, surrounded by a much larger, scarcely populated, area of grasslands,
brushlands, and forests stretching to the Cordillera mountains in the west and to the region's
Pacific shores in the east. The coastal towns of Palanan, Maconakon, Divilacan and Dinapique
recorded a population of 23,274 during the 1990 census, approximately 1% of the region's
total population.
Overall population growth declined to 1.5% between 1990 and 1996, but marked spatial
variation occurs here as well: the population of the isolated Batanes islands declined by 1.09%
per year between 1990 and 1996, while that of the largely forested province of Quirino, carved
out of Nueva Viscaya in 1971, grew most rapidly - by 2.53% per year - during the same
period. Quirino is the 'frontier province' of Cagayan Vailey; still heavily forested and only a
short distance from the province of Ifugao, in the Cordilleras; the province experiences
increasing in-migration by land-seekers from that area. The fact that the majority of the
region's population speaks Ilokano points to a history of immigration of the area as a whole.
While not all Ilokano-speaking Cagayanos can still call themselves GI's ("Genuine Ilokanos",
full-blood Ilokanos born in the Ilokos provinces), Itawi, Ibanag and other indigenous groups
have clearly become cultural minorities in their own homeland. The same can be said of
nomadic Negrito groups living in the Sierra Madre mountains, too small in number and too
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difficult to reach to be included in the census. The migration history of the region is discussed
in more detail in Chapter 8, in relation to contemporary migration into the Sierra Madre.
1 ...Moving on, the Sierra Madre mountams come into view; blue-green, a sharp ridge towering over
rolling pastures and the endless cornfields in the floodplain of the Cagayan River, which meanders its
way north, and is closely followed by the concrete road that we are on. Every time we cross a bridge
over the river or one of its tributaries, we see riverbeds filled with gravel and sand. Signboards saying!
"Road under repair" show that the river has still not settled on its current course. There are bulldozers
near the river, loading gravel into the yellow trucks of the Provincial Government....Inhabitants of a
small settlement along the road hold up fish, birds, chicken, mushrooms and a whole range of other
"edible" products, hoping to sell one or two to the travellers driving by. We stop the vehicle when we
see someone offering a large monitor lizard. The powerful anitnal is tied to the branch of a tree, dangling
upside down and looking perfectly helpless; we settle for a price of 200 pesos. When we unwind the
ropes around the ammal's legs and beak it suddenly jumps back to life and violently regains the freedom
we wanted to give it. Robert jokes that the people will be happy because they can catch it again,
tomprrow and still eat it, even though they 'ye ajready spld it!...
THE FORESTS OF THE NORTHERN SIERRA MADRE
The Sierra Madre mountain range is 1,200 kilometres long, stretching from the northeastern
tip of Luzon to the province of Laguna in Southern Tagalog, crossing several provincial and
regional boundaries. The Northern Sierra Madre is the part of this elongated mountain range
that lies within the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Nueva Viscaya, Quirino,
Isabela and Cagayan. Dipterocarp tropical moist forests are still the dominant vegetation in this
part of the Sierra Madre. Dipterocarpaceae are tall, slow-growing tree species that flower only
once every five to seven years. Their seeds have only a brief germination period, and because
of their relatively heavy weight do not fall more than 50 metres from the mother tree (Jakobs
1981). Around 50 species of Dipterocarpaceae are found in the Philippines. In climax-form,
these mixed lowland tropical rainforests have a top canopy which reaches a height of 30 to 50
metres, plus two more storeys of trees underneath. Under these three storeys, bush-like
vegetation, rattans, lianas and the wide buttresses of the trees dominate. Minor openings such
as those caused by lightning recover naturally, as dipterocarp seedlings will develop under
moderate light conditions. Larger openings give a comparative advantage to secondary species,
that grow faster in un-shaded conditions. Thus opening up too large an area in a dipterocarp
forest causes a shift in species composition, away from the original commercial species and
towards the secondary species.
Until 1996, the eastern slopes of the Sierra Madre could not be reached from the valley side
by road transport3. The absence of a lateral road across the mountains leaves travellers from
the coastal areas with only two options: one is a time-consuming and risky boat-trip via the
northern town of San Vicente, Cagayan, or via Baler, Aurora, in the South. The other option -
a faster but more expensive alternative - is to travel with the sole airline company that plies
irregularly between the airport of Cauayan and the Palanan airstrip. Taking the six-seater plane
to the Pacific side, one is treated to magnificent views of the Sierra Madre forest. During the
first twenty minutes, as the plane slowly gains altitude, the wide belt of grasslands between the
green paddies and the forest lands is visible. Reaching the lower elevations of the western
slopes, a patchwork of clearings and pockets of residual forest comes into view, criss-crossed
During my most recent visit to the region m January 1998. I was informed that in 1996 the Isabela provincial
government had funded the openmg-up of a seven-kilometre stretch of forest that used to separate logging roads between
the towns of San Guillermo and Dmapique. on the Pacific coast My mformants could not lell me whether this first lateral
road was already hemg used for public or commercial transport
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with logging roads that reach all the way to the highest ridges. Moving farther eastward, the
vegetation changes into medium-cover forest that bears traces of landslides and surface erosion
in places where logging roads were cut. Beyond the top ridge, an uninterrupted sea of green
present itself, rolling down towards the blue Pacific and its sandy shore. Within the contiguous
forest tract on the eastern slopes and parts of the western slopes of the Sierra Madre, the
following forest types can be distinguished (Danielsen et al. 1994: Ridsdale 1991)
1) In the southern part there are beach forests whose species have adapted to sandy or rocky
soil, and are similar to those in other beach forests in the Philippines, such as Casuarina
eguisetfolia, Terminalia caiappa, Barringtonia asiatica, Casealpina nuga, Erythrina
variegata and Crinum asiaticum (IPAS 1992, cited in Danielsen et al. 1994)
2) Mangrove vegetation is found at Bicobian and port Dimalansan, near Maconacon, as well
as in smaller pockets near inlets and river mouths, including the mouth of the Palanan river.
Aerial photograph interpretations identified only l ,000 ha of mangroves on the Pacific
shores of the northern Sierra Madre in 1990, compared to 2,300 ha in 1950.
3) Two types of 'bonzai' forest are located in a north-south coastal strip between Dinapique
and Maconacon:
3") Limestone forest: these occur on limestone outcrops and contain many endemic
species, often stunted, semi-deciduous and adjusted to the nutrient-poor soil conditions
where they occur. The area south of Palanan is believed to be the largest intact area in
Northern Luzon of this forest type, the flora of which is only just becoming established
in the Philippines.
3b) Other than their stunted, less dense appearance, and the fact that they have adapted to
the high metal content and low fertility of the ultrabasic rocks on which they occur,
very little is known about the ultrabasic forests of the Sierra Madre, or the Philippines
for that matter. Indicator species from comparable sites in Palawan and Zambales have
not been seen in the forests here, while the presence of the palm Heterospate brevicaulis
and some rare Rubiaceae indicate that this area may well contain new species.
4) Lowland evergreen forests occur from the lower elevations up to 750-1000 metres,
dominated by dipterocarp species such as Red Lauan (Hopea negrosensis), Tangile (Shorea
potysperma) Mayapis (Shorea squamata) and Palosapis (Anisoptera thurifera). By far the
largest area of intact old-growth and high-cover secondary stand is found on the Pacific
slopes; those on the western side have all been repeatedly logged and partially cleared, with
the exception of some minor pockets on inaccessible ridges (see also 3.4).
5) Lower montane and mossy forests are found above 750-1000 metres; in montane forests,
trees are shorter than in the lowland evergreen vegetation, but species like almaciga
(Agathisphilippinensis) can still reach heights of 30 metres or more. Other common species
are Lithocarpus sp., Rhododendron sp., Schefflera sp. and Vaccinium sp. Trees are shorter
on the exposed Pacific side, and often covered with mosses and epiphytic ferns, due to the
generally moist and cool conditions here.
Very little botanical and faunal inventory work has been carried out in the Sierra Madre to date.
In 1990 and 1991 an exploratory biodiversity survey was carried out here by a consortium of
local and international organizations, including the Philippine Department for Environment and
Natural Resources, the Danish Ornithological Society, Leiden University Rijksherbarium, the
Arnold Arboretum of Harvard University, the University of the Philippines, Conservation
International, Birdlife International, CVPED and several other organizations. This survey
produced a preliminary estimate that the area is likely to contain at least 60% of the
Philippines' overall biodiversity and a number of new plant species (Cl 1991).
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Table 3.5 DENR forest-data on Cagayan Valley (Source: DENR, 1991)
Total forest lands 1,723,759*




Parks & military reservations 120,461
Grassland/brushland 525,198
* NEDA (1991) uses a considerably higher figure (see table 3.3)
The data presented in table 3.5 were used for the preparation of the Regional Master Plan for
Forestry Development, by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in 1991, and
are based on an international cooperation project between the German and Philippine
governments, the RP-German forest inventory. Between 1983 and 1988, this project carried
out extensive nationwide ground surveys and used photogrammetry and satellite imagery to
produce new forest maps for the Philippines as a whole, as well as a compilation of forest
statistics by Region and province (FRI 1988). The most recent national survey, based on aerial
photograph interpretations, by the USAID-funded Natural Resources Management Project ,
corresponds rather well with these data, setting the total forest area of Cagayan Valley at
996,000 hectares; however, only 257,850 hectares was classified as old-growth dipterocarp
forest. The results of aerial photograph and SPOT-satellite interpretations carried out within
the framework of this research are presented in section 3.4.
The Northern Sierra Madre is one of the ten priority sites under the National Integrated
Protected Areas System (NIPAS), legislated by the Philippine government in 1992. In 1996,
the Netherlands Government granted 5.7 million dollar to a local consortium of governmental
and non-governmental organizations for a five-year project which included detailed ground
surveys of the area and surroundings of what was formerly known as the Palanan Wilderness.
This area, defined by a 45-kilometre radius from the town of Palanan, Isabela, was declared
a protected area by Presidential Decree in 1979. On the basis of the new ecological boundaries
established by the project, a management plan will be prepared for the sustainable use and
protection of the more than 330,000 ha of forest lands, mangroves and coral reefs in the
Northern Sierra Madre Nature Park.
Our trip is delayed in Cagayan Valley's lone city of Santiago. The Maharlika highway, originally built
as a by-pass road around the old town centre, now finds itself again passing through a bustling, congested
commercial centre. However, busmesses have moved away from the old town centre to the road, where
potential customers pass by or stop over on their way to other destmations. On both sides of the road we
see eateries, service centres for cars, chainsaws and other engines. Near the public market, which local
government officials decided to moved from the old town to the highway, at least 30 buses of varying age
and size occupy the shoulder and nght lane of the road, surrounded by young men calling people to join
their trips to Aparri, Tuguegarao, Manila and a host of other destmations. The single most important
reason for our slow passage through Santiago are its thousands of tricycles. With an admirable
combmation of skill and guts, drivers manoeuver their unit through a throng of vehicles resembling tin
cans, which are packed with passengers and merchandise. The spectacle of this sea of moving vegetables,
bags of rice, pigs, and dogs, with paws strapped baclcwards on their backs, not only offers passers-by an
unexpected crash course in Philippine ingenuity, but also a practical example of the "Eat my Dust" device
ipainted on one of the sidecars in bright, happy colours. The air is heavy with the noise, heat, smoke and
dust of this bustling urhan centre... l
REGIONAL ECONOMY
Cagayan Valley is one of the Philippines' poorest regions. In 1988, the Gross Regional
Domestic Product stood at 2.4 billion pesos, resulting in an annual per capita income of less
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than 1,000 Pesos (at 1972 prices). Agriculture, forestry and fisheries contribute more than half
ofGRDP(table3.6).
Table 3.6 Cagayan Valley regional economy:






















The agricultural sector itself relies almost entirely on two crops, rice and corn, to which 94%
of its farmlands are devoted. Only 6% of the Region's farmlands produce the so-called high-
value crops (NEDA, 1991), such as fruit trees, vegetables, nuts or ube (yam, used in ice-cream
production). In spite of harbouring more than half a million hectares of grasslands, Cagayan
Valley continues to be an importer of meat and other basic food items like eggs, vegetables and
fish. Only 23% of the region's fish consumption is produced locally (NEDA 1991).
The National Economie Development Authority points to the region's physical
characteristics - surrounded by major mountain formations - and its smal l. poorly maintained
road network as a key cause of the economie stagnation. Until 1995, the two-lane Maharlika,
or Japan-Philippines Friendship highway was the only paved road connection between the
northernmost towns of Aparri and Manila. This route includes the 50-kilometre Dalton Pass
between San José, Nueva Ecija and Sta Fe, Nueva Viscaya. Until the early 1990s the region
was cast back into isolation dunng many a rainy season, as landslides, collapsing road sections
and bridges, and the ensuing repair works rendered Dalton point impassable for several weeks
on end. Since then, however, the road situation has improved considerably, thanks to the
complete rehabilitation of the Dalton Pass, the Northern Maharlika and the road connecting
Cagayan to the boundary of Ilokos Norte. Until recently (see note 3) there was no possibility
for land transportation between the valley side and the Pacific coast, in the absence of a lateral
road across the Sierra Madre.
The insignificance of the industrial sector in Cagayan Valley is also related to the region's
role as a granary of the National Capitol Region, where commercial grains are shipped out to
feed the population (which derives 40% of its rice from Cagayan Valley), and the livestock are
kept in large- scale bio-industries in central Luzon and southern Tagalog. Since the mid-1990s,
however, small-scale bio-industries, mostly broiler farms and piggeries, are also sprouting in
the region. The Jaka group of companies established a major agro-industrial plant in Echague,
Isabela, modelled on the large integrators in Bulacan and Laguna, where fertilizer, stockfeeds
and livestock are produced in one facility. In addition to these industrial investments, there is
another sign that the Regional economy may be picking up momentum: the regional economy
grew by 8.1% per year from 1993 to 1997, outpacing the national economie growth rate of
6.7% in the same period (PNA 19/4/97).
The extent and quality of the region's mineral reserves have not yet been adequately explored,
but the presence of significant volumes of extractable cement, copper, and other precious
metals has been established by the Philippine Bureau of Mines. Until the mid 1990s, mining
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activities in the region were confined to the small-scale extraction of guano from caves in the
Sierra Madre and sand and gravel from the Cagayan river and its tributaries. The government's
current policy aimed at stimulating foreign investments in the development of mining
concessions throughout the Philippines will boost the mineral industry in the decade to come.
Two major hydroelectric dams (Magat and the Ilaguen dam currently under construction east
of San Mariano, inside the Sierra Madre) provide an adequate supply of electricity, although
the distribution infrastructure continues to be affected by the regular occurrence of typhoons.
Other conditions likely to facilitate economie expansion in the years to come are the recent
improvements in the local peace-and-order situation - Cagayan Valley has always been
perceived as a stronghold of the New People's Army - as well as the improving road and
energy infrastructure. and a host of development initiatives by local governments. The Isabela
provincial government, for instance, is trying to attract foreign capital for the establishment of
an Industrial and Tourism Estate in Bicobian Bay, on the Pacific side of the Sierra Madre.
Cagayan has starled the development of a Free Economie Zone, styled after the special
investment zone in Subic bay, near Port Irene on the northern shores of Cagayan.
...Evening falls within an hour. As we are travelling further up North, the sun colours the landscape in
shades of pink, purple and orange, carabaos placidly carry their owners back home after a day's hard work
in the fields. I am surprised to see a huge concrete building nsing up behind a lake; it is built along the
highway, away from population centres in the middle of the vast denuded hills. Large brass characters on
the impressive front of the building form the words Pamahalaang Panlalawigan ng Isabela4. l ask the
driver what these words mean. He smiles and says: "you ask our Governor. Some call him the King oj\
Cagayan Valley, because He controls the Solid North vote. A man who can deliver 2.5 million votes is weli'
taken care ofby the President..." |
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Each of the five provinces of Cagayan, including the Batanes islands, which have a population
of only 14,000 (less than the small fishing town of Sta Ana), are administered by a governor
and the provincial offices of the 18 different line agencies. These agencies, such as the
Departments of Public Works and Highways, Agriculture, Public Works and Environment &
Natural Resources, used to be the main instruments of state government at the local level. Since
the enactment in 1991 of the Local Government Code, central government power, authority,
responsibilities and resources have been devolved to lower-level state institutions, i.e., the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, or villages. Elected governors, mayors and
barangay captains are supported by elected councils. The line agencies generally have regional,
provincial, municipal, district or, in the case of the DENR, community offices that may cover
several municipalities. The regional directors are presidential appointees, while those under
them are - at least formally - career officials.
The Philippines has a system of politica! representation by district; the boundaries of these
electoral districts, which are administered by the powerful Department of Interior and Local
Government, do not necessarily coincide with those employed by the other line agencies. Until
the 1995 elections, Isabela sent four members to the House of Representatives, Cagayan three
(in the 1998 elections each gained one more seat, when the towns of Santiago and Tuguegarao
voted in favour of city status), while the other three provinces have one each. The 1987
constitution prevents elected officials from serving more than three consecutive 3-year terms
(not counting the 1986 elections). The structure of the Philippine government is examined in
Office (capitol) of the Provmce of Isabela
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more detail in Chaptcrs Five, Six and Seven. which descrihe the forestry laws and policics it pursues,
and analyze how these politics were implemented in the Cagayan Valley region during the study period.
3.2 The Philippines: from timber exporter to timber importer
The Philippines is the first major log-producing country in Asia whose natural ibrest resources have
reached the point of near-depletion. In the carly 195()s, the Philippines was Southeasl Asia's largest
timber exporter, joinedby Malaysia a few ycars later and bylndonesiaaround 1965 (Laarman 1988:
155). Recorded national log exports peaked at an al- time high of 8.7 million cubic metres in 1969,
generating foreign exchange earrungs of over 3(X) million US dollars. In the same year, logs and lumbcr
were the biggest single export-eamer for the country, delivcnng 33% of total exports (WRI1988)''. By
1987, this share had fallen to 5% (Putzel 1992a). Between 1987 and 1994, the number of corporate
logging concessions in the country feil from 154 to 31, producing 8(X),()(K) m' of timber annually
(Overhoff 1997). Currently, the Philippines is the world's number eight importer of tropical hardwoods,
spending 165 million US dollar per year to buy 7(X),(KK) m' of logs in the international market (ITTO
1997, PNA 1998)6.
Fig.3.1 Regional distribution of Philippine forest cover (1950-1992)
•Oldgrowth 1992
• Forest cover 1992
ö Forest cover 1950
Mindanao Palawan Visayas Luzon
These figures do not entirely capture the considerahle volumes of timher illegally cut for internal and export
markets dunng the loggmg hoorn A companson of Japanese import records and Philippine export records shows that hy
1980. the volume of logs smuggled out of the Philippines exceeded the otficially recorded volume hy 100% (Porter and
Ganapin 1988)
Nearly 60 million m' (round wood equivalents) of tropical timber products is traded annually in the international
market. In 1996 Japan imported 17% of this volume, followed hy the European Union (26%). China and the People's
Repuhhc of Taiwan (21%). and Korea (9%). (iovemmenl restncttons on round log exports rednced the share of round lops in
the overall volume of tropical timher products traded in world markets trom 45% m 1987 Io21% in 1996: sawnwood is
around 20%. veneer ahout 1%. while the share of plywood increased from 27 to 50% in the same penod (ITTO 1997)
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Sources: Kummer 1992a (1950 data). Aerial reconnaissance survey, NRMP-DAI (1992 data)
Three-quarters of the Philippines' forest cover was lost during the postwar period. Of almost
15 million hectares of natural dipterocarp forest in 1950, only 4 million remained in 1992. A
qualitative assessment of these forests shows that the decline was even more serious. In 1934,
of the total forest cover of 17.2 million hectares, 10.7 million ha or 62% was of the old-growth
dipterocarp type (Bautista 1990). In 1992, only one-fïfth of the four million remaining hectares
was old-growth forest, while the other 80% were logged-over forests of varying quality. The
extent of forest degradation in the past sixty years is accentuated further by the following
considerations:
Most of the remaining old-growth forests are located in inaccessible areas at high
elevations, with shallow soils and steep slopes. Biologically rich evergreen lowland
rainforests now comprise a smaller portion of the old-growth area than they did sixty years
ago.
Although unlogged, the remaining old-growth forests are more disturbed now than 60 years
ago. The use of guns, dynamite, chemicals and burning techniques by local and immigrant
hunters has reduced wildlife stocks, as evidenced by the scarcity of hunting products and
widespread complaints of a declining catch by local huntsmen.
Forest degradation and conversion have continued since the 1992 survey.
The situation is not better for other important ecosystems: for example, 75% of the original
mangrove forests had been converted into fish ponds and other land uses by 1987 (Baconguis
et al. 1990, cited in Liu et al. 1993). Between 1967 and 1976 alone, the period when large-
scale logging and plantation development also decimated large forest areas, the total area of
mangroves was reduced from 448,000 to 254,000 hectares, a loss of 4% per year (Porter and
Ganapin 1988:39). Dynamite and cyanide fishing, sedimentation, pollution and irresponsible
tourism have left only 3.9 to 5.5% of the Philippine coral reefs in excellent condition: an
estimated 60- 80 % are in fair or poor condition (Gomez et al. 1994).Because of the near-
annihilation of the Philippines' old growth forest areas, and the high degree of endemicity of
its biodiversity. Norman Myers classified the Philippines as one of the world's ten 'hotspot'
areas in tropical forests (Myers 1988, cited in McNeely et al. 1990). Some 60% of the
country's 167 mammal species, 50% of its 322 resident bird species and 45% of its plant
species occur only in the Philippines (Cl 1996).
The regional differentiation in table 3.7 shows that 55% of the remaining old-growth forests
are in the Luzon island group. The northern Sierra Madre harbours the greater part of these
old-growth and high-quality forests. The aerial reconnaissance survey of the USAID-funded
Natural Resources Management Project that produced the most recent estimates on the extent
and distribution of tropical moist forests in the Philippines, showed that half of these remaining
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old-growth forests are in the Cordillera mountain range, west of the Cagayan River, and the
other half (257,850 ha) in the northern Sierra Madre. The results of the aerial photographs and
SPOT satellite imagery interpretations carried out in connection with this research, and
presented in section 3.4 show that half of this area is mossy forest. On the other hand, the
Sierra Madre also holds a large area of residual forest with a 60-80% forest cover. Out of the
750,000 hectares of Sierra Madre forest analyzed for this study, almost 300,000 hectares had
either a tree crown cover of 80 to 100 percent. .Therewith, the northern Sierra Madre holds the
largest contiguous area of intact tropical moist forests in Luzon, and one of the largest in the
entire Philippines.
3.3 Common views on the causes of deforestation in the Philippines
The National Master Plan for Forestry Development (DENR 1990) identifies population
pressure as the primary cause of the Philippines' forestry crisis. Showing a graph juxtaposing
the growth of the Philippine population - which went from 19.2 million in 1948 to 63.8 million
in 1988 - against a line representing the rapid decline in national forest cover during the same
period, the document concludes that "deforestation is directty related to population. Indeed, in
the country, forests declined slowly when population density was low, and rapidly when
population density was intense" (NMPFD 1990: 13). Other repons, including the 1994 ADB-
funded forestry-sector study of the Philippines also see a "strong association" between
population growth and deforestation, adding that logging also plays a role, but only via the
construction of roads allowing "the entry oflandless migrants who, by converting forest land
to agricultural use, hosten its destruction....Even excessively logged, degradedforests have
been found to recover and attain full stocking after 20 years, provided the areas are left
undisturbed" (ADB 1994:24).
Indeed, the Philippines went through a period of rapid population growth during this
period. Between the 1950s and 1960s, annual population growth rates averaged more than 3%,
and remained at 2.7% in the periods 1967-1972 and 1975-1980, making the Philippines Asia's
fastest-growing population in Asia during this period (Porter and Ganapin 1988). Kummer's
landmark statistical study on postwar deforestation in the Philippines examined relations
between forest conversion and a series of other factors, including road density, distance to
Manila, 'annual allowable cut' (a measure for the volume of timber extracted by logging
corporations annually), population growth and changes in agricultural area for 68 provinces in
the Philippines between 1970 and 1980. Absolute changes in forest cover (the narrowest
definition of deforestation, cf. section 1.2.1) were found to be significantly correlated with
changes in agricultural areas and timber extraction rates. However, when changes in absolute
population size, or in population density were regressed against forest losses in the same
period, this produced a statistically insignificant r2 of only 0.05 and 0.02 respectively. The
author concludes that
'the results of this study cannot support the contention of most scholars of tropical deforestation that
increasingpopulation is the leading cause of deforestation...".(Kummer 1992a:126)
Both Kummer and Liu et al. (1993) found that the proximity and density of roads correlated
significantly with deforestation rates in the various regions of the Philippines. Comparing
digitized land-use maps of 1934 and 1988, and combining the differences between these two
years with the 1941 road map, Liu et al. found that 78% of all forests lying within 1.5
kilometre of a road in 1934 had been cleared by 1988; a comparatively low 39.5% of all forests
lying at a distance of 15 to 16.5 kilometres from a road were cleared in the same period. The
meeting the Sierra Madre deforestation problem 67
second factor that Liu et al. found to be positively correlated with forest loss was the ratio
between the perimeter and the area of forests: the larger the P/A ratio, the more likely it was
to be cleared.
For all three years analysed by Kummer (1957, 1970 and 1980), forest cover was indeed
most extensive in the provinces where road density was lowest. However, Liu et al, point to
the fact that road density in itself is less problematic than the distance between forests and
roads: for example, in 1941 the greater part of Mindanao had a relatively small but evenly
distributed road network but still experienced considerable loss of forest in the period 1934-
1988. Kummer adds a temporal dimension to the road factor, by showing that over time road
density becomes less strongly correlated with forest cover. Roads are important in the
beginning of what Kummer hypothesizes to be a two-step deforestation process, which starts
with large-scale corporate timber extraction and is completed by "desperately poor people trying
toflnda place where they can at least feed their families" (ibid: 91).
Rural poverty and the search for arable land are rooted in part in the highly unequal
distribution of farmlands over the population (Leonen 1993). On the basis of government
records from a land registration programme set up in preparation for agrarian reform in 1988,
5.8% of all land owners (those reporting holdings of 12 hectares or more) owned 3.8 million
hectares of land. In other words, less than 1% of the Philippine population owned half the
country's cultivated farmlands. Smallholders who had under 3 hectares each -66% of all
landowners - owned only 16.4% of Philippine farmlands (Putzel 1992b:30).
Kummer briefly mentions the possibility that deforestation may be due in part to market-
oriented agricultural expansion into forest areas, but is compelled to leave this aspect aside for
lack of quantitative data (Kummer 1992a: 99). The development of large-scale agricultural
plantations, which began during the Spanish and American colonial periods (see Chapter 7),
caused large-scale conversion of forests into farmlands, particularly in Mindanao. From the late
1960s through the 1980s, favourable IMF conditions and a boom in export commodity prices
turned the Philippines into the world's largest exporter of coconut products; 29% of farmlands
in southern Mindanao and southern Tagalog, mostly upland areas, is dedicated to coconut
(Putzel 1992b:18). Sugar and corn are other major corporate crops planted in upland areas in
the Visayas and Mindanao. In chapters 8 and 9 of the present study assess the role of one
corporate erop, hybrid corn, in forest migration and upland agriculture in the Sierra Madre.
The last factor cited by most sources on deforestation in the Philippines is the problematic
functioning of Philippine government institutions and officials (e.g., ADB 1994; Boyce 1993;
Broad and Cavanagh 1993; Hurst 1990; Vitug 1993). Criticism focuses on a variety of aspects,
such as the fact that the legal framework perpetuates the public ownership of all lands over 18%
in slope, and denies indigenous people and other upland dwellers the tenurial security which
is necessary to realize a more participatory and sustainable use of resources (Lynch 1986). In
addition, deforestation is promoted by perverse government incentives, such as the licensing
system, the low level of forest charges imposed by the government, export restrictions and tax
holidays for an inefficiënt wood industry (Bautista 1990; Gillis 1988; Repetto and Gillis 1988)
, and documented cases of outright cronyism and political meddling with the bureaucracy
(Vitug 1993).
Thus we see the factors discussed in Chapter 2 coming together in the discourse on
Philippine deforestation, and with as little consistent proof here as was noted on the global
level. The Cagayan Valley appears to be an interesting exception to the overall deforestation
trend in the twentieth century; in 1992 the region still had one million hectares of natural forest,
covering 38 % of its land area. Despite the proximity of two of the country's most densely
populated regions (Ilokos Norte and Central Luzon), and its location near the densely
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populated, poor and predominantly rural settlements along the Cagayan river, the Northern
Sierra Madre remained largely forested until the early 1990s. However, a more detailed study
of forest cover reveals that behind this seemingly stable forest boundary, the relative share of
forests with a high percentage of tree crown cover declined considerably during the period
when large-scale, mechanized logging operations took place in the Sierra Madre.
3.4 forest degradation and loss in the Sierra Madre, 1950-1990
On the basis of aerial photographs interpreted by Clement and Van Dijk (1995) and Roest
(1995), the changes in forest cover in the Northern Sierra Madre were determined for the
period 1950-1990. The methodology used in the interpretations and in the subsequent GIS-
based analysis are discussed in section 2.3.3. The idea of examining changes in forest cover
behind the forest boundary arose out of dissatisfaction with the standard but - in my view -
problematic FAO defmitions of 'forest' and 'deforestation' (cf. Section 1.3.1). On the basis
of these defmitions, all areas with more than 10% woody vegetation cover qualify as forest,
while deforestation only occurs when this last vegetation is removed for other land use. This
choice tends to leave the deforestation impact of activities involving incomplete forest removal,
such as selective logging, out of the picture. To solve this problem, as I explained earlier, I
opted to follow FAO in defining forests as areas with a tree crown cover of 10% or more, but
not to confine deforestation to the removal of this last 10%. Instead, I incorporate forest
degradation, defined as all changes in natural tree crown cover from 100% to 10%, and forest
clearing (the removal of the last 10%) in my definition of deforestation.
The case of the Sierra Madre provides an opportunity to assess the impact of logging on
forest cover in relative isolation from other activities, as large-scale corporate timber extraction
was by far the most significant activity in terms of the forest modifications which took place
there between 1950 and 1990. For reasons that will be examined in the following chapters, until
1990 forest migration remained confined to a small number of pioneers and logging labourers.
Therefore, changes in the total area of different classes of cover may be attributed mainly to
the corporate logging industry, including the illegal timber extraction that the issue of timber
licenses failed to prevent.
In presenting a brief overview of the most relevant results of these surveys, in the following
pages, I will refer extensively to a series of maps, that are placed at the end of this Chapter.
The changes taking place over the years are most apparent if the maps are viewed in the
sequence in which they appear there. The first map (3.3) shows the differences in the areas
covered by the three surveys. The comparative maps (3.6, 3.8, 3.9) have been normalized, i.e.,
they show only the areas analyzed in all three years. This reduced the total area for which
comparative analyses were made to 750,000 hectares, or approximately 75% of the 1992 forest
cover of the Northern Sierra Madre. All comparisons include both changes in aggregate area
per class as well as changes in the geographical distribution of each class. The forests of the
provinces of Quirino, Nueva Viscaya and Aurora were largely left out of the analysis, either
because of the absence of aerial photographs or, in the case of Aurora, because they lie outside
the Cagayan Valley Region.
The forest cover maps per year (3.4, 3.5, 3.7) show the absolute areas for each crown cover
class for the entire area analyzed in each year. Thus after the contour map 3.3, 1950 is presented
first, then 1980, then the same map with all the forest concessions in operation during that year,
followed by a comparative map for the years 1950 and 1980 (map 3.6). This map, like the other
two comparative maps (3.8 and 3.9) is printed in colour, in order to show details of the shifts in
tree crown cover classes; aggregate maps, in which these changes are lumped in to 4 categories
(stable, improved, degraded and cleared) are shown in maps 3.10-3.12.
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Map 3.4 shows that out of 966,732 hectares of forest analysed in 1950, almost 600,000 hectares
had a forest cover of 60-100%. Close to 200,000 hectares, located mainly on the western slopes
and around the coastal town of Palanan, already qualifïed as low-cover areas (less than 60%
crown cover), even though corporate logging was still in its in fancy in Cagayan Valley by this
time. Some 80,000 hectares had already converted into other land uses, which means that forest
migration, utilization and conversion on the more accessible lower slopes of the Sierra Madre
starled before 1950.
The 1980 forest cover map (map 3.5) covers a total of 786,314 ha, and shows an increase in
the share of the low cover class in overall forest cover from 21% in 1950 to 36% in 1980, while
the share of high forest cover areas declined by more than half, from 35% in 1950 to 16% in
1980. Map 3.5 also shows the number of corporate timber concessions active in the Sierra Madre
during this period, when large scale logging was at its most intense (see Chapter 7). Map 3.6
compares the results of the 1950 and 1980 analyses, and shows that much of the 1980 medium
and low cover area was the result of declining crown cover in areas that still had a higher
percentage crown cover in 19507. All in all, 38% of the forest degraded to lower crown cover
classes during this period (see map 3.10). Only 4.5% of the 1950 forest cover was converted into
other land uses during this period. Forest clearing occurred in all tree crown cover classes.
Forest degradation continued in the following ten years. The ratio between high and low forest
cover areas declined still further, the former still occupying only 14% of overall forest cover in
1990. The decline in converted forest area (slightly lower than the 1980 figure) is almost certainly
caused by the changed contour of the area covered by the 1990 interpretation; as map 3.3 shows,
the 1980 areas not covered in the 1990 interpretation are almost certainly converted forest areas,
such as the farmlands surrounding the town of Palanan and converted areas near Dapir, Baggao.
In all three interpretations, forests with a 60-80% crown cover occupy between 25% and 30%
of the total forest area. However, this does not mean that these areas were in a stable condition,
recovering from the selective logging operations carried out during the previous decades. As the
comparative maps show, high cover areas degrade in to medium cover forests, medium cover
forests degrading or being cleared, and lower cover areas regenerating into medium cover forests.
Table 3.9 presents these changes in detail, showing how each class developed over the years.
Here, we see that about half of the 1980 medium-cover areas remained stable, 35% degraded, and
15% - 36,000 hectares - regenerated into high forest cover areas. Of the 105,000 hectares of
forest with 80-100% crown cover still present in 1980, only 47,000 ha had not been logged by
1990. Approximately 100,000 ha of stable mossy forest remained in 1990.
In comparison with the previous three decades, forest conversion accelerated in the 1980-
1990 period: 4.3% of total forest cover was cleared during this ten-year period, close to area
cleared in the previous thirty years. Still, this is a relatively low forest conversion rate, considering
the dense network of roads which logging companies had constructed in the Sierra Madre by the
end of this period. One change in the clearing pattern that may be attributed to these roads
ernerges when we compare the two periods. Between 1950 and 1980, a large proportion of the
forest cleared was high- and medium cover forest (see legend of map 3.6). These were
presumably cleared by employees of logging companies operating in the vicinity of old growth
and good residual stands. Between 1980 and 1990, the construction of logging roads (visible on
map 3.7) facilitated the entry of land-seeking migrants onto the lower slopes of the Sierra Madre,
where the forest stands are relatively poor. Indeed, as the data in the legend of map 3.8 show,
28,200 ha of low crown cover forest was cleared between 1980 and 1990, compared to 2554
The •classifïcation error' class contams areas that can not be compared due to mutually exclusive classifications
'n the two surveys (e.g. mangroves m 1959 and mossy m 1980)
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hectares of high and medium cover forests cleared.
Fig 3.2 Changes in distribution of tree crown cover classes, 1950-1990, Sierra Madre
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The overall deforestation image presented in map 3.9, and translated into the charts of fig. 3.2
shows that 5,3% of the 750,000 hectares of Sierra Madre forest located in the provinces of Isabela
and Cagayan were converted into other land uses between 1950 and 1990. During this period, half
the area with high and medium forest cover in 1950 had degraded to lower forest classes in the
same period. The total area with a 80-100% forest cover was reduced from over 340,000 hectares,
or 35% of the area, to just over 100,000 hectares, a major part of which are recovering logged-
over stands on the eastem slopes. The greater part of the stable mossy and montane forests is also
found here. The aggregate area 202,982 hectares of montane, mossy and high-cover dipterocarp
forests in the Sierra Madre lies below the areas found in the 1992 aerial reconnaissance survey
carried out as part of the NRMP project (see section 3.1.2). The difference is due mainly to the
fact that Sierra Madre forests in the provinces of Nueva Viscaya and Quirino were not included
in the interpretations presented here. Quirino, in particular, still has a high forest cover and may
be expected to harbour a sizeable area of good dipterocarp stands. Another source of errors lies
in the methodology used in the preparation of the basic maps by (Clement & van Dijk 1994) and
Roest (1995). The 1990 interpretation, for example, is based on visual interpretation of a 1987
SPOT satellite image, combined with land-use maps derived from this same source by CVPED
in 1992 and the 1992 closed-canopy map (scale l :250,000) which was part of the NRMP project.
The comparative maps reveal that 7-9% of the areas were given incompatible classifïcations, as
a result of this technical limitation.
Having established the factual dimensions of deforestation in the Northern Sierra Madre, the
following chapter describes how forest migrants and the indigenous inhabitants of the area make
a living. It identifïes relevant motives and assesses how these activities are related to the
continuous degradation and loss of forests in this area.
Map 3.3 Areas covered by the 1950,1980 and 1990 forest cover maps
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Map 3.6 Comparison of 1950 and 1980 forest area, by crown cover class
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Map 3.7 1990 Forest area, by crown cover class, with roads and rivers
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Map 3.8 Comparison of 1980 and 1990 forest area, by crown cover class
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Map 3.9 Comparison of 1950 and 1990 forest area, by crown cover class
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Map 3.10 Changes in forest cover 1950 - 1980, Northern Sierra Madre
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Map 3.11 Changes in forest cover 1980 - 1990, Northern Sierra Madre
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Map 3.12 Changes in forest cover 1950 - 1990, Northern Sierra Madre
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At the Cutting Edge. Primary actors and activities in the
deforestation of the Sierra Madre
4.1 Introduction
Seen from the lowlands, shades of green and blue dominate the Sierra Madre. Occasional puffs
of smoke, passing trucks loaded with timber, furniture shops, and DENR checkpoints along
the highway are the only visible evidence of what most people in the Cagayan Valley region
know from hearsay: deforestation. Seen from the inside, these forested slopes unveil a variety
of landscapes and human activity. The ranches on the lower western slopes give way to the
first settlements, surrounded by banana plantations and cornfields. Further eastward along the
old logging road, there are signs that the lower crests of the blue mountains are not as forested
as they seem from a distance; there are only a few tall trees still standing, their trunks
blackened by fire. Bamboo groves, croplands and recovering brush vegetation dominate. The
densely forested interior of the Sierra Madre is reached only after a longer hike. This is the
home of the Agta people and the Philippine eagle, the indigenous inhabitants of these lands.
This chapter introduces the primary actors and activities behind the abstract image of
deforestation in the Sierra Madre. After estimating the number of people residing inside these
forest lands in the early 1990s, I will briefly describe the Agta and assess how they have been
influenced by forest migration and the extraction of forest products by outsiders. I will then
proceed to define the term forest migration as it is used in this study, and describe the main
livelihood options of forest migrants: large-scale mechanized logging, small-scale carabao
logging, and upland agriculture. The fourth activity, the hunting and gathering of non-timber
forest products, will be discussed only briefly, as it does not contribute significantly either to
livelihood options or to the deforestation problem. These activities will be examined by means
of the concepts 'options' and 'motives', as weighed by forest migrants trying to make a living
in the forest lands. In the chapters to follow we will also be meeting other actors with
'significant decision-making power' (De Groot 1992:308) over these activities and a number
of factors deserving of a deeper contextual analysis. While it is in effect the combination of
these activities that leads to deforestation, the descriptions will nevertheless include an
assessment of the sustainability of each individual activity. Finally, I will look at the household
economics behind these activities, draw some provisional conclusions on the options and
motives influencing forest migration and the selection of income-generating options once
migrants have settled inside the Sierra Madre. This will lay the foundation for Chapters 5 and
6, which address the question of why successive administrations have failed to control the
increasing appropriation of forest lands and resources by private interests in the lowlands.
4.2 Upland population estimates
The Northern Sierra Madre belongs to the 53 % of the total land area that is owned by the State
(NSO 1995); classifïed timberlands constitute the greater part of this so-called Public Domain
(see Chapter 5), alongside smaller areas of unclassified lands, national parks and forest
reserves. Until as recently as the 1970s, these public forest lands were officially considered
uninhabited, except for indigenous forest tribes. These tribes were tolerated on what they
themselves regarded as their ancestral land, as long as their presence did not conflict with state
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interests, such as the extraction of natural resources or the construction of necessary
infrastructure. Over the years, however, rural families have migrated into the forest lands,
developing farmlands and permanent settlements there. When the population of such an upland
settlement reaches 1,000, the minimum number of people to qualify for barangay status,
government services such as schools and health clinics follow the migrants into the forest
lands.
Up to now few nationwide surveys have been carried out on forest occupation and upland
farming; one source on upland population which is often quoted estimates that by 1985 over
17 million people were already residing permanently in the uplands (Cruz et al. 1992:18). Half
of this number lived in the public domain, and of these, 6 million were indigenous forest
tribes, which places the estimated number of forest migrants nationwide at 2.5 million (Cruz
et al. 1986, cited in Doedens 1992:10). In my view, the Cagayan Valley data used in these
studies overestimate the percentage of the regional population living in the uplands. Table 4.1
compares the upland population of Cagayan Valley as estimated by Cruz et al. with total
population data from the National Statistics Office:
Table 4.1 Estimated upland population (Cruz et al. 1986) compared with population
census (NSO 1995) Cagayan Valley.
(in thousands) 1950' 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985"
Upland 402 592 893 971 1.129 1.470
pop (Cruz el al. 1986)
Total Pop 669 1.045 1.462 1.653 1.919 2.130
(NSO 1995)
Upland pop as % of Tot. 60 57 61 59 59 69
* 1948 census
** linear interpolation herween 1980 and 1990 census data
The data used by Cruz et al. imply that between 1950 and 1985 some 60% of the regional
population were living in upland areas (i.e., lands with over 18% slope), or close to 1.5
million people by 1985. The authors arrived at their data by estimating the proportion of the
population of each municipality living in the uplands, and then applying this percentage to the
municipal census data. This high estimate may also be due to the fact that the provinces of
Ifugao and Kalinga Apayao were still part of the Cagayan Valley administrative region at the
time of the survey. Nevertheless, since all population centres and prime agricultural lands are
located near the banks of the Cagayan River, this figure obviously overestimates the upland
population of Cagayan Valley to such an extent that the overall reliability of all the estimates
put forward by the same authors regarding the total number of people residing in upland areas
is open to question. The first - and thus far only - comprehensive survey of forest occupants
in the Sierra Madre was carried out in 1987 by a joint project set up by the German
government and the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural Resources (the 'RP-
German' project). The survey recorded just under 66,000 forest occupants in the provinces of
Quirino, Isabela and Cagayan, or 2.7% of the region 's population (GTZ 1990, see Table 4.2).
at the cutting edge...
Table 4.2 Inventory of 'forest occupants' in the Sierra Madre (GTZ 1990)
No of Total No of Av. HH size Area Area per HH



































































































The aggregate area of occupied forest land recorded by the RP-German survey is close to the
39,676 ha of forest land converted into farmland between 1950 and 1990, according to the
results of the aerial photograph and satellite imagery interpretations presented in the previous
chapter. On the other hand, the figures in the RP-German survey are consistently below
census records on the number of inhabitants of selected upland settlements in the Sierra Madre
(see table 4.3). Only 640 forest households were recorded in San Mariano, for example, while
this town administers over 200,000 hectares of forest lands, nearly all of which have been
repeatedly logged since the mid- 1950s. The vast majority of the municipality's citizens (over
5000 households) moved to the uplands after 1950'. One reason why the RP-German survey
did not register all of these migrants as forest occupants may have been that by the time of the
survey, the lands these people occupied was no longer forested or publicly owned. Most
probably the survey did not include those who lived inside the Sierra Madre but did not belong
to its indigenous forest tribes, or those who were farming denuded, patented or titled lands
along the valley floors in the uplands. What may also have played a role is the fact that at the
time of the survey in 1987, access to forest communities was constrained by the presence of
the New People's Army in the Sierra Madre. For the same reason, many migrants temporarily
left the Sierra Madre during the 1980s.
Not all upland harangays of San Mariano were formed after 1950; topographical maps of the Cagayan Valley
Produced as part of the 1918 census already show the presence of human settlements in de forest lands of this
mumcipahty, such as the barangays of Del Pilar and Tappa Their early development is probably related to their role as
stopover pomts for traders plymg the foot trail between San Mariano and another old settlemem on the Pacific slopes of
*e Sierra Madre. the town of Palanan Admmistratively. both San Mariano and these barangays nelonged to Palanan until
San Mariano became a town, after mdependence. Baggao, Cagayan. which lies m the vicinity of another passable 'saddle'
'n the Sierra Madre range, already had a barangay called Imurung inside its forested hmterlands.
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Table 4.3 Registered upland population for selected settlements
(A comparison of GTZ 1990 and Census 1990)

































*Excluding Poblacion + major lowland barangays
Based on the above considerations, the total resident population of the Northern Sierra Madre
(that part of the Sierra Madre administered by the provinces of Nueva Viscaya, Isabela and
Cagayan) would be 130 to 150 thousand people, or approximately twice the number recorded
in the GTZ survey. Within this group, the indigenous inhabitants of the Sierra Madre have
already become a minonty; their traditional way of life within the forest was increasingly
being undermined by the unrestrained entry of outsiders into their ancestral homeland.
4.3 The Agta
The original inhabitants of the Sierra Madre, the Agta2 (also referred to as Aeta, Ata or Agay)
were probably among the earliest people to enter the Philippines (Kroeber 1928, cited in Rai
1990:5). While that hypothesis has yet to be supported by archeological evidence (Griffin
1985), the Agta are known to have lived in the Sierra Madre for at least 4000 years (Rai
1990:45). No comprehensive surveys have been undertaken on the Agta population: 8,000
were estimated to live in eastern Luzon in the early 1950s. In the provinces of Cagayan and
Isabela alone, their number was placed at 5,500 in 1986 (RDC 1986, cited in Maus and
Schieferli 1989). Of these, 800 to 1,000 live in the town of Palanan, an old trading centre
located on the Pacific shores of the Sierra Madre (Griffin 1985). In spite of considerable
behavioural and philosophical differences within the group, all the different Agta groups living
in eastern Luzon are considered to belong to one culture (Griffin 1996:114).
The Agta living around the town of Palanan were already in contact with missionaries and
In addition to the Agta. the largest number of whom live on the Pacific slopes of the Sierra Madre. indigenous
forest commumties also reside on the western slopes. such as the Ilongot. or Bugkalot trihes of Quirino and Nueva
Visvaya (Rosaldo 1980) and the Kalinga The latter are scattered groups of lowland origin. who fled the Spamsh colomal
authonties in the 16"1 and 17" century and settled near tributanes of the Cagayan River. notahly near the present towns of
Baggao and San Mariano (See also Chapter 8) These Kalmgas (enemies) or Irravas (those upriver) are said to ^ook]ust
like the Ybanag or Ilokano, hut they speak their own language" (Research diary. Maren 1996) There are similanties
hetween the language of the Kalinga in San Mariano and the Paraiun and Agta languages of the eastern Sierra Madre
(Griffin 1985:93).
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other ethnic groups in the early Spanish colonial period (Headland 1986, cited in Griffin
19%), but contacts with lowland society have significantly intensified during recent decades.
Initially, these contacts took place largely at the initiative of the Agta, who would come down
from the forest to engage in barter trade with lowlanders, exchanging fish, bush meat, honey
and other products for sugar, coffee, rice and other market goods.
Extensive research on the Agta of the Sierra Madre (Griffin 1984; Griffin and Estioko
Griffin 1985; Headland 1986) has revealed the protracted sequence of ad verse changes that
the Agta went through from the moment that outsiders were no longer content to wait for them
to bring down their barter products, but began to enter the Sierra Madre at their own
initiative. The motives of these uninvited guests ranged from a desire to integrale the Agta into
mainstream society through Cnristianization, and literacy and settlement programmes; the
extraction and sale of forest and mineral resources taken from their ancestral domains; and the
acquisition of title to lands with potential value for agriculture, mining or tourism3. These
increasingly intensive intrusions into the Agta homeland undermined the ecological and
cultural integrity of their traditional lifestyle.
The products to which barter trade and economie integration exposed the Agta hastened
their sociocultural marginalization; in exchange for sugar, alcohol, and cigarettes, the shy and
unassuming Agta permitted loggers and migrants to use forests and lands as they pleased.
They sometimes asked outsiders to stay away from particular areas, such as ancestral burial
grounds, or to spare useful trees that their livelihood partly depended on, such as the
Almaciga (Agathis philippinensis). The resin of this tall tree, better known as Manila copal,
was traditionally gathered by the Agta and sold to licensed buyers in the lowlands. Almaciga
resins are used in the production of varnishes and a host of other industrial products, including
tiles, car paints and dentures (Polet 1991:37). Despite a ban on the cutting of this species,
requests to spare the Almaciga in logging operations were not always respected after alcohol
had done its work:
'The loggers would easily befriend the Agta. You know these people are very innocent and
peaceful. Once they had tasted gin, they would soon be drunk and then the loggers could simply
cut the trees and leave" (Almaciga licensee, San Mariano, research diary Oct 1990)
This quote captures in a few words the marmer in which the rights and culture of the Agta,
and other indigenous peoples, were long approached in Philippine society: because of their
dark complexion and kinky hair, the Agta became an object of ridicule. Until as recently as
the 1980s, they were not included in national population censuses. Their illiteracy and
nomadic lifestyle were the official reasons why Government censuses long ignored the many
small and dispersed Agta groups (Visorro and Van den Top 1993). They either live in
isolation from mainstream society or, in places where they have mingled with lowland
Filipinos, serve as helpers, are given Christian names or the family name of their masters, and
are regarded more or less as the personal property of those they work for. In the past logging
companies also offered employment opportunities to Agta males, both for humanitarian
reasons and because of their knowledge of the area. They were hired as surveyors, guards,
soldiers, members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), or couriers
to communicate with leaders of the New People's Army, which had several military bases
One kcy informant told me that in 1992 the family of an mfluential politician in Isabela managed to acquire
Honeymoon Island. a small island off the coast of Palanan town. which used to be a sacred ntual ground for Agta
marnages Through a rush procedure m the Bureau of Lands of the Regional DENR Office, the island was first classified
as Alienable and Disposahle and then titled in the name of the family Several cottages were constructed on what is today
known as Escando Island
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deep inside the Sierra Madre Addicted to alcohol and facing the decline of their traditional
hunting and gathering practices, Agta men living near the timber concessions were attracted
by these new opportunities. It is ironie that they ended up as security guards, safeguarding the
equipment of those who were systematically salvaging the ecosystem which had for
generations supplied them with a livelihood.
Of the various Agta groups residing in the Sierra Madre, those living on the east coast,
roughly between the towns of Divilacan and Dinapique, were least affected by the process
described above. This was due in large measure to a Letter of Instruction issued by President
Marcos in 1979, declaring the area within a 45-mile radius of the town of Palanan as a
wilderness area (LOI 917, 1979), effectively banning logging and mining activities here.
Other factors, especially the absence of a lateral road between these easterly forests and the
population centres to the west of the Sierra Madre helped to make this declaration
considerably more effective than most other forestry policies, violations of which were the
rule rather than the exception during this period (see also Chapter 6). The relatively pristine
condition in which this declaration left the forests and marine resources in the area enabled
many Agta living in or near the wilderness to maintain the lifestyle of their ancestors, living
in simple lean-to shelters and making a living as hunters, fishermen and gatherers of rattan and
other forest products. Nevertheless, the Agtas' traditionally high level of economie self-
sufficiency has gradually been eroded (Rai 1990:6). As a result of their growing participation
in the market economy, agriculture has gone from a minor sideline to a cornerstone of their
livelihood. Agtas now develop their own farms through slash-and-burn practices, or work as
farm labourers for forest migrants.
As a result of the increasing and more structured penetration of lowland groups into the
Agta domain, the degradation of the resources upon which they used to rely and their own
growing dependence on the outside world has been accompanied by rising death rates among
the Agta. Headland & Headland (1997) even question their survival as a people under the
exogenous changes they have faced in recent decades: in spite of a high Total Fertility Rate
"with women who live to menopause hoving an average 7.6 live births each"(ïbid:82), the
number of Agta in Casiguran declined by 43% between 1936 and 1994. Disease (84% of all
deaths), a high maternal mortality rate and a relatively high homicide rate resulted in high
death rates. Alcoholism, excessive smoking of poor-quality tobacco, and a poor diet, have
combined to debilitate the health of the Agta population in the Sierra Madre (pneumonia and
tuberculosis together make up one quarter of all deaths among adult Agta). The decline of
their numbers has been aggravated by a shortage of women of child-bearing age. Agta girls
are in demand as domestic helpers in nearby towns, and many end up as permanent sexual
partners or common law wives of non-Agta men, reducing the prospects for Agta men to find
a marriage partner (ibid).
In view of the present precarious situation of the Agta, the government has recently taken
steps to recognize their cultural identity and their rights to ancestral domains; hopefully these
will help to stabilize, or even reverse, the process of degradation and decline. On the other
hand, less favourable plans have also seen the light, such as those of the Provincial
Government to attract Taiwanese investment for the establishment of a Coastal Isabela
Industrial and Tourism Estate near Divilacan. The project would consist of a major hotel, golf
courses, and industries for the processing of natural resources, including a fish cannery and
knock-down furniture factories. The places where the Agta have been best able to maintain
their cultural dignity and lifestyle are the least accessible, almost deserted Pacific shores and
the forest lands of the Sierra Madre. It is therefore unlikely that the Agta have more to gain
from industrial development or further integration into lowland society than from their
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tradition of occasional economie exchanges with their neighbours. The restoration of the
principle of mutual territorial respect, upon which social and economie relations between the
Agta and mainstream society used to be based, is crucial for the future of the Agta as a people.
It remains to be seen, however, whether they themselves would opt for such a return to the
past, or rather would prefer to continue the process of integration, ultimately becoming full-
fledged Filipino citizens.
4.4 Forest migrants: origins and motives
4.4. l Forest migraüon: single step or staggered process ?
We tend to think of forest migration as a single step: a family decides to leave its place of
origin and heads for a destination in the forest lands. They sell whatever they cannot take
along (thus creating a financial buffer to overcome the difficult first months of developing the
new farm), pack up essential belongings and then, one day, leave for its destination. This
model probably applies to the early nineteenth-century migration movements from Ilokos into
Central Luzon and to the homesteading pioneers entering Cagayan Valley between 1930 and
1970; the distance between the place of origin and the destination was simply too great to
allow a step-by-step procedure (see also Chapter 8).
However, contemporary forest migration to the Sierra Madre is hardly ever such a single
step. A protracted series of preparatory moves takes place which ends when the entire
household actually tkes up residence inside the forest. There is considerable variation in this
process among the three broad categories of forest migrants defined in the next section. The
relatively short distance between what we will refer to as source and destination areas
facilitates the possibility for migrants to employ this staggered approach. Most forest migrants
in the Sierra Madre originally came from the nearby Cordilleras and from the lowlands of
Cagayan Valley, and commuting between the place of origin and the forest lands significantly
reduces the risk and hardship inherent in the initial phases of forest migration.
In this study the use of the term 'forest migration' encompasses all intermediary steps
between this 'commuting' phase and the permanent settlement of the entire household in the
forest lands. Whether as logging labourers, gatherers of rattan and bamboo, or as farmers,
forest migrants all spend a substantial part of the year (which can probably be estimated at
more than 4 months, the length of the dry season) in the Sierra Madre, deriving a significant
share of their total income from one or a combination of the activities described in the course
of this chapter. The construction of a permanent residence in the Sierra Madre and the arrival
of the most members of the household - one or two may have overseas or urban employment
- is the ultimate indication that the staggered process of shifting economie reliance from the
place of origin to the Sierra Madre has been completed. Investments in the establishment of
terraces, plantations or irrigation facilities inside the Sierra Madre also indicate the
household's intention to establish a permanent economie base inside the forest lands.
Having clarified the second word of the term forest migration, we must now examine the
word/oresr, which may be read as, forest land in its legal sense, i.e., unclassified lands in the
public domain and lands which have been classified as forest lands, as a rule4 because the
slope is in excess of 18% (see also Section 5,2.1). In other words, what qualifies one as a
forest migrant is not the land use in the destination area, but its legal status as a publicly
owned forest land. Forest migration then means moving one's household and residence from
a source area to the forest lands of the Sierra Madre, including the preparatory phases, in
Other areas are those designated as forest reserve, national park or military reservation
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which members of the Household spend at least four months per year there, deriving a
significant share of total household income frorn forest lands. This definition not only serves
to distinguish people who extract forest products from people who are in the process of
settling there, but also to distinguish immigrant forest land residents from others who are
native or indigenous to the Sierra Madre. This latter group includes not only the Agta, but also
groups which entered the forest lands in pre-colonial and colonial times. Although pre-
independence forest migrants were probably driven by motives comparable to those of the
pioneer migrants described in the next section, the social, economie and political context of
this period differed greatly from that in which post-colonial migrants entered the Sierra
Madre. Moreover, the descendants of these early migrants, who were born and raised here,
see themselves as native to these lands5. Thus I will reserve the term forest migration for
people who moved to the Sierra Madre in the postwar Philippines. The year 1950 more or less
coincides with the start of the first, small-scale commercial logging activities in the Sierra
Madre, which attracted lowland labour towards the forest-based industries and opened up
roads, facilitating human settlement and agricultural expansion in the forest lands. This
implies that the vast majority of the people who are primary actors in the deforestation process
are forest migrant households, defined as "households who starled the process of forest
migration to the Sierra Madre after 1950, who derive a significant share oftheir total income
from forest lands and whose heads reside inside the Sierra Madre more or less permanently ".
4.4.2 Forest migrants: a typology
At first sight, forest communities seem to be "all the same": loosely organized settlements of
relatively poor houses, some of bamboo, some with clay walls and cogon roofs, others made
of cement hollow blocks and with galvanized roofs, but still modest by lowland standards.
There are usually a few sari-sari stores in these settlements, selling a limited range of products
including rice, unrefrigerated soft drinks, instant coffee, sugar, soap, gin and cigarettes. There
is also a certain uniformity in the products one sees lying around, waiting for transportation
to the lowlands: some square logs, a few piles of bamboo, bananas and, during the harvest
months of March and September, large expanses of rice and corn, drying in the sun.
However, beyond these similarities lies a world of such variety that it is difficult to capture
the origins and livelihood of forest migrants in a general description. Forest communities are
characterized by strong heterogeneity, both internally and from one to the other, and in terms
of sociocultural background and economie life. "Kaingineros", as they are called, originate
from various areas, speak different languages, and have different means of making a living.
Some left their place of origin only recently, bringing only their essential belongings, while
others arrived decades ago and have accumulated substantial land holdings and wealth,
permitting them to enroll children at prestigious schools, such as the University of the
Philippines College of Medicine in Manila.
Three broad categories of forest migrants can be distinguished by the context in which they
moved to the Sierra Madre. I have labelled them 'pioneers', 'followers' and 'newcomers' (see
Table 4.4). With the exception of the most recent forest settlements, in which newly arrived
migrants only recently starled to develop farmlands and residences, representatives of each
category are found in most upland communities. The 1970 cut-off point which separates
pioneers from followers is related to the fact that the latter entered during the corporate
To distinguish indigenous from native forest residents, we will adopt the critenon used m the 1993 Ancestral
Domam Claims Act. which recogmzes claims from groups whose ancestors have lived inside these lands "smce time
immemnriaT
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logging period in this area (1970-1990) and were thus often directly tied to a timber license
holder or one of his contractors; for them, the opening of farmland long remained a mere
sideline, until forest resource depletion or unemployment turned upland agriculture into their
main source of income. Pioneers resemble recent 'early newcomers' in terms of their primary
land-seeking motive, but they migrated in a context which was more favourable to the
realization of these motives. The most recent group of forest migrants, who have entered since
the end of the corporate logging era (see Chapters 5 and 7) are in a more precarious position.
They do not have access to good lands or to the chainsaw and carabao that followers were able
to buy during their term as company employees. Moreover, deeper penetration inside the
forest frontier has become more difficult, as logging roads are no longer maintained by
logging companies, making it more practical for newcomers to settle near established
settlements instead of venturing into unoccupied forest land.
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In an analysis of the determinants of economie progress among forest migrants in San José,
Palawan, Eder (1974) found that the factor 'time of arrival' was not significantly related to
their level of socioeconomic success. Instead, personality traits and an element of fortuity
seemed to be dominant. My assumption that time of arrival can indeed be linked to other
characteristics does not necessarily contradict Eder's finding: many of those who ventured
into the unknown forest lands before the advent of the logging boom were characterized by an
enterprising personality and, because of their pioneering spirit, found themselves in the right
place at the right time to seize the opportunities offered by the arrival of the logging industry.
Nevertheless, those equipped with these talents found considerably more opportunities to put
these to economie use before and during the corporate logging era than those who arrived
later. The following sections will illustrate this finding.
(1) THE PIONEERS: ENTERPRISING FARMERS PROSPECTING PRIME AGRICULTURAL LAND
The pioneer migrants entered the Sierra Madre between 1950 and 1970, hoping to find good
lands for agriculture. In most upland barangays the ownership of the best farmlands, including
irrigated ricefields, was still confmed to those who settled there frist6. Among the pioneers,
One example of an exception to this rule is the barangay of Dimatan, which was originally established inside the
forest lands in the 1950s, but was relocated during the height of the, to avoid that migrants might be perceived as NPA
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there were traditional upland residents from the Cordillera (from the provinces of Abra,
Benguet, Ifiigao and Kalinga Apayao), as well as Ilokano lowland farmers from the provinces
of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva Viscaya.
Box 4. l Profïle of a Pioneer
"H was in the late fifties, when a few of the 'Adasen' clan of the Tinguian 'tribe' left their homesteads in the
uplands of Abra - a province in the Cordilleras - in search of land. Abra was getüng overcrowded and for some
people the living conditions had become too hard to bear any longer The work was hard, the area barely
accessible and there was an mcreasmg shortage of [agricultural] land.(...) After having crossed no fewer than
seven provinces - the captain used to enumerate them when recalling the event - the Adasen were able to find a
suitable piece of land in the foothills of the Sierra Madre, in the municipality of Tumaumi, Isabela. At first, six
Tinguian families and one Ilokano family (from the lowlands) settled here. They have since been followed by
kinspeople from Abra. Initially, all were attracted by the availability of land and the desire to make a better life,
while others joined through marriage. (...) Those who had just arrived starled with nothing; their carabaos had
been sold and they had left everything behmd. They began to clear the forest and to grow rice, upland rice on
the kaingins around Banif>, the upper pan. In the lower part, Malapmg, the plots were transformed into irrigated
rice fields. Through continuous hard work, people succeeded in moving forward. Some succeeded even more than
others and could eventually af ford a second house in the town of Tumaumi.(...) When logging companies entered
the area (in 1973, GT), some people protested, but they could not compete with those who had mterests m U. The
advantage of this development was the opening-up of the area. The loggmg road became the access road to and
from the town proper".(quoted from Ypma 1994:49-54)
By virtue of seniority, economie position and social prominence, pioneer migrants can often
be found in local leadership positions, either in elective government posts or as leaders of
ethnic groups within upland communities of mixed origin. New migrants who wish to settle
in the vicinity of pioneer settlements must ask permission from these leaders, who also decide
whether they are allowed to open up farmland. Nowadays, those who succeeded are well-off
compared to those in the other categones; their early arrival gave them the first piek of prime
agricultural lands inside the mountains, which they turned into irrigated rice (talon) and
rainfed corn farms. They were young, single adventurers when they left their place of birth.
looking for economie opportunities in the Sierra Madre, and they found prime pieces of flat
and rolling lands with good agricultural potential, lying in small inner valleys and on gently
sloping hills, as well as dark soils, waterfalls, rivers full of fïsh, and an abundance of tradable
forest products like rattan, bamboo, vines, resins and wildlife. Occupation rights to large tracts
of land were obtamed through trade with the Agta, or were obtained by clearing areas for
agriculture. Pioneer migrants still recall how easy it was to convince the Agta to exchange
their ancestral rights for a token payment:
"I used to own this whole valley here, it must be around 10 hectares When we came here. this land
was owned by the Agta. We told them that we wantedpeace with them and asked what they wanted
so that we could take the land- all that they asked for was two carabaos, and so we gave them our
carabaos and they went to a place deeper inside the forest" (Research diary, Oct 1990)7
Surveyors of the Bureau of Forest Development, who entered the forest to delineate logging
concessions and annual cutting areas, sometimes assisted the pioneers in obtaming ownership
supporters, or get caughl in the crossfire of the Army's anti-msurgency campaign All households were given a 7-hectare
Ixmgkag field and a residenlial plot just outside the forest frmge Even after having heen relocated. the households
conlinued to cultivate their lands inside the torest m addinon lo their new hangkag fields
Baldi (m prep 67) reports sales of Agta cleanngs to lowland migrants in Cagayan. against token prices or
without any compensation at all
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titles to these lands8; when the logging industry arrived, some pioneers were able to mobilize
company equipment. such as bulldozers, to have their lands levelled and turned into talon land.
The arrival of the logging industry also created new economie opportunities for those already
settled inside the forest; eateries and sari-sari stores provided company workers with the daily
necessities during their prolonged stays inside the forest. Eventually, these mini-stores also
became sources of informal credit for later groups of forest migrants.
(2) THE FOLLOWERS: LOGGING LABOURERS "GROUNDED" THROUGH MARRIAGE OR
UNEMPLOYMENT
Box 4.2 Profile of a Follower
Mr Maximo Tuliao is introduced to us as the founding father of Musmga and as the barangay's first captain. In
1965, hè was invited tojoin two head peütioners, Mr. Gulay and Mr. Tadeo, who wanted to claim titles for un-
surveyed lands instde the Sierra Madre. His father, who worked with the Bureau of Lands, facilitated the
surveying and titling of the lands. This is how the prime, low-lying lands of Musinga became their property. "ƒ
was horn in Apam, Cagayan in 1928 My mother was an Yhanag, my father an Ilokano, who worked in the Bureau
of Lands In 1940, l fledbecause of the war and went toAngadanan. where I helped my brother and sister on their
farm fprobably the Tabacalera hacienda m Angadanan, GT) After the war, I moved over to San Mariano, I was
still young and looking for adventure This place was fully forested then. bul logging had already starled by the
Ever TLA and sawmill Logging was sttll done with the two-man barrotsaw at that time, and my life remained very
f aar, .m i was lookmgfor land. Ifound my wife m San Mariano, m Brgy Gangalan (her name is Dummga Echorre,
an Igorol name, probably a daughter of an Igorot father and Ybanag mother, GT) We got married and we had
our children and then Ifound this land here in Cassala and was able to buy 6 hafrom a Kalingafor 6000 pesos
and one carabao That was in 1973; ow voungest son Georgië was 5 years old then, and hè is 28 now, so that was
23years ago " Although elderly now, hè is still m remarkably good shape, with strong teeth and a lean body,
cultivatmg part of his farm himself with his wife. He takes us around his farmlands. located close to the nver and
partly irrigated, and proudly shows us his second kultglig (smal! farm tractor), which hè was able to buy after
his first erop of hybnd corn, last year. He lives in a relatively isolated spot on the outskms of the barangay and
says be has distanced hunself from barangay politics. His three sons are leading figures in the local carabao
busmess. (Research diary, March 1996)
Minor commercial timber extraction has been undertaken in Cagayan Valley since the early
twentieth century, but it took until the late 1960s for the large-scale, mechanized and corporate
logging industry to really take off in the Northern Sierra Madre. The first corporate logging
companies brought in skilied labourers from other regions, where mechanized logging
operations had started earlier. Soon afterwards, surveyors. bulldozer operators, truck drivers,
chainsaw operators and helpers were also hired locally. They gained an even larger share of
the employment opportunities offered by the wood industry, because of the common practice
among urban timber licensees to farm out timber quotas among local contractors on the basis
of royalty payments per boardfoot extracted (See also Chapter 5). Due to the region's
prolonged ramy season, logging operations were generally suspended between July and
January; during the wet season, the company employees either returned to their families in the
lowlands, workmg in the obhgatory reforestation projects of the company, or stayed near the
concession area. With the use of their chainsaws, it was not difficult to open up slash-and-burn
fields for the labourers. For these migrants, farming initially only served to supplement cash
income from the company with rice and vegetables. During the dry season, when the best erop
's planted, the demand for paid logging labour also peaked. The second erop, planted at the
The Philippinc Land Act specifies that unclassified forest lands under 18% slope can hè classified as Alienahle
and Disposahle (see Chapter 5)
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end of the wet season, was only an option for those who did not return to the lowlands after
the dry season. For most followers, agriculture only began to produce a more significant share
of overall income after their main aim in migrating, i.e., cash income, could no longer be
realized through timber extraction alone.
The 'follower' category consists mainly of former logging labourers who starled as part-
time forest occupants and eventually turned into permanent residents. Because of the highly
unstable security situation that prevailed inside the Sierra Madre during the 1970s and 80s,
rather than establishing new barrios of their own, followers often settled near the houses and
fields of the pioneers. They occupied the second-best rolling lands adjacent to the small inner
valley floors that the pioneers had succeeded in appropriating. Their employment with the
company gradually evolved into the activities presently known as carabao logging and
waterlogging, the extraction of timber by forest residents who owned a carabao or a chainsaw,
or both (see Section 4.5). Others engaged in the extraction of non-timber forest products,
particularly rattan, which was taken out of the cutting blocks of old-growth forest prior to
logging. After 1990, upland agriculture was increasingly geared towards the generation of cash
income, the causes and consequences of which are discussed in Chapter 9.
(3) NEWCOMERS FROM THE NEARBY PROVINCES
This category of forest migrants is probably the most diverse in terms of social and cultural
background; there are newcomers who used to be labourers and the employees of
entrepreneurs in the lowlands; their bosses either sacked them or offered to assist them in
cultivating a commercial erop in the forest. Others still have minor tilling rights in the
lowlands, but face a growing disparity between the income they can derive from this activity
and the demands of a household with school-age children.
Box 4.3 Newcomers from the lowlands The Ramon family, sitio Ibon, Cagayan
At short distance from one of the best stocks of secondary and pnmary forest on the western slopes of the Sierra
Madre, we meet a group of srx people eatmg corn in front of a temporary shack near a newly opened field. We
are invited to visit the sitio where these people and two more families live. There is a horse and all around the
house there are products drying; the family looks happy, healthy and productive, and they say it was a very good
decision to move here. They teil us they are all relatives; the eldest man and woman (50 and 51 years old
respectively) are the parents of two of the young men working here, the other two men are first cousms. They
came from the nearby lowland barangay of Danguilan, Penablanca, where they were also immigrants; the old
man has a long history of different jobs before hè became a farmer there, 15 years ago, when hè gained tilling
rights to half a hectare of farmland, paying his tertia (share of the harvest, GT] to the landowner every year.
One of his sons worked the land of his father, the other one was a dnver. "We were so hard up there. we did not
ffwn a carabao and we did not have a nch relative; all our relatives just workfor their own income too (sarili,
sariti). Now we do not need them anymore: we had to buy all ourfood there. here we produce our own, we used
to borrow fertilizer and here the soil is good. We were alwavs in debt there. always with the same trader and now.
we produce our own ginger, garlic, beans, com and we can sell it anvwhere we want. We cleared things with the
captain of Baliuag when we wanted to enter here, and also with our kumpare Yanez [the pioneer migrant, GT]
and they satd, yes, you go there, because the yield is twice that of Danguilan. And the captain of Danguilan also
gave us pemussion to go, all hè said was "Be careful, that is a forest area!". Bul we do not thtnk so, because there
is a govemment programme to give this land to the landless. The DENK already told us ifwe are from Penablanca
we can come here and thev have already surveyed it for our Stewardship Cenificate; each one ofus will gel 5
hectares" Research diary, March 19%)
Encouraged by reports from former neighbours or relatives about free lands in the Sierra
Madre, newcomers entered the forest lands expectmg to solve a chronic shortfall rn income
by opening additional farmlands there, either a fallow field or a patch of residual forest.
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Romero (1991) reported a group of 20 lowland tenants, who had recently started to clear
upland farms to supplement their income. The majority of these newcomers were commuting
daily between their forest clearings and their residence in a barangay in the foothills of the
Sierra Madre.
Box 4.4 Newcomers from the uplands
'Natadem ti buning ti Ifugao' (sharp is the machete of the Ifugao...)
The last upland settlement we meet on out way to is called Cagurungan, an Ybanag name meaning "where there
are shells in the river", a reference to the marine origin of the limestone layer surfacing here. On our climb up
to Dupaya we meet a young boy watering a carabao in a creek. This cool spot is still shaded by the residual trees
which surround it, but all the bamboo under the trees has already been cut and piled around the trees, with some
dead stalks standing against the trees, to make sure the flames wül reach the crowns of these trees during the
burning, next month. These migrants came from barrio Santa Cruz, Aguinaldo, Ifugao. Tatung ('Daddy')
Hud'ong is the pioneer and leader of a group of 11 Ifugao who opened up the first land in Dupaya in 1994. The
old man is a charismatic personality with a record of pioneering, first in Santa Cruz, then in Quirino, and now
in this new settlement. Nanang Lumu, one of the members of the group, says that all 11 are just workers and
oldcr men opening up land for their children. This year, the group went ahead and Mr. Hud'ong only arrived last
Saturday from Santa Cruz. Nanang says that she was born in Mayaoyao and decided to migrate to Mungayan,
Ifugao to find a better life there; but since they were the last to arrive, they found only 2 ha of bangkag and uma
land there. Now that their 8 children have children of their own (Nanang already has 26 grandchildren), that
place is becoming too small: 'There is no more free space and our soils are not so productive anymore.' Mr.
Hud'ong says that the problem in their place of origin is that some have big lands and some have small: "ƒƒ we
could divide the land there. we would not be here". The main problem here is malaria. One of the group already
died of it, and most others have had the disease.
The group lives as one community, sleeping under one roof and eating together. One of the group members
serves as their Chnstian minister and prays with them before every meal, a habit they learned from an American
missionary who regularly visits Aguinaldo. The meal consists of nee and green peas, a typical Ifugao staple. Two
birds, shot by the boys in the forest today are skinned alive and then cooked for dinner. At daybreak, we drink
the streng black coffee prepared by Mr. Hud'ong, and have a breakfast that consists of leftovers from yesterday's
dinner. After breakfast not much time is spent around the house; everybody sharpens his bolo, the boys pump
up their airgun and within 30 minutes, all are on their way to their clearing areas. Although the 11 people live
as a community, there are subgroups; each clears its own area. opening up an area large enough for l can or 7
gantas of seed (appr. l ha). We jom Nanang and Tatang Lumu at their clearing area, cross the creek separatmg
the hill where the hut of the group is located and climb the next hill, covered with a lush vegetation of bamboo
and residual trees. The top portion has already been fully cleared; the two work their way down towards the
creek. The soil is moist and brown, a shallow layer of soil on a steep, rocky slope that will be used for banana
cultivation. The woman says: "we would not have to do this kind of heavy (narigat) work if had been able to
stay in the lowlands. but it is too expensive (nagastos) for us there and so we have no other way but to travel very
far and find a new land for our children". We ask when the area will be burned and she answers "I do not know,
it is the work of Mr. Hud'ong, that is why hè is now here. We will go home in two weeks'time and then Mr
Hud'ong will stay here". (research diary March 1996)
In comparison with migrants in the first two categories, social and economie motives related
to the place or origin, referred to here as 'source motives', play a more influential and positive
role in the case of newcomers. For pioneers and followers, source motives play either a minor
or a negative role, while 'destination motives' are more dominant and positive (see Box 4.5).
Typical 'positive source motives' are the conditions in the migrant's place of origin that
stimulate the decision to migrate: lack of land, unemployment, debt, and the growing disparity
between cost of living and income. These then add up to 'positive destination motives', such
as logging employment, or the prospect of finding land of one's own, encouraged by the
success of relatives with prior migration experience. Even for those among the earlier migrants
who also left their source areas for economie and social hardships there, economie prospects
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m the destination areas were more favourable at the time they migrated than when the
newcomers moved. Among the farming and landless poor of Cagayan Valley, the most recent
category of forest migrants comprises enterprismg people with the basic means and labour to
allow them to invest household labour in the development of new farmlands in the Sierra
Madre, and to sustain themselves during the initial months of land preparation and the long
wait for the harvest.
Specialized land developers, such as the Ifugao migrants described in the last profile, are
also part of this category, as well as wood-carvers facing a shortages of raw material in their
place of origin, and chainsaw operators displaced by the logging industry, who open residual
forest lands for others for a fee per hectare. Here we see certain resemblances between the way
the first Ifugao newcomers in the above profile establish themselves inside the forest and those
described earlier in the pioneer category. In their search for land, both types of migrants enter
deep enough to find residual forest not yet claimed by anyone, opening up these lands as
quickly as they can to reach the boundary of the nearest settlement, thus delineating their
territory according to the rules of custom. They own carabaos nor chainsaws; during the dry
season, they collectively cut residual vegetation for weeks on end with machetes (bolos) only,
preparing a large area for expansive forms of agriculture, which will only intensify once
relatives come over and settle permanently9.
In 1998, when I returned to the settlement of the newcomers described in Box 4.4, the
Lumu couple had built themselves an Ifugao-style wooden pole house here, while 35
households had followed them into the Sierra Madre. The 'pioneering newcomers' were still
shuttling between their place of origin and Dupaya, but their presence had clearly become
more permanent and they had registered as voters for the May elections as residents of the
nearby barangays of Masipi and Limbauan. By this time, the leader of the first group. Mr.
Hud'ong , was only irregularly seen in Dupaya, spending most of nis time with a new group
to develop new uma farms in forest lands near Pamplona, Cagayan. In the summer of 1997,
hè sold part of the land hè had opened in Dupaya to the Lumu family for 2,000 Pesos. The rest
of nis uma and ublag lands, a total area of approximately 10 hectares, was being offered to
another migrant for 10,000 pesos, who said hè was still saving money to conclude the deal.
Both profiles show mat, for most newcomers, the decision to develop new homesteads and
farmlands in the Sierra Madre is often influenced by the encouragement of one person who has
prior experience in forest migration. who invites or even leads the others into the Sierra
Madre. If a newcomer opens up a fallow field (ublag) provided by someone already settled
inside the Sierra Madre, hè may be asked to pay a sum of money to buy the occupation rights,
or to share part of his harvest with the onginal owner A third vanation of this model is that
of financed forest migration, in which a newcomer is actually sent to the forest lands by an
entrepreneur in the place of origin, who either speculates that the land will eventually become
titled or has a short-term interest in buy ing a specific erop to be produced on the new land.
The profiles presented above represent the two main places of origin of the people in this
category: farmers and landless people from the upland province of Ifugao and from the
lowlands of Cagayan, Lsabela and Quinno For Ifugao migrants, the distance between their
place of origin and the Sierra Madre is 100-200 kilometres, a distance which takes one to two
days by public transport. Newcomers originating in the lowlands only travel between 30 to 50
kilometres, which makes it possible for migrants to shuttle several times per month between
the new forest farm and their home base in the lowlands, without immediately giving up
Griffm (1985:92) also observed the practice of Ifugao (and Kahnga) migrants who 'leapfrog over existing
settlements to collectively clear new lands. and to numtam close contact* with their place of origin
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whatever tilling rights or other sources of income and social security their households have in
the place of origin.
In some established forest settlements, the influx of newcomers increases the sense of
scarcity of free 'convertible' forest land, especially when migrants (such as those in Box 4.4)
do not settle on fallow fields previously opened by others, but rather open up unoccupied
residual forest nearby. Pioneers and followers may react to the rapid appropriation of nearby
forests by newly arrived migrants in different ways. One is to plant coffee or mango seedlings
in uncleared residual forest stands, to mark their claim to clear these areas in the future. Other
migrant settlements have adopted
resolutions to control or prohibit the
arrival of newcomers on public lands
which they regarded as reserved for
the future farms of their offspring.
The effectiveness with which such a
social fence can be implemented
depends on the quality of local leaders
in forest communities and on the
degree of support that they receive
from higher government officials and
politicians, in particular town mayors.
The migrants described in the second
profile had been denied entry by the
people of one barangay, but were
granted free access by the captain of
the neighbouring barangay. As we
will see in Section 4.8.1, established
forest migrants may welcome the
entry of newcomers to alleviate labour
shortages in their upland farms.
Source Motives
access to Farmland
drbf or sent by financier
escape from tenancy
employment opportunities
loss of social network





low cost of living
disease, hardship
access to market, services
peace & order
government policies
4.4.3 Source and destination motives
in forest migration: an initial
inventory
Box 4.5 is an initial inventory of
nominal motives which stimulate or
discourage forest migration, based on
how migrants themselves talk about
that decision. This overview provides
no more than an impression of the
range of considerations taken into
account, including highly individual
ones, such as mamage, or legal and
politica! problems in the migrants' place of origin. The overall pattern illustrated here is that
all migrants are driven by a combination of source and destination motives, and that the
balance between the two shifts over time. For pioneers, the decision to leave the source areas
rneant a greater isolation from markets and relatives than for followers and newcomers. For
followers, the main reason for leaving for the forest is the prospect of finding better
negative motive, discouraging forest migration
positivo motive, stimulating forest migration
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employment opportunities than were available in their place of origin. The table also shows
that a number of negative destination motives, such as the uncertain Peace and Order situation,
the threat of government sanctions for the illegal occupancy of the Public Domain, and the
difficulty of establishing contacts with lowland markets and services, tend to change in value
or significance over tune. The threat of government sanctions against the illegal occupancy of
government land, still a serious problem to pioneers and followers, is no longer as pressing
for newcomers. Instead, they have the possibility of benefiting from government support
(stewardship, extension) after settling inside the forest. I will examine this issue in detail in
Chapter 5. Other positive destination motives, particularly the prospect of greater self-reliance
on newly developed farmlands have continued to attract pioneers, followers and newcomers
alike.
The improvement in the prospects for establishing oneself in the forest went hand in hand
with a negative economie outlook in the place of origin, especially for the newcomers. The
history of agncultural expansion in Cagayan Valley (see Chapter 8) shows that until the mid-
eighties the total area of cultivated farmland in the lowlands was still expanding rapidly. After
1990 farmers in the lowlands and in the sparsely populated. but mountamous Ifugao Province
found fewer opportunities to develop new farmlands in their place of origin. Other factors,
such as the impact of agrarian reform policies and the introduction of high-yielding gram
varieties in the lowlands, have gained in influence; these will be discussed in Chapters 8 and
9, where we will also return to the subject of the motives enumerated here, and examine the
process of forest migration in more detail. But first I will look at an activity that played a
major role in setting the forest migration process in motion.
4.5 Corporate logging
4.5.7 The activity
At the time this book was written, corporate logging had become almost a thing of the past,
in the Philippines as a whole and in the Sierra Madre. The issuance of corporate licenses for
the large-scale mechamzed extraction of timber from the region started with the Taggad
concession in 1947 and accelerated after 1970. At the height of the logging boom in 1982, a
total of 44 corporate logging concessionaires were active in the Cagayan Valley region,
varying in si/e from 30,000 to 220,000 hectares, with a cumulative Annual Allowable Cut of
2.4 million cubic metres of timber. Each year approximately 25,000 ha of old-growth forest
was converted into secondary stands of varying quality Due to factors that will be examined
below, the number of corporate logging licenses declined sharply between 1990 and 1997,
when the four remaining concessions in the Sierra Madre were permitted to extract only
20,000 cubic metres of timber. The same trend is visible in the Philippines as a whole"1
Although for this reason it may be appropnate to describe this activity in the past tense, the
significance of the impact it had on the overall deforestation process in the Sierra Madre after
1970 warrants a detailed exammation of its charactenstics and historical origins in this chapter
and those that follow.
Corporate logging entailed the large-scale mechanized extraction of timber from natural
dipterocarp forest concessions by business corporations with or without permission from the
Government The Philippines' oldest legal instrument covering these activities was the so-
called 'Timber Licensing Agreement' (TLA, see Section 5.2.2), by means of which the
government leased a large tract of public forest land to a logging company for the purpose of
Chapter 7 provides a more detailed history ot corporate logging m the Philippines and Cagayin Valley
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developing the climax stands into more productive production forests. The company gained
the exclusive right to extract timber from this concession, subject to government approval of
Annual Operations Plans submitted by the company. Corporate timber licenses had a validity
of 25 years and could be renewed for another 25 years if the holder could show that the
resources entrusted to him had been managed in accordance with the terms of the Philippine
Selective Logging System. Concessionaires were also obliged to hire forest guards to protect
the concession from illegal extraction and settlement. The continued validity of the license, as
well as the yearly approval of the Operations Plan, depended on compliance by the timber
licensee with the management conditions stipulated in the TLA, which had to be verified
annually by field officials of the Department for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The Philippine Selective Logging System provided technical guidelines to ensure the
sustainable management of these corporate concessions and to maximize the growth andd yield
rates of premium timber species in these natural forests1'. Species with a good commercial
value are Red Lauan (Shorea negronensis), Tangile (Shorea polysperma), Yakal (Hopea
Acuminata), Apitong (Dipterocarpus grandiflorus), Guijo (Shorea quiso) and White Lauan
(Pentacme contorta). In selective logging, it is assumed that after every cut, the forest will be
left to recover for a specified period of time, between 30 and 40 years, after which another cut
can be taken out. Each year, the licensee was allowed to selectively log a certain portion of
the forest concession; the volume of timber extracted was calculated in such a way that areas
logged in the first year of operation would be ready for a second cut in year 25. The Selective
Logging (SLS) prescribes the following course of action:
1) Forest Inventory, estimation of standing stock and sustained growth and yield
A team of foresters and labourers enters into the concession area. The cut of permitted
species is determined on the basis of the following key (dbh= diameter at breast height):
- 25 % of the total stock of 60-70 cm dbh
- 75% ,, ,, 70-80 cm dbh
- 100% ,, ,, SOcmandabove
On the basis of these inventories, a forest management plan is designed and the extractable
volume determined.
2) Preparation of TLA Operations Plan (for approval by DENR)
The Operations Plan (OP) is an annual specification of how the concessionaire plans to
implement selective logging activities in his concession. The geographical location of the
cutting blocks is defined, as well as the species to be extracted, the extractable volume, the
road network needed and the Timber Stand Improvement measures to be carried out in the
logged-over stand. A reforestation plan for an area (not necessarily inside the TLA) is
included in the OP, to be funded by the TLA holder The TLA holder can only start
logging operations after approval of the OP by the DENR.
3) Surveying, tree-marking and the construction of logging roads
Engineers determine the area specified in the OP on the ground, lay out a trajectory to be
followed by the bulldozers in the construction of logging roads and specify improvements
to enhance road stability (drainage, gravelling) Foresters and labourers mark trees to be
harvested, as well as trees that should not be damaged during the felling because of their
potential value in the next cutting cycle.
4) Felling and cutting, yarding
Selective Loggrng is "the svstematic removal of mature, overmature and drftctive trees m such a marmer as to
lfave an adequate number and volume ofhealthv residual trees of the desired species necessary to produce a future erop of
'imber and forest cover for the protection and conservation nf soil. water and wildlife" (PD 1559, 1978)
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Chainsaw operators feil the marked trees, remove tops and branches and cut these into
round logs of approximately 3 metres length. The round logs are yarded from the stump
site to a log pond, either by cable or making use of winches and spar trees.
5) Transportation to log pond and sawmill/ processing plant
At the log pond, an open spot in the forest that can be reached by the logging trucks, the
round logs are loaded on trucks and taken to the sawmill for semi-processing, or to a
plywood mill or other wood-processing plant (pulp, matches, dendro-thermal energy).
6) Timber Stand Improvement (TSI)
Because of the added light reaching the forest floor after removal of sorne of the taller
trees, many seedlings and vines sprout and compete for light, water and nutrients. Some
of the vines 'strangle' the young tree seedlings, slowing down the recovery of
commercially important species. Timber Stand Improvement is carried out 5 to 10 years
after the last cut. Less valuable species are girdled or removed, while 'potential erop trees'
are liberated from competing vines and trees. Wildlings of valuable timber species are
added to the residual stand. TSI entails a long-term investment by the concessionaire,
recoverable through a higher extractable volume at the end of the cutting cycle.
7) Reforestation
Site preparation, hole-digging, manure-hauling, seedling production, planting, the
construction of fire lines and the replacement of seedlings that died after the first planting
are all funded by the TLA holder. For every hectare logged, another hectare must be
replanted.
8) Evaluation (by DENR)
At the end of the logging season, the DENR verifies whether the OP has actually been
implemented. Non-compliance with the guidelines set out by the Selective Logging System
or with other pertinent regulations and policies, including the ban on prohibited species
such as Narra (Pterocarpus varanus12) and Almaciga (Agathis philippinensis), can lead to
suspension or cancellation of the TLA.
TLA holders were also required to select a portion of their concession to be preserved as a
wilderness area. Other rules and regulations prescribe the maximum width of logging and spur
roads (10 and 6 metres respectively) the density of roads used for log transportation; specify
felling techniques that minimize damage to the residual stand; require the maintenance of forest
cover on a twenty-metre strip along the banks of rivers; and ban logging in mossy forests and
in areas steeper than 50%, or over 1000 metres above sea level.
In practice, the selective logging system was hardly ever followed.13 TLA holders, their
contractors, and others illegally entering their concessions failed to observe most of the
technical prescriptions designed to minimize residual damage due to yarding and the
construction of logging roads and log landings. The so-called 'Bataan' system became the
Standard operating procedure in the mechanized logging operations on the western slopes of
the Sierra Madre. This system derives its name from the vintage Second World War personnel-
and weapon-carriers; these were imported from the American army base in Bataan province
by local contractors in the fifties and sixties, and used to haul logs from the forest to the
Prickly Narra is dominant m the Sierra Madre Pterocarpus indicus,Ü\e variety with smooth-skinned seeds also
occurs, but less frequently than m other parts of the Philippines.
See also Chapter 6 on the implementation of government policies with regard to the corporate logging mdustry
Other sources descrinmg violations of Philippme forestry laws and policies are Broad and Cavanagh 1993; Delos Angeles
1982; Hurst 1988; PCLI 1991: Repetto and Gillis 1988; Romero 1991; Simons 1991; Vitug 1993.
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sawmills in the lowlands. A Bataan-style logging operation involved a team of people with a
bulldozer and some trucks who entered into a concession to survey commercial stands of
timber and then to take them out. There was no pre-defmed management plan and instead of
following the sylvicultural practice of putting into place a pre-designed network of roads and
landing areas, the bulldozer operator followed the surveyors to random places near the main
road, where good trees were to be found. Because of the ability of the bulldozers to negotiate
extremely steep and muddy slopes, they were able to open up a dense fishbone network of
logging roads, often only serving the cutting and yarding of one or two valuable trees. In this
marmer, "foresters were clearing so much landfor roads, cable and tractor ways andfor log storage
that an estimated average of 30 % oftheforest - and often as much as 40-70% - was clear cut in the
course of the logging" (Sy and Lasmarias 1983:36, quoted in Porter and Ganapin 1988: 25)
The improper construction of logging roads has been a common feature of corporate
logging concessions in the Sierra Madre; where access roads passed through good timber
stands, they were over-dimensioned to allow the clear-cutting of a larger area; where they
passed through poorer portions, prescriptions on maximum slope were disregarded so as to
reach the next set-up more quickly. A major problem occurred when natural waterways were
crossed without the use of culverts. As a result of such haphazard road engineering, these
roads could barely support the weight of the often overloaded trucks leaving the cutting area.
Severe erosion occurred along these roads, and cascades of landslides can be seen downhill
from road tracés. Especially after heavy rain, bulldozers repeatedly scrape thick layers of mud
from the road tracts, creating bypasses along landslides and collapsed passages of creeks, and
dig deeper into the mountain slopes to create new tracks which will enable trucks to pass.
Anyone who has once been a passenger on top of the last log loaded on a six-by-svt*, sliding
down the steep, muddy bends of a logging road, while being treated to a rundown on the more
spectacular accidents that have overcome trucks making the same trip, feels a distinct sense
of relief at having reached the sawmill alive.
It is difficult to imagine the scale of these operations during the seventies and eighties.
First- hand reports by former employees of contractors operating in the WESCA concession
in Isabela say that every logging season 10 bulldozer teams, each with two or three chainsaw
operators, were operating inside the concession, and that the company had 300 logging trucks
hauling logs from various sources in the Sierra Madre15. Simons (1992) gave an eyewitness
account of a commercial logging operation in the Sierra Madre.
"The road plan is designed globally when the setup boundari.es are determined, but the final
decisions about where to establish a road are made by the bulldozer operator. Upon advicefrom
his helper, who is in front of the bulldozer to lookfor trees to be cut, the operator tries to minimize
the length of the road. Sometimes this means a road is laid straight uphill, especially when there
are only a few trees to be harvested. The bulldozer brings the logs to a log landing where they are
loaded onto logging trucks. In this way, the trucks do not need to use the steepest bulldozer roads.
At other times, bulldozers go straight uphill and then construct a zig-zag roadfor the logging trucks
going down. This way the weight of the machine helps in pushing down. Therefore it can push
harder and is less likely to get overheated. Bulldozer roads reach up to 90% in slope. trucks can
pass slopes up to 50% using the front winch... .areas were set onfire to have a better overvievo in
the area, especially in areas with a dense bamboo undergrowth." (Simons 1992: 35)
4 Designed to carry a maximum load of 2.5 tons, these trucks generally carry at least 2200 boardfeet of timber.
weighing around 3500 kg (Simons 1992:37)
5 Since some licensees were actually managing several concessions, farming these out among local contractors.
'°gging conglomerates could form, and one contractor could ship logs from several concessions to one large sawmill.
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The same author also observed that nearly all trees were felled in a downhill direction. A
chainsaw operator prefers this method, because the tree falls away from him and can not slide
downwards towards him after the fall. The more rapid fall of the tree in a downhill direction
also reduces the risk of a tree getting caught in other standing trees, a problem which can take
a good deal of effort to solve. The downhill felling method is more likely to damage residual
stands than uphill-oriented felling, both during the fall of the tree and afterwards, when the
logs need to be pulled back upward towards the loading point; this is done with a mechanica!
winch mounted on the front of the logging truck, a practice which again damages soil and
undergrowth uphill from the stump site.
Technical breakdowns were common, as the trucks and bulldozers were poorly maintained,
and these frequently obstructed logging roads. Since they were being paid per boardfoot of
timber produced, the logging crews would start cutting trees in the logged-over forests
surrounding the road block, so that they could at least produce some timber while waiting for
repair work on the equipment to be completed (Romero 1991:55). The practice of setting fire
to bamboo stands illustrates the careless way in which contractors and their employees16 went
about logging operations; the presence of such dense undergrowth and bamboo inside the
concession also points to the insufficient implementation and maintenance of Timber Stand
Improvement. The scarcity of good trees suggests that this operation took place in a secondary
stand which had not sufficiently recovered, a practice which was illegal up until 1992. In that
year, the Philippine government announced a logging ban in the country's last virgin forests.
This so-called "Oplan Sagip Gubat" (Operation Save the (virgin) Forest) led the DENR and
concessionaires to make new inventories of residual forests, in order to assess whether
commercial volumes of extractable timber were to be found in stands that had been logged less
than 25 years ago. These inventories were carried out by independent Forestry Service
Organizations and, in many cases, they produced volumes of standing stock only barely above
the minimum post-harvest stock of 67 m3 set by the government. With such dim prospects for
profitable extraction in the short term, concession holders backed out of the new Industrial
Forest Management Agreements put forward by the government after 1992, to replace the
TLAs (Dr. A. B. Masipiquena, pers. com. 1994)17
Illegal logging operations were invariably associated with Timber Licensing Agreements,
particularly on the western slopes of the Sierra Madre. Contractors in the lowland towns of
Cagayan Valley availed of the capital, equipment and manpower to conduct their own logging
operations, both in existing concessions and in those that had been suspended, cancelled or
voluntarily abandoned by the original holder. The origins of these illegal logging operations,
locally referred to as salabadiok, lay in the breakdown of law enforcement in the corporate
timber industry during the last decade of the Marcos administration. Army officials,
bureaucrats, local politicians and foresters who were involved in the logging industry in
Cagayan Valley during these years corrupted each other into package deals whereby violations
of the law were tolerated in exchange for personal benefits. The fact that these benefits were
directly proportional to the volumes of illegal timber involved acted as an incentive for poorly
Asked whether hè was not concerned about his cmployment once timber stocks were depleted, a bulldozer
operator answered "noprohlem, ihen we go mimng'" (H Simons, pcrs.com.. 1992)
The main reason why many IFMA holders returned their concession to the government was the new regulation
that required concessionaires [o deposit an amount equivalent to 10% of the standing stock of commercial species to a
special government account. This amount would be forteited should the concessionaire be found to have violated the terms
of (hè agreement The low stocks reduced the deposit. hut also led to a long period m which there was little or no return,
and logging could only be resumed when new surveys indicated that stocks had adequately recovered.
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paid local officials to even become active proponents of these deals (see also Chapter 6).
The following story from a female salabadiok operator in the town of San Mariano shows
how the large amounts of money earned in corporate logging eventually encouraged her to
become a logging entrepreneur herself. Baby Gonzales is the daughter of a landed family of
former tobacco and sugar planters in Benito Soliven. When we met for the first time in 1990,
she was already a well- known organizer of salabadiok logging operations, and she
accompanied us on several field trips inside the Sierra Madre. She never failed to make use
of these trips to promote her own business.
Box 4.6 Profïle of a Salabadiok (illegal logging) entrepreneur
"ƒ used to be a secretary in ... [one of the TLA holders operating in San Mariano, GT]. During my stay
with them, I started to sell slabs and other waste lumberfrom the sawmill, bui after some time, l began to
sell the real lumber and Ifound out there is much money in wood. In 1985/861 stoned my own salabadiok
operations; The NPA allowed me three trucks and askedfor 300 Pesos per truck in taxes. tfound some
trucks in Bulacan, someonefrom this tawnfinanced my operations and l provided him with wood. J t is very
easy money! Afterpaying the military and the DENR (each 200per truck) l earned 12,000 Pesos just
sitting here. My operations expanded quickly; between 1989 and 1991, I operated 23 trucks, 6 for the
Mayor, 6 for me and a numberfor other people in town. I became a financier myselfand my brothers and
sisters also panicipated with some amount. I was getting 30 cents per board foot transported and with my 6
units (2.5 tons each), l eamed 58,000 Pesos between March and June! Ofcourse, there is the NPA, and
the Army people and others to be bribed. We give them 100 to 200 for their coffee, some pocket money, we
take them to a nice restaurant, things like that. We wait, because we know they have to take a rest, and
then when it is midnight, we move...
The drivers like it very much to workfor me in salabadiok, they earn doublé salaries and afree
allowance of 1500 Pesos per lood. Every five trips, one is for the boys [the truckdriver and the cutting
crew, GT] Ifthey ride a strong truck, they can get 2 trips per day. My challenge to them is to make a
homerun: ifthey can reach 11 trips in one week; the number 11 is also for them. Every lood is 1800
boardfeet, and so the financier made lO.OOOpesos per lood after paying everything (we v/ere paid 9.8
Pesos per bft). But it is also risky for the financiers sometimes; there was this person who hiredme and my
surveyor to go to an areafor salabadiok. But when we brought the bulldozer and the trucks inside wefound
the place hè indicated was not good, we could not earn so much because there were only small diameters.
We had to bnng out the equipment and some lumber but not much. But l did not lose anything, I was
already holding an advance lo organize the operation. Once we are moving, the risk is on hts part, and so
hè lost, not me....
In 1991, when San Mariano was placed under a logging moratorium, I bought three chainsaws
and gave them to my some people here in Musinga. l also gave an advance of 2000 Pesos to each katsero
(chainsaw operator, GT) and provided them with oil, gasoline and diesel for the truck. I wanted Narra
only, no other species. But after two months, l was still waitingfor the Narra. Ifound out they brought it
down to San Mariano and delivered it to another buyer. They went back to supply me but it took them 6
months to get some, not all that I ordered. It is good l have one trusted man here [in the upland barangay
of Musinga, GT] so that I could get back my chainsaws and make them produce. I om now renting my
chainsaws to some other people. they pay 2 pesos per linealfeef. (Research diary, March 1996)
The story of Baby Gonzales captures in a nutshell how easy and profitable large-scale
mechanized timber extraction was. Attracted by these incentives, and using part of the
revenues to hand out money to those charged with protecting public forests from private abuse,
she was able to conduct logging operations on a considerable scale without any formal license
or other official papers. The practice whereby TLA holders farmed out timber volumes to local
contractors was replicated locally, as employees of these contractors acquired their own
equipment and entered the concessions on their own. After 1990, when government policies
towards corporate logging became increasingly restrictive, and illegal movements of heavy
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logging equipment into the forest lands could no longer be hidden under the cloak of legal
corporate logging operations, lowland entrepreneurs entered into direct timber production
contracts with forest communities.
As in all corporate enterprises, both the revenues and the level of influence on the conduct
of logging operations increased in proportion to the distance between the actors and the cutting
area. In local terms, chainsaw operators were comparatively well off, with earnings around
1000 pesos (US$ 40) per day during the logging season. A former TLA employee recalled the
fïesta-like atmosphere surrounding the industry during that time:
"During the logging days. we could be drunk all day and when the money was gone, wejust went
back to the forest Logging produced one-day millionaires: the manager of our sawmill was a
pure Chinese, hè was one of the richest Chinese in the Philippmes, a business partner of 'Don'
Alfredo Lim. He always arrived in his own helicopter". (Research diary, March 1996)
Like the chainsaw operators and helpers in the forest, actors in the lowlands were also paid
on the basis of boardfeet; however, given the volume of timber requiring the authorization of
company foresters, government officials and other decision makers in the lowlands, their
revenues could easily run into hundreds of thousands of pesos per season. Someone holding
a timber license and farmed out his annual allowable cut of 20,000 irf (a modest amount for
the seventies and eighties) to local contractors for an average royalty of 50 centavos per
boardfoot would earn 4.3 million pesos per season. According to a conservative estimate,
between 1970 and 1990 TLA holders and their contractors extracted timber worth at least US$
1.7 billion from the natural forests of the northern Sierra Madre18.
Once a sector consistmg of a limited number of Manila-based concessionaires managing
large blocks of forest lands, the large-scale corporate logging industry in Cagayan Valley was
transformed into a conglomerate of local contractors extracting allocated volumes of timber
from these concessions on the basis of volume-based royalty payments. Financial gains made
by these contractors allowed them to organize and finance their own package deals of tolerated
illegal extraction in and around these concessions, hiring workers from among the communities
of pioneers and followers already settled inside the Sierra Madre. This salabadiok system
changed again after 1990, as forest migrants themselves discovered the economie potential of
timber extraction and began to enter into direct timber production contracts with buyers in the
lowlands. This third timber extraction mode, carabao and waterlogging activities, which was
initially carried out by forest migrants on their own initiative, is discussed in Section 4.6. In
the late 1980s, when corporate logging was already declining, these originally illegal logging
activities of forest migrants were integrated into the regular and salabadiok operations of
lowland-based contractors, gradually all but replacing corporate logging as the sole legal mode
of access to timber from natural forests.
4.5.2 Actors in corporate logging
Apart from the diverse group of forest-based primary actors, including bulldozer and chainsaw
operators, yarders, truck drivers and those working in the sawmills, there is an extensive set
of secondary and tertiary actors with a certain degree of decision-making power in the
corporate timber industry. As we saw in the methodological section of Chapter 2, it is
debatable whether forest migrants and logging labourers should actually be classified as
primary actors in corporate logging, considering the fact that many of them entered the Sierra
Estimated volume extracted between 1970 and 1990. based on recorded extractable volume (assummg no illegal
extraction): 26 million m3 of prime species, valued at the 1980 price of 4 P/ boardfoot. converted into 1997 U.S dolars.
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Madre as logging company employees. The owners of these companies, one might argue, had
a greater decision making power in logging operations than the people on their payroll. As we
will see in the course of this chapter, however, the methodological choice made in Chapter 2
to start the ranking of actors from those involved in problem-relevant activities inside the
forest is not only consistent with the problem-in-context framework, but emphasizes the
individual independent dec is ion-making power of forest migrants. Unlike company workers
involved in sawmilling, transport, processing and manufacturing, the forest-based timber-
cutting teams rapidly went from salaried company employees to temporary wage-labourers
and, still later, to independent sub-contractors, paid on the basis of timber volumes delivered
to the company. The main actor categories involved in the corporate logging industry,
presented in Fig. 4.1, are briefly described below.
TlMBER-CUTTING TEAMS
Logging operations were carried out by teams consisting of a surveyor (the person who
knows the cutting area and leads the team to timber trees marked to be cut), a bulldozer
operator, a surveyor, two or three chainsaw operators and six or seven helpers. The high
revenues were a major incentive for these actors to join timber-cutting teams. Corporate
logging employment paid fairly well because income was directly proportional to the
volume of wood produced by the individual labourer; as we will see later in more detail,
the daily wage of a logging labourer could easily be four times as high as the amount that
one could earn in other sectors of the economy. Although physically taxing and risky, the
adventurous, macho image of the industry and the challenge of felling large trees without
getting hurt also appealed to many young men. The sense of pride one sees in the faces of
a band of young men riding a tall, powerful logging truck on its way to the forest spoke
volumes about the motives of young people in opting to join the logging industry. In the
early years of corporate logging in Cagayan Valley, teams always contained a few
labourers 'imported' from other regions, where logging had starled earlier than in Cagayan
Valley. Very soon, however, local contractors and workers handled most logging
operations themselves, and local forestry schools began to produce skilled rangers and
foresters. Born and bred in the region, they spoke the local dialects and being
socioculturally related to others in the actors' field, local employees had the advantage of
being potential 'assets '19 in contacts with the bureaucracy, the military or the New People's
Army.
COMPANY FORESTER
The company forester was the local boss of the entire logging operation. He managed
financial transactions on behalf of the concessionaire, prepared the annual operations plans,
arranged permits and other official papers from the government bureaucracy, and
coordinated informal and formal payments to political, administrative, military and NPA
officials whose cooperation was required for the undisturbed conduct of the logging
activity. This quote from a forestry professor with close contacts in the logging industry
illustrates the central role of the Company Forester as the caretaker of the Timber licensee,
and the sums of money circulating within the industry:
' This term ongmated in the military anti-insurgency campaign; if somebody was referred to as an asset, this
meant hè had close contacts with the NPA. Later, the same term was used by government officials for key informants with
contacts among politicians and busmessmen associated with Mlegal logging operations.
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'The TLA holder would give an amount of 50 million Pesos to the Company Forester at the
start of the logging season. With this amount, hè could maintain peace in the concession area;
the Company Forester was always a very popular man because nobody who visited him was
disappointed. "(Research diary 1993)
Box 4.7 Profile of a Company Forester
Ramon lives in a large, two-storey house, built in 1989 along what is jokingly called 'miltionaires' lane' in the
lowland town where hè was born. Both hè and his neighbour recently built ostentatious houses with money made
in a mix of legal and illegal timber businesses. His house bas steel bars on all thewindows for protection, its walls
are covered with thin layers of coral sheet. U is dark inside the house because walls, floors, ceiling and furniture,
as well as a massive staircase to the second floor are made of Narra, the most desired species for Philippine
interior decoration. Tonight, Ramon is comfortably seated outside in a small Spanish smoking cbair with his feet
up, and hè is facing two lines of men seated around a long table. Helpers serve beer andpoliaan, while hè cuddles
his son, He shows me a large scar on the boy's face; recently, while playing with his father's gun, hè nearly shot
himself through the head
Between 1980 and 1992, Ramon was the most influential Company Forester in the region , managing several
concessions in Isabela. During the fmal years of the industry, hè operated a few trucks of his own that transported
logs from the area, which is how hè amassed what a close friend refers to as his 'nest-egg'. When logging really
went down, after 1992, Ramon established his own NGO, to handle consultancy work in foreign-funded environ-
mental projects in the Forestry sector. Other than the director, the NGO employed no permanent staff. Experts
are contracted from a nearby university, fieldwork is done mainly by young university graduates with temporary
contracts. As the timber industry, formerly a major employer of forestry graduates, is laying off rather than hiring
new personnel, his NGO offers a welcome new employment opportunity. Ramon is a well-known figure in the
Department of the Environment and Natura! Resources; as a Company Forester hè used to visit the office
regularly to liaise with the Forest Protection and Forest Utilization sections. Nowadays, hè is seen mostly at the
Foreign Assisted Projects division. Good contacts with the DENR are as essential for company foresters as they
are for an NGO manager. Here, fellow forestry graduates administer the implementation of government-funded
projects. One person hè never fails to pay courtesy visits to is the Regional Executive Director. He, in turn, needs
to carefully manage his relationship with Ramon, who is rich and has personal ties with the Governor and with
several influential congressmen. After an attempt to start a political career himself in 1992, Ramon ran again for
the post of mayor in a former logging town, and won in 1995. He continued to manage his
NGO , using it as a means to generale external financial assistance for development projects in his town. (Perso-
nal diary 1990-1998)
LOCAL CONTRACTOR
A local businessman who owns or rents the machines (bulldozer, trucks) and personnel
needed for a corporate or salabadiok logging operation, and who has an informal
understanding with the Company Forester whereby hè extracts part of the Licensee's
Annual Allowable Cut from the concession in return for a royalty. Logging contractors are
often engaged in related businesses in the construction sector, such as wood processing
(sawmilling, furniture, plywood), or the hardware trade.
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
The policy of the Philippine government to grant business corporations a temporary lease
to extract timber from state-owned forests requires a bureaucratie system in order to
monitor whether licensees are managing these leases in accordance with the conditions
under which they are granted. Appointed government officials at the national, provincial
and local level are charged with this task. Elected officials such as town mayors,
governors, and members of the national House of Representatives make up the second
category of government actors who are important for corporate logging activities: directly,
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by defining relevant laws and policies, but also indirectly, through their influence within
the bureaucracy. The latter role is part of the Philippines' longstanding tradition of
patronage politics, in which electoral success depends on a combination of maintaining
good relations with the business sector, whose financial support is indispensable for
successful election campaigns, and projecting a credible image as a politican who will
protect the poor from government policies which affect them economically. The interests
of local politicians, such as the provincial governors and municipal mayors, inevitably
conflict with those of appointed officials in the DENR, charged with protecting public
property and natural resources from overexploitation by local campaign-funders and
voters. Chapter 6 examines in more detail the interactions between these two categories of
state actors on the implementation of forestry policies.
TlMBER LlCENSEE
Those who held corporate timber licenses were urban businessmen, army generals and
others in close contact with high government officials, including the President of the
Philippines. They often resided outside the region, only arriving occasionally by private
aeroplane or helicopter to meet with local staff or government officials. Throughout the
martial law period, the most influential timber licensee in Cagayan Valley was 'Don'
Alfonso Lim, who had supported and fmanced the political career of Ferdinand Marcos
since the 1960s. He owned one of Cagayan's first corporate timber concessions, Taggad
Industries, and later took over the management of two others (Pamplona Redwoods and
Veterans Woodworks Incorporated). He also held shares in several others, including
Southern Plywood, operating on the eastern slopes of the Sierra Madre, and the ACME
group of companies, which included several other concessions in Isabela (Vitug 1993).




The term 'carabao logging' is used for a variety of local, and mostly small-scale modes of
timber-extraction by forest migrants. The use of the carabao instead of heavy machines to haul
wood products from the forest to the community or to a waterway, is the essential difference
between these local methods and the large-scale, mechanized procedures described above.
Other differences are related to the working power and physiology of the carabao:
Distance to the cutting site
A carabao has a limited action radius and needs to wallow almost daily. Local people say
that a carabao cannot haul a load more than 15 kilometres at a time, but must rest for a
while between trips.
Extracted Volume
The maximum load a carabao can haul is 54 bft of Narra (around 90 kg), and this limits
the volume of timber that carabao loggers can extract during the dry season, as well as the
diameter of the trees. Only skilled chainsaw operators know how to cut big logs into
manageable planks that carabaos can haul.
In addition to my own tindmgs m the field, this paragraph consists of data gathered m the orthern Sierra Madre
by Millan and Dros (1997), Numan (1997). Klisters (1991) and Veth (1992).
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Efficiency
Due to the limitations of the carabao, loggers take away only the most valuable, dark core
of the trunk. After the tree has been felled, the trunk is cut into pieces 6-10 feet in length
and then squared or sliced, using a chainsaw. From an efficiency standpoint, this practice
is wasteful, the more so because the trees cut by carabao loggers are generally younger and
smaller in diameter. Only 30 to 40% of the total wood volume of these immature trees has
commercial value, and the remainder is left behind in the forest. On the other hand, if
carabao logging is not followed by conversion of the forest into farmland, this means that
more nutrients can re-enter the forest nutriënt cycle than in the case of corporate logging,
in which sawmilling takes place outside the forest, and waste materials are processed into
charcoal.
Access roads
In order to transport forest products from the cutting site to the road, waterway or village,
carabao loggers use tracks constructed by the bulldozers of corporate loggers. Without
maintenance, erosion and vegetation regrowth eventually turn these tracks into trails, that
carabao loggers can continue to use. Where corporate logging is still going on, carabao
loggers have an additional advantage, since the carabao needs to haul the logs only to the
nearest logging track, from where trucks are used to transport the wood the rest of the
way.
In the past, carabao and corporate logging had a more or less symbiotic relationship. For the
corporate industry, forest migrants and their carabaos offered a cheap, temporary workforce,
as well as a scapegoat for its own poor record in forest protection. For carabao loggers, large-
scale mechanized logging provided road access to additional old-growth forests, removed
timber too big for carabaos to haul, and offered transport facilities to take their products from
the cutting site to the lowlands. Carabaos were used to yard square logs, flitches and planks
from the stump sites to the pick-up point along the logging road. In the commercial logging
era, a carabao logger could penetrate deeper into the forest and make more trips, since it was
easier for him to organize transportation to the lowlands, either through a friend who drove
a company truck or by a using a truck hired by his buyer. When commercial logging decreased
in the early nineties, forest migrants became more and more aware of the limitations imposed
by the use of a carabao. This led to a shift from premium hardwoods to lesser-known
hardwoods and softwoods found within a 15-20 kilometre radius of the migrants' settlements.
During the wet season, from August to December, carabao loggers feil the volume they
will sell the following summer, between mid-March and July. The loggers regard this as their
investment in the next season; once a buyer comes, they can quickly come up with the volume
required and recover the time and money invested. Other reasons for feiling a certain volume
of trees prior to sale are:
1) It is the surest way to appropriate a tree. Once a tree has been cut, there is an unwritten
rule that says that no one who was not involved in its feiling is allowed to touch it.
Basically, the same principle applies to surveyors who discover a tree and leave their own
mark on it, but this does not have the other advantages described below.
2) When a large tree is found in a difficult location (remote, steep slope, etc.), the buyer runs
the risk of losing his investment if the timber can not be extracted. Trees may be offered
to buyers wholesale or under a production sharing-agreement. In the first case, which is
preferred by the producers, the buyer gets the whole tree and the team is paid in cash. In
the second option, the producers get a share of the wood harvested, meaning that producer
and buyer share the risk of production failure. The advanced feiling of a tree ensures that
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a Wholesale deal is possible, because the buyer is already assured that the timber can
indeed be produced.
3) The quality of the wood tends to improve in the first few months after felling; it will dry
slowly, become lighter, and crack less easily after slicing.
4) Old cut is legally accepted as an exception to the enforcement of temporary or selective log
bans. In other words, felling the tree makes it more likely that one can actually bring out
the timber without getting caught by the DENR. CVPED case studies and DENR reports
suggest that for every 100 households based in the uplands, there are at least 10 operating
chainsaws (Kusters 1991; Millan and Macadangdang 1994; DENR official, pers. com. Oct
1994). Combining this figure with the total number of 30,000 households who make their
home in the residing in the northern Sierra Madre in 1995, an estimated 3,000 chainsaws
still operate here, producing at least 56,000 m3 of timber per year21, roughly equivalent to
the annual allowable cut of one corporate timber concession during the 1970s and 80s.
Barangays involved in carabao logging have distinctively higher numbers of carabaos than
would be needed for the agricultural labour required in the croplands22. Averages of three or
more carabaos per household are reported (CVPED Team IV 1994). Loggers keep so many
animals because they not only haul logs, but also serve as a kind of savings account. Carabaos
do not require a great deal of care: in the uplands, where there is sufficient grazing space
around the settlement and hence no need to cut grass to feed them, a child can see to the
animals' pasturing and wallowing needs. They also fetch a good price in the market: a one-
year-old untrained male carabao fetches seven to eight thousand pesos in the local market, the
equivalent of the average annual income in the uplands.
In addition to the commercial species mentioned in the previous section, carabao loggers
also look for Narra trees. While the cutting of this tree is prohibited by law, Cagayan Valley
has a thriving furniture industry which makes almost exclusive use of Narra as its raw
material. One indication of the volume of Narra taken out by carabao loggers is that since 1990
they have been able to supply all the wood required by the furniture industry in Region 2.
Huigen (1997:28), citing a project proposal by a local association of furniture producers, sets
the wood requirement per furniture shop at around l m3 per month. Although the total number
of furniture shops is diffïcult to estimate, given the semi-legal character of Narra processing,
the number of unregistered furniture shops is widely believed to equal the 1,000 shops
registered with the Cagayan Valley Furniture Producers Association. Based on these estimates,
the region's furniture industries process 24,000 m1 of timber, mostly Narra, per year, a
volume that could be sustainably produced by approximately 1,000 hectares of pure Narra
plantations23, but which continues to be entirely extracted from the logged-over, natural forests
of the Sierra Madre. The problem here is that the natural Narra stock will probably be depleted
before the 35- year period has elapsed which is required to establish such a sustained-yield
Based on the assumption that each of these chainsaws is used for 4 two-week trips per year. producing 2000
boardfeet of timber per trip
During interviews. Forest migrants in Palanan. where commercial logging was hanned m the seventies. joked
that they could not go back to agricultural activities because their carabaos had been haulmg flitches for so many years that
they had forgotten how to plow (Dr A.B Masipiquena. pers. com.. May 1994).
Assummg 400 trees per hectare, harvested after 35 years. yielding 2m of lumber per mature tree (8 metre bolt.
70 cm dbh) = 800 m3/ha/35 yrs = 23 m3/ha yr The annual demand of 24.000 m3 is produced by 1000 ha of pure Narra
plantation
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Narra plantation. Fig. 4.2 shows that the current volumes of Narra processed annually by the
region's furniture industry are bound to cause a strong reduction in the natural Narra stocks
of the Sierra Madre. The following assumptions underlie this graph:
1) The 24,000 m3 of Narra timber used annually by the Cagayan Valley furniture industry is
extracted from the 600,000 ha of residual dipterocarp forests on the western slopes of the
Sierra Madre.
2) An average l % of the
overall timber stand is
Narra; this means that
of every 10 hectares of
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yield rate (of all timber species) of 2 mVha.yr. This means that the growth and yield of
Narra alone would be close to 0.02 mVha/yr (This is also higher than the figures put
forward by a DENR/NRMP workshop in 1994, where it was estimated that every 10
hectares yield one extractable Narra tree (4 m3' every 30 years, or 0.013 mVha.yr).
4) A resulting aggregate Narra growth and yield estimated at 12,000 m3 per year, declining
linearly with overall stock decline. (It is assumed that extracted areas do not produce
significant volumes of commercial Narra within the period considered here.)
One indicator of a rising awareness of timber scarcity among forest migrants is that carabao
logging appears to be shifting from a free-for-all system of resource extraction towards
exclusive systerns of resource access, through the delineation of extraction territories. As in
large-scale corporate concessions, these informal territories generally consist of an access route
together with the forest resources located on either side of that route. One rattan-gatherer told
me hè that hè found out about this so-called area-area system when hè entered a trail to find
rattan, and met some people there who refused to grant him entry, saying that they had already
occupied that trail. Ever since, the man only gathered rattan in areas where there were no open
trails. The 'owner' of one trail later told me that the area-area system succeeded the kanya
karcya system practised earlier, whereby forest products were removed on a first-come, first-
served basis. According to this trail owner, the area-area system was introduced by the NPA
in 1992, after a conflict had arisen between carabao loggers over square logs that had
disappeared from a trail. The area-area system applies exclusively to forest products, and
cannot prevent the opening of new farmland. Should someone plan to develop a farm inside
forest land claimed by the person who opened the trail, hè is morally bound to respect the
econome interests of the trail owner by opening up an area where there are few trees.
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(Source: Milan & Macadangdang 1994)
Data from two migrant communities relying strongly on carabao logging confirm a depletion
trend in Narra extraction, with commercial sizes found at ever greater distances from the
settlement (table 4.5). Unlike logging companies, forest migrants cannot easily shift their
carabao logging activities to other areas where good timber is still available. After
concentrating on softwoods or bamboo for a time, the remaining response of forest migrants
to resource depletion is to switch from resource extraction to other sources of income, usually
agriculture24. This means that the relative importance of carabao logging as a source of income
invariably decreases over time. Chainsaws and carabaos can then be used for the opening of
additional farmlands, and eventually for the conversion of fire-and-fallow farms into permanent
croplands (see also Section 4.7.2 and Chapter 9).
4.6.2 Actors in carabao logging
Carabao logging is a part-time activity. While the revenues may constitute as much as 60% of
overall household income (Huijbregts 1996:105), very few forest migrants spend more than 4
months a year on timber extraction. Thus the primary actors in this activity are actually the
same people we will be meeting in the next section, dealing with upland agriculture, and in
many cases the individuals who were introduced in the previous section as corporate logging
labourers. Many forest migrants have successively played each of these triree roles since they
first entered the Sierra Madre. Carabao logging encompasses a variety of activities, ranging
from surveying to cutting and hauling, and forest migrants participate to the extent their
resources permit. Newcomers seldom have either a chainsaw or a carabao, and as a rule can
only work as helpers, waterloggers (transporting logs and flitches from the cutting site to a
pickup point), or surveyors, if they happen to discover a harvestable tree. Pioneers and
followers, on the other hand, often have the means to organize carabao logging trips and thus
earn the most from the activity.
Carabao logging entails close cooperation between forest migrants and the buyers (or their
middleman) in the lowlands: the former must deliver the correct species and specifications at
the appointed time, while the latter must deal with the risk of confiscation once forest products
are on their way down to the lowlands, where they pass DENR and Army checkpoints on their
way. With the exception of the 'investment' cut during the wet season, carabao logging teams
only set out for the forest after an order has been confirmed through a cash advance from the
buyer, often a furniture maker, building contractor or lumber dealer from the lowlands. While
the loggers are out in the forest producing the appointed volume, the buyer makes arrangements
in the lowlands to prevent the confiscation of his shipment:
Migrants who enter the Sierra Madre with the specific mtention of developmg new farmlands for themselves or
others may be more likely to move on to new frontiers, now that unoccupied and still forested lands are becommg harder
to find.. However, since people in this category make their living primanly from agriculture from the time they enter the
forest. the depletion of forest products actually has little relevance for the decision to move on to a new frontier
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"The buyers in [...] are mostly from outside. They proceed there on Saturday; the buyer knows
some ofthepeople there very well and hè wilt ask if there is good Narra, howfar it is and ifit can
be taken. Ifthe guarantor, usually the chainsaw operator, says 'OK', they willgive him on advance.
This is the 'proof ofpurchase' and the buyer will now send the truck. The average deal is 2000 bft
at 15 Pesos per bft, and the advance would be 5 to 10,000 Pesos. Once the advance hos been paid,
the team hos to go out and get the wood, since the financiers cannot afford to [end money that will
take more than a month to realize a return.. One ofthem is a rich man who lives in Malapit, and
used to be employed by Veterans [the former concessionaire, GT]; hè now owns two trucks and
takes out Narra. He sells it up at Aparri, and from there it goes to Manila by barge. He prefers the
nothem route because there is less risk ofbeing caught giving bribes. The cutters do not get the rest
oftheir money until the lood hos arrived in the lowlands; sometimes a buyer will even notpay them
until the fumiture hos been produced and solo". (key informant, Nov '94)
Once the sale has been agreed upon, a group will be formed consisting of a surveyor, a
chainsaw operator, a helper and several yarders. The surveyor is the person who knows where
good timber can be found in the surroundings, and guides the team there. The chainsaw
operator brings a helper, who carries the chainsaw or provisions to the cutting area. He may
also be the cook and the one who goes for help in case they have engine trouble, say, or run
out of kerosine . The yarder hauls the flitches or planks from the stump site to the road; either
for pick-up by a truck or a carabao hauler. The hauler then takes the flitches from the cutting
area to the place of sale. In the case of a large sale, leaders are hired to load the planks and
flitches onto a logging truck. The chainsaw operator only assembles a team when hè is certain
of at least 400 bft. But given the minimum sale of 2000 bft, several teams may go out to bring
back the volume sold. On average, one carabao logging team can produce 1,500 - 2,000 bft in
square logs in one to two weeks25 (Millan and Dros 1997). Much depends on the skill of the
chainsaw operator, as it is his cutting technique which determines how much of the valuable
core material of the tree can be recovered.
Although carabao logging sometimes serves subsistence purposes, such as the construction
of a house or community building, it is primarily a source of cash income. As we will see later
in this chapter, it offers the highest returns on labour of all the income-generating options in
the uplands. The share of the harvested value one receives will depend on the quality and
quantity of the product harvested, and on one's place in the team. Lumber prices vary
according to species and the size of planks, flitches or round logs. A chainsaw operator can
produce 60 bft of planks a day and around 140 bft of flitches. At the 1994 local selling price
of Narra planks (18-19 Ph£/bft), a chainsaw operator could make 500-1,000 PhP/day,
enabling him to quickly recover the cost of a loan taken out for the purchase of a chainsaw16.
Despite the returns on labour, there are limits to the amount of time people can spend on
carabao logging, mainly because of its seasonal nature. Other constraints are the risky nature
of the work and the physical requirements, which mean that most carabao loggers are young,
unmarried males. The semi-legal or illegal nature of carabao-logging and ultimately the
dwindling stocks of commercial timber in the surroundings also reduce the total amount of time
15 Dutch student Kusters (1991) estimates that one chainsaw can cut and slice approximately 10 trees per month.
Producmg 2000 to 3000 boardfeet of commercial timber. I consider the higher rates given here more accurate, since they
were given by a Filipmo forester after a six months' study on carabao logging m two commumties m the Sierra Madre.
A companson of the returns on labour of vanous livelihood options is given in Section 4.10. The figures
Presented there are based on 1994 lumber prices. which have risen with the increasing scarcity of timber as a result of the
contractmg corporate logging mdustry m the 1990s Actual net returns on labour may be slightly lower after payment of
formal and mformal taxes to NPA. army and government officials (see Chapter 6).
122 chapter 4
spent on this activity. Numan (1995) reports that carabao loggers set out on a tree-cutting trip
with a specific purchase in mind, for which they need the income generaled by that particular
trip. On the basis of my own interviews, I would venture to say that carabao logging is largely
a demand-driven activity. While forest migrants may have a concrete objective in mind for the
revenues generaled by each trip, the decision to go into the forest is based primarily on an
assured order from the iowlands, for the following reasons:
1) Cutting teams need a cash advance to buy petrol, oil and supplies to last them one to two
weeks.
2) The timber buyer has to make arrangements with local DENR field officials to secure
passage of the forest products at the checkpoints. It would not make sense for carabao
loggers to set out for a trip until this has been done, since their pay also depends on the sale
of the - processed - product.
3) Once the demand has been ascertained, forest migrants are eager to invest their time in such
a prime cash-earning opportunity. Since most sources of cash income present themselves
only during the dry season, the highest-paying job naturally gets priority, and farming
chores may even be skipped or contracted out to other migrants..
Thus in addition to the cutting teams in the Sierra Madre, a preliminary version of the actors'
field of carabao logging would also include the following actors (see fig. 4.3):
MlDDLEMEN/BUYERS
Middlemen are individuals with reliable contacts in the forest lands, who enter into deals
on behalf of one or more buyers in the Iowlands. Huigen (1997) distinguishes first and
second middlemen: the first middleman is based in the upland barangay where the lumber
is produced and organizes the logistics for a carabao logging team. The second middleman
is a lowland-based trader/entrepreneur, who organizes lumber transportation from the forest
lands to his lumberyard and distributes the volume produced among the buyers who are
financing the operation.
WOOD-PROCESSING INDUSTRIES IN CAGAYAN VALLEY
Wood-processing industries in Region 2, such as furniture shops and construction
industries, have traditionally depended largely on illegal sources of lumber. In addition to
price considerations, furniture makers also relied on carabao loggers because of the strong
customer preference for Narra products. Legal logging concessionaires were not allowed
to cut this tree, after Marcos proclaimed it a protected national symbol. The construction
industry was interested in illegal lumber because of cost savings, and because of shortages
caused by the primary goal of TLA holders, which was to ship round logs and sawn timber
straight out of Region 2 and on to destinations abroad. Thus most local wood-processing
industries all starled as more or less as 'hitch-hikers' of the legal logging industry.
Depending on their skills and productivity, carpenters, varnishers and planers earn between
2,000 and 5,000 Pesos per month, while the salary of a master carpenter employee may
reach 7,000 to 8,000 Pesos per month (Huigen 1997) The various jeepneys and ostentatious
houses owned by some these shop operators suggest that the production of furniture,
woodedn tiles, carvings, panels, knock-down stairs and other specialty wood products
continues to be highly profitable. Due to the uncertain supply of raw materials, the industry
ived, and continues to live, under an umbrella of political patronage and has gradually
become better organized by setting up its own association (see Section 5.2.2)
Fig. 4.3 A basic actors field of carabao logging
Reduced forest cover Stable forest cover
Carabao logging
1 i















rty, no leadership .

















, M i ' J M !
• profil
^•"TesponcTto^
































Policies governing the extraction of forest products by forest migrants have only recently
been formulated; until the early 1990s, carabao logging was entirely illegal, making it
necessary for middlemen to make prior arrangements with checkpoints along the route
between the upland community and the buyer's lumberyard. Since 1994, carabao logging
has been subject to regulations under the Community Forestry Programme. Settlements
with government actors are now directed towards securing the proper documents, which
attest to compliance or approved exemptions to these policies (see Chapters 5 and 6).
Government actors approached for that purpose are DENR office personnel, checkpoint
officials, army checkpoint officials and, in some cases, local politicians.
CONSUMERS
The continuing demand for construction lumber, wooden furniture, decorative panelling and
flooring is what ultimately keeps carabao logging going. These industries serve not only the
needs of local consumers: since the export of unprocessed lumber from the region was
banned in 1994, exports of semi-processed and processed wood products to other parts of
the Philippines have increased, and local politicians and representatives of the industrial
sector invite international investors to develop export-orientated wood-processing industries
in the region.
Rather than aiming at a comprehensive treatment of carabao logging, the preliminary and
relatively empty actors' field in Fig. 4.3 refers to actors and factors that will be examined in
more detail in the following chapters. But first we will continue our efforts to gain insight into
the variety of deforestation-related primary actors and activities in the Sierra Madre.
4.7 Upland agriculture27
4.7. l The nomenclature
Kaingin is the generic term often used by lowlanders, government officials and foreigners to
refer to slash-and-burn farming in the Philippine uplands. The term does not differentiate
between the wide range of agricultural strategies, including long- and short-fallow swidden
farming, agroforestry practices, and forms of ploughed cropping which fall into this broad
category (Henkemans 1994). As several other authors have pointed out (Dove 1983; Kleinman
et al. 1995; Olofson 1981; Sajise 1982), slash-and-burn farming has long been poorly
understood and regarded almost by defmition as environmentally unsound. As a result, the
indigenous and migrant people engaged in this kind of agriculture, known as kaingineros, have
long been seen as important contributors to the problem of tropical deforestation. (Bee28 1987;
DENR 1991; FAO 1987; Myers 1988; PCARRD 1982; WRI 1990). As we will see in Chapter
7, such critical views on the subject of upland agriculture are also related to a long history, in
which relations between the 'free' forest lands and the Spanish, American and Philippine
administered lowlands alternated between trade and conflict. State-sponsored efforts to mobilize
7 Important contributions to the matenal presented m this section were made by Dirkx (1995). Doedens (1992),
Dros (1995), Numan (1995). Romero (1991), Veth (1992). Wedda (1992) and Van Voorthuizen (1995).
To avoid confusion. in my references to the work of Ooi Jm Bee (1987) I will conform to the practice of other
authors (Eder 1989; Kummer 1992e). who use his given name Bee. and not his family name Ooi m their citations.
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forest lands and resources intensified in the early twentieth century, when the United States
introduced the Philippines to scientific forestry and large-scale, mechanized logging, making
upland farming even less compatible with government views on how best to manage the forest
lands.
One of the first field studies to challenge dominant views on Philippine upland agriculture
was published in 1957 by Harold Conklin (Tucker 1992). His detailed description of Hanunoó
swidden agriculture showed that these indigenous forest people were indeed deliberately
managing their resources, though they were inspired more by utilitarian than environmental
motives (Conklin 1957; Warner 1991). Whether the same holds true for forest migrants with
no prior experience in upland management remains to be seen; in any case, doubt was cast on
longstanding views that upland farming could be equated with exhaustive and shifting forms
of slash-and-burn agriculture. Later studies revealed that slash-and-burn farming was often part
of a gradual transition from rotational to permanent open-field and agroforestry farming
systems (Garrity et al. 1993:560)
Olofson (1981) objected to the use of the term kaingin, because "it lumps together both
swiddens, which are regularly shifted, and permanent orfixed-hillside farms...and because of
the lumping nature of the term, permanent kaingin farmers are sometimes mistaken for
"temporary farmers" and "denuders of the forest", i.e., for shifting cultivator s, because a more
objective term is not used" (ibid:4). Because of this lack of specificity and the negative
connotation in which this word has been used in the Philippines since colonial times, I opted
not to use the term kaingin in this book as the umbrella term for the variety of farming
techniques practised in the Sierra Madre. The English alternative swidden, which Olofson
prefers, may indeed sound less negative, but is still often associated with the idea of shifting
farms carved from natural forests, suggesting that these farming techniques are totally unrelated
to other, permanent methods of managing erop land. In practice, at least in the Sierra Madre,
many croplands cleared of forest vegetation29 with the help of fire and fallow systems gradually
develop into permanently cropped agroforestry areas, i.e., commercial tree plantations yielding
fruits, resins, or firewood, or ploughed permanent croplands. The Ilokano language most
commonly used by migrant farmers in the Sierra Madre distinguishes the following four basic
types of farmland, two of which, uma and ublag, together comprise the stage that is usually
called slash-and-burn, swidden, or kaingin farming:
1) Uma
These are newly opened patches of forest land, cleared with the use of slash-and-burn
techniques, as well as those lands which were opened in recent years and are still producing
annual crops™. Uma lands can be distinguished from the other farm types described below
by the alternate use of fire and fallow as the main soil management technique: erop
cultivation takes place without ploughing, and without the use of chemical fertilizers. Uma
preparation entails the systematic clearing of all existing vegetation (either a residual forest
stand or a sufficiently regenerated ublag), after which the biomass is left to dry and then
The term forest vegetation should hè mterpreted here as: residual stands of logged-over natural dipterocarp
forest. The conversion of pnmary forest into farmland hy forest migrants is highly exceptional in the Sierra Madre. not
'east because over 80% of the old-growth forests m these mountams were logged between 1970 and 1990.
Peters (1995) and Van der Veen (1997). who conducted fieldwork among Ilokano and Ifugao migrant settlements
'n the province of Quirino. USe both uma and bakker to refer to a patch of newly opened - and cultivated - forest land; the
"ame of the patch changes into sipsip once the second and consecutive crops are cultivated on these lands. and becomes
"Wa. once the land is left to fallow. Once an uhlag area is reopened for agriculture. the area is referred to as patompong.
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repeatedly bumed. As a rule, a mixture of grain, vegetables and perennials is produced on
these fields, until grasses and vegetation regrowth make the cultivation of annuals less
feasible and a new uma needs to be opened up. Many Uma lands still have a few trees firom
the original forest cover that were tall enough to survive the burn, despite fire-damaged
trunks.
2) Ublag
Regenerating fallow areas that have been used as uma at least once before. Older ublags
that have been repeatedly opened up are left to fallow for a longer period and thus have
more small trees, shrubs and bamboos on them. Henkemans (1994) mentions the local
practice of planting ublag areas with banana trees and other perennials (coffee, papaya,
pineapple), in order to earn some income from these lands. In other cases, banana trees are
introduced directly after the fïrst burn, and only old, unproductive banana trees are still
visible between the regenerating forest vegetation. The duration of the fallow period ranges
from two to seven years.
3) Bangkag
Lands devoted permanently to agriculture. The essential difference with uma is that the land
is ploughed. The switch to plough-based farming can only take place after roots and stumps
have decayed sufficiently, in other words, after several fire-and-fallow cycles. Rain-fed
agriculture takes place here, and often fertilizer and agrochemicals are applied. Moderately
sloping, undulating areas are preferred.
4) Talon
These are irrigated lands, mostly under wet rice varieties, located in inner valleys and other
low-lying areas near a spring or natura! watercourse. Highly suitable for agriculture, they
are the fïrst forest lands converted into farmlands.
The main distinction between uma farming and the other types is that in the permanent
croplands, fire-and-fallow cycles are replaced by ploughing in order to prevent forest
regeneration, limit competition between weeds and the agricultural erop, and improve soil
fertility. The farming practices commonly employed on uma and ublag lands are highly
relevant to our understanding of the deforestation problem under discussion here. As a rule,
these practices retain the possibility for forest regeneration, although steep ublag areas with
shallow soils that are given only short recovery periods before being turned into uma land again
are more prone to the adverse environmental impacts of deforestation, such as the loss of forest
habitat, watershed degradation and downstream sedimentation. For this reason, the remainder
of the present section will explore in more detail the various uma-ublag systems practised in
the Sierra Madre. In Chapter 9, which discusses the increasing production of commercial
agricultural crops in the Sierra Madre, especially hybrid corn, the role of talon and bangkag
agriculture will be examined.
4.7.2 A closer examination of crop-fallow sequences
Uma farming involves two cropping periods: a dry-season erop planted in April or May and
a wet-season erop planted in October or November. Traditionally, the wet season erop is
regarded as the fïrst and most important erop; just after clearing, the soil is fertile and free of
weeds, conditions which are particularly important for the principal erop cultivated in the uma'.
upland rice. The second erop, which is harvested in the dry months of February and March,
is usually beans or peanuts, as during the wet season these crops are easily affected by rot and
moulds. The cropping sequence of upland rice and beans is common on uma farms in the Sierra
Madre. A generic cultivation calendar for two cropping periods in the uma farm appears in fig-
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4.4. After the first year of cultivation, farmers can choose from a wide range of cropping and
fallow sequences, as we will see in the course of this section. The opening of a new uma farm
involves the following sequence of activities31:
1) UMA SITE SELECTION AND CLEARING
During the final months of the rainy season, when the rains are becoming less frequent and the
cool northeastern winds still prevail in Cagayan Valley, upland farmers select a forest patch and
slash its vegetation in preparation for the burn. Clearing must be completed by early March,
when the dry season starts and the cut vegetation has to dry for one to two weeks to ensure a
quick, hot burn. The patch to be cleared may be either an ublag area which the farmer
considers adequately recovered or a patch of residual forest vegetation that is to be cleared for
the first time. With the exception of certain areas in Quirino and on the Pacific slopes, almost
all uma clearings are in logged-over stands. This makes clearing easier, as these forests contain
only a few "forest giants" of the kind Conklin saw being felled by the Hanunóo in Mindoro
(Conklin 1957). Probably because of the labour involved in clearing primary forest, residual
stands were also preferred by these traditional shifting cultivators. Thus in the three seasons
which I observed, only 7 swiddens were opened in primary forest, compared to 155 in
secondary stands (ibid:6l) The following criteria were weighed in the selection of the forest
patch to be turned into uma land:
Accessibility, Distance to the house
Uma fields are preferably located within walking distance, so that the hike from the
house to the farm and back can be made daily; this usually involves walking to one's
farm in the early morning hours between six and eight o'clock, and travelling back
between four and six in the afternoon. As in carabao logging, this limits the access from
a given upland settlement to a radius of 10-15 kilometres around that settlement32.
Simons (1992) mentions that accessibility and distance are also important because of
security considerations related to the unstable Peace and Order situation.
Customary Ownership
Most people avoid opening up an area that informally belongs to another family, unless
one has the permission of the owner to do so (often on the basis of an informal
sharecropping agreement). Land becomes someone's informal property when hè has
cleared it of the natural vegetation (i.e., before actual cultivation). This informal rule
is based on the relatively large investment in - hired - labour that clearing requires, in
comparison with the other stages of uma/ublag cultivation.
Slope and elevation
Flat and rolling lands are cleared first, since they have the best potential to be turned
into permanent erop lands, and ultimately be classified and titled as such. Where these
lands are already occupied, which is usually the case when newcomers settle in
established forest communities, steeper areas also qualify, as long as other criteria are
A more detailed analysis of upland farmmg in the forest lands of Quirino may be found in the forthcoming
disserttüon of Esther Moonen (see also Moonen 1998).
A limited number of cases have been reported m which migrants have moved their residence to a new location in
the proximity of new 'convertible' lands with good agricultural potential (Doedens, 1992).
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met. Some upland farmers even prefer steep slopes", because they are easier to weed
(no need to bend over), or because the slope is expected to provide shelter from a
typhoon (Doedens 1992: 46).
Sou type
A deep brown soil with a fine texture is preferred. Red, acidic soils degrade quickly
and require a great deal of labour to protect the erop from competition by cogon
grasses, which sprout on these soils after only one or two cropping seasons.
Vegetative cover
A farmer who owns a chainsaw can open up a piece of forest that still has a fairly high
biomass and bigger standing trees. Those who can afford to invest labour and money
in the opening-up of residual forest do so because this offers the prospect of achieving
a higher yield after the first burn, when the ash of the residual forest and the fresh
topsoil ensure good fertility. Dros (pers. com. 1995) tells of an upland farmer in
Amistad, Cagayan who chose to clear an area of rather well-stocked secondary forest,
using his chain saw, rather than to convert his large, flat area of ublag to bangkag. The
clearing of the forest entailed so much additional work that the entire first cropping
season was missed, but the farmer was convinced hè would be better off with his new
field, as yields in the coming seasons would more than compensate him for his
investments. On the other hand, the additional labour and capital expenses for the use
or rental of a chainsaw represent an investment that not everyone can afford or is
prepared to make. Poorer and smaller households therefore prefer areas with few
grasses and a good number of small trees. The presence of bamboo stands is a sign of
good soil fertility (Wedda 1992).
The decision to clear either a new patch of forest or an ublag has to do with the time which has
elapsed since the migrant started to farm. New migrants obviously do not yet have the option
of re-opening an ublag of their own, even though they might prefer to do so, given their limited
labour. Clearing an ublag requires less labour than the opening of a residual forest stand. On
the other hand, some of the advantage in terms of the required labour is lost in the course of
the season, when more weeding is required on re-opened fallows than on newly cleared forest
soils. One way of remedying the shortage of labour during the busy clearing season is to rent
a chainsaw. The use of a chainsaw cuts the labour requirement in half: a man with a chainsaw
can clear one hectare of secondary forest in 20 to 30 days, a job that would otherwise take
about two months. Renting a chainsaw costs 70 to 100 pesos per day, excluding gas and oil,
or the equivalent of two days' work as a farm labourer. For many newcomers, such an
investment is neither affordable nor economically rational. Since cash is scarce in these
households, every day of labour saved by the use of the chainsaw has to be repaid by working
two days for the chainsaw owner later. Sometimes payments in the form of labour are made
during the clearing season, by using the chainsaw to open up a patch for its owner.
Thus migrants who settle in areas where pioneers and followers have already converted
most of the nearby forest lands into uma and ublag, and who cannot afford to hire a chainsaw
to open up a new uma of their own further away often ask a pioneer for permission to re-open
one of his ublag lands, either buying the user rights for a lump sum, or settling for a
sharecropping agreement with the person claiming customary ownership to the land on the basis
Conklin observed the same preferente among the Hanunóo: "<,ometimes activitie.i connected with feiling, hurning
and weeding are a good deal easier if the site is on sloping rather than on relatively level land" (ihid:38). The average
slope of the lands cleared by these indigenous forest people was 43- 60%
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of the labour put into the first clearing. Newcomers (such as the Ifugao described in Box 4.4)
who, like the pioneers in the fifties and sixties, opt not to settle in the proximity of the last
settlement, but rather to leapfrog beyond it to a spot where unoccupied convertible lands are
still found, initially clear between 0.5 and l hectare of forest every year (Dirkx 1995; Doedens
1992; Dros 1995; Simons 1992), until customary ownership has been established of a total area
of uma and ublag lands amounting to four to six hectares34. At the same time, each upland
community has its own small group of enterprising early migrants who claim ownership of
estate-like areas of converted forest land. Since their arrival in the Sierra Madre in the sixties,
two pioneers in Pauikan and Amistad had opened up 165 and 130 hectares of forest respectively
(land which was partly idle or cultivated by others), on the basis of paid labour or sharecrop
tenancy (see also Section 4.9.1).
The physically demanding work of forest-clearing is typically carried out by the men,
especially in residual forest where trees have to be cut with chainsaws and axes. In the case of
more lightly vegetated ublag areas, which can be cleared using bolos, women and children play
a larger role, especially at times when the dry spell starled late and rapid clearing is needed to
ensure a good bura before the planting season. Women and children remove bamboo, smaller
vegetation and weeds, which must be cleared before the bigger trees are felled. Cut bamboo
poles are placed upright against trees which are too tall to feil by bolo or axe, thus enabling the
fire to consume the crowns and prevent them from shading the erop after planting.
Clearing starts at the bottom of the nearest unoccupied and unclaimed slope, preferably in the
proximity of a water source. In the following year, the clearing moves sideways the nearest
creek, and up again until the boundary of the adjacent settlement or watershed is reached. The
next move is upslope again, and the pattern repeats itself, until the household decides it has all
the land it can handle for erop production, or until all forests within hiking distance have been
converted. Clearing must be thorough and complete, even around creeks and on hilltops where
only marginal cropping is possible. If there is a thick vegetation cover in an area selected for
uma, that area may even be burnt before clearing, to facilitate the work (Wedda 1992). Farmers
give the following reasons for the complete and rapid clearing of residual forest during the
early years after settlement:
~ The staple-production priority of newcomers, due to financial hardship and distance to
markets, requires the fertile soil of a newly opened uma. On older uma lands, upland rice
is choked out by a regrowth of forest vegetation and cogon grasses (Imperata cylindrica).
- Customary law35 among forest migrants prescribes that public land belongs to the person
who 'improves' (read: clears) it first. Cases have been reported of areas locally regarded
as the property of the person who cleared them 25 years ago and left them to fallow ever
since (Dros 1995:68). By spending the first years of one's stay in the forest opening up land
rather than intensifying on land already cleared, a forest migrant appropriates more land
for future use or sale. In pioneer settlements, where land scarcity is perceived as imminent
due to the arrival of many newcomers, speculative land clearing may resulf6.
cf. Table 4.2 for average are»s of farmland per forest-based household recorded by the 1987 RP-German survey.
This customary law was also a formal government law dunng the American penod and the early years of
"ndependence. when the homestead law allowed landless families to occupy and use - though not own - a maximum of 24
ha of public land if they had cleared it of its natural vegetation (see also Chapter 8).
6 During a field trip to Qumno in the summer of 1993, l encountered Ifugao clearing crews, who were continuously
opening up secondary forest stands for well-established migrants Due to the increasing number of new arrivals. the notion
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— Migrants call this sideways expansion "the runfor the boundary", referring to the maximum
width of the strip which will later be cleared in the upslope direction. The slope upward
from the current clearing is called the abanti and is considered the property of the person
who opened the fïrst clearing at the foot of that slope (Peters 1995: 15). By reaching the
boundary fïrst, the width of the strip to be cleared in years to come is maximized37.
- Steep slopes around creeks are attractive for both clearing and farming: there is no need to
bend, and one can work in an upright position.
- A good burn is hot and quick; steep slopes create long flames that climb quickly; the burn
can be completed within an hour.
- There should be no vegetation left near the croplands, as these will become hiding places
for rats and monkeys
- Competition for light; during the dry season, remaining tree crowns would prevent the
drying of the cut vegetation and thus interfere with a good burn. During the cropping
season, trees take light away from the crops on the ground.
The first burn takes place a few weeks after the dry season has set in, usually during late
March or early April. By this time, the cut vegetation has dried well and a good burn is
assured. The timing of the burn is critical: it is important to wait long enough for the slash to
dry adequately, but there is always the risk of an early onset of the rainy season. Bad timing
may render an entire clearing useless. The fire is starled in the lower part of the uma; before
doing this, fïre lines are established around the borders of the prospective uma'*. Farmers who
have selected neighbouring umas coordinate their prospective burning dates. The burn is always
initiated during the hottest hour of the day, around noon. Dew prevents a good burn in the early
morning, and the evening is less attractive because winds tend to shift rapidly once the sun goes
down (at dusk it either picks up or drops completely, both unfavourable conditions during
burning).
If the clearing is completed early or the monsoon arrivés late, successive burns are
conducted to reach a more complete clearing. After the fïrst burn, preparations are made for
remedial burnings by placing piles of half-burnt branches and other vegetation around the
trunks of bigger trees. These consecutive burns may be prepared and carried out by the women
and younger members of the household, if the man has work to do elsewhere. Scorched stumps
are not removed from the field unless they are valuable species or are needed for fuelwood.
Clearing remnants from the field also serves to mark one's claim to the land.
Migrants from the Cordillera bring with them the skills and knowledge required for the
proper clearing and burning of a forest patch; neither their fellow migrants from the lowlands
nor the Agta had previous exposure to this technology. One Ibaloy farmer expressed his role
as a slash-and-burn extensionist as follows:
"It is realty hard to bum an area well. Somenmes it takes six times before one can be sure that the
forest will not come back. I om an expert in burning but there are many who do not know how to
of future land scarcity hegan to take hold among these early migrants. giving rise to speculative clearing The crews were
paid 1,500 pesos ($60) for each hectare cleared (Research diary, March 1993).
One key informant told me that some migrants even 'take advantage' of this customary mode of appropnating
forest for future clearing, by burning a strip of land around a particular forest area with the idea of claiming everythmg
within that line as theirs for future clearing (Research Diary. March 1996).
38
The risk of an uncnmrolled foresl fire is not imaginary. especially m poorly stocked logged over forest; the
partially opened canopy causes higher temperatures and lower humidity and an overall desiccation of forest foliage and of
the lower vegetation-layers.
at the cuning edge... 131
do it. For example the Agta. Before we came here they did not even know how to make uma. But
we educated them, and now they know how to clear and burn also" (Research diary, 1992)
Several authors have pointed out the beneficial effects of burning for erop cultivation, such as
the deposition of part of the burnt biomass on the topsoil, which lowers acidity and raises levels
of essential nutrients such as calcium, potassium, phosphorous, and magnesium; much of the
nitrogen and sulrur contained in the biomass oxidize into gaseous compounds (Andriesse 1987;
Kleinman et al. 1995, see also Section 4.6.3). The topsoil is also believed to develop a more
favourable structure, while the erop is less affected by weeds and diseases, many of which are
destroyed by the fire (Rambo 1981, cited in Peters 1995; Sajise and Fujisaka 1986). The
labour-saving effect of fire has also been widely acknowledged; although clearing remains an
arduous and time-consuming activity, fire is the fastest way to remove slashed forest or
grassland vegetation, while postponing regeneration long enough for cropping to become
feasible. Another factor which used to motivate upland tribes to burn their fields was the belief
that this would drive away bad spirits. Some trees, such as the Balete (Ficus balete), are
traditionally seen as a dweiling place of spirits (Wedda 1992:56). Cutting these without having
first made an offering to the spirits was believed to bring illness and misfortune to the person
involved. While it is unclear what role these animistic elements still piay in the decisions of
forest migrants on future land use, especially those from the Christian lowlands, their influence
can not be ruled out.
2) PLANTING AND WEEDING
A variety of crops (see table 4.6) and cropping patterns are found on upland farms. Most often,
the first crops planted in the uma after clearing are upland rice and beans or upland rice and
bananas, often intercropped with a host of minor crops. If bananas are planted from the first
erop onwards, farmers are forced to clear new forest during the next dry season, because rice
yields are impaired by the shade of the banana trees, which take from 10-18 months to become
productive (Huijbregts 1996:103).







































Other crops commonly grown on upland farms in the Sierra Madre are:
Annuals: watermelon, Baguio beans, pumpkins, okra, ampalaya. eggplant, tomatoes, chillies and tobacco.
Tree crops: jackfruit. papayas, horseradish, mangos, mandarins, kalamansi, pomelos, santol and coconut.
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Upland rice germinates after the first rains have lallen It is sown in newly opened uma lands
at the onset of the rainy season, normally in May but sometimes (as in 1992) as late as July.
The month of April is considered too hot for planting, but as soon as the first rains arrive,
sowing and planting should start to give the agricultural crops an advantage over the weeds.
The man makes holes in the soil about 5 cm deep and 10-15 cm apart, using a wooden pole.
Behind him, women and children plant a few seeds in each hole and then fill it up with a little
soil. Sometimes, an offering is made before planting begins. This might be done in order to
please the spirits, the so-called 'patunib' offer that Tingguian migrants in one settlement in the
Sierra Madre still practice. A household member plants a few seeds in the field on the afternoon
before the actual planting takes place. This is expected to have a positive effect on yields and
to drive away evil spirits from the field. Again, these rituals are only practised by elderly
migrants from upland areas; neither their offspring nor Christian migrants from the lowlands
attach any great importance to these religieus traditions of upland agriculture (Wedda
1992:51)39
For forest migrants with a tradition in upland farming, such as the Ifugao, upland rice is
the undisputed first erop on the uma. The drawback is the fact that it requires a relatively high
labour investment in return for modest yields, around 500 kilograms of unhusked pagay (II.)
per hectare, roughly half the amount of cereals consumed annually by a fïve-member
household. Due to its small leaves, upland rice has more trouble competing with weeds. During
the first cropping season on newly opened land, this drawback is not yet serious, as fertility is
high and weeds are themselves still recovering from the burn. Depending on the quality of the
soil, consecutive erop yields are bound to be more seriously affected by weeds and declining
nutriënt levels. In addition, it is not advisable to plant upland rice where neighbouring farmers
opt for a different erop, since birds would cause high losses in the few areas where rice is
growing. Furthermore, a second erop of upland rice can only be cultivated with some success
if the uma has remained relatively free of cogon grasses, which become harder to suppress
when soil fertility declines and acidity increases. Corn, on the other hand, competes more
aggressively for light and nutnents; its higher leaf area causes a more rapid and higher soil
cover, which suppresses weeds, allowing this erop to be cultivated several times in a row on
the same uma.
For these reasons, and also because lowland people are not used to eating the red upland
varieties of rice, some migrants grow traditional white or industrial yellow corn varieties from
the first cropping onwards, occasionally interplanted with rice or bananas. Here, the idea is to
sell the erop in the lowlands and to buy peeled lowland rice with the cash earned. Kusters
(1991) reports on a case in Cagayan, where native (white and red) corn varieties and
subsistence crops like upland rice dominated in uma farms. Cagayan Valley has a history of
producing corn for human consumption, as the cultivation of this staple was more compatible
with that of tobacco, which until the sixties was the region's most prized export commodity
(See Chapter 8). A dry-season corn erop is intercropped with legumes, peanuts, common beans
and mung beans. Intercropping of upland rice and yellow corn occurs in both cropping periods.
In that case, the yellow corn is widely interspaced and planted two weeks ahead of upland rice.
Planting of the uma is done jointly by men and women, although men have the final
responsibility for the production of grains and tree crops. Women care for vegetables and other
secondary crops in the uma, often cultivating an additional field of their own in the vicinity of
the home. With the exception of one upland sitio where vegetables were produced on a large
Wedda emphasizes that practices may shift from preventive to curative: mstead of making an offermg before
planting, a sacrifice is made after ploughing or harvesting. or where someone has fallen i l l
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scale for the Baguio market, relatively small areas with crops like Baguio beans, squash,
watermelons, onions, carrots and ginger are generally cultivated for subsistence. Weeding and
harvesting are also jointly carried out by men and women.
After the first erop has been harvested - in the case of upland rice, four months after
planting - the uma is cleared again and the second erop planted. The clearing now only entails
the removal of weeds and erop residues, which are piled alongside the cropping area. Due to
the wet conditions that prevail during the months of September and October, burning is not
usually done then. Forest migrants who derive an important share of their income from
carabao logging or water logging may opt not to re-open the uma for a second erop, since by
the time this erop is ready for harvest, the short timber extraction season is already underway40.
In view of the time lag after clearing, farmers develop agroforestry-like cropping patterns
on their uma lands. Other perennials, such as bananas, coffee, papayas, citrus fruits, mangos,
pineapples and cacao are interplanted with the last annual crops to be harvested from the uma,
in preparation for a final cropping stage that Henkemans (1994) calls 'improved fallow'. These
crops also act as informal markers of ownership, protecting the ublag from clearing by another
household. They also extend the period during which the investment made in the opening-up
of the uma produces returns in the form of marketable products, even when the fertility of the
soil has dropped. Since clearing, between two and six annual crops have been harvested, and
the uma is now left to recover under this 'improved fallow' system.
3) CROP-FALLOW SEQUENCES
As we saw in the previous section, migrants arriving in unoccupied lands near the forest
frontier expand their clearings every year, and thus maintain relatively long fallow systems
during their first 8 to 10 years in the forest lands. By this time the household has cleared a total
farm area that is large enough to permit a rotational farming system with a shorter fallow
period. A shift to permanent, plough-based farming only becomes feasible when the roots and
stumps in the first clearing have decayed sufficiently to make ploughing possible. In the
expansive systems, upland rice is commonly the first erop after clearing, while a variety of
other crops are intercropped. The second or third annual erop is intercropped with young
seedlings of fruit trees in preparation of the 'improved fallow' phase. The Ifugao newcomers
described in Section 4.4.2 interplanted banana suckers with upland rice from the first planting
onwards. This extensive system was opted for because:
- In the phase they are in, agricultural expansion (the sideways "run for the boundary") has
priority. Demarcating these lands with perennials such as bananas is more important than
the income derived from the crops produced there; during the rainy season these migrants
can still partly rely on sources of income and social security in the place of origin.
- There is an abundance of unoccupied residual forest lands in the vicinity, and thus no need
to reopen ublag lands for farming.
Operating as a group, and inviting young boys and elderly relatives with little alternative
employment options to come and work as seasonal labourers, they were assured of
sufficient labour - and available forest lands nearby - to be able to clear new uma lands in
the next dry season. This assurance is necessary because once bananas have been
interplanted on the uma, grain cannot be planted during the next cropping season, because
of shading by the adult banana trees. A household which depends entirely on the upland
In bangkag and talon farms, this period is considered the best cropping opportunity. because the risks involved
in transporting products to the market are lower m March than m October. when the rainy season is fully underway and
access roads into the forest lands are oliën muddy.
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farm for its livelihood and on its own labour supply for both clearing and erop production
tends to postpone the planting of perennials until an area has been opened up which is large
enough to produce its annual rice intake (or commercial grain for the cash income to buy
this intake).
- Besides upland rice, these Ifugao migrants (at least when we met them at the end of the dry
season) also consumed cassava and green peas as their staple, perennials which require little
labour and which can be intercropped or planted in alternating strips, with bananas.
Fig 4.4 Common crop-fallow sequences in upland agriculture
year l year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 6 year 7 year 8 y e a r 9
i—mr—irn—rnr i—mr
Expansive fallow systems
3(2)- A A A A
2(1)- A AP
l (1)- AP P
Rotational fallow systems
5(3)5 A A A A
3 (3) 3 A A
4(2)2 A A A A





x (y) z = nr. of annuals (in nr. of years) nr
A = annual erop P = perennial erop
»• A
»~ A A A A
of fallow yrs.





Fig. 4.4 and table 4.7 present a number of expansive and rotational crop-fallow sequences
commonly observed in migrant settlements in the Sierra Madre. As a rule, the length of the
fallow period appears to be linked to the number of crops consecutively harvested from the land
after opening and, in the rotational systems, to the economie lifespan of the banana.. Saba is
the variety most commonly planted, is used primarily in industrial ketchup production; it
remains productive for five to seven years. By this time, other forest vegetation has overgrown
the banana trees and renewed clearing is necessary to make the ublag productive again. If the
ublag is indeed cleared by the time the banana trees cease to be productive, then a rotational
fallow system is practised. Thus newly established settlements, where expansive fallow systems
prevail, have a characteristic landscape of newly opened uma lands bordered on one side by
residual forest and on the other by improved fallows, which most often have the appearance of
banana plantations. The decision on whether to re-opening the ublag or open a new uma
depends, as we saw earlier, will depend first of all on the availability of convertible forests in
the vicinity. But even if there are free forests near the settlement, migrants do not simply go
on expanding their farmlands. By the time a migrant household manages a total area of four to
six hectares of uma and ublag lands, a rotational short-fallow system becomes feasible. Of this
total area, 1.5 hectares of uma, formed by two or three pieces of land opened up during the
previous seasons, are cultivated with annual crops. The remainder of the area is under
'improved fallow' in various stages of productivity41. In such a rotation, the ublag is left to
fallow for five years after three years of agricultural cropping; it is then reopened eight years
A study among 37 households in four migrant communities in the Sierra Madre found that each household owned
a combined area of 3.8 ha of uma and ublag, of which 0.8 ha was cultivated with upland rice and 0.8 ha with hananas.
The cultivated areas ranged from 0.3 to.5 ha for the upland rice field and 0.03 to 4.8 ha for the banana fields (Dirkx
1995). It must be noted that these surfaces were estimated by farmers and not validated by measurements on the ground.











Planting 01 June - 15 My








Uma, yr 2 Hybrid corn
t/ma, yr 3 Hybrid corn & Banana/Fruit trees
Ublag, yrs 4 - 8
TYPE II
Improved fallow
Uma, yr 1 Upland Rice and banana
Uma, yr 2 Banana
Uma, yr 3





Uma, yr 1 Hybrid corn & upland rice
Uma, yr 2 Hybrid corn & upland rice
Uma, yr 3 Upland rice
Ublag, yrs 4 - 8 Improved fallow
TYPE II
Uma, yr 1 Hybrid corn & upland rice
Uma, yr 2 Hybrid corn & upland rice/Banana
Uma, yr 3




Uma, yr 1 Hybrid corn & upland rice/Banana
Uma, yr 2 Banana
Uma, yr 3 Banana
Ublag, yrs 4 - 8 Banana
Puerta
Uma, yr 1 Upland rice
Uma, yr 2 Hybrid corn & mung bean
Uma, yr 3 Upland nee & Banana
Ublag, yrs 4 - 8 Improved fallow
Dry Season
Planting 15 Oct - 01 Dec.
Harvest 15 Jan - 15 Mar.
Hybrid corn
Hybrid corn
Hybrid corn & banana/Fruit trees
Stringbeans & mung bean
or: Hybrid corn & peanut
Hybrid corn & banana/fruittrees




Corn, mung bean, peanut









Hybrid corn & mung bean
Hybrid corn & mung bean
Bananas
Notes:
In addition to the mam erop (occupymg the largest part of the uma/ublag). which is mdicated in this tahle,
smaller areas with a vanety of vegetables and root crops are also planted in uma and ublag. Since the decision to
grow these minor crops is only margmally mfluenced by the decision on the mam erop, they are not mcluded
here
High Y leiding Variety (unfit for human consumption)
upland rice may take longer to mature than yellow corn The length of the growth cycle depends mamly on the
variety Other factors, such as soil. climate and labour allocation. set the actual cropping calendar per farm. The
dates given here may be seen as the most probahle dates at which planting and harvesting start in the given
localities and for the most commonly used varieties
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after the last clearing provided that the vegetation type and density42 on the ublag indicates that
the area has recovered sufficiently for a successful cropping. This rotation leads to fallow
periods of three to five years, shorter than the minimum eight-year period which, according to
Conklin (1957), is required for the recovery of soil fertility.
Other rotations have even shorter cycles: one of the systems shown in fig. 4.4 alternates
one-year cultivation periods with one-year fallow. Rotational crop-fallow sequences also exist
in areas where there is still abundant convertible forest, such as places where migrants still
derive a sizable income from timber extraction or urban wage labour. Expansive systems may
be resorted to when the arrival of new migrants leads to a sense of competition over remaining
unconverted forest areas, or when the construction of a road or the introduction of a new
agricultural erop brightens economie prospects for agriculture. The quality of residual forests
in the vicinity also has an important hearing on the fallow system: once these forests no longer
produce significant quantities of saleable product, the next rational economie option is to
convert them into farmland. Labour, carabaos and chainsaws can then also be mobilized for that
purpose, resulting in a shift to more extensive fallow systems, larger farm-areas per household
and a stronger cash orientation of the farm (see also Chapter 9).
The expansive fallow systems practised by forest migrants in the Sierra Madre may not be
equated with the long-fallow shifting cultivation systems of indigenous forest peoples. Nor can
the rotational systems be equated with non-traditional forms and thus almost by defmition
labelled as less sustainable (see, for example Myers 1992; Garrity et al. 1993: 559). Expansive
systems occur where migrants still have sufficient access to land, labour and capital to manage
large landholdings, and rotational systems are adopted by migrants facing labour constraints,
or living in an area where convertible forest lands are no longer found within hiking distance.
The second of these conditions is more structural than the first, especially for newly arrived
migrants in the early phases of opening up new farmland. More established pioneers and
followers are often in a position to hire newcomers to help in the expansion of their farmlands.
Newcomers from the lowlands, who prefer not to enter the forest lands too deeply and are more
inclined to settle in the vicinity of established forest communities, tend to re-open fallows
formerly cultivated by a relative or the local leader who allowed them to settle in his
community. There are cases where well-established migrants sell ublag lands to new migrants,
or allow them to cultivate them under a sharecropping arrangement. Those with access to lands
suitable for bangkag or talon farming tend to switch to permanent cropping, especially once
forest products become scarcer in the vicinity, and carabao puiling power becomes available
for farming43.
At various speeds, using a wide range of cultivation techniques, and with varying degrees
of success, all migrant communities are gradually forced by forest degradation and land scarcity
to switch from expansive to rotational fallow systems and, where possible, to permanent
farming. During the first eight to ten years after its arrival in the forest lands, the average
migrant household develops an upland farm of four to six hectares, about one-third of which
is cultivated, half with annual crops and half with perennials. After this period, and depending
on such factors as the quality and availability of forest products in the vicinity, the physical
Farmers consider the regrowth of young dipterocarp trees and seedlings on the ublag as an indicator of good
fertility (Dros 1995:85).
All the categones of forest migrants defined earlier mclude some 'professional uma developers' who have made
the contmuous opemng-up of new forest lands into a way of life. selling these lands to other migrants after a few years and
moving elsewhere.
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properties of the lands that the migrant has managed to appropriate, the agricultural background
of the migrants, and the availability of labour and capital in the household, migrants either
continue to expand their farmlands, switch to shorter fallow rotations, or begin to develop their
forest farms into permanent bangkag and talon lands. In this way fire-and-fallow farming in
the Sierra Madre contains a highly diverse set of mixed cropping strategies which together
constitute the first steps in a process by which forests are replaced by permanent farms. The
question as to whether this last stage is preferable to the previous ones, from a sustainability
point of view, is dealt with in the following sections.
4.6.3 Some remarks on the sustainability of uma farming in the Sierra Madre
Questions regarding the sustainability of fire-and-fallow farming systems in the Sierra Madre
can be approached from two normative angles: from the point of view of frontier stabilization,
and from a perspective of soil conservation and productivity. Based on the former, a switch
from expansive to rotational and permanent farming would be desirable. From the latter
standpoint, however, expansive fallow systems are more sustainable, allowing the soil and
vegetation to recover long enough for future crops. Obviously, neither of these two
sustainability dimensions can be realized in isolation. If fallows in a rotational cycle are too
short to allow sufficient soil recovery, the reduced productivity of the land will eventually
compel the farmer to either start investing in soil and water conservation measures, or to open
new lands elsewhere. The following sections discuss the effects of uma-ublag cycles on soil
productivity, and the contribution of uma farming to forest clearing in the Sierra Madre.
IMPACT OF FIRE-AND- FALLOW FARMING ON FOREST SOILS
While there is a great deal of variation in the impact of slash-and-burn agriculture on the
chemical and physical quality of tropical forest soils, the principal effects of an altered nutriënt
level and soil structure are undisputed (Siebert and Belsky 1985:288-291; Hamilton and Pierce
1983; Jordan 1985). During the cultivation period, the availability of important nutrients such
as phosphorus, potassium and nitrogen declines; higher soil temperatures hasten the oxidation
of organic matter, which, in turn, lowers nutriënt availability and adversely affects the structure
and water-holding capacity of the topsoil. If steep slopes are cleared in high-intensity rainfall
areas such as the Sierra Madre, soil erosion rates may go up from 0.04 to 38.8 tons/ha.yr
(Veracion 1977, cited in Maus & Schieferli 1989:50).
Low availability of phosphorus, a scarce nutriënt in most tropical soils, represents a
constraint for agricultural erop production. The first burn temporarily solves this problem, as
nutrients contained in the biomass are added to the soil. However, if insufficient time is allowed
for the recovery of mineral nutriënt levels (K, Ca, Mg), soil acidity is bound to rise, a
condition in which imperata grasses are able to compete more effectively with the agricultural
crops. The process that Jordan (ibid: in Dros 1995:10) calls savannization is then set in motion.
While these grasses can serve as pioneer species in the recovery of these soils (by opening them
up and stimulating the activity of soil fauna), the repeated burning of grasslands stalls the
recovery of nutriënt levels, because the ashes produced by grassland fire contain few nutrients.
The extensive imperata grasslands in the vicinity of early forest settlements are likely to be the
result of this process44. In his study of slash-and-burn agriculture in the forest fringe of San
Unlike the grassland areas mside the Sierra Madre. a numher of the "idle grasslands" (Maus & Schieferli
1988:56) on the rolling plams adjacent to the flood plains of the Cagayan River appear to be of prehistorie ongm (see
Chapter 8).
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Mariano, Isabela, Doedens reports that "Migrants near the forest fringe were reported to allow
outsiders to cultivate ublag areas that they had themselves cultivated twice already; some of the
older ublag areas no langer deemedfltfor agriculture were converted into posture lands and
burnedmore regularly for that purpose " (Doedens 1992:52-53)
Two independent studies on the effects of fire-and-fallow cycles on soil quality, carried out
in 1994 and 1995 in three sites in the Sierra Madre, failed to fmd evidence of chemical soil
degradation on either expansive or rotational fire-and-fallow farms (Dros 1995; Van der Veen
1997). The chemical properties of soil samples taken from 15 uma and 11 ublag sites were
analyzed in relation to the land-use histories of these sites. The sites studied by Dros were
managed under extensive crop-fallow cycles and had all been opened up for the first time
between 1976 and 1994, with the exception of one site, which had been cleared for the first
time in 1965, was used for 2 years and then left to fallow for 25 years. The fact that soils under
rotational crop-fallow cycles, as analysed by Van der Veen, produce similar results as the
extensively managed lands studied by Dros was due to the fact that none of the sites sampled
by Van der Veen had been cleared before 1988: three of the five uma fields were first opened
in 1993, 1994 and 1995 respectively, while the two fields cleared for the second time were in
their first cropping after a fallow period of three to four years. The relatively low temperature
and regular cloud cover prevailing at elevations of 400-800 metres, as in the study area,
probably had a further moderating effect on chemical erosion after forest clearing.
Both studies emphasize the absence of ploughing on these lands as an explanatory factor for
the absence of soil degradation. Reducing levels of readily available nutrients (particulariy
nitrogen) in the root zone compels farmers first to switch from cereals to perennials, and then
to leave the land fallow. This natural check on the decline in fertility - only readily available
nutrients are depleted - facilitates a swift regeneration of vegetation after the cultivation period.
The studies confirm that the burn 'costs' approximately 25% of the organic matter contained
by the topsoil after the slash and before the burn, and that much of the organic matter contained
by the slash is also converted into gaseous nitrogen compounds, carbon dioxide, water and
charcoal. Nevertheless, the nutrients contained in the ashes, supplemented by the mineralization
of soil organic matter, create good conditions for erop production. Both authors stress nitrogen
deficiency as the principal fertility constraint on erop yields after two years. The common
practice of alternating the production of upland rice with that of beans, which fix nitrogen, may
be seen as a management measure to deal with this constraint.
Dros (ibid) reports that banana production is still possible after two years of annuals,
largely because their deeper root system enables banana trees to extract nutrients from layers
not reached by annuals. Combined with their size and leaf area, this makes bananas a more
effective competitor with weeds and residual forest vegetation. To some extent labile organic
litter produced by the decaying leaves of these trees replenishes the nutriënt levels of the
topsoil; in old ublag farms in Mansarong, Sta Margarita, Baggao Cagayan, where bananas had
reached the end of their productive life span, recorded levels of organic matter in the topsoil
which were comparable to those of nearby areas not yet cleared for farming. Under an
extensive crop-fallow cycle, in which ublags are cleared again after 12 to 16 years, soil organic
matter and plant nutriënt levels recover most of their original values (/te/: 85) Contrary to
farmers' own perception that re-opened fallows were less fertile than newly cleared forest soils,
the results of Dros and Van der Veen suggest that the fertility and structure of soils under
expansive crop-fallow systems did not differ significantly from those under the original forest
vegetation (Van der Veen 1997: 64).
And fmally, both studies emphasize the risk of nutriënt depletion and a concomitant rise in
at the cutting edge... 139
soil acidity if ploughing and permanent corn cultivation are introduced on these lands45. The
absence of ploughing in uma lands places a natural restriction on the number of crops that can
be successively cultivated there, and thus on the degree to which nutriënt levels can be reduced;
ploughing facilitates the mineralization of organic soil matter over a deeper layer of the soil,
so that larger amounts of plant nutrients are released. If these 'exported' nutrients are not
replenished (mulch, manure, fertilizer), they are eventually depleted. The increased
mineralization of soil organic matter reduces the capacity of the soil to retain mineral nutrients
(Ca, Ma, K) and lowers stocks of organic nutrients (N, P and S). This, in turn, exacerbates the
acidification problems which were also recorded by Siebert and Belsky (1990) in soils subjected
to intensive annual production in the uplands of Leyte.
Increasing soil acidity, in turn, further constrains the availability of phosphorus, a critical
nutriënt for root development and plant growth. High levels of iron and aluminium in most
soils of the humid tropics facilitate phosphate fixation, leaving less available for root
development and plant growth. Lowered soil acidity, e.g., due to the influx of minerals from
ashes after buraing, stimulates both the solution of these phosphates and the mineralization of
soil organic matter, releasing phosphorus for plant growth. This beneficial effect of burning,
i.e., the recycling of part of the nutrients contained in the vegetation back into the soil, does
not alter the fact that cultivation means a net export of soil nutrients which must be replenished
by the weathering of parent material and the mineralization of organic matter (J.M. Dros,
pers.com. Oct 1997). Both Dros and Van der Veen therefore emphasize the importance of
maintaining organic matter levels as a source of phosphorus46 and warn that a conversion of
slash-and-burn farming to permanent bangkag farming is not necessarily a step forward in
terms of pre venting chemical soil degradation47. Dros concludes that:
"The merits of the soil (fertility, resistance to erosion, water-holding capacity and high-
quality organic matter, mycorrhizae that facilitate hardwood growth) are well maintained -
but not well exploited - by the kaingin farming system" (ibid: 94).
Thus looking at the sustainability of fire-and-fallow upland agriculture from the point of view
of long-term soil productivity, it may be concluded that expansive fire-and-fallow farming is,
not surprisingly, the least problematic mode of slash-and-burn farming. However, the studies
carried out thus far have not encountered any serious problems related to chemical soil
degradation in the rotational systerns either. Because of the relatively short period during which
these soils had been cultivated, however, the validity of this finding must be ascertained
through studies carried out in areas subjected to protracted series of rotational crop-fallow
sequences. On the basis of both studies conducted so far it may be concluded that the
replacement of fire-and-fallow by ploughing will facilitate a more thorough depletion of the
natural fertility buffer of forest soils, and is therefore bound to render these soils more acidic.
Chapter 9 presents some mdications of the increasmg cultivation of hybrid corn varieties in upland farms in the
Sierra Madre. and analyzes the political-economic backgrounds of this trend.
The mamtenance of a good soil organic matter content is valuable Firstly, it provides a continuous source of
Phosphorus through mineralization Secondly, organic phosphates appear to be less readilyftxed than anorganicforms.
And thirdly, organic acids dissolve some 'fixed' phosphate and so render n available" (Van der Veen 1997:58)
One could argue that even in terms of physical erosion. fire-and-fallow upland agriculture is also more
"ustamable than plough-based farming. due to a more superficial impact on soil structure, a lower risk of surface erosion
'n furrows. etc. However. the companson depends on the practices followed in the two systems; contour ploughing
Prevents soil losses. but so does the mamtenance of a good soil organic matter content under fire-and-fallow management.
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The ploughing and permanent farming of forest soils can be a step in the direction of
sustainability if this is accompanied by mulching, contour ploughing, the application of manure
or chemical fertilizers, and other soil, water and fertility management measures. This
conclusion is particularly relevant to recent changes in cropping practices in both urna and
bangkag farms in the Sierra Madre, as presented in Chapter 9.
CONTRIBUTION OF FIRE-AND-FALLOW AGRICULTURE TO FOREST CONVERSION
In spite of the risk of falling prey to criticism such as that expressed by Eder (1989) and
Kummer (1992a,c) with regard to the work of Ooi Jin Bee (1987), who came up with the rather
poorly founded estimate that shifting cultivators converted 330,000 hectares of natural forest
into upland farms herween 1980 and 1985, my efforts to assess the sustainability uma farming
would be incomplete without an attempt to quantify the areas of residual forest cleared annually
by forest migrants in the Sierra Madre. One weak element in Bee's calculations was the
assumption that all upland households carve 3.9 hectares of farmland from the forest every 12
years48. As described above, migrants in the Sierra Madre convert residual forest into uma and
ublag lands more rapidly, but then cease to expand once their uma and ublag lands together
cover four to six hectares. At that point, rotational crop-fallow systerns become feasible.
Expansion may resumé after a son has grown physically strong enough to make a significant
contribution to the expansion and management of the farm and, eventually, to develop a farm
for himself and his own household. Assuming that migrants do not need to move on after
developing this area because, as the preliminary findings presented in the previous section
show, soil productivity can be maintained under the rotational fallow systems, and forest loss
due to upland agriculture becomes directly proportional to the combined effects of forest
migration and fertility rates in the uplands: each new migrant family opens an area of
approximately five hectares, as does each male child who chooses opts to make a living as an
upland farmer.
Table 4.8 Projected forest conversion to uma farming, 1990-2015-2040
Key »ssumptions Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4




proportion of boys staying in SM
km2 add'l uma land cleared by 2015
km2 add'l uma land cleared by 2040
total km2 of forest converted into farmland (20 1 5)
total km2 of forest converted into farmland (2040)
m2 of forest cleared/hh.year (1990-2015)
m2 of forest cleared/hh.yr (1990-2040)
forest cleared 1 990-20 1 5 as % of 1 990 forest cover





















































Kummer (1992) argues that a twelve-year cycle is too long for migrant shifting agriculture and shows that a
more realistic six-year cycle produces improbably rapid deforestation rates. hence illustrating his view that there are many
permanent torms of agriculture in the uplands as well. and that Bee's approximatmn vanes too greatly in keeping with
changes m lts underlymg assumptions to effectively prove otherwise
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Scenario 1 (5 ha. 2%
pop growth 80% of boys
stays m Sierra Madre)
Scenario 2 (5 ha 2%
pop growth. 60% of boys
stays in Sierra Madre)
Scenario 3 (5 ha, 3%
pop growth 80% of boys
stays m Sierra Madre)
Scenano 4 (6 ha. 3%
pop growth, 60% of boys
stays m Sierra Madre)
km2 additional km2 additional total km' of total km2 of m2 of forest m2 of forest
uma land uma land forest converted forest converted cleared/hh year cleared/hh year
clearedby2015 cleared by 2040 into farmland mto farmland (1990-2015) (1990-2040)
(2015) (2040)
The projections shown in table 4.8 and fig. 4.5 are based on different combinations of
assumptions on population growth, average farm size per household, and the number of
children opting to make a living in the Sierra Madre. More details of the calculations
underlying these fïgures are provided in Annex B. In all scenarios, the areas cleared annually
per household are significantly lower than the 0.325 ha. per family per year estimated by Bee
(ibid), and correspond to estimates by the Regional Master Plan for Forestry Development
(DENR 1991) and Kummer (1992e). It should be kept in mind that these are artificial fïgures;
in practice, the process is not as continuous as these small annual areas suggest. As we saw
earlier, agricultural expansion in migrant settlements takes place via a staggered process of fits
and starts, triggered by the arrival of newcomers, a planned road, or the introduction of a new
erop. As Kummer argues (1992a:88), fire-and-fallow farming does not appear to be shifting
as rapidly as is widely assumed. Nevertheless, as both table 4.8 and fig. 4.5 show, upland
farming will entail the conversion of 25-43% of the remaining forests of the Sierra Madre into
agricultural land by 2015, even under the conservative assumption of an average population
growth. Scenarios 3 and 4 are based on a 3% population growth rate and may be seen as the
scenarios associated with increased forest migration, the second combined with a higher farm
area per household, and more children leaving the uplands for education and urban
ernployment. Both scenarios result in the complete clearing of all remaining forests in the Sierra
Madre in the next 50 years.
The value of an admittedly simplistic exercise such as the above lies in the identification
of the key variables that set the agricultural expansion pace, rather than in the absolute values
of the fïgures that result from it. Population growth, influenced by the fertility rates of those
already present in the forest lands, and the net migration balance of forest lands vis-a-vis
adjacent lowland areas, is one of those variables which directly influence the agricultural
expansion rate. The second important variable is the available labour, which determines the
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total area which can be cultivated per household, and the feasibility of putting certain soil and
water management techniques in place. If the present labour- and capital-extensive forms of
upland farming were gradually replaced by sustainable, more intensive farming practices, more
people could earn a living from the same farmland. During a two-year interdisciplinary study
during the preparation of an Environmental Management Plan for the Sierra Madre, the
shortage of labour emerged as a critical factor constraining the feasibility of introducing
sustainable land- use alternatives (Rommelse 1996; Van den Top et al. 1997). The development
of agroforest farms, tree plantations, the construction of terraces and hedgerows, and other soil
and water conservation measures all require labour investments beyond the capacity of most
households. Such an approach would still take many years to realize, even if upland
communities were more inclined to collaborate in the realization of such measures. A third
critical factor is the number of children who opt to stay in the Sierra Madre and make a living
there. The scenarios are all based on the assumption that only male offspring develop a farm
of their own once they have mairied. In scenarios l and 3, one out of every five boys fmd
employment outside the forest lands and migrate out. In the second and fourth scenario, 40%
of all boys born in the uplands migrate out. This assumption, combined with average population
growth and a maximum farm size of 5 hectares, produces the lowest forest conservation
projections, but still represents a loss of 50% of present forest cover in the coming two
generations. In view of the few off-farm employment opportunities traditionally available in
Cagayan Valleys, the likelihood of mis scenario materializing will depend largely on local
access to education, information and employment opportunities in overseas and urban
employment in Central Luzon and the National Capitol Region.
From the dual perspectives of soil and water conservation, therefore, we must conclude that
fire-and-fallow farming practices of forest migrants in the Sierra Madre are not sustainable. The
expansive fallow systems allow the regeneration of vegetative cover and soil fertility, but cause
the movement of the forest frontier. As far as the rotational systems are concerned, initial
student studies devoted to the physical impact of these more intensive rotations failed to fmd
evidence of serious chemical soil degradation. However, as we have seen here, increasing
numbers of people depending on upland agriculture for a living will eventually cause the
resumption of expansive systems, causing the total loss of the Sierra Madre forest in the
decades to come.
In areas already opened up for farming, the uma-ublag cycles are shorter than the period
of eight to ten years generally considered to be the minimum for stability. Visible degradation
of watershed as a result of erosion in newly opened farms, burnt grassland areas, and poorly
managed residual forest areas cause increased sedimentation in the tributaries and lower reaches
of the Cagayan river. These heavier sedimentation rates in the Cagayan River - rather than
changes in peak, or base flows from the watershed - will cause additional economie costs in the
lowlands, which is home to most of the region's 2.5 million population. With due caution - in
view of the inadequate records on the actual damage caused by past flooding events in the
Cagayan River basin, and remaining uncertainties about the hydrological impact of changes in
forest cover - higher flooding and siltation rates were calculated to cause a 10% increase in
economie damage to roads, irrigation systems, and population centres, or $5-10 per year per
hectare of forest cleared in the Sierra Madre (Oosterberg 1997).
The stabilization of the forest frontier by replacing rotational fire-and-fallow farming by
plough-based permanent cropping does not necessarily enhance the sustainability of agricultural
land use or facilitate a more thorough intake of mineral and organic nutrients by the erop over
deeper layers of the soil. Alternative measures to stabilize the forest frontier and enhance the
productivity of rotational land-use systems, e.g., by maintaining the slash and omitting the
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burn, the integration of livestock farming, agroforestry and soil and water conservation
measures probably offer a better long-term option for a sustainable livelihood inside the forest
lands. The amount of labour required to put these systerns in place, as well as the limited
financial and legal prospects that forest migrants have to secure the ownership of these
investments in the longer term, make it unlikely that such long-term land uses will be adopted
on a significant scale in the Sierra Madre in the years to come. These factors are examined in
more detail in Chapters 5 and 9.
4.8 Other livelihood options
4.8.1 Paid labour
Possibilities to earn cash income through daily wage labour declined significantly with the
suspension and cancellation of most corporate logging concessions in the early 1990s. Some
opportunities remain, primarily in carabao logging but also in government projects49 and in the
occasional construction of a house, school, barangay hall or irrigation canal. Owners of
bangkag and talon farms occasionally hire wage labourers to plough their land, plant rice or
help in harvesting. Table 4.9 presents the approximate daily wages to be earned in agriculture.
Section 4.8 compares these returns on labour with those earned in other activities.
Table 4.9 Agricultural wage labour rates (Pesos/day, 1992-1994)
Uma clearing 50 - 70
Planting 30 - 40
• Weeding 30- 50
Ploughing (incl. carabao) 85 - 120
Sources: Aquino 1991; Bakker 1995; Dirkx 1995; Numan 1995; Polet 1991; this research
In uma farming, the most important agricultural land use in the uplands, peak labour demands
are managed mainly through exchange labour. The high labour demands of forest clearing are
often managed by working as a group and spreading this joint workforce over the lands to be
opened up by the various members of the group. In Ilokano, the non-monetary exchange of
labour, which is governed by the principle of reciprocity, is referred to as amuyo (Wedda
1992:44). The voluntary offering of labour for a collective purpose, such as the opening of a
trail or the construction of a bridge is referred to as bayanihan, a Tagalog term which has its
origins in the word bayani, or hero: a person who offers his labour for free for a common
purpose performs a heroic deed. The Marcos administration gave the term banayihan a more
nationalistic connotation. The spirit of 'love of country' was used to mobilize citizens for
voluntary collective action aimed at the 'beautification' of the country through landscaping or
the construction of minor public works, such as waiting sheds. Wedda and Van Aken (1997)
distinguish a third non-monetary form of exchange labour, called "bataris". While this term
is also the Kapampangan translation of the Ilokano term amuyo (pers. com. Van den
Muijzenberg, Nov. 1997), both authors found that it was used for yet another form of exchange
labour, whereby people work in each other's fields, or assist in the construction of a house, in
exchange for coffee and a good meal that includes meat.
In spite of the existence of these mechanisms for the occasional exchange of labour, forest
migrants must rely largely on the labour available within their own household, since the social
cohesion that is required for exchange labour systems to work tends to be lower in migrant
49' cf. Pasicolan (1996) for an analysis of the effectiveness of paid labour as an instrument to promote local
participaiinn in government-funded reforesution projects in the Philippines.
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communities than in the source areas. Cases have been reported of ethnically heterogeneous
migrant settlements in which separate cooperatives were set up with the specific goal of
protecting and promoting the cultural identity and economie interest of people of a particular
ethnic background (Doedens 1992; Graeber 1993; Van Zorge 1996). Traditional modes of
collective action and labour exchange appear to endure best in upland communities in which
the majority of people share ethnic origins, as in the case of Tibunauan and the much older case
of Dimatan. In such communities, paid labour is only resorted to in cases of the greatest
urgency, as when clearing must be done very quickly.
As a rule, paid labour becomes more important as forest settlements age and economie
differentiation among migrants becomes more pronounced (Van Aken 1997; Huijbregts 1996).
Differences in economie means and income appear to be related to the length of time since they
arrived in the forest land. Pioneers with large land holdings mat they cannot cultivate using
only household labour, people who run sari sari stores, and chainsaw operators hire poorer
migrants to plough or clear land for them, or to lend a hand during the harvest. Payment takes
place in various ways:
— in cash
Less common in the uplands than in lowland society. More important in older migrant
settlements with a higher degree of economie differentiation. Amounts paid per day depend
on the kind of activity carried out and vary within the ranges indicated in table 4.8.
- in kind or in return for items or cash borrowed earlier at the land owner's store
During the rainy season, devoid of opportunities of earning cash income, poor families buy
their basic needs from these stores on credit. In exchange for financial help, either in the
form of cash loans or goods provided on credit, poorer members of the community provide
casual labour to expand, improve and cultivate the pioneer's land. Two gantas of rice
(market value = 30 Pesos, equal to 2 day s' staple requirements of a household of five) is
worth one day's labour the following summer.
- share of the harvest
Doedens observed one case where a worker was paid according to an 'eight-to-one system',
whereby hè received every ninth bushei harvested (Doedens 1992:36).
- permanent sharecropping arrangement
The re-opening of old ublag areas by new migrants is either arranged through a one-off
payment to the pioneer or follower who first cleared the forest on mis land, or through a
sharecropping arrangement between the cultivator and the owner. I will return to this in
Chapters 8 and 9.
4.8.2 Hunting and gathering of non-timber forest products
A survey held in 1990 among forest occupants in the provinces of Isabela and Cagayan
produced a list of more than 150 different non-timber forest products (NTFPs), including
spices, medicinal products and chemical substances that were collected from the natural forest
stands of the Sierra Madre. Polet (1991) and Aquino (1991)50, the authors who conducted this
survey, indicate that this number was arrived at by interviewing only 30 individuals from four
ethnic groups. To illustrate this point, Polet cites an ethnobotanic study among the Itawis in
Cagayan, in which around 250 products were identified (Rocero 1982 in ibid:29). Using a
somewhat less refined categorization than that employed by De Beer and McDermott (1989,
The data m this section were drawn largely from these sources. and from Wakker (1991)
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1996)5', the main non-timber forest products gathered and hunted in the Sierra Madre are as
follows:
FOREST ANIMAL PRODUCTS
• Wild pig (Sus celebensis negrinus) ('Alingo')
Of all terrestrial forest animals in the Sierra Madre, this is the one most commonly hunted.
Hunting pressures have increased considerably in recent years, due to disturbances by
mechanized logging, an increase in the number of hunters, and the introduction of firearms
and other non-traditional hunting techniques by forest migrants, reducing the effectiveness
of the bow and arrow, the hunting tooi of the Agta (Rai 1990.47). The growing tendency
among forest occupants to keep domesticated pigs in their compound is a further indication
of the scarcity of wild pig (cf. Persoon and De longh 1997).
• Philippine deer (Cervus mariannus) ('Ugsa')
Probably closer to elimination in the Sierra Madre than the wild pig; wanted both for meat
and as a live animal for domestication. The shy deer prefer the remoter parts of the forest,
where they live mainly on forest foliage, unlike the wild pig and monkey, which are
attracted by the agricultural crops on forest farms, and thus tend to be found near the
forest/farmland fringe.
• Philippine Macaque (Macaca fascicularis) ('Sungo')
Monkeys are not systematically hunted as are deer and pig, but are either accidentally
caught in traps intended for other animals or shot by hunters looking for subsistence
bushmeat. Monkeys are considered a nuisance, because they tend to live in the vicinity of
banana plantations and uma fields, taking their share of the harvest.
• Various fish
A wide vanety of fish species are used for food; tilapia ('Tilapia'), mud fish ('Dalag') and
cat fish ('Paltat') are the most common ones. Eel ('Igat') is rare and precious, traditionally
a typical Agta product which, according to lowlanders, can be exchanged for canned
sardines. Today a medium-sized eel easily fetches 50-80 Pesos. Reported catches per
fishing household range trom 60 to 100 a year (Polet 1991; Romero 1991).
• Bats, flying foxes ('Paniqui')
The Philippine bat fauna comprises 45 known species, 25 of which are endemic; the many
caves present all over the Sierra Madre provide good resting sites for bats, which is no
doubt the reason for the large and diverse population (Danielsen et al. 1994). Bats are
hunted for meat, and in some places local people collect guano, an excellent fertilizer
formed by the excreta of bats and birds.
• Wildcat (Felis spp) ('Mutit')
An untargeted catch, occasionally caught in snares intended for deer or pig.
• Various birds
The Sierra Madre is home to more than 200 different bird species, many of which are
threatened with extinction (Danielsen et al. 1994: 32). Bird hunting is very common among
forest migrants, for both food and fun, and because of the widespread presence of airguns
and firearms in the area, farmers shoot at whatever they happen to spot on their way to and
from their fields. The birds commonly hunted for food are jungle fowl (Gallus gallus) and
various species of pigeons, hornbills, doves and cuckoos. Bird and animal hunting is not
only born of necessity, it is also experienced by men as a pleasant form of amusement in
In addition to practicaliry. one reason why l combined 'edible' and 'non-edible products' under one
headmg is the tlexibility with which this distinction is handled in Philippine rural cuisine
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an otherwise arduous life. If caught alive, birds may be played with or even kept as pets for
some time before being killed and eaten. The Martines bird (Acridotheres cristatellus),
which is non-endemic, is caught young and kept as a pet, mainly for its ability to imitate
human voices. There is a good market for parrots: Guaiabero (bolbopsittacus l. Lunulatus)
and hanging parakeets (Loriculus p. Philippinensis) are common in both degraded and
primary forest areas, and are sold to pet shops in Manila. Large birds of prey, such as the
rare Philippine Eagle (Phytecophaga jefferyi) and the Philippine Hawk Eagle (Spizaetus
Philippinensis) are shot primarily out of fear. Young eaglets are also in demand among
high-ranking officials and businessmen in the lowlands; forest migrants told of delivering
young birds of prey for prices in the order of 10,000 Pesos. If a nest is spotted in a tall tree,
the tree is felled to catch the young birds inside. More recently, the reduced logging
intensity, mass-media information campaigns, and DENR monitoring have somewhat
curtailed the collection and trade in birds of prey.
Very few forest migrants spend more than occasional hours on hunting. For most migrants,
catching a bird or wild pig is the result of efforts to protect their crops, the accidental felling
of a nesting-tree, or a chance sighting while commuting between home and the forest. At the
same time, more intensive hunting techniques have been adopted by those for whom hunting
is more than an occasional pastime. Large areas of residual forest and brushland are burned
to attract wild deer with the young grass shoots which sprout after a fire, and increasing
numbers of snares and other traps are being used to capture just a few pigs or a deer. The use
of dynamite, wrapped in candle wax and hidden inside bait is another new technique which
leaves game little chance of escaping unhurt from the dense network of traps laid out for them.
Installing and monitoring traps and collecting the catch is a time-consuming activity. For those
equipped with the skills and stamina required to succeed at this trade, the return on their labour
can exceed that offered by other activities, as the following case shows:
"Nato was bom in Nueva Ecija and came to the Sierra Madre with a logging company in the
I960s. When the company closed, hè began to spend more time hunting in the forest between
Cassala and Palanan. During a two-day hike to Palanan, hè checks his 150 traps along the
way. Every month when hè passes his traps, hè finds five to ten pigs. Once hè arnves in
Palanan, the drying of the meat produces 100 kg ofdnedpork, worth 10,000 Pesos in the
market of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. Via a boot tnpfrom Palanan to Baler, hè travels there by
bus to sell the meat." (Research diary, March 1996)
Fresh-water fisheries became unsustainable with the introduction of cyanide and pesticides, and
the technique of electrocution. In the latter method, locally referred to as 'Kuryente', the
fisherman kills the entire fish population in the vicinity of two steel rods by sending a high-
voltage jolt into the water. Aside from their non-selectiveness, both techniques entail serious
health risks; Headland & Headland (1997:84) report the poisoning of an entire Agta camp as
a result of the discharge of a chemical insecticide into the river upstream.
Both fishermen and hunters speak of depletion, not only through overexploitation, but also
as a result of habitat degradation, soil erosion, increased silt loads of surface water, and the
resulting sedimentation of breeding grounds. The presence of large numbers of firearms inside
the forest lands aggravates the problem of unsustainable hunting. The official purpose of the
establishment of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) in 1988 was to
enable local communities to protect themselves against the New People's Army; firearms were
distributed among hastily trained civilians. In practice, the CAFGU policy heightened the
intensity of the armed conflict inside the Sierra Madre (Jones 1989:273). The growing number
of private firearms, combined with the continuous entry of armed logging company personnel
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into old-growth forest also caused additional hunting pressures on forest fauna. Those pressures
subsided somewhat in the early nineties, when the both the insurgency and large-scale
mechanized logging went into decline. With the exception of those few individuals who hunt
for a living, forest migrants no longer penetrate as regularly or as deeply into the forest as they
were able to do using logging company trucks. If strictly implemented, the 1992 logging ban
in virgin forests (see Chapter 5) and the establishment in 1994 of the Northern Sierra Madre
Natural Park would create a refuge where hunting pressures can be managed and the
reproduction of forest fauna ensured.
FOREST PLANT PRODUCTS
• Rattan
Rattans are climbing palms which, using their whip-like leaf-extensions (flagellae) and
thorns, cling to trees in their upward growth. In the primary forest, sterns reach a length
of 30-40 metres, with some species attaining 100-200 metres, winding up and down along
several trees, or growing along the forest floor. Rattan sterns of 10 metres or more are of
commercial value. Even poles the diameter of a cigarette can be sold to buyers, but those
with diameters of 2 cm and above fetch higher prices. Of the 69 rattan species known to
the Philippines, gatherers in the Sierra Madre distinguish the following species with
commercial value: Palasan (Calamus merrillii), Tumalim (C. mindorensis Becc.) and
Limuran (C. ornatus var. Philippinensis Becc). Polet (1991) suggests that other species may
be extracted as well, but are not recognized as by the gatherers as separate species. The
following materials are derived from the poles:
- Splits: small-diameter poles are sliced 3 to 6 times; fibers are removed, but some
remain, which enhances durability.
- Malacca: the skin of the rattan cane is peeled off in 4 to 14 slices.
- Round-core: After skinning, the square core which remains is sliced into a round core
- Wicker: the square core is pushed through a wicker blade, dividing it into three to six
parts, called 'wickers'.
The first three products are used in by rattan furniture manufacturers in Cagayan Valley and
central Luzon. Wicker is the principal raw material used in basket-making, both in the
home and in the basketry shops in the region.
• Bamboo ('Bulu',11)
While generally considered part of the NTFP category, bamboo is not a typical forest
product; bamboos are members of the Graminea, a family of grasses that thrive very well
after forest disturbance. After logging, rapid bamboo growth is one of the principal reasons
why secondary forests are so combustible and difficult to penetrate. The most common
bamboo species in the Philippines are 'buho' (Schizostachyum lumampao), 'bayog'
(Dendrocalamus merrillianis), 'Kauayan tinik' (Bambusa spinosa) and 'Kauayan kiling'
(Bambusa vulgaris). Bamboo poles are collected from residual forest areas, but also from
bamboo groves in the open lands surrounding forest settlements. Their uses vary from
construction material (roofing, bamboo mats, walls, and fishpens) to fencing and paper
production. The importance of bamboo as a trading commodity is also connected to the
tobacco industry here and in nearby provinces. Each year, large quantities of bamboo are
needed for the dry ing and curing of the tobacco leaves (Aquino 1991; Polet 1991).
• Resins, tannins, fruits, and insect products
The collection of Almaciga resins or Manila copal from the Almaciga (Agathis alba) tree
was mentioned earlier. The resin is also known as 'the candle of the forest', as a small piece
of hardened Almaciga burns for hours. Polet estimated the total volume collected annually
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in the town of San Mariano, Isabela at 22,500 kg, representing a Manila market value of
approximately 150,000 Pesos. After 1989, when a logging moratorium was imposed in the
town, the collection of Almaciga declined drastically. Gatherers used to bring their products
down in logging trucks, which plied the 30-40 kilometres between the forest and the town
centre. Other trade-related plant and insect products gathered in the forest are orchids,
honey and various fruits (beetle, guava, rattan fruits), but the trade in these items is not
substantial. A host of other herbs, oils, spices, fibres and chemical substances are gathered
in smaller quantities; as a rule these are not sold, but rather used locally for various
purposes, including medicines, dyes and decoration.
The revenues earned in the collection of non-timber forest products are lower than those to be
made in logging. A case study devoted to the collection of forest products in barangay Tupa,
San Pablo, Isabela, revealed that net revenues from illegal timber sales constituted 70 % of
migrants' overall income from the collection and sale of forest products (Laarman et al.
1995:160). Rattan and bamboo sales accounted for 18% and 7% percent respectively. The
collection of rattan, in particular, is time-consuming and physically demanding, especially since
large-scale corporate logging activities have more or less come to an end. Like carabao loggers,
rattan gatherers used to accompany logging company trucks and employees into the primary
forest, removing rattan from the trees before they were felled and bringing their products down
by logging truck.
Polet (1990) describes the hardships of a group of migrants gathering rattan in an
abandoned logging concession in San Mariano, Isabela. A lowland-based rattan licensee
finances a team of skilled rattan cutters. After one to two weeks inside the forest, the poles are
brought down on bamboo rafts. When the rattan arrivés downstream, the gatherers' income
depends largely on how their financier (to whom they are bound to deliver their product)
translates transport-related damage into the price offered for the poles. The quality of the poles
always suffers from the damp conditions during transport, so that the value of the quantity
brought down can only be set after it arrivés from the forest. After subtracting the cost of
products supplied and cash advances paid to the team, the migrants are left with only a small
amount. The return which rattan gatherers make on their labour is in the order of 30 pesos per
day52, close to the cost of purchases the gatherers make at the onset of their trip for their own
sustenance and the needs of their household during their absence.
A case in which rattan gatherers ended up in permanent debt peonage under this system of
pre-fmanced collection was encountered by Lowe (pers. com. April 1997) in the southern
Sierra Madre during the late 1980s. Lowland traders provided Agta rattan-gatherers with
essential consumption items, such as rice. In exchange for the value of these commodities plus
interest rates, the Agta were bound to the exclusive delivery of rattan poles to their
moneylender, again valued at his prices. Lowe also observed how Agta people were actually
traded against the value of their outstanding debts (Lowe, pers. com. 1997)".
The collection of rattan is therefore "a last-resort activity"(Polel 1991:77) of the poorest
forest residents, who lack better economie options. Others are involved, on a smaller scale,
Polet's higher estimate is hased on an extractable volume per gatherer of 192 poles (measuring 12 feet each) in 4
days; at a value of l peso per pole, this amounts to 48 p/day. Given the distance between the source areas and delivery
pomts. 2 days must be added for transportation. reducmg the return on labour to approximately 30 p/day These results
correspond to the findmgs of Wakker (1991) and Numan (1994) m Palanan. Isabela and Baggao, Cagayan respectively
Lowe told me hè bought one Agta himself for 500 Pesos. The purchase was filmed on camera, as part of a
documentary about labour abuse in the Philippines. (Barry Lowe, pers. com.. April 1997)
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because they need the raw materials in the production of baskets and other rattan products.
Better-off forest migrants look down on this activity as an "unprofitable waste of time"
(Huijbregts 1996.58). A study among forest migrants in Dipugpug, San Mariano found that six
out of thirteen households who used to be involved in rattan gathering switched to logging when
a buyer in the lowlands offered to fmance them as carabao loggers. Until the logging
opportunity arose, these six (two of whom own a chainsaw) earned roughly 1,750 pesos
gathering rattan from January to May. In the following three months they earned an average
of 7,500 pesos from logging (Doedens, 1992:42)*.
In nis study among 48 rattan-gathering households in San Mariano, Isabela, Polet found that
rattan contributed 6% to an overall cash income of 17,230 pesos per year. This overall income
is low in comparison with income and expenditure data collected by the same author and
Aquino (1993) among households involved in bamboo-gathering, agriculture and water logging.
Households specialized in the collection and sale of bamboo had an average annual income of
35,130 pesos, 14% of which came from bamboo. Since bamboo is available not far from the
settlement, it can be collected during a longer period throughout the year. Moreover, none of
the 36 bamboo-gatherers interviewed by these authors had ever been involved in bonded sales
or systems where informal credit was provided by traders in the lowlands. Since in practice the
formal system of government licenses is seldom if ever implemented, the market for bamboo
is fairly free. All this means that bamboo gatherers are able to generale higher returns on their
labour, and also have more time - compared with, say, rattan gatherers - for other income-
generating activities. However, the higher income of a bamboo gatherer is due mainly to other
sources of income, notably timber extraction and agriculture (see Table 4.10).
Table 4.10 Income composition of rattan- and bamboo-gatherers, San Mariano, Isabela
Rattan-gathering Bamboo-gathering



















(Sources: Aquino (1991); Polet (1991)
Not all forest migrants view bamboo as a scarce and economically interesting resource. In the
summer months, when ublag or residual forest stands are cleared for upland agriculture, the
bamboo groves cleared from these lands are seldom collected for sale in the lowlands, but
simply burned with the other vegetation. Nevertheless, outsiders entering the forest lands in
search of bamboo cannot simply extract bamboo poles from clearings made by forest migrants,
as I found out during one of my field visits:
"While we're havmg our breakfast, a group of eight people riding white Brahman cows passes
the Ifugao settlement. According to Mr. Hud'ong, they're coming to gather bamboo (used in
the Hadendafor tobacco drying and curing). 'Ifthey want to get bamboo from ourfields they
pay, hè says, but ifit is from outside, it is for free" (Research diary, March 1996)
The fact that some forest migrants burn considerable volumes of bamboo, while others spend
time and effort cutting and transporting this product to the lowlands points up both the
One tull-t ime chainsaw operator even earned 20.000 pesos between May and July of 1991 (Doedens 1992:42).
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abundance of bamboo in the Sierra Madre and the restricted access. Many forest migrants
clearing new uma land do not yet have the animal draught power required to haul the heavy
bamboo poles to the lowlands. Aquino found that rattan-gatherers often belong to the
'newcomer' category, with minor holdings of ublag and uma land, while the 39 bamboo
gatherers hè interviewed had been living in the same place for nearly 12 years and had obtained
ownership titles to lands inside the Sierra Madre (ibid:16). Since rattan poles with a commercial
value occur mainly in old-growth or recovering secondary forest stands, while bamboos are
abundant in residual forests and brushlands55, Aquino's statistical findings confirm that rattan-
gathering is practised by people who arrived at the forest fringe fairly recently, while the
collection of bamboo is an economie sideline of forest migrants residing in older settlements
further away from the forest. The decision to take up the collection of rattan, bamboo or the
other products mentioned above is not based on considerations such as flnancial return on the
labour invested, but is closely related to other context factors, such as distance to the resource,
carabao ownership, family custom and the specific products required by lowland entrepreneurs
in exchange for informal credit.
Throughout the corporate logging decades, rattan extraction in the Sierra Madre was carried
out using a non-rotational system of cutting blocks shifting upwards into the mountains,
together with the extension of logging roads into new areas of old-growth forest. Resource
inventories by Tesoro (1984) and FRI (1987) (cited in Wakker 1991:81) showed a drop in
standing rattan stock in Region 02 from 1,806 million to 1,457 million linear metres between
1981 and 1987, a decrease of 58 million linear metres per year. This rate seems unrealistically
high, even considering the relative intensity of extraction and forest conversion due to large-
scale logging and farm establishment during this particular period. The total volume of rattan
extracted annually by the region's 38 licensed and 50-100 unlicensed rattan buyers is estimated
to be on the order of 10-15 million linear metres, or about ten times the production rates
reported to the DENR (ibid: 61). In his simulation model on the sustainability of rattan
extraction levels in San Mariano during the 1990-1991 season, Aquino found depletion periods
of five to fïfteen years for commercially sized rattan poles in actual cutting areas of San
Mariano, Isabela. If licensees actually extracted rattan only from areas officially awarded to
them - and should we take into account the fact that most of these blocks are only partially
forested - then the aggregate rattan cut would need to be reduced by nearly 50% of the 1990-
1991 volume to reach sustainability. Wakker (ibid) arrived at similar conclusions for rattan-
cutting areas in Bintacan, Annafunan and Palanan (all in Isabela).
At the time these studies were carried out, the first effects of the contraction of corporate
logging activities were already being feit by the rattan furniture industry in the lowlands; new
commercial rattan stocks, which were found only at a considerable distance from the population
centres, could no longer be accessed with the help of company bulldozers, or brought down by
logging trucks. Thus both gatherers and buyers were faced with the depletion of rattan stocks
in existing cutting areas, because of the stagnation in the opening-up of new areas of old-growth
forest. In other words, the cutback in commercial logging operations curtailed rattan extraction
levels before the stock of commercial sizes was entirely depleted throughout the Sierra Madre.
Bamboos are sensitive to soil acidity; for that reason they are less common in the residual forests of certam parts
of northern Cagayan (Bakker, 1994) This also explams why forest migrants consider the presence of bamboo stands in a
potential forest clearing as an indicator of good soil fertility (see Section 4.7.2)
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4.9 The overall livelihood picture
Forest migrants generally live far away from major markets and service centres. Nevertheless,
cash income is indispensable for a household, in order to secure bas ie consumption items that
it cannot produce itself. In a survey of 33 migrant households in five forest migrant
communities in the Sierra Madre in 1993, Bakker (1995) recorded an average per capita cash
income of 5,570 pesos ($200) per year, well below the Philippine rural poverty threshold of
7,751 pesos set by the National Economie Development Authority (NEDA).56 Bakker divided
her sample into two groups, based on whether they have access only to uma/ublag land or to
permanent fields as well. Those in the former category had an even lower average income of
around 4,600 pesos per year.
Fig.4.6 Expenditure pattern of 33 migrants in five forest settlements in the Sierra
Madre (Source: Bakker 1995)
l migrants with uma/ublag and
bangkag/talon land
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The average household size in the surveys of Bakker, Dirkx (1995), Balde (1994), Doedens
(1992) was 4.6 to 6.7 persons. In my own survey of 74 upland families in six migrant
communities, the average number of people actually living in the household was 4.4.1 excluded
children who had already married or for some other reason (such as employment elsewhere) were
no longer dependent on the household's food and cash income for their livelihood. Thus the
average migrant household in the Sierra Madre spends approximately 25,000 pesos per year on
food, items like kerosine, soap, coffee, canned goods, tobacco, sugar and, salt, alongside
occasional expenditures on transportation, medicines, and clothing. Approximately 30% of this
amount is used to supplement the household's own production of rice; uma farmers bought 54%
of their staple requirements, compared to 32% for the better off owners of permanent farmlands
in the second category (See fig. 4.6 and table 4.11).
In 1993. NEDA lowered the Philippines' national poverty threshold from 9.886 to 7,751 Pesos per capita per
year. A number of non-food items were removed from the list of basic necessities. notably cigarettes and alcoholic
beverages Bakker's surveys mdicates that some 10% of household expenses relates to these items (see Chapter 4).
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Table 4.11 Income and expenditure of 33 migrants in five forest settlements in the

















































































































— — - i
Cross farm income (food products valued at shadow farmgate price, commercial crops at actual market prices)
minus tarmmg expenses. plus income trom other sources, including forest products, wage labour and off-farm
income
** Off-farm income comprises agr/non-agr labour and remittances.
Group I: migrants with only uma farms (average size = l .34 ha)
Group II: migrants with average 2.2 ha of uma and / ha of bangkag/talon lands
While the bangkag and talon owners can afford slightly higher expenditures, there are only
minor differences between the two categories of migrants in the relative importance of
expenditure items. The fact that those owning permanent croplands spend more on education
is related to the fact that 11 of the 18 households interviewed in this category had young and
school-age children, dependent on the income of the household. The households in the first
category were not only smaller, but also predominantly in the phase where their children were
starting to leave home. While the number of family members aged 13 or over (who had
finished elementary school and were ready to work in the farm) was equal for both categories,
the productive members of the households in the second category had responsibility for one or
more dependents.
_
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Table 4.11 shows that households with access to permanently cropped lands had a higher total
income, and derived a larger share of their income from farming than those without permanent
fields, whose livelihood relied more heavily on the extraction of forest products. In general,
the same trend toward higher incomes and a higher share of agriculture within those incomes
was seen in the surveys by Polet (1990) and Aquino (1993), which were presented in the
previous section. The informative value of table 4.10 lies in these income and expenditure
patterns, rather than in the absolute values per item. Considering that income levels include the
fmancial value of farm products consumed by the household members themselves, valued
against shadow farmgate prices, the total cash income levels recorded in this survey usually are
not sufficient to finance the stated expenditures. The limited number of households surveyed,
the relatively short period spent with each family, and the illegal nature of the most important
source of cash income of forest migrants, carabao logging, are likely to cause downward
distortions in the total incomes recorded. In the sample studied by Bakker, for example, 13 out
of the 18 respondents with access to permanent erop lands resided in the proximity of good
residual forest stands and in settlements that were accessible by truck and even tricycle during
the dry season. Nevertheless, Bakker's results suggest that timber extraction provided these
respondents with only a minor source of supplemental cash income, although many stated that
they either owned a chainsaw or participated in log-hauling. As we saw earlier, carabao logging
continues to be an important contributor to overall household income for pioneers and followers
with access to permanent erop lands. A survey among Ilocano and Ifugao migrants in the forest
lands of Maddela, Quirino found that the households that owned the largest areas of permanent
farmland and derived most of their income from these lands, still generaled a quarter of their
total income from the sale of forest products (Huijbregts 1996:105). Table 4.12 summarizes
the main options from which forest migrants can choose as a means of generating their cash
and food income.
Figure 4.7 illustrates how the various income-generating opportunities described in the
previous sections compete for labour allocation throughout the year. Forest migrants earn the
largest portion of their annual cash income during the dry summer period between February
and June. In the past the log-hauling activities of corporate logging companies were also
confïned to this period, when six-wheel-drive trucks were able to enter the logging roads in the
Sierra Madre to collect agricultural crops and forest products. Agricultural labour requirements
also peak during summer, when the main cereal erop is harvested from the bangkag fields,
talon areas are prepared for the coming monsoon, and new uma clearings should be carried out
quickly, so that one or more good burns can be realized before the end of May, when the heavy
rains of the southwest monsoon arrive. By contrast, migrants growing rain-fed rice in uma,
bangkag and talon fields harvest their most important erop in September or October, in the
midst of the rainy season. Since the most laborious part of the fire-and-fallow cycle is clearing
and burning, fig. 4.7 shows that migrants who rely on uma and ublag lands for their
agricultural income face time constraints when it comes to participating in other cash-earning
opportunities, especially carabao logging activities. Being limited to fire-and-fallow farming
through lack of access to animal - let alone mechanical - draught power, farmers without
ploughed lands are often hired by bangkag owners to plant their lands while they are occupied
in log-hauling. Owners compensate cultivators either on a daily-wage basis, or through a
sharecropping arrangement. Households that can afford to hire wage labour for their farms are
those with substantial bangkag or talon farm areas (where cash crops are produced), and those
with a substantial cash income from logging (or another source of steady cash income, e.g., a
shop or remittances from relatives with urban or overseas employment).

















Table 4.12 Estimated return to labour for livelihood options in the Sierra Madre
Activity Return on labour
(pesos per day)
Carabao logging







banana on uma 125-200
upland rice & beans on uma 40
hybiid corn on uma 45
hybrid corn on bangkag 140 (incl. input/credit-cost)
white com on bangkag 85
Agncultural wage labour
Uma-clearing 50-70
Planting 30 - 40
Weeding 30- 50
Ploughing (incl carabao) 85 - 120
Basket-weavmg 30
Rattan-gathering 20-30
Sources: Dirkx 1995; Numan 1995; Bakker 1995; Polet 1991; Aquino 1991; own fieldwork
See Annex C for calculations of returns on labour for agncultural crops
Income of the hauler depend* on the quahty of the wood, markei prices and distance from the cutting area to
pick-up point In 1994, a one-day carabao hauling of 54 boardfeet of premium timber over a distance of 10 km earned
approximately 200 Pesos. By 1996, waterhaulers reported bemg paid 8 Pesos per hoardfeet for transporting Narra lumber
from the cutting site directly to a pick-up point m the lowlands The trip takes 4 days, and the haulers bnng 400 boardfeet
in one trip, resultmg in a gross return to labour of 800 Pesos per day However this RTL still needs to be adjusted
downward by incorporatmg costs for mamtenance of the person transporting the log. brtbes paid for passage at
checkpomts. losses due to confiscations. waiting time for the actual payment and working days lost due to mjuries
incurred along the way.
at the cutting edge... 155
In view of the lack of options open to uma farmers for either food and cash income, the
popularity of bananas as a cash erop is not surprising. After the clearing of the land, the banana
trees produce a small but steady income (5,000 to 10,000 pesos per hectare per year at 1993
prices) in return for a minimal investment of labour over a period of four to eight years. The
heavy bunches can only reach outside buyers when access roads from lowland markets to
pickup points in the Sierra Madre are passable by six-wheel-drive trucks. Another drawback
is the fact that the shade of banana trees hampers the growth of annual crops; this is why it is
most popular in newly expanding settlement areas near the forest frontier, where the production
of grain can be shifted to new uma land. In older settlements, banana trees are found mainly
in the improved ublags. A tnird disadvantage of raising bananas is the sensitivity of the plant
to typhoons. In 1990 and 1993, strong typhoons passed the Cagayan Valley region, inflicting
large-scale damage on banana plantations in the Sierra Madre and depriving many of the
poorest migrants of a scarce source of cash income for at least one year.
Fig. 4.7 also illustrates why forest migrants engaged in carabao logging often opt for the
production of only one erop of corn on their bangkag lands. The dry season being a peak period
for timber hauling, carabaos are mobilized for that purpose when chainsaw operators, timber
buyers and bamboo traders are offering hauling contracts. Hence the option of preparing land
for the planting of hybrid corn in the summer competes for labour during those few months
when the most lucrative cash earner presents itself. An added reason to forego the summer
planting is the risk of erop failure due to the moist conditions prevailing between July and the
harvesting months of September and October. These moist conditions and the regular
occurrence of typhoons during this period also represent a risk for the traders financing the
cultivation of commercial crops. The poorly maintained logging roads into the Sierra Madre
become impassable for extended periods of time in the rainy season, and the erop may not be
able to reach the lowland market. Forest migrants cultivating bangkag lands near all-weather
roads may indeed opt to produce two commercial crops per year. The increasing production
of commercial corn varieties in the Sierra Madre is more closely examined in Chapter 9.
4.10 Initial conclusions, further questions
The results of interpretations of aerial photographs and satellite imagery presented in the
previous chapter show substantial deforestation between 1950 and 1990: 46% of the Sierra
Madre's high and medium forest cover area was degraded into lower classes, and 4%, almost
40,000 hectares, was cleared. Forest migration remained limited during this period: in 1990
an estimated 130,000 people were living on the l .4 million hectares of forest lands in the Sierra
Madre. Even if we take into account the fact that in-migration was concentrated on the western
slopes, the resulting population density of less than 20 people per square kilometre is low.
I therefore conclude that up until 1990, large-scale, mechanized logging operations were
the most important cause of deforestation in de Sierra Madre. During the 25-year boom-and-
bust cycle of the corporate timber industry, a small number of holders of Timber Licensing
Agreements were allowed to extract an estimated 26 million cubic metres of premium
hardwoods worth nearly two billion dollars, from these natural forest stands. A similar volume
of illicit timber is estimated to have been extracted by local logging contractors and their
employees during this same period.
For the early forest migrants, pre-logging pioneers, and former logging labourers
(characterized here as 'followers'), agriculture was not a major income-earner during the
corporate logging period, but merely ensured the food security of the household. With money
earned in the logging industry, these migrants were able to buy chainsaws and carabaos, and
carry out their own small-scale logging operations inside logging concessions, a practice which
156 c hapte r 4
became more common after the majority of these concessions were suspended, cancelled or
abandoned during the early nineties. Since then, forest migrants have come to play an
increasingly important role in advancing the deforestation process. Residual forests, already
exposed to premature second and third cuts in previous years, continue to be used for rattan-
gathering, bamboo-cutting and carabao logging. Extraction continues until these products are
no longer found within the 15-kilometre action radius of the carabao. The alternative option of
using waterways for the transportation of forest products is not feasible for all forest
settlements, but it does enable chainsaw operators to continue logging at much greater distances
from their settlements. Once accessible forests have been stripped of their residual stocks of
commercial products - and even before then - migrants tend to put the remaining biomass to
economie use by clearing and burning it, to produce a number of agricultural crops in a labour-
and capital-extensive marmer.
In the case of the Sierra Madre, therefore, tropical deforestation is triggered by corporate
logging companies failing to secure the long-term productivity of logged-over forests, and
completed by individual forest migrants competing with each other for the lands and the
remaining products contained in this open-access resource on a 'first-come, first-served' basis.
As only a relatively small number of migrants resided in the Sierra Madre, only a small areas
had reached the second phase of this deforestation process by the time this study was carried
out. After 1990, competition for the lands and resources of the Sierra Madre began to intensify,
as new migrants from poor rural villages in Ifugao and the lowlands of Cagayan Valley also
began to enter the western slopes of the Sierra Madre to clear farmlands and ultimately to settle
there with their families. Unlike the pioneers and followers who preceded mem, this last group
of migrants immediately turned to agriculture as a means of making a living. Since they do not
have carabaos or chainsaws, and often find the best lands already occupied, these recent
migrants are engaged almost exclusively in fire-and-fallow farming. Not only does this have
a favourable effect on soil fertility and the ability of the erop to compete with weeds and
disease, it is first and foremost a labour-efficient method by which these often poor migrants
can develop a good-sized farm area within the constraints set by the available household labour.
Thus far, little evidence of soil degradation has been found under either extensive or
intensive fire-fallow cycles in upland farms in the northern Sierra Madre. Moreover, the
majority of forest migrants are not continuously shifting their farms in the direction of the
forest frontier, as is sometimes assumed. The majority build a permanent residence and
gradually switch from longer to shorter fire-and-fallow cycles, and eventually to plough
farming, as unclaimed convertible forest land becomes steadily scarcer. This last step is not
always a sustainable one, as it may lead to a more thorough depletion of readily available
organic and mineral nutrients distributed throughout the deeper layers of the soil. However,
combining current population growth rates with the farm size required for a sustainable fire-
fallow cycle, simple extrapolations show that in the coming fifty years the present forest cover
of the Sierra Madre will largely be converted into farmlands to accommodate its occupants. It
follows that, in die medium term, it is not so much the upland farming methods as the numbers
of migrants who depend on them for a livelihood that pose the greatest threat to the future of
the Sierra Madre forest.
Social and economie relationships between people living inside the forest lands and
secondary and tertiary actors living in lowland areas play a role in all the primary activities
discussed in this chapter. Logging company employees become 'follower' migrants; lowland-
based buyers of rattan, bamboo and timber organize and finance carabao logging, bamboo-
collection and rattan-gathering. And as I will argue in Chapter 9, moneylenders in the lowlands
are also increasingly engaged in the financing of erop production contracts in upland farms.
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Another 'outsider' that may be expected to have a significant influence on developments inside
the forest lands is the Philippine government. Questions have arisen on the policies it is
pursuing in the forestry sector, and on the manner in which the people representing the
government are putting those policies into practice. Why have successive governments allowed
such a relatively small group of primary actors to take advantage of these resources, when the
effects are so obviously at odds with the public interest, not to mention that of the indigenous
peoples who claim these lands as their ancestral home? The next two chapters describe relevant
government policies pertaining to the ownership and use of the Philippine forest lands and
resources, and examine the process by which these policies are interpreted and implemented
on their way from the national policy formulation level to the field.
Chapter 5
Policies and policy actors in Philippine forest management
5.1 Introduction
The continuous decline of the Philippine forests since the early twentieth century could be the
result of either a deliberate government policy to convert forests into alternative economie
assets (e.g., capital and farmland) or a failed government attempt to manage these public
resources in a sustainable way. History shows that subsequent Philippine governments
performed both roles, the latter with considerably less success than the former.
To understand the role of the government in deforestation, the first question to be answered
concerns the content of the relevant laws and policies'. The 1904 Homestead Act (see Section
8.5), and subsequent government-sponsored settlement programmes in Mindanao, Palawan and
the Visayas, are examples of policies that stimulated forest migration and forest clearing. After
independence, however, government policies reflected increasing concern about unsustainable
forest use. Nevertheless, corporate logging enjoyed an unprecedented boom after
independence, putting to the test policies designed to protect the Philippine forests from abuse.
The rapid deforestation rates of the postwar years are evidence that those policies have failed
the test (ibid). This failure may have been due to (1) the policies themselves, (2) the way
government actors implemented them or, (3) in a more general sense, the quality of the
relationship between the citizenry and the state, its policies and its representatives. The latter
two factors are examined in Chapter 6. Here, I will first provide a critical overview of policies
that have been central to Philippine forest governance since the 1970s, and the various actors
involved in their formulation.
5.2 Philippine forest policy
The Philippines has a wide range of presidential decrees, laws, policies and implementing
guidelines concerning the protection and utilization of its natural forests (De Gu/man 1992; La
Vina 1991) The state is mandated to define and implement rules and regulations regarding:
- ownership of lands and natural resources
- forest product utilization
- forest land use and occupancy
- reforestation and nature conservation.
The following sections present an overview of the main policies pursued in these four areas,
including the most significant changes that took place after the popular overthrow of the
Marcos administration in 1986, and assess the potential contribution of these policies to
sustainable forest management, i.e., without considering the implementation aspects discussed
in the next chapter.
Following Van Braam (1986:14-17). I define a policy as 'fa pamcular combination of objectives and Instruments of
social actmf> deemed appropnate to ohtam these objectives". Government policies concretize societal values into normative
statements ahout processes in society, and mclude the possibility to re-direct an undesirable process.
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5.2. l Ownership of lands and natural resources
All policies and laws guiding the use and protection of Philippine forests are based on the
Regalian Doctrine, which dates back to the sixteenth century, when the archipelago was
annexed by Spain. All lands and resources in the Islands were considered Crown properties,
unless there was evidence to the contrary in the form of official certificates based on formal
law. Lynch calls the doctrine mythical, claiming that it was re-invented by the United States
as a "conventen! legal pretext" (Lynch and Talbott 1995:45) to justify and perpetuate the
colonial government's hold on the large public domain after 1898, when Spain lost the Islands
to the United States. In 1909, the Regalian Doctrine was legally refuted by a U.S. Supreme
Court decision stating that land occupied in the Philippines since time immemorial was never
legally public land" (Carino vs. Insular Affairs, 1939, cited in Plugge 1992) but this court
decision has been ignored ever since and the Spanish crown's ownership of all lands without
formal titles was inherited by successive governments of the Philippines. In 1902, the United
States Congress reinforced the public ownership of unclassified and untitled lands in the
"Philippine Act", as did the new 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
It would appear that the American and Philippine governments applied the doctrine more
rigorously than Spain's King Philip had intended, to the disadvantage of the ancestral
inhabitants of the public lands. In 1594, for example, hè specified that "Grants of land to
Spaniards be without injury to the natives and those which have been granted to their loss and
injury be returned to their lawful owners "(Lynch 1986: 271). Two other Royal Decrees, issued
in 1754 and 1880 respectively, also recognize "justified long and continuous possession" as a
valid title, even in the absence of formal deeds (De Guzman 1992: 33). Subsequent American
and Philippine legislation pertaining to the public lands also recognizes so-called native titles,
but confine these to public agricultural lands. The 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,
although still based on the Regalian principle that forest lands are owned by the government
unless proven otherwise, is a novelty in the history of Philippine forest policy, as it opens up
the possibility for indigenous forest people to gain ownership titles of lands in the public
domain on the basis of formalized claims that they and their ancestors have lived on these lands
since time immemorial.
During the early years of United States administration of the Philippines (which lasted from
1898 to 1946, with a three-year interruption during World War II when the country was under
Japanese rule), 92% of the Philippine land mass was declared Public Domain. In the
subsequent 'Philippine Act' of 1902, the U.S. Congress granted authority to the Philippine
government to dispose of and allocate tenurial rights to use natural resources in Public Lands.
The 1903 'Public Lands Act' (Republic Act 926) specified a land-classification system for the
granting of individual ownership of land; only so-called Alienable and Disposable Lands
could be privately owned, while the Public Lands would be permanently managed by the State,
a principle which is still upheld under the terms of the 1987 Constitution:
"All lands of the Public Domain, waters, mmerals, coal, petroleum and other mmeral oils, all
farces ofpotential energy, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated"(Philippine Constitution, 1987, Article XII, Section 2)
The Public Lands Act distinguished, among others, the following classes of land:
Alienable and Disposable (A&D) lands refer to those lands of the public domain which
have been classified and declared as not needed for forest purposes.
Forest Lands, comprise both lands classified as such under the criteria defined by the act,
as well as all unclassified lands of the public domain.
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Public Forest is the area of lands of the public domain which has not been classified, which
differentiates lands needed for forestry purposes from those which are not.
The primacy of the forestry sector in government decisions on the allocation of public land
flows from the nationale behind this classification: forestry purposes prevail over other land
uses, and only agricultural lands in the public domain can be alienated by the State. The Forest
Act, enacted by the US Congress in 1904, reaffirmed that only agricultural lands in the Public
Domain could be classified for private titling. This act, which upheld the concept of state
ownership of forest and mineral lands, classifying them as 'not-Alienable and Disposable', also
stipulated the marmer in which the State was to organize the extraction of natural resources
from these lands, i.e., by issuing licenses to the private sector (the special relationship between
the State and the Philippine forestry sector is given further historical dimensions in Chapter 7).
The Revised Forestry Code of 1975 (PD 705) still limited the possibilities of classifying
Public Land as A&D land, by stipulating that all lands with slopes of 18% and above were
automatically classified as Forest lands, which could not be alienated from the State or legally
acquired. This principle has continued to be a cornerstone of all subsequent forest laws and
policies, and the above mentioned Ancestral Domain Act appears to be the first serious sign
of a reversal in the Philippines' long history of rejected claims by indigenous forest peoples to
the ownership and use of tracts of public land. DENR Department Administrative Order N° 2
of 1993, initiated the process of registering, defming and validating such claims (see section
5.2.3).
Land classification proceeded slowly; in 1948, two years after the Philippines had formally
gained independence from the United States, the Public Domain still comprised over 70% of
all lands; 61 % were unclassified public lands and 10% classified forest land (Bautista 1990:74).
Under the first two administrations of the independent republic, the majority of newly classified
lands became Alienable and Disposable. After independence, the responsibility for land
classification shifted from the Bureau of Lands to the Bureau of Forestry. This shift reflected
the growing importance of forest industries for the Philippine economy and reduced the chances
of public lands being classified as A&D. The Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands could not
process any land claims unless A&D classification had been issued by the Director of the
Bureau of Forestry, a situation which led to bureaucratie rivalry and the de facto impossibility
of anyone residing in the Public Domain obtaining legal ownership of the land (Lynch 1986).
Under the administration of President Corazon Aquino, both bureaus became part of the newly
established Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the responsibility
for land classification returned to the Bureau of Lands.
The government's reluctance to release its unclassified lands, and the preferential treatment
the forestry sector continued to enjoy after independence, is reflected in the fact that out of the
13.3 million ha of public lands which were classified between 1957 and 1985, 72% were
retained by the state as classified forest land (Bautista 1990: 75). In 1994, the share of the
Public Domain classified as public forest or unclassified and assumed to be under forest had
dropped to 50%. According to Lynch (1995:58), most of these remaining forests are probably
located in ancestral domains. The most recent forestry bilf, which was approved by the House
of Representatives and replaces the outdated 1975 Forestry Code, pledges to complete the
classification of all the remaining unclassified lands in the Public Domain within three years
House Bill 2966. An Aa Providmg for the Sustainable Management of Forest Resources, approved by the Committee
°n Natural Resources of the House of Representatives on 29 November 1995
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of the enactment of the bill in 1995. The bill maintains the criterion setting the maximum slope
at 18 % for lands classified as A&D, but Section 36 recognizes land and domain claims of the
indigenous cultural communities residing in the public domain, and endorses DENR's
administrative order N° 2 of 1993 pertaining to the delineation of these claims.
5.2.2 Forest product utilization: from corporate license to 'democratized access'
TlMBER LlCENSING AGREEMENTS (TLAS)
Large-scale, mechanized logging operations have been the dominant land use in all Philippine
forests since the early twentieth century, when the United States mechanized the industry,
encouraged private investments for purposes of large-scale timber extraction in the 'Philippine
Islands', and developed the first scientific forestry school in the Philippines, at Los Banos (see
Chapter 7). Government policies were developed to regulate the extraction of forest products
from the public domain by private logging companies. The first Philippine Forest Act,
introduced by the U.S. Congress in 1904, became the bible of Philippine forestry and up until
1975 it remained the basis for all subsequent forestry regulations (Boado 1988:172). The Forest
Act introduced the Timber Licensing Agreement (TLA) as the legal instrument for corporate
access to public forests. Through these agreements, the government grants private enterprises
the right to
"utilize forest resources within any forest land without any right ofoccupation or possession over
the same, to exdusion ofothers, except the Government, but with the corresponding obligation to
develop, protect and rehabilitate the same in accordance with the terms setforth in said agreement"
(Presidential Decree n" 1559, revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, 1978)
TLAs are valid for 25 years and renewable for an additional 25 years. The government retains
the right to unilaterally suspend or cancel the agreement if it finds convincing evidence of
violations of forestry rules and regulations, as stipulated in the 1975 Forestry Reform Code
(PD 705) and its successor PD 1559 or the Revised Forestry Code of 1978. Section 61 of the
Revised Forestry Code stipulates that a licensee may transfer or convey his license or
extraction rights in the concession to other parties, but only if no violations of forestry rules
and regulations have been committed. The same section explicitly prohibits semi-transfer,
known as 'farming out', in which someone who holds a timber license allows one or more local
contractors to carry out logging operations in the concession, and receives a fixed sum for
every board foot of lumber extracted by these other contractors.
Logging, wood processing and transport can only take place after the licensee has received
government approval for his Annual Operations Plan, which specifies how and in what parts
of the concession the licensee will extract the Annual Allowable Cut (AAC), the volume of
timber which may be cut, as defined by the government. The Operations Plan is based on field
surveys by the company forester and his crew, who survey the concession and carry out stand-
stock inventories. The Operations Plan also provides details on access roads to be constructed
for the operation. Each timber licensee is required to carry out reforestation and timber stand
improvement activities in the concession, or in its vicinity. These activities offer company
personnel alternative activities during the rainy season, when terrain conditions become
unsuitable for mechanized logging operations.
Government officials monitor the implementation of the Operations Plan by issuing
transportation permits, certificates of origin and sawmill permits. Since 1993, only processed
and semi-processed wood products may be exported from Region 2. By monitoring the total
amount of wood shipped out of each source by the TLA holders, the government sees to it that
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licensees do not extract a higher volume than their Allowable Cut. Checkpoints along the
Maharlika National Highway are used to verify whether all vehicles transporting forest
products carry the appropriate papers. Any lumber transported without the proper documents
is confiscated and sold at public auction. Through ground and areal surveys, the government
monitors actual logging operations, to see that they are carried out according to the Operations
Plan.
In the 1987 constitution, TLAs are no longer mentioned as an option for forest resource
utilization. Instead, Executive Order 278 of that year reflects a shift away from commercial
large-scale users and in favour of 'democratie access' to natural resources, notably for poor
households occupying forest lands (De Guzman, 192:48). This was quite a remarkable change,
after decades during which government policy had consistently provided legal support for the
corporate logging industry in its land-use conflict with forest communities, both indigenous and
of migrant origin. Existing concessions had to be converted into so-called Timber Production
Sharing Agreements, in which both government and forest communities had a larger share of
the revenues from corporate logging operations in public forest lands.
In 1992, there were still 68 valid Timber Licensing Agreements in the country as a whole,
down from 471 in 1976. Of these, 38 had obtained DENR approval for their 1992 operations
plan. A year later, the number of corporate concessions in operation had dropped to 33
(Philippine Star, 24 May 1993). The same newspaper article quoted an announcement by the
DENR that its officials would "start tophysically examine logged-over areas and to check for
any deviations from the concerned TLA's operations plan", an activity that the department had
been responsibility for carrying out ever since the first Philippine Bureau of Forestry was set
up in 1908. DENR underscored its renewed monitoring vigour with a "new set offines and
penalties to be imposed on tree damaging TLAs".
The number of corporate logging concessions in operation also dropped sharply in Cagayan
Valley: from 28 in 1989, with an aggregate Annual Allowable Cut of 1.3 million m3, to four
in 1997, with a total AAC of 20,000 m3 (see also Chapter 7). One of the mores problematic
aspects of this rigorous reduction in corporate logging concessions during the early 1990s was
the lack of alternative management measures. By 1992, the cancellations and suspensions had
created approximately one million hectares of accessible residual and old-growth forest. In a
context in which forest communities lacked legal tenure to these resources, and the DENR had
insuffïcient staff and resources to protect these, the Sierra Madre became a virtual open-access
resource, to be appropriated on a first-come, first-served basis.
PROS AND CONS OF SELECTIVE LOGGING
TLA holders are required to manage their forests in accordance with the principles laid down
in the Philippine Selective Logging System (SLS). The development of this system, by the
College of Forestry of the University of the Philippines, was a response to growing government
concerns about the sustainability of large-scale mechanized logging operations:
"due to the general practice of leaving understocked areas in the process of removing the best
marketable timber, the country willface a shortage oftimber after the virgin forest hos been logged
over. Due to careless logging and a complete disregardfor the safety ofyoung trees, more areas
would be added to the millions of hectares already barren or understocked. To avoid the increase
in such areas and the tremendous cost of restoring the forest by artificial reforestation, Selective
Logging had to be practised"(Bureau of Forestry, 1970:5)
Selective Logging optimizes the productivity of natural mixed dipterocarp rainforests for
commercial timber species. The higher sustained growth and yield of these species is achieved
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by removing 'ovennature' and a percentage of 'mature' trees of commercial species from a
climax vegetation. Through Timber Stand Improvement measures, the density of commercial
species is increased at the expense of non-commercial species. Other prescriptions concern
measures to minimize damage due to access roads and log ponds, the protection of critical
watersheds, rivers and streams in the concession area, and a felling system that minimizes
damage to the residual stand. Section 4.4. describes the system in more detail.
Empirical evidence suggests that selective logging is not as sustainable as the above
theoretical prescriptions suggest. Garrity et al. (1992:566) cite several studies on the damage
caused by the extensive road network, loading and collection points, and the mechanical cutting
and hauling operations inherent in large-scale mechanized logging. Based on observations of
the impact of selective logging techniques on the residual forest stand, Kuswata (1980:120),
Ashton (1980:48) and Thaib and Karnasudirja (1981, all cited in Gilles 1988:99) estimate that
half of the standing trees larger than 10 cm in diameter are severely damaged. A FORI study
in two set-ups of mechanized logging operations in the Phüippines reported that 42 % of the
marked residuals had sustained damage after selective logging. High-lead logging is reported
to cause damage to as much as 72% of the remaining stock (BFD 1984:223). A weakness
which is linked not to the selective logging techniques themselves, but rather to the stability
assumptions on which they are based. is the impact of un-modelled social 'distortions' such as
forest migration and illegal cuts following the -first opening of the old-growth vegetation. As
Gillis reports:
"The Philippine experience with selective cutting is similar to that of Indonesia. Concessionaires
who began operating in the 1950s were, by 1986, just Teaching the end of the first cutting cycle
provided under that system. It is no\v clear that the quantity and the quality of the second-cyde
horvest will be much below the earlier optimistic estimates of the government" (Gillis 1988:99)
Bautista. an economist who has studied the Philippine forestry sector for many years, explains
that many forest concessions never reach a second cut, because their economie horizon is
shorter than the 25-year period during which the resources are entrusted to them. Philippine
TLA holders only hold on to their concession for an average period of nine to ten years,
leading him to conclude that "given the actual term of the lease, being 25 years, renewable for
another 25 years, the early voluntary return ofleased lands may reflect the capacity oflicensed
holders w exhaust the standing timber within their concession area, as well as their lack of
interest in replanting and sustaining yield" (Bautista 1990:78). A 1982 cost/ benefit analysis
of the Selective Logging System as implemented in three concessions in Agusan del Norte,
Cagayan Valley and Davao-Zamboanga del Norte, concludes that the second cut often takes
too long to be of economie significance. Likewise, capital outlays in replanting and Timber
Stand Improvement after the first cut are of questionable economie rationality for the loggers
(Cruz 1982). Higher returns can be earned by investing in other sectors of the economy, or
simply banking one's money; real interest rates are well above the productivity of mixed
dipterocarp forests (Rice et al. 1997). Thus profit-maximizing loggers are inclined towards the
unrestricted extraction of all commercial volume during the first cut.
Gillis (1980) argues that governments should allow loggers to follow this tendency, instead
of inhibiting such behaviour by imposing non-specific forest charges. In his view, selective
logging entails the high grading, or cream-skimming of a natural forest capital, and is not the
logger's economie response to forest charges based on a non-specific amount per board foot
of timber extracted from the concession. High-grading loggers only remove the most valuable
sterns from the forest, leaving the rest behind, often in damaged condition. The economie value
of the damaged, unused volume of residual timber is lost, for both the State and the logger.
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Hence, in Gillis' view, high and non-specific forest charges are an incentive for high grading.
Although the Philippines did indeed have a system of non-specific forest charges and selective
logging guidelines to encourage timber concessionaires to practice high grading, most
concessionaires behaved quite like the "rational loggers" described by Bautista, Cruz and Rice
et al.: they maximized the volumes extracted in the first cut and pulled out of the concession
well before a second cut could be harvested. One explanation for the fact that forest charges
were unable to reinforce the official selective logging policy was that, until recently, these were
disproportionately low. Up until 1980, application fees for a TLA concession were as low as
l Peso per hectare (Vitug 1993:58), while for each cubic metre of prime hardwood extracted,
a forest charge of 3.5 Pesos (well below one percent of the commercial value) was imposed.
In 1980, these charges were increased to 9.35 P/m3 (for domestic use) or 13.25 F/m3 (if
exported) and by 1984 to 30 Pesos/m3, which was still only 5-6% of log value against
Wholesale price (Bautista 1990:78). The other assumption that underlies the high-grading
theory is that governments are actually able to impose these taxes in ruil upon concessionaires.
The validity of this assumption in the context of the Cagayan Valley Region is weak, but will
be further examined in the next Chapter.
Accepting the sub-optimality of selective logging from an economie perspective, the
alternatives Gillis presents are probably less attractive from an environmental point of view.
His recommendation that non-specific charges be replaced by a flat income tax or a system of
differentiated forest charges according to species may indeed be an incentive for loggers to
extract a higher volume, thus increasing earnings from the first cut by both the licensee and the
government. However, maximizing extracted volumes results in much greater damage to the
forest ecosystem and reduces the chances of forest recovery. In fact, the most recent systems
for sustained yield forestry in natural tropical moist forest are based on multiple cycles in
which considerably smaller volumes of timber are extracted per hectare (see Chapter 2, section
2.2 A). A more effective, if more complicated, measure would be not only to charge loggers
(and lumber users) on the basis of the timber extracted , but also to pass on to them the cost
of their operations, both on-site in the remaining stand and off-site, on whatever scale defined.
This can be realized either by increasing differentiated forest charges, or via the price-incentive
which is part of present efforts towards timber certification. Charges, or prices, could then be
co-determined by management variables such as the quality of the residual stand and the
reforestation performance of the concessionaire. In this way, poor management would reduce
logging profits. In the present situation, loggers do not bear any of the environmental and
social consequences of their operations, as Gillis himself notes in a later work:
"enterprises are only charged on the basis of timber removals, without reference to the stock of
merchantable and legal-sized sterns in the stand. This contributes to the unavoidable features of
selective cutting and unintended deplenon of tropical forest resources. ..the damage to the residual
stand on public lands constitutes a social cost for which the logger is not charged. ..these damages
can be very substantial." (Gillis 1988:98-99)
While it is true that forest charges do not reflect the costs Gillis mentions here, damage to
residual trees is punishable by law. In the tree-marking surveys that are a mandatory part of
the preparation of the Annual Operations Plan, not only trees for immediate harvesting are
marked, but also those which will be ready for harvesting in the next cutting cycle. If the
'ogging operation damages marked residual trees, the law imposes a fine equivalent to four
times the regular forest charge (HB 2966, Sec 78).
Despite objections raised by the wood industry, the DENR imposed higher forest charges
through Department Administrative Order No. 39, series of 1993. From then onwards, a
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reforestation fee of P 12,500 per hectare had to be deposited with the Philippine Wood
Producers Association, an amount which is forfeited if the concessionaire does not carry out
his reforestation obligations. Forest charges were increased to P550/m3 for common and
construction hardwood, and P 3000/m3 for premium species, which is 10-15 % of market
value.
One objection to raising forest charges is the possible side-effect of stimulating illegal
extraction. However, the highest deforestation and forest degradation rates in the Philippines
took place between 1960 and 1990, when forest charges were low by any standard. In this
policy context of low, non-specific forest charges, massive over-cutting by concessionaires and
forest migrants took place, as well as other forms of fraud involving the extraction, processing
and trading of forest products (Bautista 1990; Broad and Cavanagh 1993; Repetto 1990;
Repetto and Gillis 1988; Tumaliuan 1994; Vitug 1993; World Bank 1988, see also Chapter 6).
If high grading had indeed occurred, under the sylvicultural prescriptions of the Philippine
Selective Logging System, the Philippine deforestation problem would probably not be as
serious as it is today.
DlMINISHING POLITÏCAL SUPPORT AFTER 1986
The Philippine Government gradually distanced itself from the corporate approach to forest
management after 1986. Aside from a few showcases of corporate forest management, such as
the pulp and matchwood plantations of PICOP and Providential Tree Farms in Mindanao, the
track record of the corporate method of implementing selective logging led to the conclusion
that "rare exceptions apart, the experience thusfar hos not borne out the merits of the system"
(ADB 1988:19). This was a historica! turnaround: for the first time since the timber licensing
system was introduced into the Philippines almost exactly one century earlier (cf. section 7.2),
the government began to reassess how well its public resources had fared in the hands of
private enterprise. This policy shift may be attributed to four developments in Philippine
society:
- First, there was the 'EDSA Revolution', when a crowd protected rebellious military and
blocked Epifano Delos Santos Avenue, the main thoroughfare of Metro Manila, and finally
forced Ferdinand Marcos and his family to flee to Hawaii on February 26, 1986. The
revolution temporarily cut off many of the ties that had been forged between corporate
enterprises and Malacanang, the presidential palace, during the two decades that Marcos
was in power. The logging industry was closely associated with nepotism and corruption;
and a contmuation of this mode of exploitation of public resources was incompatible with
the new administration's promise of principled good government. NGOs were allowed to
operate openly, became better organized, and began to exposé past and present abuses in
the logging industry, emphasizing the nght of forest commumties to co-manage the national
forest patrimony. The contmuation of corporate forest-access policies was difficult to
reconcile with the People Pouw-based political legitimacy of the administration of Mrs.
Corazon Aquino.
Compelling evidence of deforestation discredited claims by the corporate logging lobby that
the timber extraction boom between 1960 and 1985 could be sustained. Nationwide, forest
degradation and loss had assumed serious dimensions that were apparent not only to
foresters and other professionals, but to the citizenry as a whole.
Environmental awareness heightened as a result of a large number of natural disasters that
took place during the period 1990-1992: the 1990 earthquake and the heavy rains that
followed it, the 1991 Pinatubo disaster, and the flash flood on November 5, 1991, which
killed 8000 people in Ormoc City, Leyte. Local officials blamed the disaster on lost forest
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cover, due to unrestricted logging in the watershed areas around Ormoc City.
As a result of continuous forest migration, the presence of human beings inside the public
domain could no longer be neglected. By the late 1980s, the corporate logging concept did
not outlive the validity of its fundamental perception of forests as unpopulated timber
production systerns.
To prevent the resurgence of the old practice of using corporate timber concessions as
instruments of favouritism, the new 1987 Constitution introduced competitive bidding in the
awarding of forest exploitation rights to the private sector. Logging revenues were to be shared
between the Government and the private sector. Forest charges were raised from 5% to 20%
of stumpage value, and the export ban on ra w logs, referred to in PD 705, was reconfirmed
by DAO 19 of 1989. Furthermore, new strategies were employed to supervise logging
operations more strictly. Special Operations, such as Oplan Sagip Gubat (Operation Save the
Virgin Forest), Oplan Luntian (Operation clean up) and Oplan Jericho were carried out by
DENR, in cooperation with the Philippine national police and the Philippine army.
The latter operation entailed an impressive display of government muscle-flexing in the
direction of illegal logging activities. The operation entailed a combined air, sea and land drive
by DENR and oüier government agencies, including the army, the police and the Department
of Justice, to stamp out the illegal cutting, storing and trading of timber in Regions 2,4 and 10.
Illegal sawmills were closed down and more than 250 million pesos' worth of logs confiscated.
In Region 2 alone 16 businessmen were charged, 11 of whom were arrested, together with 7
mayors (Manila Bulletin, 15 July 1993). Joseph Estrada, then Vice President and elected in
May 1998 as President of the Philippines, supervised the operations himself:
"right at the heart ofwhat environment officials concede as "the most problematic region". The
Government's chief crime busterpersonally supervised the suspension oftwo big logging companies
here which had beenfound to be operating outside their concessions (Consolidated Logging and
Lumber Mills Inc and Green Valley Timber Inc.). Estrada also inspected some 20,000 cubic meters
of timber confiscated by the DENR just last week... .Leonardo Paat, DENR Regional Director
acknowledged that theprovinces of Isabela, Cagayan, Batanes and Nueva Viscaya comprised the
'most notorious' logging region in the country. In 1991, 20% of the national timber production
came from the Region... .For the past 6 months alone, hè said, an estimated 30,000 cubic meters
of timber have been illegally cutfrom the Region 'That would already account for 9% ofwhat is
allowed for this year', Paat said. (PDI, 13 July 1993)
From the first of January 1992 onwards, logging became prohibited in virgin forests, in areas
over 1000 metres in elevation and in areas with slopes of 50% and above (DAO 24, 1991). The
conservation impact of this order was limited, since by the time it was issued, only a small
portion of the Philippines' remaining natural forest had not yet been logged over (see Ch. 3).
The remaining one million hectares of old-growth forest were the least accessible ones and of
lower commercial value. The log ban in virgin forests did not mean the end of corporate
logging: it simply led companies to transfer their attention to the secondary forests. DAO 24
directed holders of TLA and TPSA licenses to conduct timber inventories in at least 5 % of the
residual stands logged between l and 25 years earlier; DENR would then use this as a basis
of evaluation in determining whether a second cut could be extracted from these forests. The
Plans prepared by the concessionaires had to be based on a remaining timber stand stock of
67m3/ha after logging, reducing the financial prospects of logging operations in Üiese generally
understocked forests (see section 6.2). Nevertheless, the policy designed to protect a relatively
small area of old-growth forests was accompanied by regulations easing logging restrictions -
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such as the minimum length of the cutting cycle - in residual forests which comprised over l
of the country's overall forest cover.
Corporate logging moratoria were also imposed on provinces with less than 40% forest
cover and on provinces and towns under investigation for past irregularities in the logging
industry. In March 1993 a logging moratorium was declared for the entire Cagayan Valley
region. This moratorium had been pushed through by a coalition of NGOs and progressive
individuals in the regional office of the DENR. lts enthusiastic endorsement by the Central
Office in Manila was widely perceived to be, at least in part, politically sponsored: days before
the 1992 elections, the provincial governor of Isabela had broken nis promise to support
administration's candidate for the presidential elections, Fidel Ramos (see Box 5.2, section
5.3.2).
THE DEFEAT OF THE TOTAL LOG BAN
On May 18, 1993, the Philippine Senate unanimously approved a 30-year total log ban on third
reading. The approval revived the logging ban debate in Philippine society, in spite of the fact
that the sharp reduction in old-growth forests in the Philippines' had caused a commensurate
decline in the significance of forest industries for the national economy. There was broad
consensus on the need for government action to deal with the deforestation crisis in the
country, but divisions remained over the question of whether a total log ban was the best instru-
ment to achieve this. Opponents claimed that it would be unfair to penalize poor communities,
workers in the wood industry, and all those who abided by forestry rules and regulations
simply because of the Government's failure to implement the existing laws.
To turn the Senate proposal into an Act, support from the House of Representatives was
necessary. The House was not ready for that, partly because of personal involvement (see
section 5.3.2) and partly because of the continuing strength of "the lobby ing power of logging
concessionaires", branded by USAID as a constraint on forest protection in the Philippines
(Vitug 1993:59). The Philippine Wood Producers Association tried to convince scientists,
policy makers, lawmakers and the public not to support the total log ban. On January 19, 1995,
leaders of six labour unions of "the workers in the forest-dependent and forest-based
industries and nine million Filipinos likewise dependent on ourforests", placed a full-page
advertisement in all major national newspapers, thanking President Ramos "for steadfastly
maintaining your policy of Sustainable Forestry Development as contained in the bill now under
consideration by the House of Representatives" (PDI 19/01/95). Senators Mercado and
Pimentel Jr., two leading voices of the log ban movement in national politics, disclosed vote-
buying plans and lobbying visits to the President of the Philippines by PWPA representatives.
These visits were confirmed by President Ramos' Press Secretary, but claims that Ramos had
promised to veto a logging ban initiative in the House of Representatives were denied.
PWPA was also represented in a regional policy workshop in Cagayan Valley in October
1994. The vice-president of the association, who had been asked by the President to represent
him in the workshop, opened his statement by joking "it was expensivefor Ferdie Lu to ask me
to replace him today, because hè had to lend me his plane so I could get here!" During the
logging boom in Cagayan Valley, timber licensees often used small private planes to travel
from their Manila offices to the concession quarters in the North. This was not only a symbol
of status and economie prowess, but also a security measure; the risk of being robbed or
kidnapped could not be ruled out in Cagayan Valley and the Sierra Madre. With the security
issue clearly out of the way in 1994, this remark was intended to get the message across that
the wood industry was still alive and kicking. Once again, the Association stated its opposition
to any log ban or moratorium, citing the essential roles of the industry in Philippine society.
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such as employment, tax revenues to local government and servicing the demand for wood
products, unconventionally worded as follows. "the needfor wood does not decrease with the
stoppage of logging activities in a particular province. People need houses, furnitures and
when they die, coffins. "(Lu 1994:6)
The Association of Filipino Foresters did not come up with a unified position in the logging
ban debate. Most foresters whom I spoke to were opposed to a total log ban, and even to the
more restricted log ban in virgin forests. The 1991 National Master Plan for Forestry
Development, which could be seen as the first post-EDSA response of foresters in the
government and academe to the Philippine forestry crisis, lays the blame on population growth
and forest migration, claiming that 87% of national forest loss resulted from slash-and-burn
agriculture, firewood gathering and other land-use practices of upland communities. Although
the plan supported the preservation of virgin and mossy forests, it gravitated around priority
investment areas for the sustainable production of timber and other forest products from the
secondary stands and from tree plantations (Aquino 1994). A newspaper article by one of the
authors of the Plan described the dire social consequences that a total log ban would have, such
as a "massive economie dislocation of thousands of wood-based industry workers... not to
mention those in other regions directly relying on wood for their livelihood and survival". The
author warns that the Philippines would have to import 120 million Dollar worth of logs every
year to meet local wood requirements and that "most worrisome for the Government...would
be its inability to enforce forestry laws and implement order in the uplands as abandoned
logging concessions would become 'free for all', exposing their vulnerability to upland
dwellers, kaingineros and other small scale illegal loggers " (Tesoro in PDI, 9/09/1992).
While some of the arguments raised by foresters against a general closure of all corporate
logging concessions, and especially the last one mentioned by Tesoro, make much sense, other
reactions gave evidence of the remarkable resilience of theoretical principles, notwithstanding
their continuous defeat by reality. After almost 40 years of unprecedented decline in forest
cover, during which only few logged-over forests reached the end of the first cutting cycle,
Martin R. Reyes, the father of the Philippine Selective Logging System, wrote in an article in
a large national newspaper:
"..TTiere is no imminent or future danger to the people rushing to a total logging ban law...we
would have missed the P5 billion cashflow from our timber resources in virgin forests best suited
for wood production Under a selective logging system on a 35-year cutting cycle, J/35 or 3%
of the forest is logged while another 3% matures yearly m one concession orfor the entire managed
forests nationwide. Thus, 97% always stays unlogged so that to impose a logging ban of 30 or l
years is unnecessary. Logging continues year after year without loss of forest" (Philippine Star,
13/03/1993)
Ultimately, Congressmen De Venecia, Yap and the 'responsible logging' lobby had their way
in November 1995, when the Philippine House of Representatives adopted the alternative to
the log ban, House Bill nr 2966, an Act Providing for Sustainable Management of Forest
Resources. Although the bill is a far cry from a total log ban, it certainly does not simply
maintain the status quo; repealing the two key Decrees which had hitherto guided forest
management in the Philippines, PD 705 and PD 1559, the new bill represents a fundamental
shift away from corporate to community-based access to public forests, defming Community
Based Forest Management (CBFM) as "the principal strategy to promote sustainable forest
management, which shall have precedence over other strategies". The bill upholds the National
Integrated Protected Areas Law and the logging ban for old-growth forest, classifying mossy
forests and NIP AS areas as "Protection Forest". All other forests are categorized as Production
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Forest subject to extractive activities guided by integrated management plans.
Existing Timber Licensing Agreements are honoured through Section 15 of the new bul,
which says that "Existing kolders of valid and subsisting licenses or contracts granted by the
government for the development, management and utilization offorest resources s hall be
reviewed by DENR .... and only those which have substantially complied with terms and
conditions may be converted into any of the modes authorized under t nis ACT for the duration
oftheir unexpired term... "Examples of such new modes are the Timber Production Sharing
Agreement, which is basically a corporate logging license which specifies mutually agreeable
benefit-sharing agreements with local communities and the national government; DAO 121
(1989), the Private Lands Timber Permit (PLTP); and the Industrial Forest Management
Agreements (IFMAs) as provided in DAO 60 of 1993.
In areas managed under an IFMA license, logging is only allowed after degraded areas have
been reforested or have recovered to such an extent that logging operations have become
economically rational without violating the minimum standing stock after logging of 67rrfVha.
The first generation of IFMA licenses concerned degraded forest lands (brushlands and
grasslands) only. After pretests from licensees about the limited economie prospects of these
areas in the short term, a second generation IFMA was developed, comprising areas which
were 50% degraded forest land and for 50% residual forests with sufficient stock to allow
logging within a reasonable time span. One cynical observer said that after the adjustments of
IFMA-1 into IFMA-2, which served to attract the former TLA holders, hè was still waiting for
an IFMA-4 (For), the version that would compensate the Foresters of the DENR for 'lost
income' (see sections 6.2 and 6.3).
As part of the IFMA agreement between government and licensee, the latter is required to
deposit a substantial 'holding fee', amounting to 10% of the value of the entire standing stock
in the IFMA area. The holding fee is forfeited if the licensee is found violating forestry rules
and regulations. The licensee hires a DENR-recognized Forestry Service Organization to carry
out stand-stock inventories and préparé a management plan for the IFMA. FSO personnel and
DENR officials monitoring their activities are thus in a key position in the setting of standing
stock: a low stock reduces the holding fee, but also pushes the first year of logging operations
farther into the future. The implementation aspects of this and other policies are discussed in
more detail in the next Chapter.
FURNITURE INDUSTRY POLICIES
The use of Narra (Pterocarpus varanus), the national tree of the Philippines and a prohibited
species in logging operations, is tacitly allowed and it continues to be one of the principal raw
materials in the furniture industry. Owning a 'Cleopatra' sala set, or a solid Narra dining table,
office desk or cabinet, richly decorated with carvings, is a status symbol in Cagayan Valley and
in other parts of the Philippines as well. The species only occurs in low densities in mixed
dipterocarp forest; a DENR forester estimated that the residual forests on the western slopes
of the Sierra Madre contain only one extractable Narra tree per 10 hectares, producing
approximately 2.5 m3 of the precious red core wood most wanted for the production of
furniture, parquet floors and wall panels. Despite the scarcity and illegal status of its most
important raw material, the number of furniture manufacturing establishments in Cagayan
Valley increased rapidly in the early 1990s. Based on records of the Department of Trade and
Industry (cited in Huigen 1997), in the province of Isabela alone, more than 400 furniture
shops were operating in 1990. In 1993, the Cagayan Valley Chamber of Furniture Industries
had a registered membership of 965 shops, and estimated that another 145, mostly smaller
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shops were operating in the Region (Chrispijn 1995:47). Estimates on the wood requirement
per shop vary widely, but probably averages 1.5 to 2.5 cubic metres of timber per month (see
also Ch. 4, section 4.5). The industry not only produces fmal products, but knock-down
elements for ftirniture and interior decoration as well. Stimulated by a government policy to
prohibit the export of unprocessed logs from the Region, production plants in the National
Capitol Region, as well as international buyers, now contract local furniture shops to process
timber into parts, to be shipped to manufacturing facilities in the National Capitol Region and
abroad. Apparently, international demand for wood furniture continues to be good enough to
attract foreign investment in the further expansion of industry, encouraging the Cagayan Valley
Chamber of Furniture Industries to ask for DENR clemency for the industry;
"John Cummins, president of Wood Pattem Inc, ...one of the big exporten of \vood-based products
to the US, Britain and other European countries said that hisfirm wants to help Quirino not only
because ofits vast forest resources and readily available skilled manpower but also because it is
an ideal site for an industry dispersal program CVCFI spokesman Agullana said that CVCFJ
members in Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Viscaya and Quirino are appealing to the DENR to consider
the immediate lifting of the logging moratorium" (Manila Bulletin, 22 juli 1993)
In fact, this logging moratorium only lasted for a few months in 1992 and 1993. After it had
been lifted, DENR Department Administrative Order (DAO) 47, series of 1987, continued to
regulate the processing of lumber by furniture industries. This policy entailed a general Timber
Amnesty, legalizing all declared timber that was stored in the yards of wood processing
facilities (including sawmills and lumber shops) before the end of 1992, irrespective of the
origin of these stocks. Whatever was declared would be considered legal and could be used in
manufacturing. For each consignment of lumber transported from the manufacturer's premises,
the amount of lumber used was subtracted from the declared stock. Once the declared stock had
been fully utilized, the supply of new raw materials would have to be secured from a sustaina-
bly managed source, to be further specified by the DENR.
In April of 1993, DAO 47 was replaced by DAO 58, the "Rules and Regulations governing
the extraction, assessmenl, processing and transpon ofNarra Resources" . The order included
another timber amnesty, legalizing all Narra stocks declared by furniture makers per the end
of April of 1994. Again, these legalized stocks were to be used and counted down on the basis
of the fmished and semi-fmished products transported out of each yard, while awaiting the
designation of sustainable source areas for the industry in each region. In order to give local
DENR officials, Forestry Specialist Organizations, and forest communities time to define these
sustainable source areas, DAO 58 lifted the ban on the cutting of Narra and allowed extraction
in:
- cancelled and existing corporate timber concessions
- Community Forestry Areas
- buffer zones of NIPAS areas
- private lands, using special Private Land Timber Permits
DAO 58 also prescribes that the extraction of Narra from these areas must follow the normal
procedure or tree-marking and validation by the local DENR officials, and a CO or Certificate
of Origin (of the timber) had to be carried by transporters hauling the lumber to the
manufacturer and the fmished product to buyers and retailers.
The sustainable forestry act (HB 2966, discussed under 'corporate logging policies')
includes a package of new incentives for the industry. To complement lumber supplies
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produced from the above areas, and later on from the sustainable sources, imports of raw
materials are allo wed against the lowest customs and duty tariffs, even if the products made
from imported lumber, rattan poles and other forest-based raw materials are sold in the
domestic market (HB 2966, sec 62). As part of these incentives, the industry was also
exempted from payment of value added taxes. The economie rationality of these government
measures to support the furniture industry is questionable. Both in semi-finished products, like
veneer and plywood, and in furniture, the Philippine industry has higher resource costs than
its Asian competitors3. Bautista therefore concludes that
"we should not be exporting these relatively inefficiently produced goods. Stilt, 70% of what is
produced in the furniture industry is exported...to keep it going we import cheap raw material
without raising import taxes as we do on other important products; at the same time we charge high
tariffs on imported products. In this manner, we are protecting an inefficiënt industry" (G.M.
Bautista, pers.com., Oct. 1994)
Representatives of the wood processing industries in the Philippines like to refer to their sector
as a "guerilla industry", which has been in a "state of suspended extinction, really." (pers.com,
President of the Cagayan Valley Chamber of Furniture Producers, Oct '94). This image
appears to have earned the wood-processing industries a special place in the view of DENR
policy makers and implementors. The subsequent Department Administrative Orders granting
the industry exemptions from the ban on cutting Narra, timber amnesties, as well as repeated
extensions of the validity of these orders reflect both the industry's chronic dependence on a
scarce and illegal raw material, and the reluctance of the DENR to act against it. During a
regional workshop on forest policy reform in Region 2, the special relationship between DENR
and the furniture makers was reflected in the interactions between a ranking DENR official and
the President of the Cagayan Valley Chamber of Furniture Industries. The DENR official
presented Oplan Lansag Kapatagan, a joint operation of DENR and the Philippine national
police to confiscate illegal lumber stocks in the lowlands. As hè presented the plan, hè
reassured the Chamber President, saying:
"Don 't worry Mr. Munoz , eh pare4! I already said: do not touch the furniture makers for the
meantime.' So now it is only the hardware stores and lumber dealers we are dealing with in this
programme." (Research diary, Oct 1994)
During the first half of the 1990s, furniture shops and the local construction industry became
the region's principal users of forest products, and forest communities replaced logging
companies as the main suppliers of the logs and flitches used in these industries. DAO 58 and
the sustainable forestry act provide tighter legislation towards the sustainable access to wood
resources. On the other hand, the current levels of Narra consumption by the industry is not
in balance with the growth and yield of the estimated remaining natural stock of Narra on the
western slopes. At the present size and turnover of the industry, even the Sierra Madre as a
whole is not large enough to serve as a sustainable source (see section 4.5). The past few
decades offer little evidence that the industry and the DENR will be able to transform the
The vanable taken by Bautista as an indicator for the industry's comparative advantage is the real domestic resource
cost (= the domestic resource cost divided by shadow exchange rate) m relation 10 foreign producers Resource cost tor serni-
fimshed products and furniture is respectively l 27 and 2 97 times higher in the Philippines than elsewhere m Asia.
The affïnitive lerm pare refers to ritual kinship between persons, for example by bemg godfather to each other s
children or by havmg co-sponsored a wedding (see also section 6.4).
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industry into one that keys its size, production level and processes, and investment strategies
to long-term sustainability. On the other hand, furniture industries in Cagayan Valley appear
to be aware of the risks of relying too heavily on Narra. Although the search for alternative
raw materials for the production of furniture started only recently, the first shops have starled
to plant and manage plantations with fast-growing species also suitable for furniture making,
such as Gmelina arborea.
5.2.3 Forest land use and occupancy
After a century, during which corporate logging companies were given priority access to all
public forests of the Philippines, and during which neither indigenous nor migrant forest
communities could gain legal tenure to these lands, government policies towards forest
communities have made a turnaround in the course of the past decade. The 1995 sustainable
forest management bill speaks of the people residing inside the public domain as
"forest communities, indigenous peoples and other communities whose lives, culture and well being
are intricately linked with the forests, shall be recognized, encouraged and actively involved in
sustainable forest management and development under the principle of stewardship and people
empowerment" (HB 2966, 1995)
As recently as 1978, the position of the Philippine government regarding indigenous and
migrant communities residing in public and classified forest lands was still that:
"kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants of public forest shall whenever the
best landuse of the area so demands, be ejected and relocated to the nearest accessible government
settlement area" (PD 1559, 1978, cited in De Guzman 1992:46)
An important aspect of these negative perceptions about people living in forests was that their
livelihood activities were incompatible with conditions required for the sustainable management
of corporate forest concessions. Slash-and-burn agriculture, carabao logging and certain
hunting and gathering techniques disturb the recovery of a residual forest after a logging
operation, and they were perceived to be the prime cause of deforestation in the Philippines
(ADB 1994; Bee 1987; Cruz et al. 1992; DENR 1992). Early government programmes dealing
with forest communities were aimed at discouraging forest migration, and categorically
prohibited slash-and-burn farming and carabao logging. Foresters were trained for timber
extraction and the protection of timber concessions against 'squatters'. They had relatively little
background in social forestry or in agroforestry techniques.
One of the first major programmes that was intended - once and for all - to stabilize the
opening of residual forests by indigenous and forest migrant communities was the 1971 Kaingin
Management and Land Settlement programme. The programme offered upland residents entry
permits and kaingin management leases, or the alternative option of being relocated on
Alienable and Disposable lands. Permanent land settlements were reserved for "'cultural
minorities who cannot be induced to accept a combination of employment and/or allocation of
lands suitable for permanent agriculture, or those whoprefer the isolated forest environment
toperpetuate their traditional practices" (DAO 62 in De Guzman 1992:58) lts successor, the
Forest Occupancy Management programme, again offered land use certifïcates for areas in
forest concessions and in the Public Domain. None of tiie programmes was able to stem the
flow of migrants into the public domain. By 1982, a more comprehensive social forestry
approach was adopted.
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THE INTEGRATED SOCIAL FORESTRY PROGRAMME (ISF)
The first government policy providing forest migrants with occupancy, instead of land use
rights was Letter of Instruction N° 1260 of 1982, establishing the Integrated Social Forestry
Programme (ISF). Upland residents participating in the ISF programme were awarded a
Certificate of Stewardship Contract (CSC) for an area to a maximum of seven hectares of
denuded forest land, abandoned pasture lands, former reforestation areas or other forest land
with less than 10% forest cover. A CSC allowed upland farmers or forest communities the
"peaceful occupation, possession and sustainable management" of an upland area for a period
of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. (DENR 1993:15). Stewardship contracts differ
from genuine titles in the sense that they are, at least de jure, subject to cancellation or non-
renewal if the holder does not comply with certain restrictions on his land use. A certifïcate-
holder is bound to implement sustainable land use systems on the land and maintain a minimum
forest cover of 20%, either as tree farms or in natural vegetation. Furthermore, the CSC holder
pledges to prevent fires and "reframfrom cutting or harvesting naturally growing trees here
and in adjacent areas" (DENR 1993:18). CSCs are inalienable, except when the original
steward dies, moves away or ceases to be the actual tiller of the land.
The CSC was a compromise solution, combining the continued state ownership of forest
lands and resources and recognizing the need of upland residents to have a certain level of
tenurial security as a precondition for the investments they were expected to make in
sustainable upland use (Chambers 1988; Gibbs et al. 1990; Dorner and Thiesenhusen 1992;
Raintree 1986). Extension became part of the task of the DENR, initially focussing on
increasing food production, on soil and water conservation measures and on the rehabilitation
of occupied forest lands. In return for these services and for the security provided by the
Stewardship, a CSC holder commits to cultivate his or her ISF farm only and not to clear any
more residual forest lands for uma farms (see section 4.6).
In 1988, the possibility of being awarded larger forest areas under community-based
stewardships was added to the individual or family-based Stewardship Certificate. Since then
36 Communal Stewardship Certificates have been issued countrywide. the largest of which was
14,000 ha to the Ikalahan Educational Foundation in Imugan, Nueva Viscaya. This indigenous
upland community combines traditional land-use practices with technical innovations developed
in many years of close cooperation between the community and a missionary named Father
Delbert Rice. This Community Stewardship did become a success, in terms of both forest
regeneration and the forest-based livelihood which people derive from it. The foundation is
discussed in detail in Cornista and Escueta (1990) Magno (1996), and Sajor (in press). Until
the community forestry and ancestral domain programmes caught the limelight in 1994, the ISF
programme was the flagship forest policy of the DENR. Over 256,000 individual stewardships
were issued in the Philippines since 1982, with a total area of 586,000 ha, and 36 community
stewardships (with a total area of 76,628 ha) (PNA, Aug 1996). Between 1982 and 1995, the
Cagayan Valley Regional Office of DENR issued individual Certificate of Stewardship
contracts for a total area of 25,977 hectares of forest lands occupied by forest migrants, and
a 14,000-hectare community stewardship to the above mentioned Ikalahan Foundation (DENR
1996)
The overall impact of the ISF programme on the stabilization of forest frontier areas
remains questionable; while the first Letter Of Instruction specified that only those who had
arrived on or before December 31, 1981 would qualify for a stewardship, the last date has been
repeatedly pushed forward to accommodate more recent forest migrants. The ISF programme
may in fact have promoted forest migration by syphoning poor families from the lowlands into
the forest lands. Compared to the repeated failures of policies aimed at alleviating rural poverty
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through agrarian reform in the lowlands, the ISF programme offered a concrete option for
farmers and the landless poor to acquire farmland and benefit from other forms of government
assistance included in the ISF programme, such as agricultural extension.
A second problem has been the continued opening of forest lands by CSC holders; perma-
nent cropping requires ploughing and the use of agrochemicals, investments that not all upland
families can afford or are willing to make. For that reason, migrants tend to continue opening
up new uma lands A third development undermining the stabilizing impact of ISF is the use of
CSCs as collateral for loans from informal moneylenders. Loan default may then lead to
tenancy. A case study in one migrant settlement in Quirino found that out of 16 CSC holders,
"only one farmer still tills the land certified to him, seven have sold their certified land, five
others have mortgaged (parts of) their lands and the remaining three title holders have divided
their land among their off spring..." (Huijbregts 1996:78). The same study also reports families
holding multiple Stewardship Certificates, with one migrant holding 56 hectares of this land
under stewardship, divided into 15 certificates registered in the name of his two wives, his son,
five daughters, three adopted sons and four brothers. Although no systematic survey has yet
been carried out on the extent of such practices, it is safe to say that this strategy of acquiring
tenurial rights to larger areas than the maximum defined in the ISF programme is simply too
logical to be an exception, especially in light of the fact that the elder children of forest
migrants are entitled to Stewardship Certificates but often have full or part-time employment
in other sectors of the economy. The case of this son of a former logging- company employee
illustrates this:
"In 1979, my father was employed here as a bulldozer operator with the logging company. He saw
that the land was good here and so hè established ourfarm and the house near a nice forest. In
1984, l also found a job in the company, as a chainsaw operator. When the TLA closed, I returned
to being a farmer. Until that time, others had worked it for me, using the tertia system
(sharecropping, GTj. But lately, we hire workers on aper-day basis. I have one sister in Echague,
one brother m Cabagan, hè is a busdriverfor REM. one in Angadanan who is also a busdriver with
MaryAnne, one in Cordon and one working in Hongkong. For all ofus, we have one CSC, the total
area is 22 ha." (Research diary, March 1996)
The ISF programme was intended to turn denuded forest lands into agroforestry farms, with
sustainable combinations of food and tree crops, using combined soil and water conservation
techniques. This approach was believed to contribute to forest conservation, because increased
tenurial security and higher productivity would slow down the clearing of residual forests for
agriculture. Cases such as the Ikalahan Foundation, and the Centre for People Empowerment
in the Uplands in Ilagan, Isabela, a seven-hectare farm individually managed by a forest
migrant and his extended family, demonstrate that degraded forest lands can indeed be turned
into productive multi-functional forest farms (Rice 1994). However, these cases continue to be
exceptions to the rule observed in most ISF sites in the Sierra Madre, where white and yellow
corn are mono-cropped (see also section 4.6 and Chapter 9).
One sanction which DENR can employ to discourage upland residents from violating the
terms and conditions specified in the ISF programme is to eventually deny a CSC-holder
renewal of his land rights after 25 years. But the chances are minimal that, should that measure
be taken, the tiller and his family would actually abandon the forest land and cultivation
practices after these have provided a basic livelihood for so many years. HB 2966, Sec 80
provides heavy penalties for the unlawrul occupation and destruction of government land: a fine
of 20,000 100,000 pesos plus a maximum imprisonment of 6 years is slapped on anyone
unlawfully occupying and "destroying" government land. Anyone caught in the act of carrying
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out slash-and-burn agriculture risks a prison sentence of 10-12 years and a fine equivalent to
eight times the forest charges for the products lost as a result of the clearing. But then again,
drastic as these penalties may sound, none of them can be realistically imposed on a forest
migrant living on the margin of subsistence. The Regional Executive Directer of the DENR
wrote in a conference paper on the ISF project and its successor, the Community Forestry
Programma:
"The ISFPprogram lacks the necessary strength to totally transform the people as the protector and
manager of the forest resources in their immediate vicinities. The/act that the only resource, the
people are entitled to are those benefits from their respective farm lots, they are deprived of the
benefits from the forest which they are supposed to extract...Hence, to democratize further the
distribution ofnatural wealth, the Community Forestry Programme emerged" (Seraspi 1994:8)
COMMUNITY-BASED FOREST MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS (CBFMA) AND
CERTIFICATES OF ANCESTRAL DOMAIN CLAIMS (CADC)
Community Forestry was first adopted as a government strategy in 1989. During the first years
of legal access of upland communities to publicly owned forest products, the CFP programme
was merely one of several modes of forest management, as noted earlier. In July 1995,
however, Presidential Decree N° 263 declared Community-Based Forest Management as "the
national strategy to ensure sustainable development of the country 's forest land resources". In
1996, DENR specified the rules and regulations for the implementation of this decree. This was
a far cry from past decades, when upland communities were depicted as the prime culprits in
the national deforestation problem, the state now
"...recognizes the indispensable role oflocal communities and indigenouspeoples in theprotection,
rehabilitation, development and management of land and natural resources .... pursuant to its
policy of people empowerment, seeks to entrust the responsibility for rehabilitation, protection,
conservation and management of forest lands to local communities and indigenous peoples "
(DENR DAO 34, 1996)
To operationalize the new strategy, a new tenurial instrument was introduced, the Community
Based Forest Management Agreement (CBFMA). Like the Timher Licensing Agreement and
the Certificate of Stewardship, the CBFMA is essentially a leasehold secunty with a validity
of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The same DAO defines the CBFMA as a "co-
production agreement between the community and the government, for the farmer to develop,
utilize and manage, consistent with the principles of sustainable development, a specified piece
of forest land.... The products harvested, or removed therefrom or the equivalent cash value
thereof shall be shared by the said community and the Government" The issuance of a
community forestry concession starts with the application by an upland community. Three
phases follow between application and the start of community management; the first phase is
a verification step, in which the DENR assesses whether an area qualifies as a possible
community-based forest concession. If this phase produces a favourable result, a 'community
preparation' phase follows, in which the members of an upland community are trained and
organized for their new resource management respoasibilities. Once DENR deerns the
community to be adequately equipped to enter into a community forestry agreement with the
government, this second phase ends with the formal signing of the CBFMA certificate by the
head of the Cooperative and the DENR Regional Director. The third phase is the preparation
and implementation of a Comprehensive Forest Management Plan. This plan specifies the terms
and conditions for the use of the community's forest. The Ancestral Domain Management Plan
performs the same function for indigenous forest communities with recognized claims.
All previous community-based programmes of the DENR are subsumed under the new
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community forestry strategy. The importance the DENR attaches to it is reflected in the
establishment of a series of new bodies for the specific purpose of administering the
implementation of the community forestry programme. Both at the national level and in all
regional offices, the Multi-Sectoral Forest Protection Committees, which were created under
Executive Order 196, to oversee the implementation of activities under the Environment and
Natural Resources Sectoral Adjustment Loan (see section 5.3.4), are reorganized into
Community-Based Forest Management Steering Commitees, chaired by the DENR Secretary
and his Regional Executive Directors, respectively. A new Community-Based Forestry
Coordinating Office has been added to the central DENR bureaucracy in Manila. This
coordinating office also has regional counterparts in which the Regional Director and the heads
of his technical units participate. Furthermore, the DAO has set a one-year period in which an
entirely new Community Forestry Division will be developed at the Central Office, to oversee
the implementation of the community-based resource management programmes of the DENR.
Community-based forestry entails the formal acknowledgement by the state of the resource-
utilization rights of communities residing inside the public domain; the state's exclusive
ownership of these lands remains uncontested. Tenurial security is linked exclusively to the
agricultural and residential lands, for which forest migrants can secure Stewardship
Certificates. Indigenous forest communities are the only exception to this rule; through DAO
2 of 1993, a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC) can be granted to indigenous
cultural communities once it has been established that the land covered by the certificate has
been in their actual, continuous and open possession and occupation since time immemorial.
Access to resources is the central issue in a community-based forest management agreement,
while the ancestral- domain claims deal primarily with the right to claim ownership to lands
which successive colonial and independent Philippine governments have declared to be part of
the Public Domain. Until 1995, DENR issued five Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claims to
indigenous cultural communities, including the Bugkalot tribe in Quirino, which covered a total
area of 248,243 ha of public lands. Two years later, in February 1997, the number of approved
CADCs had increased to 75, covering a total area of 1,057,895 ha of lands in the Public
Domain (PNA, 12/02/1997).
The policy shift towards community-based resource management complicates the
possibilities for the Philippine government to keep track of the way licensees manage the
resources entrusted to them. First, the number of licenced loggers is becoming much larger
than it used to be under the corporate timber-licensing system. For a bureaucracy as hampered
by lack of means and manpower as the DENR, monitoring their performance is thus going to
be even more difficult than it proved to be under corporate forest management (see Ch 6). This
constraint is compounded by the physical and social inaccessibility of upland communities to
lowland officials. The DENR is, in effect, forced to rely on the communities' internal
monitoring and enforcement capability. However, most migrant communities inside the Sierra
Madre are relatively young and heterogeneous. These characteristics pose challenges to the
formation of socially accepted leadership, a precondition for an effective community-based
approach to monitoring and enforcement (Van den Top and Persoon, in press).
The 1995 sustainable forest management bill recognizes the 'vested rights of indigenous
communities over the forest resources in their ancestral domains, and orders their delineation
in accordance with the guidelines set out in DAO 2 (1993)' (HB2966, Sec 36). The 1987
constitution prevents both DAO 2 and this bill from making provisions for the alienation of
ancestral lands and resources inside the Public Domain, i.e., granting indigenous forest
communities real ownership titles to their lands. But at the time when this book was written.
178 chapter 5
the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and the necessary constitutional amendments required for
the state to grant indigenous communities real titles to their ancestral lands had just been passed
in the House of Representatives. This law has far-reaching implications for the future use and
protection of the Philippines' last natural forests, most of which are inhabited by indigenous
cultural communities and, for that reason, likely to be alienated from the State5.
At first sight, these recent legislative initiatives to 'democratize access' to the Public
Domain has the appearance of true popular representation: elected lawmakers, clothed in the
sacred rhetoric of granting underprivileged forest occupants the right to use the natural
resources in their ancestral lands for their betterment, undo a social injustice of colonial origin.
An alternative interpretation of these urban initiatives is that a coalition of local politicians is
collaboratively disassembling central government control over the natural resources in their
electoral districts. Once indigenous forest communities are give the possibility to convert
ancestral land claims into ancestral land titles, access to these lands and their resources will no
longer be determined by the - admittedly inept - DENR bureaucracy, but by the response of
these forest communities to external economie, political and cultural influences. Formally, the
State still has a say in decisions about the use, or sale, of ancestral land. For example, the
sustainable-forest act only allows alienation of ancestral lands to "a bona-fide member of the
recognized indigenous cultural community" (HB 2966, Sec 37). However, such restrictions are
not watertight in a context where the use of dummy-names is a common business practice. In
the Social Forestry Programme, the use of Certificates of Stewardship as collateral in informal
loans has also caused alienation, in spite of the fact that this was prohibited by the contract
between government and the Stewardship holder. The initial experiences of indigenous forest
communities entering into disadvantageous contracts with mining companies and logging firms
have already been reported from several Regions, including Cagayan Valley (van den Top &
Persoon, op.cit.; PNA 9 Oct '97)
Section 37 also aims to safeguard the Philippines' ancestral lands from unsustainable,
outsider-led resource extraction activities, by requiring the preparation of a Community-Based
Forest Management Plan (in CADC areas an 'Ancestral Domains Management Plan'). For
communities which have been granted a CBFMA, this plan must be prepared as soon as the
Agreement has been signed, directly after the validation and community preparation phases.
In ancestral domains, the development of a management plan only becomes necessary when the
community wishes to engage in the systematic extraction of forest products. Recognized
Forestry Specialist Organizations (FSOs) are invited to bid for government contracts to assist
the community in the preparation of such a management plan. Most FSOs in Cagayan Valley
are private organizations, registered as NGOs but basically functioning as small consultancy
firms, which contract government personnel, academies, former employees of logging
companies and young graduates for specific, short-term services. In the development and
implementation of the plan, these experts collaborate closely with the community, an only after
the community has been trained and organized to effectively participate in the planning process.
The preparation of the resource management plan requires technical skills that impose limits
on the participatory quality of the design procedure. In the initial phase. consultants interact
with the forest community on a wide range of issues, such as the setting up of a local NGO or
People's Organization, the demarcation of individual and communal lands within the ancestral
domain, land-use practices in these lands, and the prevailing rules regarding these land uses.
Social and biophysical surveys are also carried out, including stand-stock inventories in the
The PhD study of Danle M Aquino will offer a more comprehensive analysis of the CADC programme.
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forested parts of the domain. The community forestry rules and regulations require that the
management plan should be based on a full inventory of the resources in the area. In the two -
internationally funded - pilot community forestry projects of Wasid and Landingan,
Nagtipunan, Quirino, the preparation of the management plan included the production of
entirely new topographic and thematic maps of the area (based on a new set of areal
photographs made especially for the project). The new maps and the stand-stock inventories
were entered into a GIS-linked database, by means of which extractable log volumes could be
adequately determined. This technical process obviously takes place outside the community,
in the computer rooms of the experts contracted by the FSO. Once the results of computer
modelling under various assumptions and management choices have been optimized by the
experts, the communities concerned are informed of the results, together with the major -
assumptions made in the models underlying them. In addition to the management plan, the
community is expected to préparé annual Operations Plans, which specify the activities to be
carried out inside the community concession. These technical requirements, while necessary
to to monitor the sustainability of community-based forest concessions, also offer opporrunities
for certain groups within these communities, as well as for outside interest groups, to play a
disproportionate decision making role in resource-management decisions.
Government prescriptions on the management of community forestry projects pertain not
only to minimum stand-stock levels, extraction rates and logging techniques, but also to the
way in which the revenues generaled by the sale of these products are used. Memorandum
Circular 95-18 (1995) specifies that 25% of the gross revenues from forest extraction (market
value minus logging cost) must be paid to the government in the form of forest charges. Of the
gross income that remains after the forest charges are paid, 30% must be deposited in a
Community Development Trust Fund "w finance forest rehabilitation activities as well as
urgent augmentation of necessary basic services" (Sec. 6.2.1). The remainder of the revenues
is placed in a Community Development Investment Fund. This fund may be used for loans,
community projects, and the purchase of tools needed in alternative-livelihood options. In bold
type, the Circular specifies that "the CDIF and subsequent net incomes shall not be used to
finance activities that are based on harvesting from the natural forests" (Sec 6.2.2) Section 5
of the same Circular states, again in bold type, that the principal focus of planning should be
on "activities outside rather than inside the natural forest" and on the identifïcation and
development of alternative livelihood activities "not dependent on existing forest resources"
Community residents are encouraged to invest their "time, labour, effort and other resources"
into these alternatives, because ".. .income from forest products should only provide temporary,
supplemental finance as needed"
Besides these symbolic warnings against over-reliance on existing forest products, the
guidelines for the preparation of the annual Operations Plans (based on the comprehensive
resource management plan) contain no guidelines on how to develop alternative-livelihood
options, but are devoted entirely to a defmition of the extractive activities which will be
allowed in the natural forest. In fact, the overall rationale of the comprehensive resource-
management plan bears a strong resemblance to the one that used to underlie corporate logging
Operations. Holders of Timber Licensing Agreements were allowed to extract timber from
natural forest stands in exchange for forest protection and the re-investment of part of the
logging revenues in the long-term productivity of the concession area. Likewise, community-
based licensees are allowed to
"BORROW FROM MOTHER NATURE [capitals in original text], convert part of the standing
capital (natural forests) into liquidfiinds (cash) and use/reinvest part of the proceeds for forestlands
180 chapter 5
rehabilitation, agroforestry development, community strengthening, forest protection and forest
management" (DENR Memorandum Circular 95-18, Nov 1995)
Loggers with a strictly economie rationality do not make these investments, as we saw earlier
in this section, because the time horizon within which these investments will start producing
returns is far away, making them risky and of questionable economie rationality. Thus the
community-based forestry policy appears to be based on the expectation that, unlike the
concessionaires and their contractors, communities of forest migrants do not conduct
themselves as the perfect homo economicus, but also apply, as de Groot (1992) calls them,
care-driven and honour-driven motives. There are hypothetical grounds on the basis of which
communities might indeed be expected to re-invest part of their logging revenue in more
environmentally friendly ways than lowland-based timber concessionaires include the
following:
- Importance of agricultural income
Loggers are only interested in logs, upland families also need productive soils. The
importance of agriculture gives upland families more reason to make investments in the
long-term productivity of lands that they perceive as theirs.
- More rapid returns on investments in agroforestry
Investments in agroforestry are likely to produce returns within the first few years, at any
rate within a shorter time span than the 25-to-30-year cycle required in the selective logging
of natural dipterocarp forest.
- Permanent residence versus mobile capital
Logging companies can move their operations or capital to other areas or sectors of the
economy. Forest migrants tend to build up permanent settlements inside the forest lands.
Although migrants have shown their preparedness to move family and residence to the
forest lands, few would opt to move for a second time, especially after having made
investments in permanently cultivated lands. Unlike mobile logging companies, forest
residents are motivated by self-interest to take good care of resources that they perceive to
be the foundation of their future and that of their children.
In the Comprehensive Management Plan guiding the community in the use of its forest
concession, these other values are made subordinate to economie feasibility, the first touchstone
in the evaluation of the management plan. In an internal brainstorming document, a foreign
consultant to the community forestry programme openly questioned the economie feasibility
of the approach embodied in its strict management prescriptions. The main problems,
according to the consultant, were the high 'pre-implementation costs', such as the drafting of
the management plan, and the preparation and organization of the community (Seve 1996) Most
of the economie costs of community forestry, such as those involved in reforestation, the
establishment of agroforestry systems, and providing external technical assistance to the
community, make themselves feit in the initial years of the project. Forestry investments, on
the other hand, generally take at least a decade to bear fruit. At the prevailing official interest
rates of 30% per annum (which is considerably lower than the rates in the informal fmance
sector), the income to be generaled by the harvest of a reforestation area depreciates in year
8 to only 12% of its net present value. The importance of the economie evaluation criterion for
the resource management plan, both for the communities concerned and for investors in these
schemes, is liable to cause additional pressure on the DENR to relax existing limitations on
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timber extraction from marginal lands6.
The continuing forestry bias of the community-based forest management policy fails to
address the more rundamental discrepancy between the production horizon of trees and the
needs horizon of tree-growing forest migrants. Unless community forestry incorporates a more
significant investment component in agro-forestry and the production of rapid-turnover annual
crops, loans from the bank of nature are unlikely to achieve a high recovery rate.
The community-based approach to forest management also differs from the former, corporate
approach in the limited use of mechanized extraction and log-hauling equipment. With the
exception of chainsaws, forest communities have to rely entirely on labour-intensive logging
techniques and on the pulling power of the carabao, much like the system prevailing before the
introduction of mechanized corporate logging, which Tamesis described as a "slow, wasteful,
and tedious process" (Tamesis 1963:85). While, technologically speaking, community forestry
resembles nineteenth-century logging practices, it also comprises modern legacies from the
corporate mode of logging. For example, the contemporary extraction regime is not, as in the
nineteenth century, set by local wood requirements and a limited demand in the local market,
but by the Comprehensive Management Plan, which is based on expert assumptions and models
made outside the community. Taking into account that in most residual forests commercial
timber stocks are located at greater distances from forest settlements, and that many forest
migrants have witnessed, if not personally experienced, the mechanized mode of logging, this
aspect of the community forestry policy is bound to meet with increasing resistance. The first
cases of communities hiring trucks and a bulldozer for their logging activities have already
been reported from the Sierra Madre.
By 1996, 26 Community forestry projects had been approved in Cagayan Valley, covering
a total of 146,350 ha of secondary forest lands in the Sierra Madre. Only five of these sites
were already allowed to extract a Sustainable Allowable Cut from these areas in 1996: 718 m3
of Narra and 4,185 m3 of other hardwoods. In addition, DENR awarded a CADC for 108,000
ha of forest lands to the Bugkalot tribe in Quirino. Another eight projects covering 81,558 ha
in Cagayan and Isabela were still under consideration by the end of 1996.
5.2.4 Reforestation and conservation policies
The previous sections dealt with DENR policies aimed at regulating the two primary activities
most clearly linked to the deforestation problem: timber extraction and upland agriculture by
forest migrants. But the rapid loss of natural forest areas in the country also prompted the
Philippine government to engage directly in the establishment of tree plantations, and to
enhance the protected status of the Philippines' remaining areas of natural forest.
REFORESTATION
Between 1940 and 1970, reforestation projects in Cagayan Valley were based on the simple
concept of hiring casual labour to plant trees on public land. Some of these projects began to
yield fruit in the 1960s, such as the Magat reforestation project, the Benguet pine plantations
of Santa Fe, the enrichment planting project in logged over forests in Diadi (all in Nueva
In one Community Foreslry Pilot project in Quirino Province. the consultants who prepared the management plan
found that these residual stands were inadequately stocked for timber harvestmg; they would not be able to generale sufficient
logging income if DENR restrictions on minimum standing stock and maximum slope and elevation of areas to be logged were
maintamed To create a feasible management plan. the consultants negotiated with the DENR for a relaxation of these
restrictions and were allowed to mclude some areas above 50% or 1000 m elevation m their harvestmg plan.
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Viscaya), the Liwanag reforestation project in Isabela and the Callao Reforestation Project in
Cagayan. De Frel (1993) quotes reports by foresters in the academie world and by former
labourers of the Liwanag project claiming that, by the end of the 1960s, 1400 hectares of
rolling land in the foothills of the Sierra Madre had been reforested with thick stands of
Benguet Pine, Teak, Narra and Mahogany.
As the boom in corporate logging in the Sierra Madre began in the late 1960s, timber
licensees took the lead in reforestation in Cagayan Valley: for every hectare logged in their
concessions, they were obliged to reforest a hectare of denuded land. During the rainy season,
between July and November, when the forest becomes inaccessible and logging activities
slowed down, company employees worked in the reforestation areas, clearing vegetation7,
digging holes and planting seedlings from government-owned and company nurseries.
Fast-growing species like Eucalypus sp, Ipil Ipil, Acacia aureculiformis (Japanese acacia),
and Acacia mangium (Mangium) were most often planted in these areas. During the 1980s
Gmelina arborea (Yemane or Papertree) became the most popular reforestation species; it can
be planted using bare-root seedlings, which enables workers to carry more seedlings on each
trip from the nursery to the planting site. Other major advantages are the fact that it can be
propagated vegetatively and, even more important, its ability to survive incidental fires.
As in other regions of the Philippines, fires are the most important cause of the failure of
reforestation projects in Cagayan Valley. Timber concessionaires, who engage in reforestation
solely because it means that they can stay in the logging business (Vermeulen 1991), were
required to maintain the reforestation areas and protect them from fire for only two years. After
that initial period, the government would take over this responsibility, an impossible task for
a bureaucracy, as its local officials charged with the frustrating duty to manage these projects
invariably found out. Reforestation sites burned down for a variety of reasons:
- Grasslands used for reforestation were often located in the proximity of ranches or areas
under Pasture Lease Agreement. Adjacant ranches were burnt to allow young, palatable
grass shoots to sprout, and fire could easily spread to the plantations.
- Government reforestation projects were perceived to be nobody's property, and this lack
of responsibility and accountability paralyzed the willingness of local people to prevent and
combat fires.
- Concessionaires, who had only partially complied with reforestation requirements, used fire
to destroy the evidence of their failure, so that they could claim bad luck.
- Plantations were intentionally set on fire by nearby communities, to protest against
employment disputes, such as overdue salary payments or the lack of job opportunities in
cases where reforestation was carried out by company employees or labourers brought in
from elsewhere.
- If people from nearby communities were being hired, intentional burning could be a
strategy to secure future employment via reforestation programmes.
- Some areas picked for reforestation were deemed incompatible with other land uses
practised by local people or were perceived by them as an effort on behalf of the
government to undo their usufruct or occupancy rights in these areas.
- Many reforestation projects were planned in or near settled areas, on lands with good
agricultural potential or, as in the case of the Liwanag project, in the proximity of the
To reduce the risk of fire on the reforesution sites, and to drive out snake.s that could pose a danger lo the tree-
planters, the natural vegetation (mostly cogon grass Imperatata cylindrica) is often burned prior to hole-digging and planting-
The disadvantage of this method of site preparatmn is that it destroys the natural regrowth of shruhs and trees alrcady present,
in areas selected for reforestation. and carries the risk of fire spreading to adjacent forest areas and tree plantations.
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national highway. Money-lending land speculators sometimes fmanced farmers, to help
them to encroach on these areas, thus opening them up for agriculture. By the time a
community of more than 1000 people (200 families) has settled here, the area qualifies for
barangay status and the value of the land is bound to rise along with the demand for
residential and commercial lots.
As a result, the initial reforestation successes of the fifties and sixties were virtually undone
in the next two decades. The deforestation crisis of the late 1980s catalyzed the resolve of the
Government to draw conclusions from the disappointing experience of reforestation by the
government and logging companies. As in the case of other forest policies, local people
emerged as key actors in the process of change. In 1986, the Government initiated the National
Forestation Programme, an ambitieus effort to reforest l .4 million hectares of denuded public
land before the year 2000. Aside from stimulating private enterprise to develop commercial
forest plantations, Contract Reforestation was the second pillar under this programme.
International donors, including the Asian Development Bank and Japan's Overseas Economie
Development Fund pledged over 600 million dollar in international aid to assist the Philippines
in realizing this goal (see also section 5.3.4).
In general, the contract reforestation projects consisted of a sequence of paid labour
followed by leasehold tenure of local communities, either on an individual or on a household
basis. The tenurial instrument offered to groups or communities engaged in contract
reforestation was for them to be issued a Forest land Management Agreement. FLMAs are
awarded after a period of three to four years of plantation establishment, provided that the
contractor has achieved an 80% seedling survival rate, and the young trees have reached an
average height of 2 to 2.5 metres. An FLMA hold , which is valid for 25 years (renewable for
another 25 years), grants the owner the right to harvest, sell or otherwise utilize the products
of the trees grown in the area. During this period, the FLMA holder is also allowed to
interplant other crops on the land for his livelihood.
In his comparative analyses of contract reforestation projects in Cagayan Valley, Pasicolan
(1996) indicated a number of factors that determined the success or failure of reforestation
projects in public lands in which paid labour had been employed. First, hè concluded, the flow
of payments should be regular and if this is not the case (as often happened in contract
reforestation projects), local contractors should be wealthy enough - and willing - to buffer
these delivery failures, in order not to disturb local confidence in the undertaking. The second
factor identified by Pasicolan was clarity on the tenurial status of the land; farmers who were
under the impression that tree-planting meant the eventual loss of whatever informal land rights
they assume they have over the lands they cultivate, tried to sabotage the project. If, on the
other hand, the success of the reforestation project was understood to be an instrument to gain
formally recognized tenurial rights to these lands (such as the Forest Land Management
Agreement), local people were more likely to assume responsibility for the plantation. Local
participation was also enhanced by If the giving farmers a say in the selection of the species
planted in reforestation projects; the same held true when farmers were given the option of
cultivating annual crops between the seedlings for as long as this is feasible. Pasicolan pointed
critically at the impact which financial incentives may have for community-level cooperation,
concluding that in some project areas "everything revolved around money" (ibid:85), including
the willingness to participate in fire-fighting. When the impression is created that money is
being thrown around, the participants' own sense of ownership, responsibility and initiative is
reduced. Complications occurred more often in community-based contract reforestation projects
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than in the family-based contracts and those granted to indigenous tribes. The main cause of
this difference was, according to Pasicolan, that "most community contracts did not evolvefrom
a common interest among members, but usually from a one-person initiative"; dissent over the
distribution of benefits of contract reforestation quickly grew when the project initiator "takes
a bigger share and treats the other members of the community as subcontracted wage
labourers" (ibid:94-95) Although an ADB evaluation mission in 1990 concluded, on the basis
of the rapid increase in areas planted in the first two years, that the National Forestation
Programme "has shown commendable progress, with all the targets hoving been met or
substantially exceeded" (ibid:50), these successes did not prove very sustainable. Three years
later, government sources, quoted by Pasicolan, estimated the average seedling survival rate
in the programme at between 10 and 15% (ibid:3).
Section 20 of the Sustainable Forest Management Bill (HB 2966, see 5.2.1) exempts
plantation-grown timber from the ban on the export of raw logs and lumber from the
Philippines. The bill offers a comprehensive package of incentives encouraging private
investment in reforestation: prospective investors in forest plantations, in both public and in
private lands, are offered tax holidays, exemptions from import duties and preferential access
to cheap Government credit schemes. Sargent and Bass (1992) point to the risk that such a
policy of indiscriminate support for the establishment of plantations will lead to a reduction in
the urgency, effort and capital invested in the protection of natural forest. Plantation forests do
not represent the same diversity of natural functions and values, and they reduce the need to
safeguard the productivity of natural forests. Quoting cases from Nepal and Papua New
Guinea, the authors caution policy makers against rushing into plantation forestry without an
adequate demand forecast, and advise them to look into the social, economie and environmental
implications of plantation establishment:
"Plantations are a complement to natural forest, not a substitute. At present, because intact natural
forest has a retatively low perceived and realizable value, it is bemg lost.. .Many of the lands which
now support uniform areas offast-growing, sometimes alien trees have been converted from natural
foresf (Sargent and Bass 1992:32)
THE NATIONAL INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREAS SYSTEM (NIPAS)
The signing of Republic Act N° 7586, the National Integrated Protected Areas Act, on the first
of June, 1992, was one of the last acts of President Corazon Aquino. By the end of that same
month, Secretary Fulgencio Factoran signed Department Order N° 25 (Series of 1992), which
contained the implementing rules and regulations of the NIPAS Act. The act pertains to all
areas previously protected as wildlife reserves, sanctuaries, wilderness areas, old-growth
forests and other protected areas. It provides that within three years from the time it goes into
effect, DENR must provide the House of Representatives with maps, legal descriptions of the
boundaries of these protected areas, and an assessment of their suitability for protection under
the act. Within the DENR, the Parks and Wildlife Bureau is the unit which coordinates the
implementation of NIPAS.
The Global Environment Facility (US$17.13 million) and Philippine government (US$ 2.87
million) provided the basic funds for the first seven years (1992-1999) of NIPAS
implementation on 10 priority sites. A consortium of 10 Philippine NGOs for Protected Areas
(NIPA) has been contracted to assist the DENR in this effort. DENR, the World Bank (which
administers the NIPAS/GEF funds), and NIPA artach great importance to gaining support from
local communities for the conservation effort. This concern is reflected in the decision to
earmark half of the budget for an Integrated Protected Area Fund IPAF; the Fund provides
commercial loans to local initiatives aimed at developing economically viable "non-de g rading
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sources of livelihood" (World Bank 1994:18), which can sustain themselves in the longer run.
In this manner, the IPAF is designed to perpetuate itself as a revolving fund. DAO 25 specifies
the sale of flora and fauna from the area, leasehold income from multiple-use areas (including
tourism), fïnes, entry fees, grants and other donations as additional sources of income for the
IPAF. Profits may be used for small grants to handicrafts projects, and support for eco-
tourism, agroforestry and other employment-generating projects.
In 1979, President Marcos declared all forest lands within a 45-kilometre radius from the
coastal town of Palanan to be wilderness area (Letter of Instruction N° 917, 1979, Appendix
8). Although logging companies with concessions on the southern, western and northern
boundaries of the wilderness had penetrated into the area at several places, the greater part of
the wilderness had indeed remained intact. Outside this large reserve, all TLA holders were
required to conserve a wilderness section within their concession, an aggregate area of 11,560
ha. TLA holders naturally opted to conserve the highest, most inaccessible areas in their
concessions, mostly areas of mossy forest. The Fuyot Springs and Callao Caves, both
established in the 1930s, are the two national parks on the western slopes of the Sierra Madre.
Although their condition deteriorated under poor management, the Callao Caves continues to
be a site of both recreational and archeological interest.
The Palanan Wilderness Area on the eastern slopes of the Sierra Madre is among the ten
priority sites selected by the Philippine government for the implementation of NIP AS. To allow
a redefmition of its boundaries based on ecological considerations, the area was renamed the
Northern Sierra Madre Nature Park. Each NIPAS site is managed by a newly established
Protected Area Management Board (PAMB), chaired by the DENR Regional Executive
Director. Section 11 of the NIPAS law stipulates that each municipality and each barangay
affected by the law should have a representative on the Board, as well as one representative
from each tribal community, three NGO representatives, the Provincial Development Officer
and representatives from other departments or national government agencies involved in
protected area management. The Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park encompasses a surface
area of 331,000 ha, administered by four Municipalities, and a host of barangay- and tribal
leaders in the area. A full meeting of the 85-member PAMB takes place only once a year.
In 1996, the Netherlands Government granted an additional budget of 5.6 million dollar to
an intersectoral consortium of NGOs and GOs, to be set up and led by PLAN International,
for the conservation of the Sierra Madre Nature Park. These added means are being used for
the establishment and demarcation of the boundaries of the park, the development of an
integrated management plan for the area, and more substantial investments in community
development and alternative livelihood opportunities.
The private sector, landowners in the Pacific communities, Local Government Units and
NEDA are engaged in a continuous and concerted effort to realize the construction of lateral
roads across the Sierra Madre (see also section 5.3.1). DENR counteracts this pressure with
the 1992 logging ban on old-growth forests, and two other presidential decrees. Any
undertaking that significantly affects the quality of the environment is required by law to be
subjected to an Environmental Impact Assessment. Presidential Decree 1586 (June 1978)
established an EIA system, with special emphasis on environmentally critica! projects and
areas. Heavy industry, resource-extractive projects, and major infrastructure works, such as
the construction of roads, dams and bridges require an Environmental Compliance Certificate,
issued by the Environmental Management Bureau in Manila. Non-critical projects planned in
environmentally critical areas require Environmental Impact Statements issued by the DENR
Regional Offices. Many of the criteria defming an area as 'environmentally critical' apply to
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the Northern Sierra Madre: it contains a nature park of international significance, as well as
large tracts of ancestral domain, serves as the recharging aquifer and watershed of the lowlands
of Cagayan Valley, and it is also one of the last habitats of the Philippines' largely endemic
flora and fauna, including the Philippine Eagle (Phytecophagajefferyï). In July 1995, the Sierra
Madre received additional protection status through presidential proclamation N° 615, declaring
the Philippine Eagle as the national bird of the Philippines, and directing the DENR to create
sanctuaries in the eagle's known habitat. On the other hand, the greater budgets that Local
Government Units will have in the near future, because of the Local Government Code (which
is discussed in more detail in the next section), provincial governors, municipal mayors and
the private sector will soon no longer rely on national or international assistance to fund the
construction of lateral roads. While physical barriers will continues to block the construction
of roads across the central body of the Northern Sierra Madre Nature Park, circumferential
roads across lower ridges to the norm (the Baggao-Valley cove and Tumauini-Maconacon
routes) and to the south (San Guillermo-Dinapique) will pose new challenges to the
conservation prospects of the area.
5.3 The forest policy actors in Cagayan Valley
5.3.1 Line agencies
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR)
"Despite complaints by activists that this department is too tame and too slow, it is
surely the most assertive in Asia" (Rush 1991: 82)
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources is responsible for the sustainable
management of all terrestrial and coastal areas of the Public Domain, and for the monitoring
and enforcement of all national laws governing overall parameters safeguarding the quality of
water, air, landscape and biodiversity. In 1993, a Philippine Council for Sustainable
Development was established by presidential decree. Representatives from many sectors of
society sit on this council, which advises the Government on policies required to meet the
objectives spelled out in Philippine Strategy for Sustainable Development and Agenda 21, the
national environmental action plans that grew out of the 1992 Rio Declaration. The DENR is
composed of the following Bureaus:
- Forest Management Bureau
Traditionally the most influential technical unit of the Agency, the FMB handles the
responsibilities of the former Bureau of Forest Development (scathingly referred to by
critics of the Marcos administration as the Bureau of Forest Destruction), which was
integrated into the newly created DENR8 in 1986. The former dominance of this Bureau
emanated from its mandate to issue and monitor private licenses for the extraction of forest
products, a responsibility which led to frequent contacts between the director of this bureau
and the Office of the President of the Philippines (Vitug 1993). Rapid deforestation and the
decline of corporate logging after 1986 reduced the bureau's political and admimstrative
leverage. FMB continues to handle all government programs pertaining to forest utilization
and -protection, including internationally funded projects in support of these policies and
programmes, such as the development in 1992 of the Master Plan for Forestry
Development and the ADB funded National Forestation Program.
Initially as the DEENR (Department of Environment. Energy and Natural Resources).
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Land Management Bureau
Charged with the classification, lease and sale of lands in the Public Domain.
Bureau of Mines and Geo-sciences
Supervises the exploration and extraction of mineral resources
Environmental Management Bureau
Handles the DENR's environmental awareness campaigns and issues Environmental
Compliance Certifïcates (after an Environmental Impact Assessment has been carried out)
for infrastructure, industrial and extraction projects in environmentally sensitive areas.
Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB)
Carries out and coordinates research (mainly applied studies) in fields relevant to DENR
policy development. This bureau is located on the Los Banos campus of the University of
the Philippines.
Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau
In charge of all marters pertaining to the establishment and management of National Parks
and the protection of Philippine wildlife, e.g., from illegal trade. In addition to these
technical bureaus, the Department includes a support-services division for legal, fmancial,
administrative planning and management.
Table 5.1 Staff structure of DENR, Cagayan Valley, by organizational unit (1996
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DENR is the least affluent Philippine government agency. In 1992, only 0.4% of the annual
government budget, or 3.6 Billion pesos, was allocated to operations and programmes of the
DENR (PDI 14 Sep. 1992). The department has a decentralized organizational structure,
deploying 85% of its 24,000 employees in the regions (Clarke 1995:81). Law enforcement has
also been entirely decentralized, and is the exclusive responsibility of the Regional Offices
(Remigio 1994, cited in Huijbregts 1996).
In Cagayan Valley, all Regional Offices of the National Line Agencies, including the
DENR, are based in Tuguegarao, the regional service centre and capital of Cagayan Province.
The highest DENR representative is the Regional Executive Director (RED), a presidential
appointee who reports directly to the Secretary. Between 1990 and 1994, the Regional Director
was an Engineer from the Bureau of Lands. The appointment of a non-forester as the highest
official in the region, which had been pending for over a year, was considered exceptional by
many inside and outside the DENR, because of the continuing importance of the forestry sector
in Cagayan Valley. Combining humility with tenacity, and building up good relationships with
NGOs and academies in the Region, this RED remained at his post for almost five years (see
also section 5.3.3). His long tenure was all the more remarkable in the light of his
uncompromising stand with regard to the corporate logging industry. A large number of
corporate timber concessions were suspended or cancelled under his leadership, triggering
several attempts to have him removed from the region. DENR officials are subjected to regular
reshuffles, or transfers to other regions or positions in the bureaucracy, for reasons discussed
in section 6.3.1.
Technical Directors, who serve under the Regional Director, manage divisions which
parallel the bureaus described above. Five PENROs and 16 CENROs implement DENR
policies at the provincial and municipal level, respectively. In the Cagayan Valley Region,
more than 60% of the DENR's 1633 employees are assigned at the CENRO level (See table
5.1). Still, this is a minimal staffing level in relation to the resources that DENR manages. In
1996, employees with a forestry-related position comprised roughly half of the total staff; they
included 379 forest rangers and 130 tree markers. Many of the forest guards spent only a small
portion of their official time inside the forest lands9. This means that every forest guard or tree-
marker was expected to monitor activities in an area covering over 2000 hectares of forest land.
In the early 1990s, the average salary of a forest guard was between 3000 and 4000 Pesos (US$
150.=) per month. In 1995, when the NIP AS programme was implemented, the whole of the
Palanan Wilderness Area, 255,000 ha of mountainous forested land and a coastal zone with a
length of over 70 km was monitored by only eight forest rangers, without field gear or other
surveillance equipment. The area was regularly visited by foreign fishing boats and by armed
illegal loggers from Quezon Province. The CENRO personnel of Palanan had one small
motorboat to monitor these movements and, where necessary, to confiscate boats suspected of
carrying illegal forest or fishery products.
DENR's mandate places this agency at odds with most other line agencies in the region,
as I will demonstrate below. lts leverage on this uneven playing field is further weakened by
a credibility crisis: the idealistic objectives of the DENR are in sharp contrast with its public
image as a corrupt and inefficiënt organization.
Q
Accordmg to the press officer of the DENR m Region 2. forest rangers are often reassigned to ease staff shortages
in the CENRO offices
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NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA)
"Without a rood. the Sierra Madre is useless for mankind, aflower in the dark."
Former NEDA Regional Director for Cagayan Valley, 18 May 1992, Palanan, Isabela
Economie growth, employment, education, and public health are the four main objectives that
the National Economie Development Authority uses in the planning, monitoring and evaluation
of the Regional development, and in the coordination of plans and programmes by other line
agencies, such as the departments of Agriculture, Health, Trade and Industries, and Public
Works & Highways. Until the early 1990s, NEDA occupied a central position between the
national government, on the one hand, and the regional offices of all other national line
agencies together with the local government units, on the other. The Regional Development
Council, a multi-sectoral board in which these organizations participate, supplemented with
members from NGO and private sectors, is chaired by the regional directer of the NEDA.
Endorsement by the Council was almost a prerequisite for local projects requiring national
government approval or funding. In this coordinating and brokerage task, the NEDA Regional
Office is guided by the aims and objectives set out in five-year regional development plans.
Although smaller than most other line agencies in terms of staff numbers (only about 40 staff
work in the cramped quarters of the regional office in Tuguegarao), NEDA has traditionally
been a relatively influential government actor in the region. In the 1988 FF ARM report, the
World Bank qualifies NEDA as "extremely strong" in the field of macro-economie planning,
but "underdeveloped" in its capability to integrale natural resource and environmental issues
into these plans, both at the national and the regional level (World Bank 1988). With the
progressive implementation of the recent devolution policies, however, NEDA has been
matched, if not overtaken, by the Department of Interior and Local Government.
In 1991, NEDA produced a Regional Physical Framework Plan (RPFP), a 25-year master
plan defming the economie growth centres and sectors in the region and setting priorities for
the infrastructure works needed to stimulate this economie growth. The RPFP characterizes the
inaccessibility of the region as one of the most important causes for its sluggish economie
growth up until 1990. The northeast coast of the Sierra Madre between Santa Ana and Baler,
Quezon Province, can only be reached by sea or by air. As a result, the rich fishing grounds
and mineral resources that are known to exist on the Pacific coast of Region 2 cannot be
accessed and put to greater economie use. In addition to a series of roads, bridges and agro-
industrial zones in the lowlands of Cagayan Valley, the Physical Framework Plan therefore
envisages the construction of nine lateral roads across the Sierra Madre. Recognizing the
limitations imposed by such recent policies as the ban on logging in virgin forest and the
NIP AS law, NEDA has given priority to two routes. According to recent reports from Cagayan
Valley, the first one, from Angadanan/San Guillermo to Dinapique, which only required the
opening up of a short stretch of forest separating logging roads from the eastern and western
slopes, was indeed opened in 1997 in a combined operation of the Province of Isabela and two
operational logging concessions in the Pacific forests of Isabela and Aurora, The second
crossing, connecting the lowland town of Tumauini and the coastal logging town of
Maconacon, passes through more steep and rugged terrain and may therefore require a higher
investment. The municipality of Tumauini sees this road not only as its gateway to the Pacific
coast, but to the Taiwanese market as well.
The "plight of the people in the coastal towns" is an argument that both NEDA, local
politicians and companies use to defend the decision to construct these lateral roads. The
coastal towns are relatively small communities with only basic facilities for public health,
primary and secondary education and other public services (which do not include public
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telephones or electricity). In the absence of roads across the Northern Sierra Madre, the people
in the quiet coastal towns can only reach outside markets and essential services by plane or by
boat. The private companies servicing the coastal towns charge fares that only the better-off
can afford. Travel by boat is a cheaper option, but entails a 10-12 hour journey along the
dangerous Pacific Coast that is only feasible in calm weather. The total number of people
residing along the Pacific coast is just over 20,000, roughly equivalent to the population of one
rural town in Cagayan Valley.
NEDA and DENR represent opposing interests on the controversia) issue of whether or not
to construct roads across the Sierra Madre. DENR and conservation-oriented NGOs emphasize
that the construction of lateral roads would complicates the implementation of the NIPAS law
in the Northern Sierra Madre Nature Park by enabling settlers, businessmen and other
newcomers to gain access to the forest products and minerals of the Sierra Madre and the lands
and fishery resources on the Pacific coast. Advocates of the road, (led by local government
units and NEDA), claim that it is precisely the absence of a road which cripples the
government's ability to enforce laws and policies10. Landowners with title to agricultural and
residential land in the coastal towns are in favour of the road, knowing that the value of their
properties is certain to rise as a result of better connections between Cagayan Valley and its
coastal towns.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DA)
Cagayan Valley is one of the granaries of the Philippines. With a brief interruption of about
twenty years, when the logging industry took the lead in the economy and Cagayan Valley
became a large timber exporter, the production of agricultural crops - first tobacco, later rice
and corn - has always been the mainstay of economie activity in the Region (see also Ch 8).
In 1988, 68 % of the labour force were employed in the agricultural sector, producing 55%
of the Region's Gross Regional Domestic Product (NEDA 1991). Like NEDA, therefore, DA
is an important line agency in Region 2.
When in 1986 the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) was
reorganized and the bureaus of Mines, Lands and Forestry were lumped together in the newly
formed DENR, the Bureaus of Agriculture, Soils and Fisheries were merged, forming the new
Department of Agriculture. One could say that this move split responsibility for land use in the
Cagayan Valley Region equally between DA and DENR, the former confining its role to the
lowlands, the latter to the forest lands. From a national perspective, DA appears to be a
somewhat decentralized organization, with 86% of its 21,000 staff detailed in the regions. The
organization of DA in the region continues to be quite centralized: its Regional Office in
Tuguegarao is the largest among the line agencies. In addition, DA has well-equipped
demonstration farms and breeding centres for animal husbandry in the pro vinces. Agricultural
officers with a basic support staff hold office in all five provincial capitols and 93 municipal
buildings in Cagayan Valley.
Increasing farm productivity and stimulating agri-business is a primary function of DA. In
Region 2, the extension programmes of the department concentrate on the production of
commercial grains. To increase production levels, DA promotes technological innovations such
as farm mechanization, the introduction of new, high-yielding varieties of rice and corn, and
This argument is not supported by the empincal evidence; the largest area of medium- to high forest cover areas is
located on the inaccessible eastern slopes. while low forest cover classes dominate the western slopes, where a dense network
of logging roads was constructed by timber concessionaires (see Chapter 3)
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the proper use of the agrochemicals which they require. Increases in production and fertilizer
turn-over are important performance indicators for the Regional Office. Fisheries and livestock
production are other areas where DA pursues this policy of boosting agricultural output. For
long, animal husbandry was an ailing sector that consisted primarily of government-sponsored
carabao breeding centres as private ranches were abandoned due to cattle rustling and the
insurgency. Since the early 1990s, this sector has seen a rapid expansion in broiler farming and
pig husbandry. This development has taken place simultaneously with the introduction of new
hybrid corn varieties in the croplands of Cagayan Valley. The most commonly cultivated
yellow varieties are used almost exclusively for the production of animal stockfeeds (see
Chapter 9).
Despite a long coastline and the presence of the Cagayan, the largest river of the
Philippines, commercial fishery industries of any significance have not developed here and
Cagayan Valley's local fish demand is met in part by fish imported from other regions (pers.
com., Regional Director of DTI, Oct 1994).
Since the aims pursued by DA are synergetic with those of the agribusiness sector, it is not
surprising that DA research and extension programmes are often co-sponsored by companies
in the business of producing agrochemicals or buying agricultural products; DA produces
leaflets and sends extension workers to the barrio, while the company provides a free bag of
fertilizer or certified seeds as incentives for farmers to respond positively to the extension
programme.
Agribusiness companies are the main sponsors of the annual agricultural fair organized by
DA. During the 1996 fair, DA officials in the organizing committee were wearing prized jeans
jackets which prominently displayed the name of a national agribusiness company. Graphs
indicating the quantities of seeds and chemical fertilizers distributed in the Region were on
display, as evidence of DA's performance. Producers and traders of farm machinery and
agrochemicals have been the principal beneficiaries of DA's farm modernization programme.
While fertilizer sales in the region doubled between 1980 and 1995, yields of rice and corn
barely increased during the same period (DA Regional Director, cited in PNA, 23/10/97),
averaging 2 and 3 tons per hectare for rice and corn respectively. In 1997, DA organized
special "fertilizer watch teams" to establish the role of the inappropriate use of fertilizers and
other agrochemicals in these disappointing yield levels.
As noted above, DA's activities are officially confined to the Alienable and Disposable
lands, where the bulk of the region's principal commercial crops are produced. However,
forest migration and the concomitant opening up of forest lands for upland agriculture are
currently creating increased demand for agricultural extension in the public domain,
traditionally the 'territory' of the DENR. Although the official distribution of responsibilities
between DA and DENR remains in place, the spontaneous conversion of public forests into
private, though untitled, agricultural farms by forest migrants places DENR in an awkward
position, caught between the need to develop and implement agricultural extension programmes
in the uplands and the risk of duplicating a technical government service already offered by its
former "mother institution". DA has no immediate reason to be concerned about the expansion
of arable land into the public domain". Quite the contrary, since agricultural expansion into
In the longer run. the conversion of watershed forests into upland farms may indeed have negative environmental
impacts on lowland agriculture. by altermg the hydrological charactenstics of the river hasm. To date. however, these impacts
have been poorly quantified m economie terms. They are depend largely on area-specific physical charactenstics and the kind
of forest modification or land use practised in the watershed area (cf Bruijnzeel 1990; Bruijnzeel and Critchley 1996; Hamilton
and Pearce 1987; Oosterberg 1997) .
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the forest lands reflects positively on the principal performance indicator of the agency:
increased agricultural output. The implications of this development for the deforestation
problem in the Sierra Madre are examined in Chapter 9.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR)
The organizational structure of DAR is comparable to that of DA. The majority of DAR
employees work at the provincial and municipal level, under the respective Provincial and
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers. These officials implement the redistribution of large
agricultural landholdings among sharecroppers, leaseholding tenants, and landless people. In
1972, after one of several failed attempts since the Commonwealth period to carry out land
reform, President Marcos decreed the implementation of Operation Land Transfer (PD 27,
1972). The scope of this programme was limited to private rice and corn lands and only
allowed re-distribution to tenants actually occupying these lands. The 1988 Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (Republic Act 6657) expanded the scope of agrarian reform to both
tenanted and untenanted lands, irrespective of the crops cultivated there, and stipulated that no
land owner would be allowed to retain more than five hectares of land, plus triree for each heir,
provided the person was 15 or older and was actually engaged in tilling the soil or managing
the farm. Areas under Pasture Lease Agreements are excluded from re-distribution. Land
acquisition is either financed through the Land Bank of the Philippines or arranged through a
direct payment scheme between land owner and tenant.12 Overall, CARP aims to re-distribute
10.3 million hectares among 3.9 nüllion farmers over a period of ten years. Half of this area
is inside the public lands; here, occupants are either issued Stewardship Certificates by the
DENR under its ISF programme, or DAR Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs).
The latter apply to areas consisting of foreclosed estates and other publicly owned, non-forested
lands (Plugge 1992).
Between 1987 and 1990, the Aquino administration realized only 4.6% of the projected land
areas to be distributed (Putzel 1992b:358). Actual budgets made available for CARP have
remained under those projected , and tend to be overly used for landlord compensation. Delays
in actual disbursements of these amounts are slowing down CARP implementation even further
(Clarke 1995:84). Much of the delay is due to resistance on the part of influential landowners,
anxious to avoid the disintegration of their holdings. Some were able to re-title their lands in
favour of members of the extended family clan, while others employed delaying tactics on the
issue of the appropriate price to be paid for the land. President Aquino's relatives protected
their Hacienda Luisita in Tarlac from re-distribution by developing a stock-distribution
altemative. The majority of their tenants voted in favour of this second option. Conversion of
agricultural lands into industrial and residential estates is another way of evading land reform13.
In chapter 8 several local instances of CARP-related tactics by landowners are mentioned, as
part of an analysis on the respective roles of credit and land ownership in agrarian change and
forest migration.
The policy objectives of DAR and DENR are compatible and mutually supportive:
alleviating rural poverty and landlessness combats one of the major driving forces behind forest
migration. The ISF programme of DENR is important for DAR , in realizing the ambitions set
Direct payment schemes tend to protract the tenancy relatum snip between landowner and cultivator, if the latter fails
to pay amortization terms tor the land
For a comprehensive discussion of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines. see Putzel (1992).
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out in RA 6657; it is easier to grant 25-year public land leases to people residing there than to
take away land from families who strongly identify with the land holdings accumulated by their
ancestors. In the lowlands, the impact of the CARP law remained limited, in spite of optimistic
official records on land distribution accomplishments. Leasehold arrangements recorded as
having been agreed upon do not guarantee the eventual mrnover of land titles from landowners
to culti vators; in cases where the Land Bank has already paid the landowner and is receiving
amortization payments from the culti vators, these loans have to compete with other personal
loans for both capital inputs and personal needs during the cropping season.
In addition to land re-distribution, DAR also handles a CARP Beneficiaries Development
Programme, intended to identify and strengthen so-called Agrarian Reform Communities
(ARCs). After a community has been identified as ARC, training programmes for the
development of local organizational and other skills are implemented there, and financial
support is given for the development of economie and physical infrastructure. Included in these
support services are credit assistance (production loans, trading capital, emergency loans),
construction of roads and bridges, and grants for the acquisition of post-harvest facilities and
the construction of warehouses. In 1993 the ARC programme received a considerable boost in
the form of a grant from the European Community in support of this component of the CARP
programme (Clarke 1995:86)
The Beneficiaries Development Programme concentrates its activities in the lowlands. The
Land Bank of the Philippines, the privatized former financial arm of DAR, has been reluctant
to support upland farmers holding Stewardship Certificates. It prefers to finance farmers
culti vating A&D land; the title these farmers are amortizing is the collateral against which the
Land Bank can provide loans. Loans by the Land Bank are attractive because interest rates are
much lower than those charged in the informal sector. Still, the number of farmers borrowing
from these informal sources far exceeds those lending from formal institutions. The issue of
informal credit, and its implications for forest migration and cropping patterns in the Sierra
Madre is dealt with in greater detail in Chapters 8 and 9.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG)
officially the DILG is not directly involved in land use or forest management, it is an
actor of increasing significance for the deforestation problem. This line agency manages the
administrative affairs of the Philippine national police and the Local Government Units
(LGTJs). Since the enactment of the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) in 1991,
many responsibilities and funds formerly handled by national line agencies, such as DA and
DENR, have gradually devolved to the LGUs. DILG represents these units, ensures they
receive their share of the Internal Revenue Allotment and monitors their financial and
administrative management; it is also involved in the appointment and resignation of elected
officials, builds up the institutional capability of the PNP and LGUs, and regularly conducts
inventories of the services and facilities they provide. Table 5.2 shows the three levels of local
government, the criteria which defme these levels, and the respective number of units which
each has in Cagayan Valley. The first level, the barangay, has a population of at least 2,000
People (5,000 in Metro Manila), and receives a Standard Internal Revenue Allotment of 80,000
Pesos. The elected officials heading these local government units are a governor and vice-
governor, a mayor and vice mayor and a Barangay captain, each assisted by an elected council.
There are no elective positions at the regional administrative level of government.
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As a result of the Local Government Code, the power and responsibilities still vested in the
regional levels of the National Government Agencies have been reduced to such an extent that
questions are being raised about the necessity to maintain this administrative Government layer
in future (Brillantes 1997:3). Section 26 of the Local Government Code states the "Duty of
National Government Agencies in the Maintenance ofEcological Balance"; through this article,
DENR maintains the ultimate say in deciding whether resource management plans developed
by Local Government Units are acceptable in the light of national environmental considerations.
D AI (1995) notes that DENR has watered down and delayed the devolution of its tasks to Local
Government Units. Both the Code and DENR DAO 30 (1992) contains many phrases that
emphasize the central role which is still played by DENR. The consultant writes that one of the
reasons forr DENR reluctance to hand over tasks to the LGUs is the 'prevailing centralist
attitude of many DENR personnel and the general negative view oflocal Government leaders
as motivatedpurely by 'politics'." (DAI 1995:3). In my concluding analysis, and in section 6.5
of the next chapter, I will come back to this debate, and to the hearing its outcome may have
on future forest management.
Before the Local Government Code was enacted, the 1988 FF ARM study of the World Bank
reported that local government units were characterized by stagnant and insufficient resources
(only 10-12% of national expenditures was spent by the LGUs), and that they were overly
dependent on money transfers from Manila, because they could not raise revenues of their own.
The Local Government Code boosted the fïnancial resources of the Local Government Units;
from 1993 onwards, all cities and municipalities received a larger increase in Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) than required to finance functions and personnel devolved to them (LDAP
1994, cited in Rood 1997:4), and by 1996, all Local Government Units had substantially
greater fïnancial means at their disposal14. On the other hand, their dependence on funds from
the Internal Revenue Allotment has largely remained, despite provisions in the Local
Government Code to enable these offices to raise their own revenues. Hence, it is in the interest
of a municipality or province to try and increase its tax revenues by attracting manufacturing
and service industries, developing its natural resources, and attracting more people to settle
within its borders.
One of the local economie opportunities recognized by many politicians is the proximity
of the northernmost region of the Philippines to Taiwan, which is seen as an advantage in
attract Taiwanese investments in the region. In 1992, the Governor of Isabela revealed plans
for the establishment of an Isabela Industrial and Tourism Estate within the boundaries of the
Northern Sierra Madre Nature Park. A group of Taiwanese investors who were visiting Subic
The LOC specifies that 40% of the taxes raised by the Bureau of Internal Revenue may be distnbuted over the Local
Government Units (23% each for provinces and cities. 34% to the municipalities and 20% to the barangays. The distribution
of this budget among the provinces. cities and municipalities is based on the tollowing key: 25% across the board. 25% based
on the land area and 50% on total population BIR revenue is generaled by local taxes on real estate, banking and natural
resource utilization (forest charges, minmg fees) and other sources of local mcome In addition, the Local Government Units
have a 40 % share of the gross collections made trom "National Wealth". including minmg taxes. royalties. forest and fishenes
charges and other taxes. alongside fees and charges related t» the use of public natural resources.
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Bay were brought to Cagayan Valley for a two-day visit. The group flew over Bicobian Bay,
a well- sheltered natural harbour north of Palanan, where the Governor offered investment
opportunities for a fully Taiwanese-owned knock-down furniture manufacturing industry and
fish canneries.
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (DTI)
The Department of Trade and Industry is a relatively distant player in the deforestation policy
field. It maintains a modest Regional Office in Tuguegarao and has no decentralized offices at
the provincial or municipal level. lts main role is to attract and stimulate private enterprise in
Cagayan Valley and to keep track of the flow of commodities in and out of the region. DTI's
main thrust is to stimulate industrial activity in an economy which concentrates on agriculture
and trade or services; together, these two sectors account for 89% of GRDP (NEDA 1991).
Region 02 is a net importer of eggs, chicken and beef, produced in part using grains produced
here (pers.com. DTI Regional Director Hipolito, July 1994). A similar situation is still seen
in banana processing: 30,000 tons of banana are exported from Cagayan Valley annually, while
processed banana ketchup is imported from the National Capitol Region.
Investment records in Cagayan Valley suggest that entrepreneurs are not very interested in
developing an industrial base here; between 1988 and 1992, capital investments by
manufacturing corporations in Region 2 totalled 2.4 million pesos annually (NSO 1995).
Because of its proximity to the National Capitol Region and Taiwan, the region would be well-
positioned to create added value to the products of its primary sectors, i.e. agriculture, forestry
and, in the near future, mining. Several factors have, so far, prevented the unfolding of this
potential:
- The business preferences of the Region's principal capitalists, many of whom are of
Chinese background. The Regional Director of DTI analyzed their role as follows "you
know about the Chinese here. They are traders, not industrialists, entrepreneurs. Their
capital is their industry. And now here comes my brother the Filipino; hè says l do not have
any capital, so how can I make money!." (Research diary, Sep. '91).
- The Region's poor infrastructure and other public services. Road connections with the
biggest internal market for industrial products, the National Capitol Region, are slow and
unreliable. With a local population of only 2.5 million people with a low per capita income,
a viable manufacturing enterprise has to produce for export from the region, either to the
rest of the Philippines or to foreign markets. Electricity supply, telephone services and
educational facilities are weak as well, affecting product quality and output. Even in the
Narra furniture industry, the best products are made in the Metro Manila area, not in the
region itself (Huigen 1997)
The second type of constraints have been remedied to some extent in recent years. Should the
Peace and Order situation continue to improve, and the Region's mineral, or marine natural
resource reserves can be more systematically explored, industrial development may be expected
to gradually piek up, too.
Thus, DTI's industrialization drive represents two agency interests or motives which are
of relevance for deforestation. First, the Sierra Madre still harbours a considerable volume of
valuable timber and other forest products, as well as mineral reserves. As is the case of the
Pacific fishing grounds, these 'untapped resources' attract processing industries that could
further reduce forest cover and quality in the Sierra Madre. The second influence pertains to
the emphasis which present industrialization policies place on stimulating investments in agro-
industries. DTI would like to see DA promote the introduction of other crops, such as yam,
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soya and certain fruit trees, which offer better local manufacturing potential. However, with
both farmers and the extension programmes of the agricultural sector still dedicated almost
exclusively to the production of rice and corn, there are few other prospects for processing
industries than the bio-industrial piggeries and broiler farms that are currently mushrooming
in several places in the region. This means that for some time to come the Cagayan Valley
economy will probably continue to be characterized best by the image one sees in the Dalton
Pass across the Caraballo mountains: convoys of trucks carrying fertilizers, other
agrochemicals, cement, and manufactured consumption goods to the north, and others
travelling in the opposite direction which are stacked full of grain bags on their way to the
industrial centres of Central Luzon and Metro Manila. The implication of this development for
forest migration and upland agriculture are assessed in Chapters 8 and 9.
5.3.2 Elected government officials
1t seems it is getting harder for us in politics, J am sure you occidentals have noticed
this, there are more and more people coming to us, not like when we stoned. It is all
because of the things the old man did, hè had a different kind of politics ifyou know
what I mean. I mean a sort of dispensation type, youjust pay and pay and there is no
law, keep on giving money to everybody and they will not stand in your way. But we
cannot do what hè did and this is now the problem hè hos left behind in Isabela ".
(Research diary, July 1994)
This exasf)eration, by the wife of a ranking politician in Cagayan Valley, catches the increasing
importance that wealth has obtained for the maintenance of political power in the contemporary
Cagayan Valley. A basic understanding of the role of money in Philippine politics is thus
essential to explain the actions of politicians in the deforestation actors field. Without entering
here into details on the Philippines' electoral system, and its colonial origins, as I will in
sections 6.5 and 7.2, it may be safely stated that anyone with the ambition to be nominated,
voted for, and recognized as the winner of an elective office, needs to spend "prodigious
amounts of money" (Rocamora 1998:22). Once elected, a sound cash flow remains
indispensable in the exercise of that office.
The distribution of cash money among the electorale, often referred to as 'vote buying', is
a major cost factor. In the last weeks of an election campaign, teams of the various candidates
go around the villages, and distribute money bills among the electorale, sometimes on a per
household basis, and somelimes individually. In part because of this mechanism, the cosl of
eleclion campaigns relales to the size of the constituency of that position. During the 1992
synchronized elections for the country's more than 17,000 elective posts, Eduardo 'Danding'
Cojuanco, Ramon Mitra and Fidel Ramos spent 3 billion, 2 billion and 800 million Pesos,
respectively, in their bids for the Presidency (Lande 1992: 109; Rocamora 1998). A
Congressman gave the foliowing indication of the cost of an election campaign:
" We have decided to postpone the barangay captain elections. When the press asked me about
our position l said this election will require 600 million Pesos of taxpayers' money, and our
interest will go up, we will againface more budget deficit. But of course I discussed with my
colleagues m the House: let us be realistic. Do you really think we are not going to spend
money on these elections ? Of course l will need to support my barangay captains [one of the
others says "and get their support later" to which hè responds "of course", GT] Imagme I have
26 barangay s, I will need to spend at least 100,000 per barangay, are you ready for that, I
asked them. Of course they do not want that. What we teil the Channel 4 is that this is a matter
of inflation etcetera, but inside we all know what is really behind it" (Research diary, Feb
1994)
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In his town alone, this Congressman must spend around 3 million Pesos during the barangay
elections to ensure that 'his men' are elected in these lower offices. By the time elections for
his own position are on, the Congressman will need to spend a similar amount again. In hotly
contested areas, and depending on the financial capability of the candidates, and the prospects
of recovering the investment after the elections, candidates spend between 200 and 500 Pesos
per household. In the following case, much higher expenses were made to defeat an incumbent
mayor, who had used his position to build a strong financial basis in his town:
"Before Mayor Molina wasjust a truck helper of a logging company, bul hè became rich because
the Dragon Valley Timber Company was put in his name by the Chinese concessionaire. V/hen this
Chinese died, the company became his. Nowadays, here in Santa Rita, from medidnes to the supply
ofgoods to the construction industry, it is all for Molina. But Junior [member of a competing clan,
GT] helped the other candidate, Rodriguez, and also his sons in Manila, and Nick Talaue, who is
now logging in Dinapique. The first money that Junior gave was an amount of 240,000 Pesos, I
know because I was the one who held that money for Jr. He also gave 3,000 Pesos per barangay
to préparé food and gave us a brand new 4WD Ambulance. During the last two days bef ore the
elections, Jr. spent 2 million pesos in those barangays where Molina was strongest. Each family
received 2000 Pesos. This was in addition to the 20,000 Pesos hè gave to all barangays bef ore the
elections. He also hos students that hè supports in all 37towns oflsabela. Here in Sta. Rita, hè hos
more than 20 and they all get 2000 Pesos per month". (Research diary, March 1996)
Politicians may use the private and official funds at their disposal in various ways, but always
such that those who benefit from these funds know from whom the money comes. I subscribe
to the view of Alejo et al. (1996) that votes cannot simply be bought, in other words that utang
na loob mechanism may not work as rigidly as has sometimes been suggested. Voters still have
the freedom to weigh their loyalties, and "the efficacy of a reciprocal transaction rests not
[only] on the farm and quantity of the gifts but [also] on the time element involved, i. e. when
repayment is considered desirable and important" (ibid:87). Nevertheless, the distribution of
petty cash among voters shortly before election day is an almost indispensable component of
a successful election campaign. These dole-outs achieve the highest impact if they are
personalized as much as possible. A barangay captain, who acted as campaign leader for an
incumbent mayor, advised him to capitalize on this aspect, by keeping the actual distribution
of the money-bills to himself, instead of using the captain as his relay-station. To overcome the
problem, which barangay captains do not have, that the electorale is too large to know all
voters personally, the captain suggested the Mayor to simply use his voters' list, to keep track
of his payments:
'Dunng the last elections [1992, GT] the Acays were not sure of winning the Mayor's elections.
And so one evening Rosita [wife of the candidate, GT] came to me and she said: we also need
to give some assistance to those here in Ugad. She asked me how much she would have to
bring. But I said no, it is better if I will not be the one to hold the money. I proposed we will
use the precinct, the list of voters. And so we will mark all those who have already received
from you; maybe 8 or 10 came to my house and I wrote a note so they went to the big house and
came back to me and all received 100 Pesos. The family spent l million for the election. When
l went to see them at their house, on the vottng day, Rosita was quite worried about whether
they were winning, but I said you need not to worry, because it is all individual, we did not go
through the barangay officials. The mayor won an easy victory". (Research diary, Nov. 1994)
One aspect of Philippine politics that the above quotes reveal, is that the socio-political
networks and campaign strategies for all elective positions are intertwined, even though the
election of barangay captains must, by law, be held separately from those for higher elective
P°sitioas. Nevertheless, candidates for a seat in the House of Representatives need to invest in
198 chapter 5
these elections, to put a network of politica! allies in place at the grassroots level. Inversely,
a farmer running for the position of barangay captain can hardly win without external support
from an overall party ticket, as shown below.
Once the election victory is there, the money-flow continues, for a variery of purposes, and
in a variety of ways, of which I will enumerate a few for illustrative purposes.
- Patronage
Hardly a single day passes in the life of a Governor, a Mayor or a Congressman, without
a string of people waiting in the veranda of his or her house in the early morning hours: a
farmer whose son died on a construction site in Manila, and who lacks the money to bring
hun home and finance the funeral; people with health problems, needing financial help for
an operation; teenagers looking for an endorsement of a job application. Political leaders
in Cagayan Valley perform roles that, in different contexts, are taken care of by private and
government security systems. Politicians can neither ignore the financial obligations of
sponsoring social events, such as the annual town fiesta, or weddings and baptisms.
- Projects
During their term in office, elected officials are expected to deliver tangible evidence of
progress to their constituents. Community level 'projects', such as a multi-purpose
pavement, a road, village basketball field, or a barangay hall are of significant value for
voter approval of a politician (Carroll 1994, cited in Lande 1994:11; Alejo et al. 1996).
- Life style
To stay in power, Members of the House of Representatives must mingle with other
members of the Metro Manila-based elite, and maintain a residence and lifestyle that meets
standards there. In addition to the Manila residence, there is a need to maintain a fully
operational home base in the province as well, to keep in touch with the electorale. The
children of local political leaders enroll in prestigious schools, often in the United States,
where they are technically and intellectually prepared for their future task in the clan, either
in business or as the successors of those serving in elective offices.
On his introductory tour of the Cagayan region, one of the region's leading politicians led a
colleague of mine, and several ISU staff, through his parlour and into his office. Responding
to my colleague's naive question what the 50-odd people were doing, who silently sat in the
parlour, Dy explained that these had all come to see him about their worries, and ask him to
help him out. Then, in a personal aside, hè explained: "you see, it is not very difficult to be
popular here. You have to take itfrom the people in the dark, and give it back to them during
the day". While that statement probably over-emphasizes the role of what Gloria (1997) refers
to as politician's 'non-traditional' sources of revenue, the question remaias how elected officials
finance expenses such as the ones mentioned above.
Most of today's leading politicians in Cagayan Valley are self-made leaders, often of
humble, immigrant origin, who started as effective leaders in their own localities, and gradually
expanded their political clout during the fifties and sixties. According to elderly people,
personal wealth was not so important in these early years of politics in Cagayan Valley:
Before, there was na need to have money in the election. It all started in J955...no, only after the
second term of Delfin Albano, after 1963, because during his first election campaign, the Albanos
were very poor. Delfin was mformed that Reyes and Singson, his opponents, had money. But
Manang Iday [his wtfe, see Box 5.1, GT] had so many relatives in Casibarag, and she went with
him campaigning. Later, we were able to go around the barangay to collectfrom the people for his
campaign! And nowadays, all the candidates are the ones to pay to get the vote! (Research diary,
Nov. 1994)
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Government intervention in the tobacco and grains trade, and in the booming timber industry
of the seventies and eighties, turned elective positions into private goldmines. Combined with
the political stagnation of the Martial Law regime, which allowed politicians loyal to the
Marcos regime to stay in power for decades, those who were in power in the mid '60s were
able to build up considerable wealth. The political families described in boxes 5.1 and 5.2 are
examples of this mechanism.
Box 5.1 The Albano clan: from cow-traders to Congressmen
The first district of Isabela has been the electoral territory of the Albano clan since 1957, the year when
Rodolfo Delfin Albano became member of the House of Representatives. His father, Francisco, was a
carabao trader from Baccara, Ilokos Norte. In the early 20* century hè sold his properties in Ilokos and
migrated to Cabagan because hè saw that there was stül free land and started to cultivate rice and tobacco
here. He was still single at that time and produced for the Tabacalera company, which was then owned by
a Spanish man named Ortega. When Ortega found out hè had impregnated one of his maids, hè asked the
young Francisco to marry her. This is why their eldest son Dodoy (Florencio) had Spanish looks, just like
his descendants Al and Jojo, who became politicians as well, but not nearly as successful as the second
child Rodolfo. The latter started as a poor teacher, "who slept at the warehouse of the Tabacalera". His
marriage to Alfreda 'Iday' Bagunu, a member of a big family from Casibarag owning large lands, was of
significance for a political career that started more or less by accident on the day President Manuel Quezon
visited the Isabela Highschool in Ilagan. Manuel Nieto Sr, a prominent citizen of Ilagan town, owner of
Hacienda Sta Isabel and the private secretary of Quezon, asked Rodolfo to be the Master of Ceremonies
during the event. Quezon liked his agressiveness, here was a man who could not be pushed around. He
inquired with Nieto Sr. who this person was. Nieto mtroduced him as Delfin, the mckname under which
Rodolfo had talen his oath of office as a member of the Provincial Board (Sangguiniang Panlalawigan) of
Isabela. In 1947 Delfin first ran for the office of Isabela Governor and lost. In 1953 hè ran for
Congressman for the first time but again lost to former Governor Reyes. According to my informers, Reyes
victory was won through fraud: "they simply threw the ballot boxes in the river or they would stam the
forms with ink, erasing everythtng". But Delfin filed a case and won just in time before the next elections
in 1957, in which hè beat Reyes. In 1961 hè was re-elected as Congressman untü 1965. By then, the only
son of Delfin and Iday, Rodolfo Jr. is 31 years old, had gained political exposure as the secretary of his
father, and as Vice-Governor of Isabela. In 1969, Rodolfo Jr. ran for Congressman, and became one of
the leading personalities in Marcos' New Society Party, the KBL. He was re-elected as assemblyman ini
the Batasan Pambansa in 1974 and 1985 and, despite his close association with the Marcos regime having!
been deposed in 1986, re-elected as Congressman for the first district of Isabela in 1987 and 1992.
Throughout the Aquino presidency, Albano remained openly loyal to the Marcoses, and spearheaded efforts
in Congress to allow the body of the deceased president to be returned home. In the 1992 elections, Albano
joined Danding Cojuanco's campaign, but when Ramos had won the elections, hè was asked by the new
President to join his Rainbow Coalition and become its Majority Floorleader in the House of
Representatives. Rodolfo Jr. and his wife, Josefina Taguinod have three children, the eldest of whom,
Rodolfo m, served as mayor of the family's bailiwick town of Cabagan, Isabela. He is married to Mylene
Garcia, daughter of Davao City Representative Manuel M. Garcia, the law partner of Rodolfo Sr in the
Albano, Garcia, Diaz Law Office. In the 1998 elections, hè succeeded his father as Congressman for the
first District of Isabela.
(Sources: research diary, varipus notes made between 1990-19%; Comelec Website (1998 election results)j
the exception of one, the Respicios of Isabela, who own an old tobacco estate and occupy
several elective positions in the third district of that province, none of today's political leaders
in the Region have a history of wealth, or landed estate ownership that dates back to the
American or Spanish period (see section 8.5.1). Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the Region's most
Prominent politicians, is a special case. His father was a prominent lawyer and businessman
himself, who represented the first district of Cagayan between 1922 and 1925. Being an
illegitimate child of his father, however, hè was raised as a poor boy by his mother, a simple
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teacher in the town of Lallo, Cagayan, who had other children of her own to take care of as
well. After graduating from Highschool, at age 22, Juan Ponce managed to track down his
father in Manila, and was allowed by him to study law, first at the University of the
Philippines, and then at Harvard. In 1965, hè was hired by Marcos as undersecretary for
finance and commissioner of customs. In 1978, hè was first elected as Assemblyman,
capitalizing, according to my informers, on the misfortune and poverty of his youth, which was
"poored out in his campaign leaflets". After serving in several other positions in the Marcos
administration, hè switched to the Aquino camp during the EDSA revolution in 1986, then
became one of Mrs. Aquino's staunchest opponents in the Senate. In the meantime, hè had built
up such wealth, that hè was able to finance his own (failed) senatorial race in the 1995
elections. While his declared net worth was just over 64 million Ph£ (or 2 million dollars), the
Jaka company that hè established while hè was in the Marcos cabinet, reported 3.2 billion Ph£
in assets, and 1.3 billion in gross revenues in 1992. He succeeded in securing his re-election
as Congressman for the first district of Cagayan in the 1998 elections.
In his study on the business interests of the members of the Ninth House of Representatives
(elected in 1992), Gutierrez (1994) found that the percentage of representatives who combined
their political office with private businesses rose from 10% in 1940 to 30% in 1970. In the
Ninth Congress, 36% were full-time businessmen or corporate executives prior to their election
to the House, while 15% continued to manage business interests while in public office. Out of
199 Congressmen and -women15, 132 were found to have interests in land and agriculture, 45
in real estate companies, 50 in trading and retailing companies, 17 in logging, 14 in mining and
18 in construction.
For most politicians, approximately half the cost of election campaigns comes from
businesses and business associates. Officially, businessmen would not easily admit to perceiving
these payments as investments in future government favours, such as licenses, or obstruction
of laws hurting their interest. Many Chinese traders state, nevertheless, that they distributed
their contributions evenly among the candidates, so as to facilitate, and secure, a favourable
policy context for their businesses (Te Velde 1994). Likewise, political patronage over
corporate logging concessionaires, as Philippine journalists repeatedly reported (Manila
Chronicle, 20 Nov 1991; Vitug 1993) is likely to be rewarded with a share in the proceeds of
continued forest access (see also Chapter 6).Logging interests of elected officials became harder
to tracé after the mid-1980s, when holding an interest in the corporate logging industry became
a political liability for elected officials. Politicians either withdrew their interests or handed
these over to close associates, acting as their dummies in the management of the industry. At
the national level, several studies have brought to light direct links between national politicians
and the logging industry (PCIJ; 1991; Vitug, 1993, Gutierrez 1994). Gutierrez looked at
membership of the Board of a TLA holder or other official ties with the logging industry of
members of the house of representatives and the senate or their relatives. Of the eight
representatives of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela and Quirino in Congress after the 1992
elections, 5 had direct or indirect interests in logging enterprises.
The largest source of financial revenue during the politician's term is in the implementation
of the infrastructure projects mentioned above. For Congressman, the annual Countryside
Development Fund, also referred to as the Pork Barrel, offers by far the most important
instrument for personal largesse and financial gain. In 1994, for example, each Congressman
had 12.5 million pesos in CDF funds at his discretion, for projects in his district (Lande
Women comprise only 4% of all Representatives elected in the House since 1907 (ibid).
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1996:111, see also section 7.2.3). Aside from the political benefits to be gained from the
construction of these projects, there are often financial gains as well, for example through
special arrangements with local contractors, or by setting-up one's own construction firm,
under a dummy name. A local contractor cum business manager of a political family explained
how construction projects were used to build up a ftind for the re-election of one of its
members:
"/ told Carlito [the son, now a mayor, GT] we will only get projects above 5 Million and we leave
the rest to other contractors, we do not mind. The 10 Million Highschool building hos been awarded
to us and also the rood improvement in our town, that was contracted to my son Marlon. We have
already agreed that the profits will go to Carlito. It is betterfor us to help him thanfor him to steal
from the govemment coffers. "(Research diary, March 1996)
A third source of revenue, which the politician quoted earlier probably indicated when hè talked
about taking things at night, relates to the informal power of politicians to protect selected
people from the rule of law. The illegal jueteng number game, for example, is tacitly tolerated,
or even actively protected by local politicians in several towns in Cagayan Valley, and in other
places in the Philippines (Gutierrez 1997:39; PNA 27 March '98). Jueteng revolves around the
drawing of a number; there are 37 numbers, and players bet a small amount, usually one or two
pesos, on the number of their choice. In some places there are three draws per day: those who
betted on the right number win 450 pesos for every peso invested (that is: if no irregularities
occur in this 'wild game'). Every day, collectors make their rounds to see who wants to bet,
at what number, and to collect bets. Because of the small amounts with which one can play, and
the regularity with which the collectors come around, many poor people are said to 'feed their
number better than theyfeed their pig". The compensation received for permitting the game (a
Mayor of an average town in Isabela could receive up to 30,000 pesos a month) appears to be
more relevant for local campaigns, than for national elections. Other sources of income in this
realm will surface as we examine the role of elected officials in the implementation of forest
policies, in the next Chapter.
National party 'machineries' are a fourth important source of election funds, that is,
provided a candidate is adopted by one. Ever since its establishment in 1907, the Philippine
party system has been characterized by frequent switches of candidates between parties (Wurfel
1988). As Coronel (1998) points out, this practice did not change the structure of the two-party
system until Martial Law, because the parties had no shared political or ideological
commitment, but were merely "fleeting alliances based on political horse trading for the
furtherance ofindividual or family ambitions" (Coronel 1998:57) With an interruption during
the Martial Law period, when the Philippines was a virtual one-party state, the old party-
switching practice combined with the fragmentation of the party system, every election
producing new 'parties'. One veteran politician and Presidential aspirant in the 1992 elections
openly likened the Philippines' political parties with a particularly popular vehicle, which
allows a mix of people jump on and off at destinations of their choice: "You need Jeepneys to
take you to a destination, just likepoliticalpanies" (Jovito Salonga, quoted in Gloria 1997:1).
Out of 151 Congressmen who won as re-electionists in the 1995 elections, 87 won under
different parties in the 1992 and 1995 elections ; 51 out of these 80 transferred from one ruling
Party (Laban Demokratikong Pilipino, 1992) to another (Lakas, 1995) (Querijero 1997:42).
Since political parties, therefore, are first of all "vote getting machines and alliances of
convenience" (Coronel 1998:56), candidates must look strong in their constituency before they
can secure the financial and logistic support from a national party-ticket. Once that has
happened, significant contributions can be expected, especially if the party is sponsored by the
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incumbent administration.
Box 5.2 The Dynasty: immigrant rulers in Isabela
Faustino N. Dy, the founder of this politica! clan, was the mestizo son of a Chinese immigrant, who
established himself in the small town of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Dy himself started as an ambulant trader
travelling between Nueva Ecija and Cauayan. After his failed first raarriage, from which bis first son
Faustino Jr. was born, hè remarried Natividad De Guzman, a sister of Nueva Ecija warlord Grasing de
Guzman (Fegan 1993) and settled with her in Isabela. Faustino quickly established a popular reputation as
a matapang (ferocious, brave) person. One of my informants told me of an occasion where some of his
helpers were threatened by armed thugs to surrender their money to them; Dy happened to be in a nearby
shop and when hè heard about this hè immediately came to their aid, pulled his gun, firing and nearly
missing them. According to my sources, word of mouth quickly spread about the event and his popularity
grew quickly. In 1962 hè was elected municipal councillor in Cauayan, where hè became Mayor in 1964.
Dy was elected Governor of Isabela in 1971 and remamed there until 1986. A close friend of Ninoy
Aquino, the Dy Sr. alleged hè was one of the last Governors to give up his resistance to Marcos and his
decision to impose martial law. His mediation between the New People's Army and crony logging interests,
allowed logging to proceed, and the NPA to build up considerable logistics inside the Sierra Madre during
the seventies and eighties (Jones 1989; Lopez 1994).
When Corazon Aquino came to power, she initially removed the old Dy from the Governor's office
but one year later, the old family ties were re-established and she welcomed him under her administration
ticket. Dy regained the post of Governor in 1987 and stayed there for another 5 years. During the last one-
and-a half year of her administration, in an effort to secure his support for F:del Ramos, her anointed
candidate in the 1992 elections, Mrs. Aquino helped Dy Sr. to realize what hè would call "the obsession
ofthepeople of Isabela", a new Provincial Capitol building, costing 300 million Pesos (12 Million US$).
Until the inauguration of the building, in April 1992, Dy stood by his words, or at least refrained from
openly supporting other candidates. His three sons running for elective positions initially also used the
administration's support under the Lakas-NUCD banner, but shortly before the elections, the clan switched
parties. They all won their bids, one of them. Benjamin, as his father's successor in the position of
Governor of Isabela. By the end of his life, one year later, the 'old man' had built up a well-founded
political dynasty:
Benjamin Guzman Dy was mayor of Cauayan until 1992 and was then elected his father's successor as
Governor of Isabela. In 1995, hè successfully defended himself against an Albano-led initiative to hold a
i referendum to split up the province before the next elections. Although Albano succeeded in getting the
support of President Ramos, who made a special visit to the province in support of the split up, Ben Dy
won, and was re-elected in the 1995 and 1998 elections.
i Faustino Sanchez Dy Jr, the eldest son of Dy Sr., was elected Congressman for the second district of i
Isabela in 1992. He is the wealthiest of the descendants, and made his fortune in the logging mdustry
j (Chairman of the Isabela Wood Producers Assoctation) and through a construction firrn, Jundy and Co.
During the Marcos time, hè was closely associated with the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, and
won several bids for construction projects throughout the country. The company contmued to secure DPWH
contracts during the Aquino Administration, mcluding rehabilitation works after the Pinatubo eruption. He
iowns landed estate in San Manuel, Roxas, Isabela, and owns a garment manufacturing establishment in
Manila. Faustino Jr and his wife Christy have nine children.
Faustino G. Dy III, the younger brother of Benjamin, used to be the Chairman of the Association of
Barangay Captains, and succeeded Benjamin in 1992 as Mayor of the family's home town of Cauayan. He
was also elected as Chairman of the Cagayan Valley Mayors League.
iCesar G. Dy, another brother of Benjamin manages the family's recreational businesses, including the
Casino and Isabela Hotel in Cauayan, owned by the Dys.
Sources: Fegan (1993); Gutierrez (1994); PCU 1991^research diary 1990-1996; Comelec Website.
The 1987 Constitution stipulates that no elected official may occupy the same elective
position for more than three 3-year terms. In the case of the Presidency and the Vice
Presidency, re-election is not allowed at all. These provisions were intended to
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discourage the formation of so-called political dynasties, which could cling to particular
elective positions for generations (see, for example, McCoy (ed.) 1993). Two thirds of
those elected in the 1992 House of Representatives came from families who held public
office and maintained political influence for at least one generation, and one of every
three from a family in power for several generations (Gutierrez 1994:17). The 1987
Constitution obviously requires greater flexibility on the part of politicians to stay in
power. So, Congressmen become competitors for a gubernatorial seat, Senators must run
for Congress and so on. Clans that are large, and smart enough to position children or
other relatives in the offices previously occupied by another member, still have good
possibilities to hold on to political power for quite some time, as the family chronicle
described in Box 5.2 shows. Aside from the political skills and determination of its
founder, major strengths of this political clan are its size, its wide representation across
the electoral chessboard, and the strong synergy between its business- and political
elements, which mutually reinforce each other.
Finally, elected officials cannot gain legitimacy simply by acting as automated teller
machines. Capital is an essential, but not a sufficient asset for a successful political
career. Moreover, as we saw earlier in this section, some sources of capital are based on,
often implicit, expectations about the way the politician will use his influence, once in
public office. In Chapter 6, I will describe a number of alternative avenues, through
which elected officials can prove their worth to their constituency, and the consequences
this has for the implementation of forest policies.
5.3.3 The NGO sector
MARTIAL LAW ORIGINS
What may presently be "one of the largest and most highfy organized NGO communities
in the developing world" (Clarke, 1995:67) originated from the violent student protests
and other forms of social unrest facing Ferdinand Marcos at the start of his second term
as President of the Philippines in 1969 (Anderson 1988:16-19). Three years later, when
martial law was imposed in reaction to the growing political instability, the movement
was forced to go underground or adopt an official agenda and identity that could not be
labelled as anti-administration and thus 'subversive' or 'communist'. The birdwatching
club known as the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, founded in Manila in that same year, grew into what is still considered the
Philippines' most influential local NGO in the field of the environment.
Haribon initially kept a low profile, identifying itself with activities in the area of
research and public education. But it also began to express its first carefully-worded
criticisms on forest policies, such as the system of licences for the extraction of natu ra l
resources which "inevitably belong to the high and mighty" (from a Haribon White Paper
by Celso Roque, quoted in Rush 1991:79). It was only after the Marcos presidency and
its military and economie network had tallen apart during the EDSA revolution that
Haribon could afford to proclaim more openly the "democratization of our natural
resources" (Maximo Kalaw Jr, Haribon President in Rush 1991:79), a phrase which ten
years later was to become one of the cornerstones of Philippine forest policy.
Not only Haribon benefited from the new openness in Philippine society brought about
by the EDSA Revolution; a large informal network of other NGOs in the making took
this opportunity to come out into the open and register with the Securities and Exchange
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Commission (Aquino 1996). Many entered into agreements with national and
international organizations sympathetic to the new Aquino administration; the number of
registered NGOs rose from 27,100 in 1986 to 58,200 in June 1993 (Clarke 1995:70). In
1989, Haribon organized the Green Forum, a loose coalition of NGOs, People's
Organizations and church-related groups promoting not only sustainable development but
also linking this objective to the need for social reform, poverty alleviation and the
revival of Philippine indigenous culture (Rush 1991:78).
The initiative to bundie NGO forces increased Haribon's leverage on DENR policy.
When the World Bank was about to grant the Philippines US$ 18 million for the
implementation of the NIP AS law in 1992, DENR initially contracted the Philippine
Rural Reconstruction Movement to handle the programme. After strong objections from
other NGOs, led by the president of the Haribon Foundation, DENR Secretary Angel
Alcala was forced to back down. He informed the World Bank that hè would opt for a
contract with a consortium of NGOs which had recently formed an umbrella organization
called NIPA (NGOs for Integrated Protected Areas), in which Haribon and PRRM
alternately chair the Board (Clarke 1995:83).
GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION
Not all of the new NGOs are truly cause-oriented, non-profit organizations. In Cagayan
Valley, some newly established NGOs originated in response to an increase in
internationally funded activities, such as contract reforestation, the evaluation of
reforestation contracts, resource management planning and assistance in the implementation
community forestry projects. Government officials in the academie world, local govemment
units, and the ei vil service, as well as businessmen and displaced staff of former logging
companies, participated in these new NGOs in order to gain access to the lucrative local
market for consultancy work in the forestry sector16.
One international program which triggered the establishment of a number of new NGOs
in Cagayan Valley was the USAID-funded Natural Resources Management Project. USAID
contracted Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), a U.S.-based consultancy firm
with an office in Makati17, to manage the project, including all local subcontracts for
technical advisory services. The Regional Office of DENR was asked to préparé a shortlist
of NGOs qualified to render technical assistance to the project. The contract was awarded
to a newly established NGO, based in Isabela, and led by the former company forester of
a conglomerate of timber concessions in the Sierra Madre. With the exception of the
Directer, the NGO employed only casual junior temporary staff, mostly young university
graduates whose contracts were coterminous with the project. The people on its list of
experts were all academies and government officials, with full-time, full-tenure government
positions. Some of them had also submitted their names to other new NGOs bidding for the
same contract. As soon as project implementation began, however, the academies asked the
winning NGO to subcontract work to them through another NGO, set up by the university
One example of how this development has adversely affected 'real' NGOs was visible in the changmg background
of the two organizations representmg the NGO sector in the Regional Development Council (RDC). After the 1992 elections.
a new RDC was mstalled. and members voted for the election of the NGO representatives The majority of Local Government
officials, line agencies and the private sector voted for two new busmess NGOs - one of whom reprresented the furniture
mdustry - to replace cause-oriented NGOs as voting members of the council. , reducing NGO access. as well as potential
opposition, to the development agenda pursued by the RDC.
Eventually. this branch registered itself as a Philippine NGO.
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and with a membership that consisted exclusively of university faculty. This construction
enabled faculty to legally work on external projects in their offices and in official time.
Officially, faculty were only allowed to work for the NGO in their own time. Working long
hours at night and on the weekends in order to meet deadlines, they were under severe
stress, trying to combine teaching and NGO duties. One remedial measure employed was
to ask junior staff to take over certain classes, with or without payment, a practice which
eventually led to tension between senior members of faculty who were gaining professional
experience and earning considerable additional income18, and the junior staff who were
swamped by teaching responsibilities. The large discrepancies in payment between the
internationally funded activity and university salaries made it difficult for the university to
deny its faculty access to these 'sidelines'.
This brief example serves to illustrate one of the problems caused by the rapid
propagation of new NGOs in Cagayan Valley. formal institutions destabilized when key
staff, encouraged by new fund-raising opportunities, formed new organizations in which
they performed activities without giving up the positions in which they had gained their
expertise. The credibility of the non-profit. cause-oriented nature of NGOs eroded as
government officials began to set up their own NGOs (Government Organized NGOs or
GONGOs), and foreign and Manila-based NGOs (in Cagayan Valley referred to as
GRINGOs) began to compete for government contracts with local business-oriented NGOs
(BINGOs). The DENR coördinator of the Community Forestry Programme said that many
of the NGOs involved as contractors were "hiding behind the cloak of community
development, when their mam target is forest products extraction" (Vitug 1993:159-160).
The mushrooming of NGOs in the nineties caused confusion within the ranks of
government and international organizations, as well as among forest communities visited
by people whom they used to know as logging company personnel, who were now
representing an NGO concerned with sustainable forest management. A 1992 survey of
NGOs in Mindanao, a concentration area for international aid in the Philippines, led to an
estimate that only 10% of the local NGOs could be considered genuine development NGOs.
In this marmer, the NGO sector itself also became, in the words of Clarke "a« arena within
which battles in society at large are internalized"'' (Clarke 1995:71)
Anti-logging protests in Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija in 1990 are an example of a local
environmental movement that was stifled by divisions within the NGO community. Since
1985, people from this town in the southem stretches of the Sierra Madre had protested
against logging operations and against the use of a road passing through the town for log
transports from this area. The protest gained momentum when it was endorsed by the local
priest and the Diocese of Cabanatuan, to which the local parish belonged. Inspired by this
support, farmers, students and parish workers barricaded the road and had to be removed
by the police. Their demand to suspend these logging operations was disclaimed by another
NGO, the Aurora Forest andParks Conservation Association Inc. The latter had been set
up by logging companies and owners of wood-processing industries. All that the pretesters
were awarded after their interaction with the Secretary of the DENR was a reforestation
contract (PDI 30/9/1990).
Divisions in the NGO community deepened further after 1992, when José Maria Sison,
leader in exile of the National Democratie Front (the political arm of the New People's
The project leader for the preparation of the Resource Management Plan received a lump sum of l million pesos for
services rendered over a period of nme months. roughly equal to five times his annual salary as a senior professor in the
University. Shorter data analysis contracts offered a remuneration of 30.000 to 60.000 pesos per momh m fees.
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Arrny), called on the Philippine left to reqffïrm its opposition to the Philippine government.
His letter created a divide between those NGOs still willing to engage in cooperative
projects with government agencies and those which rejected Sison's call. 'RA' (reaffirm)
and 'RE' (reject) NGOs ended up in a situation of virtual mutual ex-communication.
CHURCH-BASED NGOs
"in the beginning I was against priests doing police \vork" says the influential
Bishop Francisco Claver. associate director of the Institute on Church and Social
Issues in Manila. But ifnobody else is doing it, then somebody hos to. Priests should
lead". (Vitug 1992: 37)
Churches are closely associated with many of the oldest, truly cause-oriented NGOs in the
Philippines. During the human rights violations of Martial Law, churches became a safe
haven for dissidents and resistance movements. The Catholic Church was actively engaged
in the environmental movement in January 1988: a pastoral letter signed by 99 bishops was
distributed in all the country's parishes, warning against the "ruthless exploitation" of the
Philippine natural resources, which it called "a« axsault on creation...sinful and contrary
to the teachings ofourfaith" (Clad 1988, Rush 1991:80). Parishioners were asked to
espouse and promote ecological causes (Vitug 1992:36-7). Coumans (1994) and Porio and
Taylor (1995) describe local cases frorn Marinduque and Bukidnon, where Basic Christian
Communities were applying liberation theology to actively support local communities in
environmental conflicts with the Marcopper company and two TLA holders. In discussions
in the BCCs of the Redemptorist Mission in Bukidnon, the personal role of the individual
as a steward of God's creation, a notion which was "reinforced in sermons" (Porio and
Taylor 1995:150). Coumans vividly describes the chronology of a BCC-supported struggle
against Marcopper, which led to the temporary shutdown of the mine. Opponents of the
shutdown of Marinduque's largest employer and sole producer of electricity accused the
Church of being associated with "leftist andradical elements" and that it was out to "teach
the people living along Calangcan Boy to arise andfight against the mining Corporation"
(Coumans 1995:55)
Church-related NGOs, such as Lingkod Tao Kalikasan, led by Sister Aida Velasquez and
the Institute on Church and Social Issues at Ateneo de Manila University are among the
leading institutions in community mobilization on environment issues. Pedro Walpole, an
Irish-born Jesuit missionary who leads the Institute at Ateneo, carries out scientific research
explicitly directed toward social change and justice. In an implicit reference to the work of
Father Delbert Rice, who mobilized the Ikalahan to set up a highly successful foundation
and continues to play a leading role in management, Walpole says the role of nis Institute
in local dynamics is not to intervene directly by organizing communities or setting up
cooperatives but rather to stimulate the "inhented human condition" of observing, thinking
about and managing one's environment. In the words of Walpole, "there had been a long
period ofsocio-cultural erosion before biophysical erosion starled". In 1994, nis work with
forest communities in Bukidnon focussed on the issue of land sales by forest occupants and
on the health impacts of a transition from subsistence to market-oriented agriculture:
" We mapped their land sales over the past few years. and when we came up with the result, they
were amazed about what they had told us. That is when l asked t hem to leave me and make their
decision. Now there is a considerable awareness about where they are" (pers comm. P.
Walpole, 2/10/94)
The Cagayan Anti-Logging Movement and its Isabela complement, the Save the Sierra
Madre Movement were also initiated by local priests, who made use of the respectability
policies and policy actors in Philippine forest management 207
that came with their religieus authority to exposé abuses in the extraction of natural
resources. Despite serious threats to his personal safety, the leader of C ALM, Father Gary
Agcaoili, took a confrontational course in 1990 when hè testified before the House
Commission on Natural Resources and gave evidence on the involvement of local
politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats in illegal logging activities in the region. The
Sierra Madre Outdoor Club, the Cagayan equivalent of Haribon's, wholeheartedly supported
CALM, as well as smaller popular organizations throughout the province.
Interestingly, Cagayan's coalition of People's Organizations1'', NGOs and Church-based
advocacy groups found an ally in the newly appointed regional director of DENR, an
engineer who used to work at the DENR in the mines and lands divisions. He starled an
aggressive anti-logging campaign soon after being appointed to his position in early 1990.
Another newly appointed official. Brigade General Orlando Soriano, the Regional
Commander of the Philippine Army in Cagayan Valley teamed up with him in the fïght
against illegal logging. The story goes that when Soriano met Isabela Governor Faustino
Dy on their first courtesy visit, Dy told the Commander to his face that hè was apersona
non grata in his province. The political power of 'the old man' was confirmed in July 1991,
when Soriano was removed from Region 2 "due to political pressure" (PDI, 9/8/1991).
This development left the DENR leader dangerously exposed; Soriano's military power had
been his shield in his crusade against armed and politically protected logging entrepreneurs.
When the Army-DENR pact feil apart, the DENR Director began to receive death threats
and was compelled to hire a personal bodyguard and take other measures, including
travelling at unscheduled hours in various cars.
The growing cooperation between the DENR and local NGOs now proved its worth;
while politicians and loggers worked for his transfer from the Region, the NGOs lobbied
for him to stay. The anti-illegal logging drive continued less noisily but no less tenaciously.
Between 1989 and 1997, the number of corporate timber concessions operating in the
Cagayan Valley Region dropped sharply (see sections 5.2.2. and 7.3.3), as a result of the
more strict enforcement of forestry rules and regulations. Other important factors behind
this achievement were the effective use of the media (which became easier with NGO
support) and international assistance, which provided DENR Region 2 with additional
resources to implement its tasks, and immunity from political interference (see Chapter 6).
THE MULTI-SECTORAL FOREST PROTECTION COMMITTEES
After the underground years before 1986, environment NGOs entered into a "relationship
ofdynamic tensiori" with the DENR (Rush 1991:81). While it is the mission of the NGOs
to advocate policy change, bureaucrats in government agencies need their support to be able
to make policies work in practice. Clarke (ibid:%2), citing studies20 on NGO-state
relationships in other countries, emphasizes that direct personal and informal contacts
between individuals from the two sides often determine the quality of these relationships.
People's Organizations are established and managed by local. often under-privileged people themselves. primanly
strive towards the emancipation and progress of their members, and only indirectly towards larger societal goals.
20
The studies cited by Clarke are:
Famngton, John and Anthony Bebbmgton (Eds) (1993). Reluctant pannen: non-governmental organizations, the
state and sustainable agncuüural development London. Routedge (p 190)
Klmmahorn, Somthavil and Kevin Ireland 'Making a difference: NGO-Government collaboration in Thailand' in
Michael Edwards and David Hulme (Eds) (1992), Making a Difference: NGOs and development in a changing
wnrld. London. Earthscan.(p61)
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My observations in Cagayan Valley attest to this conclusion; the presence of one new
Regional Directer and the fact that hè was allowed to stay on long enough to build up a
relationship of trust with the NGO community, the Church and the academie world forged
a network which utilized existing policies could to much greater effect.
In 1993, these spontaneous and informal beginnings of collaboration between the NGO
sector and the DENR were structured through the development of Multi-Sectoral Forest
Protection Committees. Each municipality, province and region was encouraged to set up
its own MSFPC, with financial and technical assistance from the ENR-SECAL programme,
the World Bank funded Environment and Natural Resources Sectoral Adjustment Loan.
Representatives of churches, press, army, police (PNP), intelligence (NBI) and the DENR
sit on this committee. Once the MSFPC finds evidence of illegal logging or the
transportation of illegal (i.e., undocumented) forest products, apprehension can be followed
by speedy prosecution under a special MOA agreed with the Judiciary.
Intersectoral cooperation has proven to be a successful strategy for DENR to make
progress in policy enforcement, but its effectiveness depends on the authority and means
provided to the this coalition, designed to detect violations of forestry policies, rules and
regulations. The new MSFPC checkpoints along highways have no power to inspeel a load,
although they are entitled to stop any vehicle and ask the driver to allow inspection of his
load. A drivers can shnply ignore MSFPC stop signs or refiise inspection, as his
cooperation is purely a matter of courtesy. It is probably even harder to catch illegal loggers
in the act of cutting trees - the type of evidence which is required if a case is to lead to a
court conviction, as the following experience of a senior forester and the Chairman of the
Regional MSFPC for Cagayan Valley demonstrates:
In 1994, DENR granted a consortium of former logging contractors from Ilagan,
Cabagan and San Mariano a special permit to haul abandoned logs from Kahoy, an expired
timber concession area in Isabela. The Multisectoral Committee (a clone of the MSFPC in
which only LGU and NGOs participate) had been consulted on the scheme, and apparently
had agreed to it. The MSFPC chairman had his doubts, and took the quite unusual step of
paying a personal visit to the area where the abandoned logs had been reported. There is no
more illustrative way to convey the perseverance and courage required for the successful
detection of illegal logging cases, even in blatant cases like this, than by literally quoting
the chairman of the MSFPC, who related his experiences to me:
"The first time we heardabout the case was in the Multi-Sectoral Forest Protection Committee
(MSFPC) meeting in Tuguegarao. l sent my wife and a colleague and asked them to state our
position that the so-called 'hauling of abandoned logs 'from Kahoy wasjust a front to allow
illegal logging. The meeting could not decide on this. but apparently the DENR was really in
a hurry to implement the scheme. It already seemed very much bloated, with 952 logs in one
area and over 1000 claimed to be present in the other. I could not believe that this was really
true. John ( a ranking official in the Forestry section of the DENR Regional office. GT) showed
us pictures of logs. but I asked him 'how do we know that this picture was taken there and then'?
The pictures were close-ups and they could well show the same pile of logs from various
positions. They agreed that a delegat ion \vould go into the area and check w hè t her there were
really so many abandoned logs there.
I do not know why they selected only a few membersfrom the LG Us to go and have a look.
together with the RSOG. the mobile units of the DENR in charge oflaw enforcement. One of
the MSFPC members who went in was a former councillor. who was known to have been
involved in illegal (salabadjok) logging before. So we knew that these people were very
interested in getting logs from this area. All ofus in the MSFPC already knew that the RSOG
hadalso become unreliable, but when they came out after two days. John was very much in a
rush and gave the go-aheadfor the hauling to start.
I requested an immediate meeting of the juli Mul t i- Sectoral Protection Committee and
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askedfor another visit to the area, to get an independent view ofwhat was happening there. But
while the meeting was going on, I began to have doubts about John, especially when hè rose
from his chair as Mrs. Donna Sy (wife of Bobby Sy, logging contractor and son of a municipal
mayor in Isabela) entered. The contract had been partly awarded to her, with paymentfor the
hauling to be made in kind at 5 and 5.8 peso per board f ooi (the current market value of prime
species such as tanguile, red lauan, white lauan. and narra was approximately 18 pesos per
board foot, GT) The other contractors were Mrs Gina Alfarofrom Cabagan, and "Dr. Wood"
Castro (a medical doctor turned logging contractor). I asked representaties from the other
sectors to join me inside, hut they all declined because of the risk. People from CENRO
Cabagan came to my house to discourage me from going in, stating that troops of the NP A from
Cagayan and Isabela were closing in on the area. They even went to the house ofmy brother-in-
law, to ask him to stop me from going.
It seemed that the PENRO and CENRO were caught ofjguard when I confronted them with
this hauling contract; hey said they had not been involved in the bidding. But the next day, as
I was preparing to go in, they tried to buy time bypreventing me from going in, claiming that
there were repairs on the six-by-six truck, andso on....hut I told them that there would be no
problem, I couldjust take the project 's own 4 WD and go in. so they really saw I was determined
to go. The truck only got us up to Kahoy, so we still had a long way to hike. But in Kahoy we
found the flrst six logs, all freshly cut, so I said: this is a violation, and we wil! need to
apprehend the contractor.
When we reached the forest the next day. I saw no abandoned logs, only a very good
secondary stand that had only been lightly logged by some concessionaire. There were many
big trees measuring 140, 120, and 100 cm in diameter. Ho-wever, the trees were no langer
standing , they had cut all the big ones indiscriminately, their leaves still green. All the
equipment had been taken out and moved to the other side of the mountain. Idecided to come
back after my trip to Cebu (my father-in-law was severely ill at this time) and go to the other
side, too. I told the people of the DENR that they would not even be able to haul the logs out,
as they would have to pass a very slony portion and would need to construct a rood. But on my
second trip, just one week after the flrst. l was surprised to see that they had constructed more
than 6.5 km ofroad, right up to the virgin forest. They tried again to stop me from going in,
saying that there was a roadblock, b ut I told them that I knew the obstacle was a log pond and
so when they saw that I knew, they allowedme topass. On this log pond I found 26 logs, freshly
cut. But when I went in I was really shocked to see 27 trucks. 2 bulldozers and six chainsaws
that they had brought in. The local chainsaws may number many more. I was thinking about
the soils and the river. and I really couldnot believe the damage that they haddone. There were
thousands of logs, more than 1.5 million boardfeet of freshly cut logs waiting to be hauled. The
local people in Simanu Norte and Sur were very happy, as they could ask the trucks to load
their square logs too and drop them in the barangay. Andso were the kaingineros. who already
had access to the area and were starting to burn the bamboo bushes, expanding their areas.
I also interviewed the local people about the RSOG field visit. They said these people did
not really go in and see the area; they butchered a few ducks and chickens. and had some
drinks and t hen retumed afterwards. We took a lot ofpictures and I asked the DENR people to
measure the logs, and then I went home. Reaching home at 7 pm l was surprised that Peping
(the husband of Mrs Alfaro) was on the phone, askingfor my report, l said I was not going to
write my own report hut that the group would préparé one. In any case. today I have told my
full story to the Executive Steering Committee of the MSFPC, and we intend to file a case
against the contractor, so that they will beforced to name names, because there may be bigfish
behind this. We will discuss it again this coming Sunday, when the DENR Secretary will be with
us in the fraternity. " (Research diary, 17/6/94)
The Kahoy case tells us a great deal about the potential, as well as the complications of the
increased cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organizations involved
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in forest protection. Let me begin with the last remark made by the Committee Chairman.
Here hè introduces an institution that could probably qualify as a separate non-
governmental actor on its own, if not for its membership, which cuts across most of the
actors discussed so far in this chapter: the often exclusive and inaccessible fraternities, such
as the Catholic organization Knights of Columbus, the secular 'Freemasons', and
professional fraternities such as 'Varon' and 'Omega'. Because of their informal, internal
hierarchy, members of the same fraternity can break through the formal lines of authority
that govern normal communication and patterns of loyalty within and between
organizations. The committee chairman can have direct access to the DENR secretary,
whom hè would otherwise have to approach through the many bureaucratie levels
separating them.
The other side of this coin is that people working in the same organization, or even in
the same office but with differing fraternity backgrounds, may fmd it hard to trust one
another. Fraternity loyalty comes very close to family loyalty, causing intra- and inter-
fraternity violence in Universities and fuelling factionalism and favouritism in Agencies
such as the DENR. In this particular case, however, the fraternity system enabled the
chairman to ignore the unconcealed stop signs hè received before actually going inside
the forest to fmd his evidence. His informal, almost secret position as a prominent and
industrious member of a fraternity network motivated and enabled him to talk straight to
persons who were by far his superior in terms of civil rank, i.e., the secretary and the
new Governor of Isabela, who are brethren in the fraternity.
A second phenomenon of the first post-EDSA decade which is pointed up by this case
is the crucial role played by elected officials in the Local Government Units. Politicians
can make or break the basis of mutual trust which is necessary to Government-NGO
cooperation. The devolution of environmental law enforcement responsibilities to the
Local Government Units, as prescribed by the Local Government Code, is based on the
assumption that local political leaders are more motivated - and more accountable - when
it comes to protecting the resources under their jurisdiction from unsustainable use than
are high-level bureaucrats and elected officials. One of the few municipalities where this
assumption holds true in practice is the town of Nagtipunan, Quirino. Under the
leadership of Mayor Andres Blando. a former district forester who became a politician
and environmentalist, Cagayan Valley's first municipal Multisectoral Committee was
established here. Using the MSFPC and his political position, Mayor Blando saw to it
that forestry rules and regulations in his municipality were strictly enforced, a line which
brought him in open conflict with two other politicians, the local congressman and the
Governor. However, both Mayor Blando's personality and the municipality's relatively
favourable land/population ratio make Nagtipunan an exceptional case. Local Government
Units tend to be severely strapped for cash, and their political officials are elected to
address immediate economie issues rather than long-term sustainability.
A third aspect illustrated by the Kahoy case is the fragility of local NGO-GO
coalitions, due to the important role reserved for personal relations between trusted
individuals in the establishment of these coalitions. The personal integrity and
commitment of one official, even when hè is the highest in charge, cannot uphold a trust
relationship at the level of institutions, in this case between the DENR and cause-oriented
groups in society that assist the DENR in the implementation of its policies. Intentionally
or unintentionally, the DENR official who participated in the Kahoy case used his
position as one of the RED's most trusted men to get the permit signed, which normally
led almost automatically to approval by the Multi-Sectoral Protection Committee. Local
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DENR officials at the CENRO and PENRO offices involved tried to prevent the
discovery of the illegal activities behind the abandoned-log hauling front. Ironically, the
only victim of the scandal was the regional director. Three months after the scandal was
exposed, Secretary Alcala was forced to transfer him to the Central Office in Manila21.
Despite these inherent sources of instability in NGO-GO partnership, the Regional
MSFPC did not disintegrate when the director, who had brought these sectors together,
left Region 02. By this time, what had started as an informal coalition between him and
key individuals in the army, the academie world and the local NGO community had been
turned into a permanent body; the Multi Sectoral Forest Protection Committees were
registered as NGOs as legal entities. MSFPC chairmen from the various Regions began
to hold regular seminars and workshops in Manila, to share experiences and develop
common strategies. International support - technical, fmancial and political - played a
more than coincidental role in the initial successes of the informal MSFPCs and in their
eventual establishment as independent institutions.
5.3.4 International actors
The Philippines receives overseas development assistance from many countries; between
1980 and 1986 there were soft loans amounting to US$ 5.67 billion contracted from
multi- and bilateral sources. In addition, US$ 1.19 billion was received in grants and
technical assistance during the same period (TNI 1987:36-37). The Aquino presidency
meant a new impulse for international donor agencies to pledge fmancial and technical
assistance for development and environment programmes throughout the country.
Between 1988 and 1992, the Asian Development Bank and Japan's Overseas Fund for
Economie Cooperation and Development lent US$ 620 million to the Philippines for
activities in the forestry sector. Other major projects were undertaken in cooperation with
the governments of Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Germany, Finland, as
well as the European Union. An estimated one billion dollars in soft loans were granted
to the Philippines for environmental projects involving NGO participation between 1986
and 1992 (Clarke 1995:80) To put these figures into proportion, they can be compared
with the Philippines1 gross national product, which stood at US$ 30 billion in 1995 (NSO
1996, cited in FEBTC 1998), or with the amount of foreign exchange the Philippine
wood industry spends annually in an effort to cope with local shortages as a result of
domestic forest resource depletion between the 1950s and 1990s. Net imports of tropical
logs and sawn wood in the Philippines was valued at approximately US$ 200 million in
1993 (Johnson 1996:22; ITTO 1997).
In the Northern Sierra Madre, at least eight internationally funded conservation and
development initiatives were going on in 1996, the largest of which was a US$ 5.6
million grant from the Netherlands, in support of the establishment of the Sierra Madre
Nature Park under the National Integrated Protected Area System (see section 5.2.4).
This grant complemented earlier international assistance from the Global Environment
Facility fund, which granted 20 million dollars to a consortium of National and Regional
NGOs, for a seven-year programme of activities to realize the basic organizational
structure necessary to implement the NIPAS law on ten priority sites nationwide,
In November 1996. DENR Secretary Ramos reinstated this person as Regional Director for Cagayan Valley, where
: rernained in charge until his retirement, in 1998.
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including the Northern Sierra Madre. International actors influence the formulation and
impiementation of forestry policies in Cagayan Valley via three avenues, which will be
discussed below.
1) Strengthening of environment-oriented POs and NGOs
Overseas Development Assistance has been an important factor in the Strengthening of
the organizational capacities of Philippine NGOs (Clarke 1995:81). By selecting
particular advocacy groups and other NGOs and helping them to develop new activities,
international organizations indirectly influence the formulation and impiementation of
Philippine forest policies. The growth of the Haribon Foundation from a birdwatching
club to the influential environment watchdog it is today is one example of this indirect
influence. lts latest offspring, the new NIPA NGO that assists the Philippine government
in the impiementation of the NIPAS la w, operates almost entirely on World Bank/GEF
funds. Two international projects now piloting policy reform in Region 2 enabled an
informal alliance of NGOs and government agencies to develop into the Multi- Sectoral
Forest Protection Committees which is assisting the DENR in policy impiementation.
According to one estimate, 20 million dollars in international aid was handled by the
Philippine NGO community (Goertzen 1991 in Clarke 1995:69). One-third of Canada's
aid to the Philippines goes directly to the major development NGO networks (Broad and
Cavanagh 1993:153).
2) Policy review, formulation and legitimation
Over the past ten years, international agencies have conducted a large number of
internationally funded sectoral reviews and policy studies in the Philippines, in the area
of forestry and the environment (ADB 1988; 1994; GTZ 1989; World Bank 1988, 1990,
1994). The most comprehensive document setting out concrete new directions for the
Philippine forestry sector was the Philippine Master Plan for Forestry Development. It
was co-funded by the Asian Development Bank, the government of the Philippines, and
the Finnish International Development Agency, and contracted to a consortium of
international and local consultants of Jaakko Poyry Oy, a Finnish consultancy firm, its
Philippine counterpart MADECOR, and senior officials in the Bureau of Forestry of
DENR. As a follow-up to the National Master Plan, which prescribes benchmarks to be
achieved by the Philippine Forestry Sector during a 25-year period starting in 1992,
Regional Master Plans were developed for all administrative Regions, including Cagayan
Valley. The most important elements of the Regional Master Plan for Cagayan Valley
have already been discussed (section 5.2).
3) Support DENR policies and projects
As noted earlier, DENR is among the least financed agencies of the Philippine
government. Due to overseas development assistance, the DENR budget increased
sharply after 1986, from 1.08 billion pesos then to 4.5 billion pesos in 1990 (Vitug
1993:58). In addition to the projects already mentioned at the beginning of this section,
in 1988 the Asian Development Bank granted the Philippines a Forestry Sector
Programme worth US$ 120 million, which was complemented by another US$ 120
million from Japan's Overseas Economie Cooperation Fund. Four years later, the World
Bank granted the Philippines an Environment and Natural Resources Sectoral Adjustment
Loan (ENR-SECAL) programme, worth US$ 200 million and USAID grants for the
development of pilot community forestry programmes around the country, rainfed upland
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agricuJture, and institutional support programmes, including the establishment of the
Multi-Sectoral Forest Protection Committees.
Because of its own limited resources, DENR's operations in Cagayan Valley were
significantly enhanced through international support, especially when projects are coursed
directly through the regional and lower-level offices. Throughout the successful 1988-
1995 period, DENR-Region II hosted several foreign- funded projects, such as ENR-
SECAL and two subsequent Natural Resources Management Programmes. In addition to
providing training opportunities, these projects included substantial investments in
information and monitoring equipment, including a small helicopter, Global Positioning
Systems and Geographic Information Systems that enhanced DENR's capability to
monitor developments in the Sierra Madre, and obtain hard evidence of illegal activities.
The presence of an international project also made it safer for DENR officials to exposé
these cases and pursue them in court; a certain level of immunity against harassment by
politicians and businessmen is provided by participation in international cooperation
projects. As long as the Philippine government continues to rund DENR as meagrely as
it has in the past, international organizations and consultants are likely remain influential
actors in the management of Philippine forests.
5.4 Concluding analysis
In mis chapter I have examined the multi-faceted picture of how government policies aim
to influence forest protection and utilization in Cagayan Valley; I have described key
actors and their influence on the defmition and implementation of these policies. This
overall image enables us to draw conclusions on the position of DENR within the
government, and on the role of its policies in the deforestation problem.
The first conclusion, which has explanatory value for those that follow, is the stark
contrast between the responsibility of the DENR and its low status, not only vis-a-vis the
private interests at stake, but also within the ranks of government. DENR is the
proverbial 'giant with feet of clay': managing half of the Philippines' total land area, the
world's longest coastal area, and the quality of the environment in the country as a whole,
the DENR is still the government agency with the lowest budget. This underdog position
is even more pronounced in the poor economie conditions of Region 2, essentially an
inhabited valley floor, where poor farmers produce rice and corn for the National Capital
Region. Here, the agency protects the region's forest lands against a large majority of
private and other policy actors, who regard the development of the 'untapped' lands,
waters, and mineral, marine and forest resources of the Sierra Madre as indispensable to
the economie progress which is so sorely needed.
What we discern here is an alliance of lowland actors engaged in concerted action to
gain access to natural resources in the uplands of the Sierra Madre. This 'struggle' can
not be reduced to one between private and public interests, because, as we have seen,
national government institutions pursuing public interests other than the environment are
also engaged in a similar challenge to DENR, the guardian of the upland environment.
Elected officials welcome every new voter and would like to see the forest lands in their
district as inhabited, peaceful contributors to the economy in their constituency; the
Department of Trade and Industry sees the furniture industry as one of the few
manufacturing opportunities in an otherwise un-industrialized region, and the Department
°f Agriculture promotes agricultural expansion in order to stimulate economie growth;
and NEDA continues to articulate the need for lateral roads across the Sierra Madre. It
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is in this field of development-oriented forces that the DENR's 800 foresters are striving
to protect more than one million hectares of natural capital from being rapidly converted
into currency and Narra sofa's for the rich and farmlands for the poor.
Against all these odds, during the period 1989-1995 DENR was able to suspend or
cancel nearly all large-scale, mechanized logging operations in the Sierra Madre because
of violations of pertinent forest policies. One explanation for this achievement lies in
close inter-sectoral collaboration between governmental and non-governmental
organizations who supported DENR's drive to put a stop to a long period of tolerated
abuse in the corporate logging industry. This inter-sectoral approach to forest protection
was also facilitated by projects involving international cooperation, and by more
coincidental - by no less important - factors such as the appointment of an independent -
minded non-forester as regional director, who quickly gained the respect and trust of the
media, NGOs, and the academie world. Two critical remarks on the role of international
projects and the NGO sector are now in order. First, international support prevented the
inadequacy of the DENR's structural capability from surfacing. If the DENR had not
received the technology, resources and manpower to supplement its minimal government
resources, then its function as a powerless institution serving as only a window dressing
would have become apparent much earlier. Second, the rapid formation of new NGOs,
People's Organizations and so-called Forestry Specialist Organizations also created
confusion about the non-profit nature of the NGO sector and weakened existing
institutions, which saw their staff leaving for 'greener pastures', or spending a
considerable part of their time on external projects.
Another factor that helps to explain the assertive actions of DENR during the early
1990s lies in the shift in political configuration and culture in the years immediately after
the EDSA revolution of February 1986. The corporate logging industry, so closely
associated with the deposed President Marcos, lost moral legitimacy and political support.
In the spirit of People Power, exclusive corporate licences to the public domain had to
be replaced by more democratie modes of access. To discern the significance of this
political shift, it must be placed in the perspective of the critical condition that the
Philippine forests were in by the late 1980s. As most of the commercially interesting
timber stocks had been extracted from the public forest lands, with the exception of some
areas in Mindanao, Palawan and Cagayan Valley, the corporate mode of commercial
logging had largely outlived its economie viability by the time it became discredited.
With log imports almost fully liberalized, an attractive incentive package for reforestation
and wood-processing industries in place, and opportunities arising in many other sectors
of the Philippine economy, the handover of the last rainforest areas to the communities
living inside these forests was not a major setback to the industry. In fact, as we saw in
the previous chapter, for some time before the corporate logging system went into
decline, upland communities had already been contracted to carry out logging activities
for timber licensees and their contractors in Cagayan Valley.
The overall direction in which Philippine forest policies have been drifting since the
1970s is a defensive one, in which the Bureau of Forestry, and later the DENR, has
gradually given in to pressures that it fmds itself unable to withstand. Although the
vestiges of state ownership of all classified and unclassified forest lands remain, despite
opposition, each new DENR policy relinquishes more authority over the lands and
resources of the public domain. From a policy of totally excluding local people from
tenurial and user rights to forest lands and resources, the former Bureau of Forestry first
began issuing entry permits and, from 1982 onwards, Stewardship Contracts for private
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leasehold of public land. The rationale of this Integrated Social Forestry programme was
that forest migrants, once they enjoyed a higher degree of tenurial security, would no
longer open up additional forests. Seeing that this policy failed to achieve that goal, not
least because of the continuous arrival of new migrants in the public domain, DENR
yielded once again, now giving forest communities the chance to play a leading role in
the management of the Philippines' remaining natural forests. By opening up possibilities
to return large parts of the public domain to indigenous forest communities, the recent
Ancestral Domains Act even touches the very root of Philippine forest policies dating
from colonial days, that classified forest lands cannot be alienated from the State.
As in its former policies, DENR continues to incorporate into its community forestry
and ancestral domain concessions elements that aim to discourage forest migrants and
indigenous forest communities from following the short term economie rationality of
rapidly converting slow-growing, and in many cases logged-over natural forests into
liquid capital and farmlands. This policy is based on the assumption that forest residents,
unlike off-site logging companies, have other than short-term economie plans for the
resources entrusted to them. The validity of that assumption has yet to be tested in
practice. A relevant constraint in these policies lies precisely in their strong reliance on
long-term commodities - trees in natural forests - to satisfy the short-term needs of those
now entrusted with their management. If community-based forest management is to
become a success, it will require substantial investments, not only in social and
organizational aspects, as is presently the case, but also in the regeneration of degraded
and denuded forest lands for agroforestry and bio-organic farming. On its own, DENR
may not have the expertise or the resources to give these components the effort they
require to be put in place.
The need to verify whether communities are managing forests in a sustainable way will
pose new challenges to the DENR, in view of the problematic hold the agency was
previously able to gain on the much smaller number of licenced forest users. From a
relatively small actors field in which a few major players dominate the extraction,
processing and inter-regional trade in forest products, the picture changes into one in
which a greater number of small-scale producers supply forest products to a
predominantly intra-regional market of smaller-scale processors and end users, some of
which produce wood products for interregional trade. Self-regulation, both by the
community-based producers of forest products and by the lowland-based buyers of scarce
and highly prized hardwoods, will be a key factor in the contribution that community-
based resource management can make to conservation.
Selective logging continues to be the guiding principle in the Comprehensive
Management Plans for community-based logging operations. On the basis of the standing
stock of extractable timber, the volume to be cut is followed by a period of 25 years or
longer, reserved for the undisturbed regeneration required in the production of timber in
natural, mixed dipterocarp forest. In principle, the protection of these residual stands is
more feasible under a community- based approach than it has proven to be in corporate
timber concessions. Forest migrants and indigenous people are on site to protect their
forest from premature extraction by outsiders, or by individuals from their own
community. Thus social cohesion and stability emerge as critical condition for ecological
stability in areas managed by forest communities. The warrants required are, first, a set
of broadly accepted rules on forest utilization and, secondly, a leadership structure to
enforce those rules. This brings us to political dimensions of community forestry.
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Internally, communities are not the homogeneous and harmonious societies they are
sometimes portrayed to be. Young and often ethnically heterogeneous migrant settlements
require years, probably decades, to settle in socially. But even in more established upland
communities, different expectations, values and socio-political factions exist under the
formal administrative structure that defines them as one community. As a rule, family
interests take precedence over the common interest, at any rate in the poor living
conditions of both migrants and indigenous forest residents, and this places limits on their
willingness to accept rules and leadership.
Externally, this makes forest communities vulnerable to exploitation by interest groups
from outside the community. In Philippine elections, candidates for the position of
barangay captain team up with mainstream parties and politicians in the lowlands,
receiving fïnancial assistance from the party or leader that they associate themselves with.
Once elections are over, the barangay captain becomes the point of entry for outsiders
with an interest in the natural resources managed by the community. Here, the strength
of the community - and the democratie content of its elections - will determine whether
the captain has more to lose by cooperating with outsider interests in resource extraction
(and providing his voters with a share of the immediate benefits), or by defending the
long-term self- interest of the community. This brings us to the political dimensions of
policy implementation, the subject of the following chapter.
Before proceeding, let me conclude with a remark on the devolution of DENR tasks
and mandate to the local government units. The past division of labour and interest within
the ranks of government, in which an understaffed, underfunded and unpopular national
Line Agency kept watch over the use of forests in the provinces, proved to be ineffective.
Elected local government officials could simply pass on responsibilities for forest
protection to the appointed officials of the Bureau of Forestry, and later to the DENR.
The Local Government Code provides an opportunity to redress this situation. On the
other hand, questions may be raised as to whether and how elected officials in the
countryside can afford to weigh the long-term common property services and values that
forests produce and represent against the short-term development agenda that defines
much of their political legitimacy among their constituents. What further complicates the
position of local elected officials as forest managers is that the majority of their voters are
lowland-based. and therefore not directly affected by the environmental impacts of
unsustainable forest use. Past policy failures are better understood if they are seen in
relation to the ftmdamental difference in orientation between elected and appointed actors
in government, and the continuous state of semi-captivity imposed by the former on the
latter. I will illustrate this in the following Chapter. Rather than the further dismantling
of the DENR, I see the need for a more independent and assertive national environment
agency, enabling forest communities to deal with future incentives from the lowland
economy in a sustainable way.
Chapter 6
Ballots and Bureaucracy;
Mechanisms of distorted policy implementation
"No state can achieve predominance without local representatives pressing forward the
state's social control, rules of the game and strategies of survival". (Migdal 1988:247)
6.1 Introduction
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Philippine government has a variety of Instruments at its
disposal to manage the use of forests lands and resources. As the de jure owner of all classified
and unclassifïed forest lands. the state holds a monopoly on decisions regarding private access
to the public domain. Violations of the terms under which access is granted can result in the
suspension or cancellation of the agreement between the State and the private stakeholder.
Nevertheless, the rapid deforestation of the Philippines in this century suggests that these
exclusive powers and instruments have not been used to achieve the official aim of the state to
ensure the sustainable utilization of natural resources. This chapter will analyze this discrepancy
by focussing on the DENR, the government agency which manages the protection and use of
public forests, and on the implementation level of the policy process. The overview of options
for illegal access underlines the key position of local-level bureaucrats and field officials in the
DENR, who perform a balancing act between their formal duty to safeguard the public interest
and the inforrnal necessity to be sensitive to private interests.
At first glance one might be tempted to lump the various schemes that evolve from this
ambiguous position under the general heading of'corruption'. Solving the deforestation problem
would then be a matter of achieving a greater degree of congruence between the formal content
°f policies and their interpretation by officials at the local level. However, an independent
bureaucracy is a precondition to achieve this, and as Hutchcroft demonstrated for the banking
sector, the Philippines "presents aparticularly strong contrast to Weber's ideal-type bureaucratie
state" (Hutchcroft 1994:94). Philippine bureaucrats, especially those at the lower levels of
authority, are in direct contact with the people affected by government policies. In the translation
°f policy documents into daily practice, they must cope with a variety of pressures, from
outsiders as well as from colleagues and superiors within the agency. These pressures cannot
always be ignored or denied, even if sanctions are employed by the agency to enforce stricter
Policy implementation. This means that policies are distorted on their way from the formulation
'evel in Manila to the implementation levels of the Cagayan Valley Regional Office and below.
Here we will examine the actions of DENR officials and other government actors in policy
implementation, and attempt to define the mechanism by which this thwarting of policy takes
Place at the local level.
In describing how officials deal with private access to public forests, I will rely entirely on
'nformation that key informants and trusted colleagues have shared with me during the years I
sPent in Cagayan Valley. As in the previous Chapters, their names, as well as the names of
Persons they mentioned, have either been omitted or replaced by fictitious ones. The fact that
'inside information' was provided by officials who were themselves deeply involved in
practices, as well as by others who steered as far clear of them as they could afford to,
"nderlines the diversity of responses which individual members of a bureaucracy employ to
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deal with the pressures and opportunities they encounter. Broad and Cavanagh (1993:71) are
probably right when they characterize the Philippine Government as a "mixed bag": some
officials strive to serve the nation and their constituents to the best of their ability, whüe others
are more inclined to maximize the benefits that they, their family and their associates can
derive from the power they have to make decisions on the use of public resources. This means
that utmost care must be observed in describing the role of government actors in the
deforestation actor field, as generalizations may eliminate precisely those grey areas where
change is spawned, and where idealistic officials mix with more 'realistic' colleagues and
superiors.
This chapter will therefore avoid general conclusions on the role of corruption in policy
implementation. In the fïrst place, corruption is a blanket term that tends to be used somewhat
indiscriminately for a wide spectrum of people and policy interpretations at the interface of
government and the citizenry. And second, corruption it is not a neutral term, but rather one
that is associated with improper conduct due to a lack of personal integrity. It can easily
stigmatize whole categories of people, notably those in elective and appointed government
positions, as people trying to take advantage of their position. Local-level officials, particularly
those in the environment ministry, run a considerable personal risk by making it clear that
policy implementation is non-negotiable. During my stay in Cagayan Valley, several DENR
officials paid with their lives for having the courage of their convictions. My third objection
to the blanket use of the term 'corruption' is that it offers few avenues that might lead to a
solution. The concept is too crude to unravel the mechanisms through which policies are
ignored, evaded or modified on their way from formulation to implementation. Once we have
succeeded in capturing these mechanisms in the form of a general model, it may be possible
to discern the fundamental reasons why these mechanisms were developed in the fïrst place
(Section 6.4). It is impossible to explore the full range of individual attitudes and solutions
which government officials use to define the balance they have found between intention and
feasibility. However, by allowing a number of officials to give their own account of examples
of policy implementation, I hope to illustrate the impact that individual mind sets may indeed
have on the governance of forest resources, not only in specific cases, but for the Cagayan
Valley region as a whole.
6.2 Options for policy circumvention
"One time when we brought our rattan poles down from the river by jeep, we were apprehended
along the way. They brought us down to the Police Station and they asked me ifl had any papers
for my lood. And we said no, we do not, but we have the permission to haul from the Licence
Holder (so ifthey are going to apprehend me they know it is Mr. Baldonado who is behind me, eh,
that is why I mentioned that to them). They asked us what is the value of the lood, l said 1.25 P per
pole and so l, 200 Pesos for the lood. Then the police commander said: but don 't you know that
this is prohibited and we are going to confiscate all ofthis? We said, well we do not mind ifyou
take all ofthis, as long as you give us something just to payfor some rice so we can eat. We are
very poor people. The police commander took pity on us and said, OK, you go nowT (research
diary, June 1994)
This case illustrates the context in which forest policies are put into practice. The furniture-
maker clearly and knowingly violates the Revised Forestry Code, transporting forest products
without legal papers. Nevertheless, hè manages to enter into negotiations with the government
official who caught him red-handed. The formal roles that the actors are expected to play are
confronted with, and eventually defeated by, the personal motives which both actors pursue
in the negotiation. Three elements of the story are of special note:
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First, no DENR official is involved in the event. At the time this incident took place, there
were no Multi-Sectoral Forest Protection Committees yet, and the police had no right to
confiscate a load of rattan poles. The correct thing for the policemen to do would have been
to escort the jeep to the nearest DENR checkpoint or office and have the case investigated
there. By bringing the truck to the police station, the policemen created a situation in which
they could make a little extra income from the people transporting illegal rattan. In
exchange for a little 'coffee money', the jeep could have proceeded. Field officials of the
PNP see how similar practices are earning their DENR colleagues some added income and
employ the same strategy to share in the benefits derived from illegal forest product
extraction.
A second important factor is the fact that the furniture maker is employing the 'weapons
of the weak' (Scott 1985). By portraying himself as a poor person who depends on forest
products for his basic rice consumption, and by asking the policeman to see to that need
if hè does indeed opt for a strict interpretation of the law, the furniture-maker emphasizes
the difference in economie situation between himself and the policemen. In so doing, hè
appeals to the policemen's sense of hiyd (Pinches 1992) and compassion over their
different fortunes in life, knowing that this will increase his chances of escaping sanctions
for involvement in illegal activities.
The trump card played by the furniture-maker, and a third element often at work in local
policy interpretation, is his reference to the fact that hè enjoys the patronage of an
influential person in town, for whom hè claims to work. The policemen are made to
understand that, should hè opt to abide strictly by the law and assist the DENR in
confiscating all conveyances not accompanied by valid documentation, hè faces the
prospect of a direct confrontation with the Licensee, Mr. Baldonado, who according to the
furniture-maker, ordered the load. Legally, the policemen would have had nothing to worry
about in case of such a confrontation, since no valid papers accompanied the load. In
practice, however, this formal dimension of the case would again have to compete with
informal dimensions, such as the licensee's leverage at higher bureaucratie levels. The
policemen knew they had better avoid a confrontation with Mr. Baldonado, a rich building
contractor and close relative of the Vice-Governor of Isabela, and opted to forego the small
financial gain to be made from these poor people.
The policemen who are "humanizing the law" (Huijbregts 1996) for the furniture-maker, by
allowing the jeep full of illegal rattan to proceed to the warehouse of his influential boss, reveal
the contours of the forces at play at the lower levels of the policy process. Patronage networks
are a particular source of confusion and insecurity among implementers and field officials as
to how they should implement policies handed down to them by their superiors. In the
knowledge that on many levels and in many locations, negotiations take place within informal
networks of government officials and - prospective - stakeholders in the lands and resources
°f the public domain, they must exercise both caution and flexibility with respect to activities
that might be part of some informal agreement made in these networks. An uncompromising
official can easily set off a land mine under his career or personal safety.
In the Philippines, corporate logging is the exclusive domain of the economie and political
e»te, and it is probably here that mid- and lower-level officials are most conscious of the fact
In this article. Pinches draws attention lo the fact that hiya (commonly equated with the Engltsh word shame. or
embarrassment. particularly m social relationships between rich and poor) "can also act as expresslom ofclass resentment
andactinn" (Pinches 1992:167. see also section 6.4)
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that the first victims of a hard-line approach to policy interpretation and law enforcement
would be their own careers and families. But as we saw in the case of the furniture-maker, the
same applies - though perhaps to a lesser extent - to other primary activities and the policies
that regulate or prohibit them.
As a result, government officials and private individuals cooperate in what will be referred
to in Section 6.3 as 'mutual accommodation networks', where options are developed by which
both the private interests of resource users and the - apparent - implementation of public forest
policies can be served. The flexible composition of these informal and versatile networks,
which include members of the government bureaucracy, makes them more effective in
responding to changes in the policy climate. While the repertoire of options designed to
circumvent government controls on private access to public resources is constantly changing,
they fall into three broad categories:
A) Manipulation of the informationflow: document falsification
manipulation of information, 'document recycling', preventing DENR monitoring by
withholding or altering information to and inside the bureaucracy
B) Manipulation of policy interpretation
using a legal pretext or policy as a cover-up for illegal activities (hauling of abandoned
logs, timber amnesty programmes, salvage timber, 'tops and branches')
C) Manipulation of DENR officials: payment handed over secretly
package deals involving incentives in return for tolerating violations of forest laws and
policies.
As in any categorization, these are not separate, watertight sets of options; often they occur
together, as part of more complicated schemes. Each involves a select group of officials who
mislead most of their colleagues charged with processing the documents handed to them. And
the development of each scheme has its own dynamics, whereby options that no longer work
are discarded (e. g., when a logging moratorium is announced) and new ones are devised which
are better suited to the most recent policy. The options and designs presented here were used
in Cagayan Valley between 1985 and 1995.
6.2.1. Manipulation of the information flow
"No problem, just change thefigures "
(Former PENRO officer during a DENR workshop, joking about a field report citing problems
with the issuing of new timber ücenses because of under-stocked residual forest, Oct '94)
Essentially, DENR policies are implemented by means of a top-down policy process: the
regional and lower offices of the Agency implement policies which originate in the Central
Office in Manila. In order to determine whether implementers are actually following their
instructions, higher levels of management depend on feedback information flowing in the
reverse direction. Documentation is only one component of this flow, but it is the most
important one. In formal terms, the quality and reliability of written information are crucial
to the formal monitoring and evaluation capabilities of the DENR, indeed, of any bureaucracy
Until 1991, the Cagayan Valley Regional Office of the DENR monitored its performance
by means of documents provided by two sources: private actors holding or applying for
resource utilization permits, and officials at the CENRO and PENRO offices. The information
provided by these two sources was validated by officials from the Regional Office and,
occasionally, the Central Office. Being in closer and more regular contact with the situation
on the ground, lower officials are in a position to either frustrate or facilitate the monitoring
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and evaluation functions of their agency. On the other hand, local officials can only provide
higher levels of management with genuine information on the situation in their areas if their
superiors allow them to:
"ƒ once had an experience with a logging company that I will neverforget. When
Maceda became secretary ofDENR. hè made a policy ofasking concessionaires to give
a deposit of l, OOO Pesos per hectare. One of our companies had an area of 1150 ha,
so they had to deposit more than a million Pesos. At the end of the logging season, the
company forester wanted to get the deposit back. And so they reported an 80%
accomplishment of their reforestation, 800 ha. I was sent to certify this report. I found
only 40% had been accomplished, so only 400,000 was to be refunded. But when I
returned to the office, the director told me to write that the whole area had been
accomplished and so the full deposit was to be refunded. In January, just after the
refund, there was a big fire and so nothing was left of the reforestation" (DENR
Official, in research diary, 1994)
The growing importance of NGOs and the media, and the establishment of the Multi-Sectoral
Forest Protection Committees (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3), have added new and often
reliable sources of information, enhancing the monitoring capability of the DENR. In 1992,
state-of-the-art Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Global Positioning Systems (GPS)
technology, a helicopter and sea-patrol vessels provided the DENR with additional means to
monitor activities in the region's forest lands. A year later, a Regional Special Operations
Group (RSOG), composed of the Regional Office and staff from several CENROs, was
established under the Regional Technical Director for Forestry. The RSOG conducts field
checks and investigates cases where reports from either its own officials or from local people
and organizations cast serious doubts on the validity of the documents used in DENR's regular
resource management decisions. These innovations promised to benefit the monitoring
capability ofDENR in several ways:
1) More and often better-quality data is available for monitoring purposes.
2) Lower-Ievel officials are better equipped to conduct intensive field verifïcation activities.
3) Higher levels of the bureaucracy are able to validate the information flow supplied to them
by lower levels of the bureaucracy.
While these innovations certainly enhanced the information capability of DENR, enabling it
to carry out more effective monitoring activities after 1990, there were still a number of blind
spots and weaknesses in the quality of internal information flows. These weaknesses were
partly due to the reluctance of DENR officials to spend long hours out in the field under a hot
sun, and partly to the stakes involved in accurately reporting their findings there. In the past
these two factors, as well as the DENR's chronic staff and budget shortages, have constrained
the performance of the DENR in policy implementation; the situation is unlikely to change
significantly under the influence of these injections of modern technology. As a result, there
are many loopholes in the internal information flow, whereby people with private interests are
able to manipulate DENR documents with no great risk of being found out.
Below, I present a number of these loopholes. They are a small bul illustrative selection
from the realm of document falsification. Each stage in a corporate logging operation offers
its own opportunities to impede the implementation and monitoring of policies emanating from
the selective logging system, which is described in more detail in Sections 4.4 and 5.2.2.
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FARMING-OUT: ROYALTY-BASED EXTRACTION BY NON-LICENSEES
In spite of the numerous complaints against TLA and Special Permit holdersfor wanton
violations offorestry laws and rules, not one ofthem hos been penalized. It is common
knowledge that almost all of them are farming out licenses in consideration of the
payment of "rayalties" at the rate of PI.00 to PI.55 per board foot which are usually
paid in advance. Based on the annual allowable cut estimate of 120 million board feet,
the annual 'rayalties' being paid to concessionaires range from 120 Million to 186
Million Pesos. Farming out of licenses is a gross violation of the Licensing Agreement."
(Aguinaldo 1988:1-2)
As in the agricultural sector, where landowners allow tenants to cultivate their lands on the
basis of a lease or sharecropping agreement, many timber concessionaires also opt to sub-
license local contractors in Cagayan Valley to extract all or part of their allowable cut,
receiving royalties for each board foot extracted. Farming-out is explicitly prohibited under
the terms of the Timber Licensing Agreement and one of the grounds for cancellation. To mask
the presence in the concessions of other logging equipment than that owned by the
concessionaire, trucks, bulldozers and documents must be in the name of the licensee. This
system was facilitated by the fact that the ownership of concessions changed over the years,
with some concessionaires operating - and thus using their equipment - in several different
concessions. DENR officials had difficulty distinguishing illegal trucks from legal ones.
Moreover, as we saw in the case cited at the beginning of mis section, there were marked and
unmarked trucks freely entered all concessions, often owned or protected by a political
strongman, upon whose activities officials would do well to turn a blind eye. Farming-out has
several advantages for the licensee:
- By spreading the operations risk; the licensee does not need to own a large number of
trucks and bulldozers. Each contractor uses his own equipment and all the licensee needs
to do is to occasionally supervise the operation.
Possibility of avoiding Cagayan Valley. Due to the strong presence of the New People's
Army, outsiders considered the place unsafe, especially for the often politically connected
licensees.
Local contractors are part of local networks, which increases their possibilities to conduct
official business with other actor groups, including the bureaucracy.
Low management overhead. Other than a resident manager, the licensee does not need to
set up a large organization in Cagayan Valley.
A steady income from the concession. All the licensee's resident manager has to do is to
collect royalties from the contractors and perhaps devote a portion of the revenues to local
sponsorships and other benevolent causes.
A less favourable result of TLA farming is the fact that the contractors have no responsibility
for the concession; their role is limited to the time horizon set by the logging season. Feuds
among contractors, often over royalty payments, have created a sense of competition between
them, speeding up log extraction and turning forest concessions into fïrst-come, first-served
resources with no acknowledged central authority. When they saw the easy money that timber
licensees earned from royalties, contractors replicated the system and began to subcontract
carabao logging teams to produce logs for them at a pre-negotiated price per board foot (see
Section 4.5). Lowlanders who could afford to hire a bulldozer and a few trucks, and who
succeeded in buying a quota through a log supply contract with a licensee, entered into
salabadiok logging, paying royalties on the basis of the agreed quota. Other forestry rules
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which could, in theory, have kept the royalty system within certain bounds, such as the
restrictions imposed by the Annual Allowable Cut, were bypassed in other ways, such as those
described below.
FICTITIOUS OPERATIONS PLANS
Timber concessionaires are only allowed to start logging operations after DENR approval of
their Operations Plan (OP). Based on the Annual Allowable Cut allocated to the concessionaire
for a particular year, the OP specifies the physical boundaries of the area to be logged that
year, the standing stock of commercial and extractable species, and the road plan needed to
extract the timber from the concession. The Operations Plan is supposed to be based on an
actual field visit by the company forester and his crew, to inspeel the concession, mark the
trees to be cut, survey the optimal road system, etc. One DENR official shared his experiences
as a newly graduated forester during his first employment in a timber concession in the Sierra
Madre:
" When I had just graduated from the Forestry School I was appointed as a tree marker with
WESCA. I said to the manager that I wanted to see the logging area. But hè refused and said it was
too dangerous because it was a critical [NPA] area. But how about my report? I asked. No, hè
said, you willjust sign. The report willjust come. I was very frustrated, I could not apply anything
l learnt in my education" (Research diary, Dec. 1994)
The Operations Plan entails the practical implementation of the Selective Logging System,
laying the groundwork to ensure and monitor sustained-yield forest management in corporate
timber concessions. However, a senior forester in the Forest Protection Division of the DENR
said:
"In my 15 years with the DENR, I have never seen Selective Logging practised in Region 2. Even
the tree marking is done inside the Hotel, and once we have the Go signal, theyjust send the guys
up there and it is afiestafor all ofthem. With no tree marking done, no direction offall, no road
plan, they just simply go where they want and cut as they go..." (Research diary, Oct. 1994)
Even though Operations Plans were often developed on the basis of 'table surveys', brief field
surveys inside the concession did take place. Company Foresters, accompanied by surveyors
and forest rangers of the concessionaires and their contractors actually went inside at the onset
of the logging season to prospect areas where the operations for the coming logging season
were to take place. Contacts with the communities inside the forest were also re-established
during these surveys, labourers were hired, and also surveyors who could help locate
accessible spots with good timber stands. NPA leaders had to be approached, often indirectly,
to agree on a package of benefits in exchange for sabotage-free logging operations:
"In the last years that WESCA was stilt operational, the NPA extorted 1000 Pesos per truck and
50,000per bulldozer. In 1986, the owner of WESCA, Don Alfredo Urn, fled the country and all his
concessions were taken over by the PCGG. Rojas (Alfredo Roxas, Director of Southern Plywood,
a concession on the Pacific slopes of the Sierra Madre, GT) and Ramon Chang took over between
1987 and 1990. But Chang had no license to operate, that is why hè paid 25 centavos per board
foot to use the name WESCA. Later, hè became discouraged because of the Peace and Order
situation; they were askingfor l Million Pesos for every bulldozer. He refused and the bulldozers
were bumed" (Research diary, Dec. 1994)
Fear of the NPA among government officials enabled logging companies to operate for many
years on the basis of fictitious operations plans without being detected , and no sanctions were
imposed when the concession was inspected at the end of the logging season. Mere hearsay of
their presence, and the prospect of either meeting up with mem and being 'taken for an
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interview', or being caught in Army-NPA crossfire were usually sufficient to keep the DENR
out of the forest. Visiting foresters sent by Central Office to inspeel what was known to be the
heartland of the NPA were even more reluctant than their local colleagues to penetrate into the
cutting areas deep inside the forest. Fears of NPA 'encounters' were occasionally reinforced
by returning officials, who reported being 'interviewed' for hours or days during field visits.
In the next section I will be examining other reasons why government officials were not keen
to spend too much time deep inside the forest lands.
As a result of the reluctance among DENR officials to conduct on-the-ground evaluations
of Operations Plans and overall concession management, they tended to accept the alternative
offered by employees of the concessionaires and contractors: to answer all their questions over
a beer, in the safety and relative comfort of more established barangays on the outskirts of the
concession, instead of taking the risks and braving the hardships involved in inspecting the
cutting area. This meant that inspection reports were drawn up with as little empirical basis as
the Operations Plans. This led to a growing disparity between the conditions presented in the
OPs and the actual conditions inside the logging concessions, as the occasional team that
ventured inside the concessions during the early nineties discovered:
"After the 'Save the Virgin Forest'policy came in, we had to inventory the secondary forest to see
whether there was more than 67 n? per ha. And so there was this group from Manila who came to
do the inventory work. They prepared the map, based on the Operations Plans and they found out
that the companies claimed to be logging in areas where people had already settled as much as 20
years ago!"
Ho we ver, for reasons that I will discuss in detail in Section 6.2, the officials opted not to
report their findings to the Central Office...
.. .But when they went back to Manila, they reported that ourforests are still adequately stocked..."
(DENR official, Oct.'94)
OVERLOADING AND MlSDECLARATION
Every truckload of lumber travelling from the sawmill to Manila has to be accompanied by
documents specifying the legal source of the lumber, the species in the load, the total volume
and the destination of the truck. This offers multiple options for document manipulation: logs
from illegal sources were channelled through the sawmills of TLA holders and accompanied
by documents stating they came from a concession with an approved Operations Plan. Or first-
class species could be declared as lower classes (to get around the payment of high forest
charges), or trucks were loaded with more lumber than the amount declared in the Certificate
of Origin (CO), as the following case illustrates:
"The Hong Kong boys came to the office recently. They were trying to applyfor the release of the
remaining stock in their sawmill. According to a CENRO stock inventory, there was 44,000 bft in
their yard. I was pan of the RSOG assigned to go there and check it out. It was raming the whole
day, but we endured it and found onfy 34,000 in the yard. But these Chinese tned to convince me
to follow the CENRO report, they even offered me 2Pesos/bft. showing me a check for 20,000
Pesos. You see those extra 10,000 bft are important for them, it is enoughfor 2 CO [Certificate of
Origin} documents of 5000 bft each, and they can overlaad, up to 8000 per CO, so for them it's
almost like 50% higher volume. Eventually they had their way. I saw them transacting their
business with one ofmy colleagues" (Key informant, Oct. 1994)
Overloading was also practised between the cutting area and the sawmill; to avoid payment of
forest charges to the DENR checkpoint inside the forest lands, logging trucks carried a
pamalong or uncounted last log on top of the regular truckload, and the crew had to manoeuvre
the narrow, often slippery logging roads from the cutting areas and logponds to the sawmill
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Forest charges had to be paid at the DENR checkpoint alongside the logging road; the charges
were based on a volume of 2.5 tons or 5 round logs, the average load per truck, so that the
extra log more or less travelled for free.
In addition to the excess logs to be extracted from the concession by transporting a greater
volume on a fïxed number of Certificates of Origin, timber licensees and officials created
options to expand the life-span of these documents by 'recycling' them.
DOCUMENT RECYCLING: THE MANY LIVES OF THE CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN
The Certificate of Origin is used to monitor the flow of products from one concession or
sawmill to the National Capitol Region. Each load is accompanied by a CO, which is stamped
at every checkpoint along the highway to Manila. Once the load arrivés in Manila, the volume
is subtracted from the Annual Allowable Cut of the concessionaire. A DENR employee
explained how these documents are recycled:
"ƒ know how it is done. l've been at the checkpoint myself; I am not a hypocrite. The document hos
a validity of 15 days and when it ispresented to the officer at the checkpoint a "USED" stamp must
be placed on it. Just as you are about to place the stamp there, they put an envelope on the farm.
so the stamp will not appear there [the envelope contains money, GT]. At the end ofour shift we
give all we have collected to our CENRO and hè uses that for things in the office, ifhe is good. Our
CENRO at that time used the money to cement the road to the office, but this was alsofunded by
the Government, so it is still corrupt" (Research diary, Nov 1993)
The two-week validity of a CO document limits the number of times each document may be
used; the travel time between Cagayan Valley and Manila is two to three days; allowing
another two days per trip for loading and unloading, document recycling enables logging
concessionaires to exceed their Annual Allowable Cut by 200-300%, while their loads always
carry valid papers. Document 'recycling' not only enables the concessionaires to evade
restrictions on harvesting, transport and processing, it also means that they pay no forest
charges; the revenues gained by document recycling are shared between the officials manning
the checkpoints (including, in most cases, colleagues and superiors participating in these deals)
and the individual or company soliciting DENR assistance.
THE USE OF DUMMIES
One way to minimize the risk of legal prosecution if one of the above options were to fail is
not to register logging equipment or even entire TLA licenses in the name of the person
making the decisions about their use. The use of dummy names is not only useful for illegal
logging activities, it also circumvents legal limits on the total area to be managed by one
concession holder, and makes it possible to dissociate oneself from a former political ally
whose fortunes have changed. Dummies may either be daring caretakers of a logging operation
or innocent local people who have nothing to do with the activities conceraed, as the following
case demonstrates. It concerns one of the largest catches in the 1991 campaign against illegal
logging, in this case on the eastern slopes of the Sierra Madre. The financier of the illegal
operation was the son of a high-ranking politician, but when the equipment was confiscated,
a different name appeared on the registration papers:
"We had a record confiscation in Bicobian Bay in 1990: 19 million Pesos' worth of illegal logs.
This was during the time of General Sonano m Region 2. Ed and the old man also had SOOpieces,
approximately 1000 cubic metres. But in the records, their names were not mentioned, only the
name of one Marcelino Uy. So wefiled a case against him and were prepared to testify in court.
Only tofind out that the equipment had been registered in the name ofan old man from the Pacific
side. The loggers had probably offered to lease the equipment to him and hè had agreed, hè was
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an innocent man and we did not want to testify against him". (Research diary, Oct. 1994)
6.2.2 Misleading policy interpretation
The Timber Licensing Agreement system was hardly a restrictive policy; the control-
mechanisms that had been built into these licenses were easily circumvented by the methods
of information distortion described above. After 1985, the TLA system gradually lost political
feasibility; alternative approaches to forest product extraction were developed. In the wake of
public pretests against exclusive corporate logging licenses and a growing awareness of the
nation-wide deforestation problem, priority was given to a policy of forest protection rather
than forest development. However, certain interpretations of these more restrictive policies
provided forest users and government officials with new options for illegal access.
"OLD STOCK"; "Tors AND BRANCHES"; "ABANDONED LOGS"; "SALVAGE Locs"
The cancellation and suspension of close to 40 corporate timber concessions created a large
area of unmanaged residual forests in the northern Sierra Madre, depriving many users of
forest products - such as building contractors, lumber dealers and the furniture industry - of
their largest source of raw materials. Among the souvenirs of corporate logging were stumps,
rejected logs, the tops and branches of large trees, only the straight bolts of which had been
taken out of the forest by the concessionaires, as wel l as stocks of unprocessed logs stored in
the yard of a sawmill that had lost its permit to operate.
From the early 1990s onwards, the DENR received more and more requests for the
extraction and processing of residual forest products. The DENR was prepared to grant such
permits and in 1994 even declared a general amnesty for all illegal timber stored in the yards
of sawmills and furniture and hardware shops, provided that all products leaving the premises
were recorded by the nearest CENRO and subtracted from the volume of old stock submitted
for a timber amnesty or other temporary permit. It is not difficult to imagine such permits
being used to cover up illegal logging operations. Reopened sawmills never ran out of old
stock, moving freshly cut timber into their yards by night, and furniture shops simply under-
reported the volumes they had processed. By chance I discovered one of the ways this was
done in October of 1994, when I bought a cabinet in a local furniture shop and needed legal
papers for transport to Manila:
"faskedAnel to go the DENR checkpoint in Ilagan to secure a transport permit for the cabinet we
bought in Naguihan last week. When hè arrived there, the DENR official invited A. to accompany
him to thefurniture-maker where we bought the cabinet to 'settle an amount'. When they arrived
at the furniture shop, the owners asked Ariel to pay an extra 300 Pesos in forest charges. He
refused to pay, saying that hè had already settled the price with the furniture-maker and knew that
forest charges were to bepaid to the DENR, not here. Embarrassed by this unexpected refusal, the
official tried to explain to him on the way back to the checkpoint that furniture-makers do not want
their legal stocks to dwindle with every product they sell, and that they normally pay 2 Pesos per
board foot to prevent a lood offinished product from being subtracted from this legal stock. He said
hè feit sorry for the fiimiture-makers and tried to help them by making customers pay this amount.
Ariel paid hts regular forest charges at the checkpoint and received the transpon permit"
(Research diary, Oct. 1994)
DENR foresters told me of several instances where they were sent to a sawmill or furniture
yard to inspect reports an of old stock, found nothing there and, upon reporting this by radio,
were requested by the Regional Office to report just a small stock in order to have a legal basis
for the issue of a temporary permit.
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"The first inventory by the CENRO people indicated a total stock of 103 m3. Then we went there
with the Regional Special Operations Groups2 to do a re-evaluanon: my evaluation with thetn was
only 30 m3. But after we submitted our report, we were called to the office to explam to the
Technical Director..." (Research diary, Dec. 1994).
In this case, and probably in many others as well, the DENR superior is not acting on his own,
but rather is trying to keep within the conditions under which hè is permitted to issue a permit -
conditions that hè himself was coerced into accepting during a meeting with the sawmill owner
or his representative.
An argument that is often used by both politicians and businessmen in requests for special
permits is the plight of poor in their area. Portraying themselves as the representatives of these
people, applicants appeal to the sense of compassion of DENR officials. However, not
everyone agrees on the motives behind such appeals to DENR officials, as the following
clipping from a local newspaper illustrates3. After the town of San Mariano had been under a
logging moratorium for some time, the mayor requested permission to extract 'abandoned logs'
from the forest lands in his municipality, claiming that the residents of the town were starving
and had "surrounded his house, asking for rice and food". The editor of the newspaper
interpreted the manoeuvre differently:
"the claims of the Mayor about his starving town may be intended to deceive the government into
granting mini-sawmill operators another logging scheme.. .the appeal made by Go may have an
ulterior motivefor mini-sawmill operators who have already paid in advancefor the delivery of logs
by carabao operators. ... According to RTC Judge Senen Casibang, it is the usual practice of
logging capitalists to provide advance payment to carabao loggers. .. .Last month some 300 pieces
of logs were seized by operatives of the DENR Regional Special Operations Office in San Mariano.
A week earlier, Go also used a radio station in Cauayan to portray his turf as a town that was
starving , following the imposition of a logging moratorium. DENR Isabela acting chief Dominador
Urmatan agreed with the Mayor's 'predicament'. (Northern Sierra Madre Express, Feb 8-14, 1994)
In 1993, that same mayor, whose son operates one of the last large sawmills in town, had used
a similar strategy to try to gain a special permit for the processing of an 'old stock' of logs still
lying in the yards of sawmills closed during Oplan Jericho, the drive against illegal logging
conducted by the DENR and the Army in 1993. His daughter-in-law, representing 17 groups
of "forest users, and sawmill and mini-sawmill operators.. ..went to DENR Undersecretary Ben
Malayang III, asking for Mayor Go's request to be granted, citing the need of the people of
San Mariano for an 'alternative livelihood "(Northern Sierra Madre Express, Jan. 1994). He
succeeded in getting the PENRO office to enter into a memorandum of agreement granting
special permits to operate these sawmills. Soon after the MOA had been signed, the plot was
exposed when the local media reported that none of the 17 signatories of the MOA were
legitimate logging licensees or lumber dealers and that their names were not on the list of mini-
sawmills demolished by Oplan Jericho. In January 1994, both the PENRO, his Regional
Director and the Go family were charged by the Municipal Court with complicity in graft. One
of the most audacious cases of this kind, which took place only four months later and allegedly
This group reports directly to the Regional Technical Director of Forestry and consists of DENR personnel from
various CENROs and the Regional Office. The Director wntes that the task of the RSOG is "to speed up investigation on matters
'nvolving violations of forest law.i. rules and regulations to lessen the barden ofpressure on the PENROs and CENROs who
oppear to be the willing victims ofpowerful politicians" (Tumaliuan 1994:9)
Politicians incrcasmgly recognize the power of the media as a politica! instrument. Henceforth. local newspapcrs.
'nitially established merely to comply with the legal requirement to publish decisions pending or already taken by the local
judiciary and government. are mobilized in inter-clan baltic This is part of the background of the editonal comment quoted here
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involved some of the sarne actors is the Kahoy case reported in Section 5.3.3.
Cases like these, where contractors from the lowlands are involved in the extraction of
residual forest products, are less common than the small-scale production of flitches by forest
migrants residing in or near the former concessions. Forest communities that have not yet been
awarded Community-Based Forest Management Agreements continue to deliver wood products
to buyers in the lowlands, mostly under cover of darkness, or use special permits to conduct
salvage logging, i.e. the collection of tree stumps and 'tops and branches' left by former
logging operations. But, as I witnessed during a field visit in 1996, many flitches that the forest
migrants bring down in the course of so-called salvage operations actually come from normal
carabao and water-logging activities deep inside the Sierra Madre. One of the farmers I
accompanied to his logging area explained how hè and his buyer in the lowlands used the
salvage logging policy to maintain the supply of forest products in San Mariano, Isabela:
" ƒ am only doing salvage logging, my buyer in San Mariano is Mrs. Verdana. the head of the
Cooperative store there. Her husband is a policeman and her brother- in- law is a member of the
Sangguiniang bayan [Municipal Council, GT]. They have a DENR license to buy and sell salvaged
Narra. I deliver parquet to them, little pieces of wood usedforflooring; this is almost all that you
can do \vith the small Narra stumps. My buyer sends the truck every month, I give him 10-15,000
bft of Narra. But we also put some commercial Narra under the parquet, it is very expensive now,
difficult tofind. As oftoday, I am getting 70P per board foot for sizes over 12feet. So although the
parquet is very cheap, what is undemeath is very dear!"(farmer in Cassala, March 1996)
San Mariano has been under various logging moratoria since 1989. They plunged the town into
a deep recession, as the wood industry used to be the most important actor in the local
economy. The two leading political families in the town, who managed their own logging
concessions there before the first logging moratorium was announced, went out of their way
to support what was left of the town's once thriving wood industry, using whatever legal
documents or permits it had at its disposal. A local missionary, former head of the Municipal
Forest Protection Committee recounted how a permit issued by the municipality of San
Mariano for the purpose of transporting a dismantled house out of town on February l was
used on March 6 to try and legally ship out freshly cut wood. The scheme failed because only
the DENR is allowed to issue such a permit, which must be validated for the specific date on
which the house is to be moved.
NEW CORPORATE LOGGING SCHEMES
Timber Production Sharing Agreements (TPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements
(IFMA) and Private Land Timber Permits (PLTP)
The vütual elimination of corporate timber concessions in the early nineties reduced the level
of direct access that the wood industry had to the Sierra Madre. As the societal acceptability
of corporate forest access decreased, the DENR took a second look at forest-based
communities which, together with timber imports, were becoming the new source of ra w
material for the wood-processing industry. But wood industries continued to look for way s of
using government policies to obtain illegal access to the Public Domain:
"Requests for PLTP cutting permits are filed for issue to fictitious private land owners. These
permits authorize these fictitious private landowners to cut prescribed volumes of trees in their
properties. However, these permits are being used by illegal logging syndicates to enter the forest
to cut there" (Hon. Renato Yap, Chairman of the House Committee on Natural Resources in
Today, 3 Nov. 1994)
Private Land Timber Permits (PLTPs) normally involve relatively small amounts of timber,
roughly the amount required for the construction or extension of a house. The fact that even
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a DENR policy with such a limited scope was used to disguise corporate logging operations
underscores once again the vulnerability of the DENR to abuse. The regional office continues
to oversee the utilization of forest products in an area comprising nearly one million hectares
of inaccessible forests, with the majority of its staff occupying administrative and management
positions inside the regional, provincial and community offices. When a truckload of lumber
arrivés at a checkpoint and the driver can show valid documents accompanying his load, it is
almost impossible for the checkpoint officials to verify the source of the logs. The few times
when verification takes place, the result is usually as below, narrated by a young DENR
official:
"There was a requestfor a PLTPfiled with the Regional Office and so Iprepared my travel order
to conduct the investigation. There really was a stock ofold cut. but I rejected it, because it was
already rotting and no langer economically worthwhile , and so I already knew where they were
going to get it: from the natural stand, ofcourse. The furniture shops in Naguilian also get their
Narra through PLTPs" (Research diary, Dec. 1994)
Although more restrictive than the TLA system, the attraction of the remaining options for
timber extraction thus primarily lies in the legal documents it provides lowlanders with,
enabling them to extract and transport both the amounts specified in the permit and illegal
forest products extracted elsewhere.
While many new DENR policies include multiple options for small-scale private access to
public forests, as illustrated above, the new opportunities for large-scale corporate logging
concessions are not nearly so attractive as the Timber Licensing Agreements. Industrial Forest
Management Agreements (IFMAs) and Timber Production Sharing Agreements (TPSAs),
described in Section 5.2.2, are also based on the concept of large-scale corporate management
of public forests, but are issued under different conditions. Firstly, they only apply to residual
forests with a minimal standing stock of 67 m3, and include a mandatory benefit-sharing
scheme with local communities near the concession area. Secondly, IFMA holders are required
to deposit with the Government a holding fee equal to the value of 10% of the standing stock.
This amount is forfeited if the government can produce proof that the terms and conditions of
the IFMA have been violated.
On the basis of past experience, however, many local contractors were convinced that these
conditions would not prove to be as disadvantageous as they appeared at the time, as long as
the DENR officials did not conduct field visits or aerial surveys of the cutting area. In 1994,
14 IFMAs were issued in Cagayan Valley, all to former TLA-holders and their contractors.
Initially it appeared that the old mechanisms were being reactivated: a local forester, who
conducted timber stand inventories in these prospective IFMA areas, explained that the holding
fee could be kept artificially low by picking relatively understocked areas as the basis for the
stand-stock inventories which determined the amount of timber recorded. However, NGOs
contracted by the IFMA-holders to design management plans for IFMA areas concluded that
many of these areas did indeed have insufficient stocks to allow logging within the first five
to ten years after the awarding of the IFMA. During this period, licensees would not only lose
interest on their holding fee, but would also be required to invest additional capital in
reforestation and Timber Stand Improvement measures in the more degraded parts of their
concession. Many IFMA-holders volunteered to waive their concession rights and got their
deposit back; the DENR temporarily stopped issuing of new IFMA licenses.
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6.2.3 Co-opting DENR officials
'BuYiNG' ADDITIONAL ALLOWABLE CUT
Despite the volume of timber that concessionaires were allowed to extract from the natural
forests of Cagayan Valley every year (some 2 million nf of prime hardwoods between 1975
and 1985, see sections 4.4 and 7.3.3) TLA-holders and their local contractors found ways to
exceed these limits without sanction. Officials at various levels of the DENR (or its
predecessor, the Bureau of Forest Development) were offered a share of the extra income
generaled by the concessionaire. Payments were directly proportional to the volume extracted
in excess of the AAC. Hence the profits of illegal extraction were used to structurally
complement the salaries of government officials, the former often surpassing the latter. But
confiscations did take place, where the officials sent to investigate policy violations were able
to withstand the lure of money:
"Before I entered the DENR, I was a socialforester. But in 1987, Director Pajaro approached me
for the Forest Protection Division and so I went there. That was when I first encountered these
money matters. The first suspension I encountered was the Veterans concession in Baggao. Their
AAC was 30,000 m3 and when we went there we found 17,000 m3 in excess. l was offered one
million Pesos to change my report, hut I knew they were really extracting so much, 150 shiploads
had been taken out already (one ship carried 4000 m3) and so we conflscated the logs and suspen-
ded the TLA. (Thefunny thing that happened afterwards was that there was a public bidding for
7000 m3 of confiscated logs, and so we were all wondering where the other 10.000 had gone)"
(Research diary, Oct. 1994)
This case shows the almost exclusive use of financial incentives as a means of circumventing
policy; the official is asked to produce an inaccurate report of his findings in the field but other
than that there is no falsification, recycling or netwerking involved. The negotiation involves
only two people, an official and a concessionaire. The official has to weigh an offer equivalent
to ten years' salary against his moral and official obligation to confiscate the logs. In this case,
quite surprisingly, hè opts for the latter.
The irony of the case is that the lower official foregoes a fortune while his superiors
partially undo the results of his moral stand: 7,000 m3 was sold at auction, while the remaining
10,000 m3 probably ended up in the hands of other actors participating in another package deal
that allowed the DENR to achieve what was still a major confiscation, mus complying with
internal performance indicators and displaying the public image of a strict policy enforcer. The
deal allowed the concessionaire to recover costs incurred in the production of the excess logs.
In this marmer, all the parties in the network in which the deal was made received personal and
professional rewards.
BUYING PASSAGE AT THE CHECKPOINT
A cynical joke among local DENR officials is that their agency is afflicted with AIDS:
Additional Income Delivered Secretly. The case presented above shows that the amounts of
money involved are out of all proportion to the regular salaries of the officials. These benefit-
sharing options have turned each board foot extracted over the allowable level into a bonus
which supplements the income of those DENR officials willing to cooperate. But they must
find a balance between various loyalties: the amount paid by violators in exchange for
providing DENR protection and safeguarding illegal activities from discovery and sanction
represents a considerable larger part of their income than that which comes from the Agency
in exchange for enforcing forestry laws and policies.
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While the volume of timber passing the checkpoints declined markedly after the corporate
logging era, the scarcity of wood and the correspondingly high prices for semi-finished and
finished products continued to warrant the payment of sizable compensation sums to the DENR
officials involved. Actors from inside and outside the bureaucracy, including a former Regional
Director for Cagayan Valley, confirm that after 1993 the role of TLA holders in supplementing
töe salaries of government officials was taken over, though only in part, by furniture
manufacturers. After the ban on the export of unprocessed forest products from the region,
semi-finished products were the main business opportunity for lowland entrepreneurs with
interests in the wood industry.
Probably the simplest and most common form of tolerated policy circumvention is the
Payment of 'coffee money' at DENR checkpoints. During night shifts, when the largest
quantities of wood of questionable legality are shipped out of the region, the manning of the
checkpoints is not an attractive duty. They offer extremely simple facilities, often little more
than a simple bahay kubo (temporary shelter made of bamboo and cogon grass or galvanized
sheets) with a simple desk and a few chairs. In addition to the discomfort, there are the
professional risks involved in stopping vehicles whose occupants are often armed, as well as
the personal sacrifice of being away from one's family at night. However, the tips received at
the checkpoints more than compensate for these discomforts, to the extent that some officials
are even willing to pay their superiors to be assigned extra nights at the checkpoints, as one
DENR official wrote to me:
"About DAO 58, about Narra. Did you know that for inventories of declared Narra (ghost or
actually in the yard), shop operators have to pay PI, 000/m3 (or 2 P/bft) as SOP? Another one is
where finished, semifinished or knock-down furniture products passing through the monitoring
checkpoints have a quota for every lood. Checkpoint Team Leaders wilt have to share with the Top
Brass at the Forestry Sector in some form (kind or cash) to be able to stay langer in the station, to
continue 'milking the cow'. Those big-time furniture operators also evade payment of the rightful
forest charges through document recycling or doublé shipments. And of course there 's a nice
amount for the field and checkpoint personnel. The sources of this information are the actors
themselves, proudly revealing their actions andpractices..."(letter from a key informant, 1996)
In the summer of 1992, the following payments were made by a ten-wheel lumber truck on its
450-km journey from Isabela to Manila:
Table 6.1 Checkpoint 'Standard Operating Procedure' payments by a ten-wheel lumber
truck on a trip from Ilagan to Manila (PhP, summer 1992)
DENR Ilagan 2,000





Tayako, San José 2,000
E1IB (Army), San José 200




DENR Sta Rosa 500
DENR San Rafael 300
DENR Pulilan 500
Jotal SOP, transport only 20.000
Source: pers com. DENR officials. 1992
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The local connotative meaning of the term SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) dates back to
the corporate logging period, when every day over 200 heavy lumber trucks would leave the
Region every day, and payments to law enforcement personnel became a matter of routine for
the drivers passing government checkpoints along the Maharlika Highway en route to Manila
. Unsophisticated as this system of bribery may appear, it does require a certain level of
coordination between entrepreneurs and the bureaucracy and, in the case of the larger schemes,
the blessing of a local political leader. All the checkpoints along the highway between Cagayan
and Manila must be coordinated, including the superiors of each office that is passed. In the
1992 data presented in table 6. l, the total amount of SOP paid is equal to approximately 20%
of the value of the 20 cubic metres of first-class lumber contained in a ten-wheeler load (in
1992, the market price in Manila for prime-quality lumber averaged around 10 pesos per board
foot). These amounts pertain to transports by concessionaires holding an existing and
operational timber license, but one which is accompanied by recycled, incomplete or inaccurate
documents.
In the same year in which these amounts were paid by legal TLA holders, a full 16-wheel
truckload of illegal first-class lumber would cost 70,000 pesos in SOP payments. This amount
does not include the payments made to secure toleration on the part of higher levels of the
bureaucracy, which 'buy' the scheduled presence of an informed official at the checkpoint the
night the transport is to take place, and immunity for lower officials involved in facilitating the
load:
"In 1992, the Hong Kong Boys were buying lumber from illegal sources. They had a fiill-scale
operation in San Mariano. Here in Cabagan we only produced 200,000 bft. They offered good
prices, 18 P/bft; the Manila price was only l Peso higher. We informed the mini-sawmills,
requesting them to produce the necessary applications and we issued them the papers. The Hong
Kong boys were conniving with the checkpoints and we were conniving with them\" (Research
diary, Dec. 1994)
The official relating this story admits his own involvement in deals with illegal loggers. My
interview with him took place several weeks after I had accidentally met him in the middle of
the night in his private car, escorting a logging truck loaded with freshly cut logs to a sawmill
in town. The following day, a colleague living in the town where hè worked at the CENRO
office told me that during the past few weeks hè had heard at least 20 trucks entering town
every night between 12 and 4 a.m. The logs were instantly processed into sawn lumber, and
then loaded and transported to Manila that same night. The participation of DENR escorts was
said to be a strategy that enabled an official who happened to meet an uninformed policeman
or army official to claim that the vehicle had just been apprehended and was being directed to
a location in town for confiscation. A colleague in his office, who was not involved in this
particular scheme, witnessed payments being made by a local business manager of the
politician whose blessing had been secured for this particular scheme:
"Every morning, my bosses collected SOP at the Baua residence (this was during the time ofour
farmer CENRO); I saw it when I was introduced one time by my colleague Ariel, who invited me
there one time to have drinks and dog meat..." (Research diary, Dec. 1994)
An interesting aspect which is illustrated by the last few cases in this section is the fact that
schemes that rely on a 'toleration' of illegal access are not run by one 'corrupt official' and
'one illegal logger'. They require a high degree of coordination, both horizontally between
people on the same decision-making level (the driver of the truck and the field official at the
checkpoints), and vertically (higher and lower officials, the owner of the logging equipment
and his employees). The degree of informed but informal organization between private actors,
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bureaucrats and elected government officials is a key characteristic of the overall mutual
accommodation nerworks (see Section 6.3) in which options for policy circumvention are
generaled.
6.2.4 Tolerated setllement andforest clearing
A form of illegal access in which DENR officials have relatively little participation is the
continuous flow of forest migrants into the Public Domain. Although government policies have
taken on a more constructive course vis-a-vis the communities of indigenous tribes and forest
migrants since the 1980s, it is still illegal to migrate to the public forest lands, settle there and
clear a patch of land for agriculture. A number of factors may help to explain the apparent
paradox that, despite this clear policy, DENR officials do not attempt to control the flow of
migrants entering the public domain;
For many migrants, forest migration is not a single step. The Ifugao send a team ahead to
prospect land, contact local people, and make the first clearings to demarcate their area.
Lowland migrants initially spend only part of their time on the forest farm, maintaining
temporary shelters there. The family of the migrant only follow when more labour is
required to cultivate a larger area of newly opened forest land. This means that it is
difficult for an official at one of the DENR checkpoints along the access roads into the
forest to identify someone driving by in a passenger truck as an illegal forest migrant.
Often people claim to be working for a logging company, or on someone else's land.
DENR officials, with the exception of some community development assistants, spend too
little time inside the Sierra Madre to keep track of changes in the population and settlement
patterns.
The forcible removal of a poor migrant family requires the assistance of the police or the
army, and would probably give rise to protests by local governmental and non-
governmental officials. In this context, DENR officials cannot do much more during their
occasional field visits than to inform the migrants about the illegal nature of their activities
and hope that some migrants themselves will draw their own conclusions.
The fact that DENR officials do not effectively seal off the public lands from illegal entry does
not mean that new arrivals can simply walk past the last settlement on the forest frontier and
settle there. There is always some kind of coordination with barangay or town officials, not
°nly as a mark of courtesy, but also because migrants have to make sure they are not
occupying lands already claimed by someone else, and that the army does not take them for
members of the NPA. A clear case of politically endorsed migration into the Public Domain
occurred in the summer of 1992 in Tumauini, Isabela. A group of 20 landless households from
the lowland town of Cauayan proceeded to the mayor's residence, asking for his assistance in
finding them a place to stay. The mayor agreed and told them to see the captain of a barangay
at the foot of Sierra Madre, giving them a handwrirten note instructing the captain to "please
Qccommodate these families and indicate to them where in your area they can settle" (Research
diary, Sep. 1992). This mayor also supported farmers who settled inside a government
reforestation area, defended their right to cultivate corn on these lands, and urged them to
speed up the construction of a barangay centre (De Frel 1993:47).
Often local politicians are inclined to adopt such an approach because population size plays
an important role in the grading of a municipality, and is one of the criteria for the allocation
°f other government resources, such as schools, teachers, medical facilities and a public
market. By allocating public land to poor people, a mayor boosts his chances in the elections
38 vvell as the likelihood of securing grants for the development of his town. At the barangay
'evel, these electoral motives are less important. Barangays receive a Standard 80,000 pesos
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from the Internal Revenue Allotment, and upland residents have no interest in allowing
newcomers to leapfrog over their fields to venture further into the forest. However, they may
be less inclined to take action against new migrants because they know that "we were once in
their position; how can we deny them novv?" (Field notes, Anak, Aug. 1993).
DENR officials only emerge as actors in the implementation of land occupancy policies
when the issuance of land titles and stewardship certificates is at stake. As in the case of
extractive activities, the boundary between 'legal' and 'illegal' provides ample opportunity for
negotiation and tolerated illegal access, either with false documents, flexible interpretations of
policies, or payments designed to generate a more cooperative attitude on the part of
implementing officials, although the latter approach is less common in the case of forest
migration. The key policy governing forest migration is the Integrated Social Forestry
Programme (Section 5.2.3). If a migrant can prove that hè was landless in his place of origin,
and that hè already resided inside the Sierra Madre prior to 1982, hè may be awarded tenure
through a Stewardship Certificate. Here, too, there are considerable opportunities to falsify
documents, in order to comply with legalization requirements. The migrant must refrain from
clearing additional forests, and there are various other conditions attached to the certificate,
such as land-use prescriptions, and the unalienable nanire of the land. Non-compliance leads
to cancellation at the end of the first 25-year term. Here, policies are not so much
circumvented as simply ignored. Common violations of CSC terms include using them as
collateral for informal loans, sale and tenancy, total clearing, and mono-cropping with annual
crops. While DENR officials are in a position to demand money in return for tolerating these
violations, in practice this hardly ever happens; forest migrants generally lack the means to
become directly engaged in negotiated settlements with DENR field officials, other than by
hosting them in the best possible way on their occasional field visits, and insisting that they
take farm products home with them. In comparison with forest product extraction, therefore,
tolerated violations of forest occupancy policies are less related do financial incentives, and
more to political interference in the implementation of forest policies. Larger economie
interests in public forest lands, and -products to be derived from these lands, set the wheels of
policy circumvention in motion. In the following sections I will be searching for answers to
the question of why representatives of the government participate in these practices.
6.3 Motives of bureaucrats and field officials to facilitate policy circumvention
.. "On 06 June J994.... Undersecretary Ben S. Malayang ƒ//, in his capacity as Acting
Secretary, issued a memorandum to the Regional Executive Director concerned,
instrucnng the latter to release temporarily saidfive trucks upon representation made
by Rep. Albano of Isabela.... CLLM1 had previously been sternly warned by the
memorandum dated 18 March ] 993 from Undersecretary Umali not to repeat the
offense ofhauling abandoned logs without proper authority from the DENR. By again
hauling abandoned logs without authority, as reported by DENR Region II, CLLMI,
in utter defiance of said warning, violated pertinent forestry laws and
regulations... what further aggravated CLLMI's case was thatfive (5) of the twelve (12)
apprehended truckloads of undocumented logs escaped while being escorted by the
authorities responsible for custody and further investigation. Such contemptuous acts
against the authorities only reinforced the earlier findings that CLLMI is deep into
illegal logging activities, using its timber license to legitimize such activities. As the old
dictum goes: flight is an indication ofguilt."
(DENR Secretary's Order of Cancellation of Timber Licensing Agreement No 105,
Consolidated Logging and Lumber Mills Inc., 12 Oct. 1994)
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Money was an influential factor in most of the schemes discussed in the previous section.
DENR officials who tolerate illegal access share in the benefits, using their public authority
for private gain. However, I believe that in many cases, a singular perspective of personal
financial gain is incomplete and misdirected. This section examines the factors at play in a
more comprehensive way, placing money matters within the context of intra-organizational and
external pressures motivating DENR officials to adopt a flexible approach to policy
implementation.
6.3.7 Intrabureaucracy motives: status, security, conflict avoidance
The primary objective of the professional life of a bureaucrat is to perform one's duties and
deliver the targets laid down by the organization. In the case of DENR officials in Cagayan
Valley, those duties consist mainly of writing reports and achieving pre-set implementation
targets (Hoekstra 1992; Buizer 1994; Van der Werff 1994). The multi-layered hierarchy of the
DENR produces a steady flow of plans, projects and programmes, together with measurable
outputs that serve as a tooi for top management to monitor the performance of individual staff
and the organization as a whole. Bagadion and Korten (quoted in Buizer 1994:48) compare the
effects of a target-oriented approach with those of a more flexible, learning-oriented approach
to the way officials interpret their tasks. An overemphasis on the production of performance
repons and measurable indicators of performance in terms of pre-set target outputs can make
the organization somewhat inflexible in their interactions with the public and obsessed with
internal management. In addition to the reports on training activities, the monitoring of
department programmes and projects, the workshops and meetings devoted to these projects,
and the responsibility for disseminating information on new Department Administrative Orders
and Memorandum Circulars, etcetera, there are also the monthly, quarterly and annual
Performance reports. These monitor the overall performance of the organization in terms of
volumes confiscated, budgetary overviews, activity overviews and output percentages in
comparison with the budgeted figures. In order to meet deadlines, officials sometimes provide
their superiors with superficial, haphazard reports, in which inaccurate or fictitious data easily
remain unnoticed.
This report-writing 'mania' not only affects the quality of the information flow, it also
leaves DENR officials less time to spend in the field and interact with the object of government
Policy: the local population. Officials themselves do not appear to be overly concerned about
their limited contact with the field situation. Outdoor activities are generally considered
inferior to office work, not only because the wages are lower, but also because fair skin and
nianicured hands are highly valued status symbols. A deep tan, on the other hand, is a sign that
°ne earns one's salary the hard way (Buizer 1994). Other motives that keep officials away from
the field during the period under study were fear of encounters with the NPA and the necessity
°f manoeuvring the steep and winding access trails to the forest communities, in the heat and
humidity of Cagayan. As a result, many DENR officials have only brief exposures to the
realities of forest users, and view that world from the perspective created by the steady flow
°f desk reports. As the experiences of several DENR officials cited in the previous section
showed, field observations that do not correspond to mis official image are either 'lost' through
the intervention of a superior or the author himself, who may ultimately decides that it is not
*orth jeopardizing one's own career and that of a superior (Hoekstra 1992:37). This not only
leaves policy circumventions undiscovered by the organization as a whole, but also facilitates
the participation of certain officials in illegal activities without the knowledge of their
colleagues. In this way, manipulated information and illegal activities remain largely
"nnoticed.
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An example that illustrates how the DENR lost track of its actual performance as a result of
its rigorous planning and reporting regime was the practice of using the volume of confiscated
illegal timber as a performance indicator. Each year CENROs competed to see which would
record the highest volume of confiscated timber. And as we have seen, considerable quantities
of illegal lumber were allowed to pass by checkpoint officials. The two actions were made
compatible by taking a quota of lumber from each truck carrying illegal lumber, before
allowing it to pass. Truck operators anticipated this, and overloading their trucks accordingly;
this enabled them to leave behind some flitches at each checkpoint. Here we see lower officials
participating in policy circumvention without the knowledge of other levels of the organization.
This mechanism is at work in the petty schemes involving accidental discoveries of flitches,
or the rattan poles of the furniture-maker in Section 6.2.
Larger schemes often take place by the inverse mechanism whereby superiors involve their
staff in the implementation of deals with high-level outsiders. In a hierarchical organization
such as the DENR, lower-level officials tend to see the lack of policy implementation as the
responsibility of higher levels of the administration:
"Doyou know why \ve lost so manyforest charges before? When a convoy was leaving Region 02
we had to call up the Central Office tofind out whether theforest charges had been paid, only to
find out they would simply say "Go, Go!" They were already pressuring us not to delay the
shipments any langer. And so we could not do anything, even though we do not know whether any
money hos been collected" (Key informant, 26 Oct. 1994)
In this respect, we must not forget that during the decades of corporate logging, strings of
command ran all the way from the checkpoint to the office of the President. Local officials
relied on instructions from superiors in determining whether or not forest products should be
allowed to leave the region. During the past ten years, however, forest management has
increasingly become a matter of local actors such as contractors, sawmill operators and upland
communities negotiating with implementers on access to natural resources. Field officials now
manage policy matters in smaller networks of colleagues and direct superiors:
"We cannot do anything but accept. Our boss (the CENRO) is there behind us, pressuring us. And
besides, we also have our expenses - 800 Pesos per day -forfood and coffeefor all the office staff,
the security, etc. ... Ifyou resist, you wilt be transferred, so all we can do is simply dance to the
music..." (DENR official, March 1994)
The threat of being transferred to another province or region hangs over all DENR officials
Officially, a transfer could be a career move, a reward for services rendered which is bestowed
on someone with influence inside or outside the bureaucracy. The less attractive way of being
transferred is by order of the Central Office as a sanction for involvement in illegal activities.
But officials likewise run the risk of enforced transfer if they are perceived as inflexible
obstacles to schemes developed by others in the organization. Punitive transfers are announced
with no consideration for personal preferences or the family's present place of residence. The
system of rotating officials from one province or region to another has become so deeply
ingrained in the DENR bureaucracy, that it is currently considered an effective tooi to prevent
ranking officials (CENRO, PENRO, RED, forestry specialists) from becoming too closely
involved with local networks, and from conniving at illegal or semi-legal practices.
This regular rotation of senior officials also has an impact on the motivation of
subordinates, who weigh the degree to which they can conform to the style and priorities of
their present superior. Strict loyalty to someone in a position of authority can leave one in a
vulnerable position when that person is transferred to another office. Compared to political
leaders in Region 2, many of whom come from families who have spent several decades in
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public office (see Section 5.3.2), the security of people occupying positions of administrative
authority within the DENR is generally short-lived. The political dimensions of these 'career
moves' will be examined later on in this chapter.
6-3.2 Financial incentives
Payments to government officials in exchange for tolerating illegal access to a protected public
resource is a basic ingrediënt of what is generally referred to as corruption, or the private use
°f public office (Kummer 1992a). Section 6.2.2 demonstrated the effectiveness of turning
dlegal activities into a source of additional income for often poorly paid government officials
in the province. However, money is not always involved, and where it does play a role, it is
not necessarily the key incentive. By accepting money, an official also complies with the other
dimensions of each deal for tolerated illegal access. Inversely, declining an offer is tantamount
to rejecting these other dimensions, such as building up a productive relationship with a
superior, colleague or influential outsider participating in a particular scheme. Junior officials
who had only recently joined the service were simply ordered to participate by senior
colleagues, often fellow foresters who, for that reason alone, could not easily be refused. For
mstance, a young forester who entered the DENR expecting to apply nis courses in forest
management was soon confronted with the difference between theory and practice:
"TTiere was no tree-marking carried out by us. The Company Forester himself marked the trees to
be cut and reported to the office of the DENR. Our 'package deal' with the Timber Management
Assistant of the company was that they would cut whatever they wanted andpay us under the table;
for each set-up we receive a certain amount" (DENR Official, Dec. 1994)
Many of the cases referred to by DENR officials took place during the boom period of
corporate logging. This industry not only left the Philippines with a nearly depleted forest
resource base, it also left the DENR with a badly tarnished public image and a disturbed
interna! discipline. In such a context, well intending staff have a hard time standing by their
Principles. Either, as Colchester observed in Surinam "honest officials resign their posts and
few scrupulous individuals prepared to overlook, or profil from, malpractice fill their
Positions" (Colchester 1995:74), or superiors undo the work of honest lower officials, as in the
following experience of a committed staff in the DENR:
"After passing my Board exam, I was assigned to the Forest Protection unit. There was a report on
a confiscated shipment ofillegally cut Narra logs. I enjoyed my experience ofcounting the Narra
stumps. that were allpiled up in the Regional Office. Then somebody came to my house and offered
me and my 5 companions 30,000 Pesos. But I rejected the offer and wrote my report, with all the
supporting documents. But then OUT District Forester was visited by the owner. My report never
reached the District Office, I learned later that it had been destroyed and my boss had settled the
issue with the vwlator. I found out the violatorpaid 100,000 Pesos" (Key informant, Dec. 1994)
Anyone who works in an organization where practices like these are tolerated would have
difficulty not becoming discouraged or even adjusting his own attitude to requests for
assistance from outsiders (or colleagues in the Agency). Once that happens, and the official
begins to adapt his lifestyle to a combined income - his salary plus other sources - it is hard
to turn back the clock and manage on a modest DENR salary. Social obligations involving
e*tra expenditures make it doubly difficult for forestry officials to reduce expenses without
isking loss of face. They are expected to do their share in sponsoring social events and
°f course paying the bills for regular drinking sprees. To maintain their lifestyle, therefore,
soirie officials do not wait for outsiders to propose package deals, but adopt a pro-active
Position, devising their own schemes and ensuring that they are not detected:
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"After the conftscanon in the Veterans concession, we also suspended the Monte Alto in Jones,
which was managed by a lumber dealer m Santiago. The trouble was that the CENROs were getting
50 centavos for every board foot extracted in excess of the AAC, so that is why they were even
promoting it!" (DENR Official, Oct. 1994)
There are, however, limits to the possibilities that officials have to turn policies into business
opportunities. Someone whose financial rise is too rapid can find himself the object of a ei vil
case on the grounds of unexplained wealth. In 1993, this happened to an official whose star had
risen quickly after years of service in a quiet corner of the Research Department of the
Regional Office. A few months before the 1992 elections, and less than a year after hè was
promoted to the office of CENRO in Quirino, hè was transferred to the first district of Isabela.
Within two years, his lifestyle changed completely; hè began to wear expensive clothes, bought
a car and built his family a new two-storey concrete house. During the town fiesta of 1993, hè
threw a lavish party for a large number of guests. His friends and DENR colleagues told me
that they found his display of new wealth shameful and out of all proportion. A few months
later hè was transferred again, becoming CENRO of Santiago. Here, his rise was halted by a
suspension on charges of unexplained wealth; if proved, this charge would have resulted in
dismissal and loss of all benefits and entitlements. When I spoke to him shortly after hè had
been suspended, hè complained about the difficulty of staying out of policy violations in his
office:
"It is not so easy to manage these political pressures; when the Covernor comes in and asks me to
accommodate one of his mayors, it is 'Yes, Sir' tang, no, teil me what is my option? But then there
are 7 torwns under the CENRO ofCauayan, and they allfollow and they askfor the same thing! f
am the onefacmg these pressures and now my bosses are charging me. I am very disappointed. It
is the duty ofmy boss to protect me, to stand by me. I do not respect him any more" (the suspended
CENRO officer, Sep. 1993)
Eventually, someone indeed protected him from prosecution; hè was first reappointed as the
officer in charge of the small PENRO office some distance from the Valley, and by the end of
1994 hè was transferred to a PENRO position in the Region. However, the person who helped
him was not his own superior in the DENR, but a prominent politician.
6.3.3 Political interference
"Do you want me to transfer you?"
(A Congressman from Cagayan, during a visit to the Regional Directer of the DENR,
after unsuccessfully demanding the release of confiscated trucks, July 1994)
Political interference in the bureaucracy is not only hard to pin down, but often paradoxical
as well; some members of the House of Representatives are engaged simultaneously in
lawmaking and in the protection of parts of the electorate against the implementation of those
same laws. The fact that local politicians, governors, mayors, barangay captains and their
respective councils may try to undermine the limitations set by national legislation is easier to
understand, since they are elected to represent the economie interests of a predominantly poor
electorate. What is clear is that the various actor groups who proclaim their adherence to the
government are not pursuing the same agenda. This issue of is examined in more detail in
Sectionó.5.
The second paradox of political interference is the fact that, while it is widespread and, in
my view, represents the most important source of policy failure in Cagayan Valley, it is almost
impossible to prove. There is a wealth of detailed oral accounts on political interference in the
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implementation of forest policies, but the people involved are careful not to leave behind any
tracé of written evidence which could link them to a particular case. Official documents are
almost never used in attempting to influence bureaucrats, and no minutes are taken of informal
interactions between bureaucrats and politicians. Moreover, an elected official is usually
represented by someone who cannot be legally connected to him, but who is widely known to
be his business managers. It is only when covert and indirect avenues prove unproductive that
a politician may opt to approach a reluctant bureaucrat face to face, as in the above case. Often
such a meeting does not take place in the offices of the DENR official, but rather in the casual
atmosphere of a social gathering. There are regular opportunities for casual encounters: the
sumptuous birthday parties hosted by politicians, important weddings and baptisms, barangay
and town fiestas, and the many conferences and other official occasions 'graced ' by the
Presence of local politicians all offer the possibility of a confidential chat. During these events
honourable guests always spend some time together in a private air-conditioned room, having
mingled with the other guests for a suitable length of time. Politicians use these informal
meetings to discuss a wide range of policy issues, often at the invitation of others; these include
civil service appointments and cases that have been 'brought to their attention'. The officials
whose cooperation is required may automatically be part of such refined gatherings (e.g., nigh-
ranking appointed officials) or, in the case of lower-ranking officials, they may be invited to
Participate for a short while. In between the jokes and small talk, and the occasional game of
Mahjong, agreement is quickly reached on the issue at stake.
Once a politician opts to personally visit an appointed official in his office, as in the above
case, or at home, this is unerringly perceived as the ultimate move and an indication that
earlier, more indirect measures were unsuccessful. By going in person, the politician is
acknowledging the importance which the case has for him, risking his face, i. e., his honour
and credibility. Any official who disregards such a clear and open plea knows there is bound
to be retaliation.
Not all politicians are equally circumspect in their personal interferences with DENR
Policy. Former Isabela Governor Faustino N. Dy was feared by some and revered by others
for his direct personal intervention in the affairs of the DENR:
"We had so many expenences with the old man. On one occasion, hè attended a multi- sectoral
meeting in Bantug. Our boss, the assistant district forester, said that there was already a Social
Forestry Programme here m Bantug and hè asked the people ifit was not true that they had been
awarded several CSCs. But hè also mentioned that there was a problem with illegal Narra
extraction by some individuals from outside. At that point, Governor Dy rose and said 'I do not give
a damn about your stories, Sir! I am the Minister ofNatural Resources here in Isabela, and I can
bury you alive!' He was holding a 22-calibre rifle and had to be escorted out of the meeting by the
Congressmen's bodyguards [ . . . ]". (Research diary, Dec. 1994)
As in the example cited at the beginning of this section, this sample of the legendary heavy-
handedness of the 'Old Man' in his dealings with DENR officials contains an element of threat
used to force implementers and field officials to shift allegiance and follow him instead of
abiding by Agency orders. Even where only implicit reference is made to its possible use,
violence is the final anchor of political interference in the bureaucracy and in Cagayan Valley
society in general. DENR officials with responsibility for forest protection and law
enforcement must take into account the possibility of violence in deciding whether to take a
strict or lenient approach to the conduct of their work. This not only holds true for DENR
officials, but also for other members of the civil service who carry out law enforcement tasks.
However, unlike most other law enforcement officials, such as the Philippine police and the
army, DENR officials carry no arms with which to defend themselves. During nightly
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patrolling of the checkpoints along the national highway, this can lead to frightening situations:
"We confiscated a truck loaded with Narra flitches during the night, andparked it near the office.
There were only two ofus that night. After a while we went to sleep, hut then the shipper's goons
arrived, carrying Armalües [machine guns]. They were looking for us in the office but we were
already hiding in the toilet. They managed to take the truck without the keys, using direct ignition.
Another time, when we had also confiscated wood, they pointed on Armalite at my neck and starled
askingfor Mr. Corpus, our forest protection officer. He was not there but I know they wanted to
kill hint" (DENR official, April 1994)
DENR officials not only have their own personal safety to worry about, but that of their
relatives and families as well. Threats of violence include kidnapping and other ways of
harming the families of officials. Any official who comes into conflict with a politician or a
third party disadvantaged by nis decision in a particular case may have to send nis family to
live with relatives outside the region, in order to protect them from possible harm. During the
height of the DENR crackdown against the TLAs in 1992-1993, the Regional Director of the
DENR was given round-the-clock protection, including a private guard carrying an automatic
weapon, and took to travelling at unscheduled hours in different cars. One of nis associates in
the office says that there were days when hè received as many as four death warnings on paper.
On the day hè suspended a concession in Jones, Isabela, a small coffin was delivered to his
house (Research diary, October 1994).
It is with experiences like these in mind that implementers carefully weigh the options of
either adopting a flexible attitude towards requests by outsiders - and probably enjoying a share
in the benefits of this accommodating stance - or distancing oneself from such practices and
maintaining a hard line on policy implementation, irrespective of the name, status or reputation
of the person behind an illegal activity. In late August of 1993, forester Leonardo Tindoc (of
CENRO Santiago, Isabela) confiscated ten 10-wheeler trucks with first-class sawn lumber,
allegedly owned by a local congressman. Tindoc had been repeatedly pressured to release the
trucks and drop the case. An alleged henchman of the Congressman's family visited Mr.
Tindoc in his house on a Saturday night, again proposing a settlement of the matter. But
Tindoc refused, saying that 'no amount of politics can convince me'. In the early morning of
the following Sunday, two shots were fired at him as hè stood in front of his house. A gunman
followed him as hè ran inside the house for cover and hè was shot dead in front of his wife and
children.
While courage of the kind displayed by the late Leonardo Tindoc and others in the DENR
is highly admirable, its impact in terms of bringing violators to court and getting a conviction
is by no means certain. Out of 115 illegal logging cases brought to the Cagayan Valley
Regional Trial Courts in 1992 and 1993, only one had resulted in a conviction in 1994 (PDl
10/03/94) Aside from the difficulty of producing evidence that will stand up in court, such as
pictures showing the date, location and individuals involved in a particular incidence of policy
violation, bribes can make evidence disappear before it reaches a court of justice:
"Last year, the DENR Regional Director was able to stop an illegal logging activity in Cagayan.
He ordered the injection pump of the bulldozer to be removed and brought to his office, so that the
machines were grounded and evidence could be produced in court. However, when hè went to
Manila to coordinate the case with the Central Office, somebody succeeded in removing the
injection pump from his desk. When the Director retumed to Tuguegarao, all the equipment had
been moved out of the forest". (CFEM faculty, Dec. 1994)
Should a case indeed be supported by sufficient evidence, it may still be difficult to implicate
key decision makers. The only ones who can be charged are 'dummy names' and the 'smal'
fry' who carry out the dirty work. The mere suggestion that a 'big fish' is behind a scherne
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compel DENR officials to seek legal assistance to counter charges of libel or abuse of
official authority. Contracts containing dummy names and even entirely false counter-evidence
are used in such a case, as the regional directer found out in 1991:
"We had a large confiscation of 4,500 m3 oflogs in Bicobian, on the Pacific side. The equipment
was owned by the business-caretaker of Congressman [] and by Carlito Yu, a relative of the old
man. But at the time of the confiscation, the equipment was leased by a certain Mr. Raymundo
Formacion, on elderly farmer from that place. Instead oftheir being charged, they charged me in
courtfor confiscating their equipment. They were able to present a manufactured tax declaration
for a piece of land. They claimed the farmer had leased the equipment to open up this landfor the
development of a fish-processing and ice plant. I only escaped prosecution because I was able to
establish that the document number used for this manufactured tax declaration had previously been
used by the same notary public for another contract". (Research diary, Dec. 1994)
DENR field officials and civil servants know just how dim the prospects are of a case of illegal
extraction actually resulting in a conviction in a court of law. Add to that the risk of being
subjected to legal and other forms of harassment, and it is understandable that they often fail
to take a firm stand on the implementation of forest policy. A more accommodating attitude
TOakes life easier in many ways, increasing one's income and enhancing career prospects.
Political patronage continues to be an influential factor in appointments and promotions in the
bureaucracy. One high-ranking DENR official may have been exaggerating when hè
exclaimed, during the birthday celebrations of a congressman: "I just wait there in the office
lo receive instructions from the Congressman on whom to appoint, and then we implement
[those instructions]/" (Research diary, March 1996). But civil servants can ignore political
fecornmendations only so long.
By positioning their bata-bata (protégés) in strategie positions in the DENR, political
leaders facilitate their leverage in the organization. Officials whose careers have benefited from
the sponsorship of a politician go through life with the utang na loob (or inner sense of
°bligation) to repay their political godfather. At the same time, DENR officials with strong
Political hackers have less occasion to worry about the risks of condoning illegal extraction,
because their protected status makes them 'untouchable'. As we have seen, in terms of job
security it may be safer to bank on loyalty to a powerful politician than to one's temporary
superior in the bureaucracy.
The strategie places where bata-bata are positioned are not necessarily the highest in the
organization; having a flexible scaler or forestry specialist in a CENRO office, or a particular
crew on a checkpoint, may be sufficient to ensure the success of a scheme. Although a
Politically sensitive leadership at the Regional Office facilitates access to DENR appointments
and promotions, such sponsored appointments cannot be effectuated without going through the
ÖENR's own internal evaluation procedure. Moreover, politicians compete with each other
for certain positions. The fmancial gains to be made from having a peon in a strategie position
TOay warrant a little investment. In this marmer, an official who is in a position to make
decisions on appointments and promotions is in effect a kind of auctioneer on the job market.
This practice of selling jobs to the highest bidder is called the suk-suk system. One
bureaucrat told me that a Forester IV position, which pays around 4,000 Ph£/month, sells at
50,000 pesos. During the heyday of corporate logging, lower jobs like scalers and forest
Suards fetched even higher prices, but, according to my informant "you can earn it back very
quickly" fby falsifying documents, GT]. Money alone is not enough, however:
"Mr. Lito Formosa will never be promoted, because in this place you need three conditions: the
'ight education, the right connections, and the right amount" (Key informant, 7 Nov. 1993)
These three factors each carry a specific amount of weight. With an influential person backing
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one's application, less rnoney is required; although there is a certain arnount that is normally
paid as a gesture of courtesy and gratitude for assistance in obtaining an appointment, a request
for assistance does not have to be accompanied by money to merit consideration. Bureaucrats
hoping to enter into fmancial deals pertaining to promotions and employment for political
protegés place themselves in a vulnerable position, in the sense that a bureaucrat may himself
become dependent on political protection against disciplinary action, as the following case
illustrates.
In 1994, a ranking forestry official at the Regional Office who had been actively engaged
in informal job-auctioning had to seek protection from disciplinary action after falling out of
the good graces of the wife of a congressman by asking an excessive fee for the appointment
of one of her relatives. She complained:
"You know that this Mr. Limatican was already selling positions! We paid him 5000 pesos for this
boy we have here to be employed (and hè even deserved il), only tofind out hejust sold it to the
highest bidder! I told him l would let [DENR Secretary] Alcala know about this, even without
telling my husband. And I know hè is also involved in that illegal logging in San Pablo! It is really
very blatant, they pretended it was an old cut and then this Limatican sent in his own team and they
really bloated it eh, they went in and cut so many trees and they buried it all in a creek in the mud
so it would appear to be old cut. We do not mind the cutting by the little people, to build a house,
because where will we get the wood if we do not allow this, but not this kind of very blatant
activity; we are not all saints but they should do it discreetly, that is what I always teil them".
(Research diary, July 1994)
Colleagues of the disgraced bureaucrat admitted that the Congressman had been trying for
some time to have him removed from the region because of this incident. One of the colleagues
who knew him personally told me:
"Jun came back from Manila last week. I talked to him in the office this moming and I sensed the
tension from his voice; his hands were perspiring. He asked me if I could talk to Ed [a well
connected logger, GT] so that hè could go to the house [the residence of the politician] and ask if
his transfer from Tuguegarao could be avoided."
When I asked this colleague why Ed's mediation was needed, hè said:
"Ed is now the eyes and the ears of the Congressman. But unfortunately for Mr. Limatican, it is the
wife who is after his head. The Congressman is very considerate, but not so the wife. They now say
that Jun is a crocodile, meaning hè is demanding his share of all sorts of things. Unlike the
Regional Director, who was able to handle his power without changing as a person, Mr. Limatican
starled to like it too much; hè used his position ". (Key informant, July'94)
In this case, the mediation apparently worked. It is not clear whether the transfer of the
Regional Director was part of the same deal, but after a meeting between the new regional
directer, Jun Limatican and the Congressman in the latter's residence, their differences were
patched up. As in the case of the official charged with unexplained wealth, the normative terrns
'discreetly' and 'liking it too much' in these quotes indicate that relationships between
outsiders, politicians and DENR officials are subject to delicadeza: the subtle art of a measured
use of one's position, i.e., responding to requests but avoiding the active and brazen use of
one's official position for personal gain. Once an official moves beyond what is perceived by
outsiders as a reasonable level of paid assistance for the granting of a request, the odds may
turn against him.
Before going on to draw some general conclusions concerning the motives and mechanisrns
underlying the failure of forest policy in Cagayan Valley, I would like to stress that the cases
presented here do not pretend to be characteristic of the DENR organization as a whole; nor
are they intended to brand certain categories of people as effective or counter-effective in the
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implementation of policy. What I have tried to do is to show that the mechanisms described
in the previous section are not just money-making schemes of purely economie rationality, but
many-faceted mixtures of reasons and forces in which officials may become trapped.
Nevertheless, an enhanced protection for the Sierra Madre requires a better protection for the
DENR against being mobilized for the implementation of personal agendas.
6.4 Mutual Accommodation Networks:
the actors field in government-assisted illegal access to public forest
"The citizenry expects the government to respond to these illegal activities.
But they do not know the mechanisms within the government. "
(Former CENRO officer, Oct. 1994)
In this section, I aim to arrive at a general interpretation of the mechanisms described in the
previous sections, by means of which policies are distorted, circumvented or stalled on their
way from formulation, in Metro Manila, to the lower levels of the bureaucracy. The degree
of autonomy that government officials have in interpreting policies and creating their own
balance between professional and personal motives is what is defined as their discretionary
space (Lipsky 1980, cited in Buizer 1994). If this space is too large, policy goals and the
credibility of the agencies of the state are at risk; if it is too small, interactive processes
between the state and the citizenry are stifled. In the previous sections it has become clear that
the DENR is unable keep an adequate rein on this individual freedom to interpret policy, as
a result of what Downs refers to as the "leakage ofauthority "from the central level down to
the level at which implementation directly affects the lives of the citizenry (Downs 1967:134,
quoted in Migdal 1980:241). Riggs (1964, cited in Hoekstra 1992:19) explained the un-
Weberian character of Philippine bureaucracy as the consequence of a prismatic society, in
other words, a society in transition between Western and local culture. In such a context, the
bureaucracy is still less than efficiently organized and is under strong pressure from
'recalcitrant clienteles' out to secure exemptions from policies which, in their view, have been
imposed upon them. Bureaucracies in prismatic societies invariably develop cultural and
political factions within their own ranks, resulting in considerable discrepancies between the
formal and actual authority of each official.
A more actor-based analysis is put forward by Grindle (1980) and Migdal (1988), who
attribute the leakage of authority to the existence of a system of negotiation between local
officials and pressure groups, in which deals are struck to accommodate mutual interests. Such
deals include a financial compensation for the officials involved which is commensurate with
the type of accommodation required. Both Grindle and Migdal call attention to a category of
officials who are particularly influential in determining to what extent policies are effective
tools of state control. These implementors derive their influence mainly from their strategie
Position between the population and those at the head of their agency. Grindle defines
implementors as
"A corps of middle-level officials who have responsibility for implementing programmes in a
specific, relatively constricted area - a state, a district, a provmce or an urban zone - and who are
held responsible for programme results by their superiors. This corps of individuals - thefirst and
second ranks of the field admimstration - maintains frequent contact with national and regional
superiors, but also has occasion to interact with the clients of government agencies and with oppo-
nents of the programme at local levels. These middle-level officials may have considerable
discretion in pursuing their tasks and, even when this is not defined as part of their normal duties,
they may have a decided impact on individual allocation decisions. (Grindle 1980: 197, cited in
Migdal 1988:238)
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In Migdal's view, implementers are part of a triangle of accommodation (ibid:248), which
connects two levels of bargaining; one level pertains to the relationship with their superiors
(both bureaucratie and political), while the other level is where local strongmen are
accommodated. As we have seen in the preceding two sections, it is just such a "system of
accommodation andpayoff" (Grindle 1977 cited in ibid:248) which is at work in Philippine
forest policy. In my view, Migdal's theory is hignly illustrative of the day-to-day conditions
under which the outlines of forest policy are transformed within Cagayan Valley practice.
However, to adapt this model to the sociopolitical and public administrative context of Cagayan
Valley, a number of adjustments to its conceptual elements are required:
First, we need to subdivide the category of middle- and lower-level officials which Migdal
includes under the term Implementers. Lipsky (1980) prefers the term street-level
bureaucrat for the lowest-level official in the bureaucracy, who is in contact with the
citizen whose actions are the target of government policy. Following Buizer (1994), I
propose to replace this term by field official, which does not have the urban connotation
of Lipsky's term, and also emphasi/es "their dual position ofworking 'in the field' and thus
interacting with the local people and at the same time being connected to a government
agency, which gives them their 'official'position"(Buizer 1994:13). In between these field
officials and the policy makers at the Central Office in Manila, there is the category of the
bureaucrats. These are the office executives at the regional, provincial and community
levels of the line agencies, the people who have the authority to sign official documents and
take decisions on resource access, on the basis of information provided by their
subordinates. It is necessary to make this distinction between bureaucrats and field officials
because, as we have seen, the control which the former have over the latter is just as
problematic as the control which Migdal's central government over its local implementers.
The second refinement is to separate the political and administrative segments of the state.
Field officials and bureaucrats negotiate mutually agreeable policy interpretations with
elected officials who are either acting independently or represent certain private interests.
Depending on the kind of accommodation required and the level of access to the
bureaucracy, a politician may either work his way downward from the level of the policy
makers in Manila, through the bureaucrats in the region, to the field officials, or
alternatively, approach one or two of these levels directly. Negotiations between elected
and administrative government officials over private access to public natural resources are
an important cause of the leaching of DENR authority.
- A third adaptation is concerned with the category which Migdal calls strongmen. In his
study, strongmen are traditional bosses, clan leaders, rich peasants, and others who
represent the peasantry. In the Sierra Madre context, I will use the term leading local
persons for this category, since here we are not talking about local elected officials, but
rather influential private individuals, who are often rich and have close political affiliations.
Thus the category 'leading local persons' includes both traditional and modern non-political
leaders, such as industrialists, representatives of NGOs, and informal leaders (people with
informal authority over others) such as landlords and moneylenders. They occur among all
levels, and in all three categories of actors cooperating, and assume a lead-role in the
establishment of negotiated deals, claiming to represent the interests of one, or several
others (the Secretary, the Congressman, the Regional office, a cooperative).
And finally, intra-bureaucratic conflicts of interest also play a role. As noted in Section
5.3, the feasibility of DENR policies may also be hampered by the policies of other
agencies. A governor who wants to gain access to the fishing grounds on the Pacific side
can work through the Regional Development Council, where the DENR has only one vote,
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and try to have resolutions passed there which allocate public resources for the opening of
a road across the Sierra Madre.
h this way, the contours of what I will call Mutual Accommodation Networks will gradually
emerge. Fig. 6.1 shows the generic structure of these networks, and the deals that form its
connecting nodes. While the figure uses the example of the accommodated extraction and use
°f Narra timber by the furniture industry, it represents a generic model that could also be
applied to the other examples of accommodated access discussed above.
Forest migrant
ilogging, clearing foresü,




Fig. 6.1 Mutual Accomodation Networks
The following observations can be made:
1) The nodes connecting the actors are negotiating grounds: each node shows the deal made
between respective actors: the forest migrant pays the field official in exchange for
accommodation, e.g., passage at the checkpoint. In turn, the local politician with the
largest clientèle has the best chances of getting fmancial and political support from
congressmen and their national party tickets during election campaign.
2) The P- sign stands for pesos, and material progress in a broader sense; in the case of the
elected official, it may mean funds for nis campaign, or private gain. P- signs in the nodes
between the field officials, bureaucrats and policy makers may not involve actual payments,
but rather refer to the career prospects and professional stability to be gained by 'going
with the flow'.
3) Money is the principal negotiating tooi of the private actors, while the primary source of
Öiis money - and thus of the network as a whole - is the forest. Part of the revenue resulting
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from the conversion of natural capital into financial caprtal is invested in the maintenance
of the accommodation network. All participants must see tangible net benefits in
participation or tangible net costs in non-participation; the network fixes the definition and
allocation of these benefits, as well as the nneans of protecting one another from possible
legal action by non-participants.
4) Patronage (patr.), or the personalized patron-client relationship in which the patron
provides the cliënt with access to resources which hè owns himself, occurs only once, in
the node between forest migrant and local elected official. A barangay captain or mayor
who protects the migrant from the law through brokerage with the field official or
bureaucrat concerned is rewarded at election time. At all higher levels, the term brokerage
(brok.) is used. The essential difference between them is that the latter term pertains to
mediated access to resources that the patron has no direct control over (Boissevain
1969:379-386, see also Section 7.2). Elected officials negotiate with DENR officials over
access to natural resources in the public domain; accommodating field officials are
rewarded with the politician's willingness to negotiate with bureaucrats over promotions,
or protection against administrative sanction.
Not all forms of accommodated access require the coordinated activation of the entire network
shown in fig. 6.1. Small accommodation networks exist both at the local level, between rattan
manufacturers and the local CENRO, and at the national level, between policy makers and
lawmakers. In the past, when corporate logging concessions were handled by the Central
Office and the President, negotiations in all nodes of the network had to lead to a coordinated
result. Such cases have become less common and more complicated in the current era of
community-based forest management, where more actors are involved and the central level is
less directly engaged in decisions on forest product extraction. Mutual accommodation
networks are not active at all times, nor are they always of the same size or composition. A
network dissolves or becomes inactive when the accommodation has been agreed upon and its
benefits enjoyed, only to be formed again once a new initiative is taken.
The transient, flexible and informal composition and ninctioning of Mutual accommodation
networks explain why local actors from the bureaucracy, politics and business are continuously
refining their ability to respond to new policies by creating new modes of accommodated
access. As corporate logging declined and lumber supply dwindled, the new policies for small-
scale extraction and processing brought new opportunities to serve an increasingly tight market
for forest products. The willingness of appointed officials to accommodate illegal access by
either misreporting, turning a blind eye, or moulding fonnal policy content into feasible policy
interpretations can be traced to the motives discussed in the previous section:
- Financial incentives
Financial rewards may represent a substantially larger component of the overall income
of an official than his normal salary. In order to safeguard this significant portion of
his overall income, the official may be more inclined to protect a particular scheme
from discovery than to abide by official policies, as duty dictates. Once hè has become
used to the additional income, it becomes a matter of saving face not to fall back into
one's old lifestyle and expenditure patterns. It is only in small networks, where petty
accommodation deals are made, that money may be used in isolation from the other
factors enumerated below.
- Compliance with top-down orders and performance indicators
The large number of official reports that field officials and bureaucrats are required to
produce throughout the year affect the quality of both information and monitoring,
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making it easier for accommodated access schemes to remain undiscovered.
- Preference for office-based activities
Field officials and bureaucrats who stay away from the field lose touch with reality and
cannot make accurate repons on policy implementation. Hot and arduous conditions
in the field, status perceptions, law-and-order risks, and DENR budget limitations are
obstacles to more intensive field visits.
- DENR hierarchy
Subordinates are expected to follow the orders of their superiors, and not to cause them
embarrassment. Junior officials who are sent out to the field report favourably on their
observations there, so as not to endanger the careers of their chiefs in the office.
~ Poliücal interference and conflict avoidance
Politica! connections are an asset for any appointed official. Politicians tend to have a
longer-term access to government power and influence than leading bureaucrats, who
are often reassigned to other provinces and regions. In the words of Migdal, this has
a "devastating effect on policy implementation....no career-minded bureaucrat wants
to be identified as a zealotfor a state policy, despite its popularity or unpopularity, if
there is a strong chance that hè or she will be left out on a limb of that policy long after
its creators and the agency chiefs have turnedto other endeavours" (Migdal 1988:240).
~ Uncertain legal backing, fear of retaliation, violence
Because of the use of information manipulation and dummy tactics, appointed officials
may find themselves unable to produce sufficient evidence with which decision makers
can be convincingly linked to, and convicted for, violations of forest policies or laws.
Unaccommodating officials, and their families, are liable to face legal or physical
harassment.
Although Migdal recognizes the "the maze ofpressures and cross-pressures" (ibid: 239-240)
which must be negotiated by the 'implementers', his triangle of accommodation conceptualizes
the role of 'implementers' as too pro-active, as if bureaucrats and field officials were actively
exploiting their strategie position midway between agency leadership and the citizenry, for
Personal financial and career gains. These benefits may indeed entice some officials to take the
mitiative and mobilize outsiders to participate in a mutual accommodation network. In my
v'ew, however, requests for special resource extraction permits, political pressure to lift the
suspension of a TLA or to release a truckload of confiscated lumber, and sponsored appoint-
ments and promotions originate largely from outside the DENR. The rewards that accompany
a flexible response to these initiatives are a compensation for the risk which the official runs,
and are commensurate with the economie value of the accommodation requested. Bureaucratie
assistance in obtaining private access to restricted forest products is determined as much by the
rewards which cooperation brings as by the potential consequences of non-cooperation.
To illustrate the diversity of responses to the pressures exerted on DENR officials from
inside and outside the bureaucracy, I will quote from a letter by one 'reformist' official
who, after ten years of trying to maintain a basic attitude of strict compliance with DENR
Policies, expressed his determination to resist temptation and encourage others in the
°rganization to do the same:
"The present adtninistration is infavour of social reform but it is frustrating, as a member of the
orgamzation, to observe the malpractices still existing. To the extent that J om influenced myself,
at times when I have no self control. Nevertheless, I still hope that total reform can be achieved
someday. Change stans with myself and I am determined to be an agent of change in our
organization" (Key informant, Sep. 1996)
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6.5 Local Bosses and National Government:
Political origins of state weakness and accommodated access
M/i examination of the complex processes through which inequality, indebtedness,
landlessness and poverty are created hos highlighted the way so-called patrons have
used predatory and coercive forms of primitive accumulation and monopoly rent-
capitalism to expropriate the natura! and human resources of the archipelago front the
brood mass of the population, thereby generanng and sustaining the scarcity, insecurity
and dependency which underpins their role as bosses" (Sidel 1995, in Rocamora
1995:xxii)
As we saw in the previous sections, DENR policies are not fully implemented, because they
are transformed, reinterpreted or actually obstructed on their way down from the central Ie vel
where policies are made, to the field Ie vel where they are supposed to be implemented. These
constraints upon the policy process are due partly to the inadequacy of the policies themselves
and partly to outside interferences, in combination with the large discretionary space of local
officials to facilitate illegal access without sanctions.
The questions which then present themselves centre on the deeper implications of these
fairly down-to-earth mechanisms. For instance, why has the DENR and its predecessor, the
Bureau of Forest Development, been unable, or unwilling to use die extensive set of legal
measures at its disposal to protect the natural resource base from private abuse? And why have
the majority of those accommodating illegal private access to public resources been able to do
so as systematically, and sometimes brazenly as we saw above? One way to explain the poor
effectiveness of the DENR would be to compare its characteristics with those of the rational
ideal-type bureaucracy defined by Weber (1984). An effective bureaucracy, in this view, is a
highly independent and disciplined organization, which recruits and promotes its members on
the basis of professional seniority and through open competition, and in which there is a clear
distribution of tasks and strict, systematic discipline. To be able to function, such a
bureaucracy requires a reliable flow of written documents. In the government bureaucracy of
the DENR, clearly other principles apply, as I illustrated above.
In my view, the ineffectiveness of the DENR can only be understood in relation to the
weak capability of die Philippine state as a whole to "penetrate society, regulate social
relationships, extract resources and appropriate or use resources in determined vvays"
(Migdal 1988:4). DENR shows this weakness more clearly than other state agencies, such as
the NEDA, the DPWH or the DOH, because its mission is precisely to guard the interest of
the state, and regulate the citizenry's access to the natural resources within the national
territory. Widespread illegal logging and migration into the public domain indicate the limited
capability of the DENR to perform this task. In fact, its actions have the appearance of a
continuous response of legalizing uncontrolled developments in the public domain, scaling
down the state's assertiveness with respect to the implications of public ownership for private
access. Intermediary forms of private tenure for these lands were devised through the
integrated social forestry programme. More recently the state relinquished its exclusive hold
over the public domain, opening up the possibility of issuing long term management leases to
forest migrants and even real ownership titles to indigenous forest tribes. Gibbs et al
(1990:255) see increasing demand for food by a growing population, and the threat that, unless
the Bureau of Forestry made public lands available for that purpose, other agencies might be
given jurisdiction over the public lands as important factors driving the coming about of the
Integrated Social Forestry Programme. Forest administrators, they argue, also saw that the
depletion of forest resources undermined a legitimacy-base that had, until then, been purely
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based on the management of forests, not on forest lands. I would argue that these compromises
have not prevented the DENR from losing a great deal of its traditional authority as the
custodian of the public domain. In that perspective contemporary policies of democratized
access constitute the unavoidable legalization of private access to common properties through
activities which have increasingly proven to be beyond the control of that agency.
One need not spend much time in Philippine traffïc, the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, the Customs Office or the Bureau of Internal Revenue to realize that problems
of state control also present themselves in sectors other than forestry. Tax collections, for
example, are among the lowest in Southeast Asia. Only 35% of potential and corporate
taxpayers filed returns in 1989 (Far Eastern Economie Review, 26 March 1992). Moreover,
the fact that many of these statements may not have been entirely accurate is reflected in the
overall level of tax collection as a proportion of GDP: between 1985 and 1990 the total taxes
collected amounted to 10.5% of GDP, compared to 15.5% in Indonesia and Thailand and 18%
in Malaysia. In the same period, the Philippine government realized gross savings of 17. l %
of GDP; compared to 33.1% in Indonesia, 34.4% in Malaysia, 32% in Thailand (Eder 1994:4-
5). Low tax revenues and savings are financial indicators of a weak government with few
opportunities to facilitate and steer developments throughout the country.
Another characteristic to size up the strength of the Philippine state, again in the Weberian
view, is its ability to monopolize the legitimate use of violence. Because of its reputation as
a stronghold of the New People's Army, Cagayan Valley has long been considered an area
with unstable Peace-and-Order conditions. People who are concerned about their security tend
to take measures to defend themselves, rather than relying on protection by state agencies, such
as the police, against robbery, attempted murder, and other forms of violence. Despite a
national debate on more stricter controls on fïrearms, a wide range of assault weapons ranging
frorn revolvers to M16 automatic rifles are freely available to interested parties in Manila and
most regional capitols. A nationwide operation to disarm private armies was initiated after
reports in July 1993 that many politicians (including 13 congressmen, 15 governors and 66
mayors) and businessmen maintained private armies throughout the countryside. Four months
'ater, 455 private armed groups had been disbanded and over 16,000 fïrearms recovered by
toe tripartite task force of the PNP, the NBI and the armed forces. With the exception of 12
individuals, mainly from Mindanao, all the politicians were cleared of charges after a meeting
with the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (PDI 12 Nov. 1993). The question
remains whether this conclusion was based on factual evidence or was an example of the
"traditional ways ofpolitical accommodation" (Thompson 1994:14) in another Line Agency.
The Armed Forces and the National Police have problems of their own with respect to
central control and organizational discipline. Siliman (1994) calls attention to the weakness of
the post-Marcos civil administrations to control the army, and argues that this weakness has
been one of the causes of the continuing human rights violations, despite the new 1987
Constitution, which hè calls "a model legal document for the protection of human rights"
(Siliman 1994:112, cited in Thompson 1994). Nevertheless, over 1000 political killings and
disappearances occurred between 1986 and 1991, and in 1994 there were over 600 political
Prisoners in die country (ibid:ll4). The histories of the political families discussed earlier in
this chapter confirm the views of Mc Coy (1993), Kerkvliet (1992), Rocamora (1995:xiii) that
"nauthorized violence plays an important role in local Philippine politics, particularly in
frontier areas, such as the Cagayan Valley during the corporate logging decades.
Although private armed groups continue to be part of the entourage of any self-respecting
nfcyor, governor or congressman, in the present-day Cagayan Valley their customary role is
sniall compared to the presence and scale of operations of the army and the police. In addition,
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the role of the private armed groups in Cagayan Valley is almost complementary to that of the
army, namely to maintain the social and political status quo by responding swiftly to
individuals or groups who challenge the existing order in the territory of their 'Boss'
(Rocamora 1995)4. In terms of the legitimate use of violence, therefore, the Philippine state
does not qualify as 'weak'. the joint forces of the Philippine National Police and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines equip the government with a considerably machinery for law
enforcement.
In cases where these agencies cooperate with the DENR in the implementation of forestry
policies, the potential power of the Philippine state to impose the law clearly shows, for better
or for worse. In 1992, for instance, Marag Valley, Kalinga Apayao, became the arena of
armed conflict between troops of the AFP and forest-based groups which the government
branded as communist insurgents. According to NGOs in Cagayan, the operations were
necessary to allow logging operations in Marag Valley to get underway. A two year
cooperation between the DENR Regional Office and the 5* Infantry Battalion in 1991 and 1992
significantly enhanced the enforcement capability of the DENR, whose unarmed officials often
face armed men accompanying loads of illegal forest products.
WEAK GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY
In my view, one structural factor that results in widespread violations of forest policy and
constrains the capability of the DENR to curtail those violations is the degree of legitimacy that
the citizenry attributes to the government in general, the "acceptance, even approbation, of the
state 's rules of the game, its social control, as true and right... [and] the acceptance of the
state's symbolic configuration within which the rewards and sanctions are packaged" (Migdal
1988:33). National politics and government have long been equated with the unequal
distribution of wealth, services and power between the National Capitol Region and the other
regions of the country. During the Marcos presidency, the citizenry witnessed how the
government agency that was supposed to protect the public domain was actually facilitating the
over-extraction of natural resources by Manila-based companies, and sharing in the spoils.
Unlike many of its Southeast Asian neighbours, the Philippine state can neither build
legitimacy upon a deep tradition of national myths, such as a Pre-western monarchy, national
pride in legendary ancestors, in epics on the origins of the state, or other "general statements
about the world and its parts, and in particular about nations and other human in-groups that
are believed to be true and then acted on whenever circumstances suggest or require common
response.... in the absence ofbelievable myths, coherent public action becomes very difficult
to improvise or sustain" (McNeill 1982:1, quoted in Migdal 1988:26) The political history of
the Philippines shows repeated efforts to construct state myths in order to mobilize the people
behind the government. After 1946, the creation of the new independent Republic was an
opportunity to define such a myth. As powerful as the public myth of Philippine history and
newfound independence was, it was rendered ineffectual by a government that Wurfel
characterizes as "corrupt and unpopular" (Wurfel 1988:14). He argues that in the next decade
the legitimacy of political institutions revived, up until the 1965 elections, when Ferdinand
Marcos gained access to the presidency "with money and nationalist slogans" (ibid: 16). Marcos
also saw the importance of a public myth to legitimize his rule: the social transformation
In itsclf, a state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence may not be beneficial to the citizenry, especially if state
leaders lack democratie legitimacy in the eyes of a majority of the population The heavy reliancc of the Martial Law regime on
the army for the maintenance of'Peace and Order1, exacerbated hy a weak central command and weak discipline within the
organization. can be regarded as an example of undemocratic and illegitimatc violence against the citizenry by the State
ballots and bureaucracy... 251
towards a New Society answered a widely feit need for a structural overhaul of the entire
political system, but soon proved to have quite the opposite effect. The whole idea quickly
became the equivalent of a government associated with corruption, a politicized bureaucracy
and an undisciplined, abusive and ineffective military which eventually brought the mass of
the citizenry to the point where it revolted against the government in February 1986. If
Gleeck's analysis is correct that corruption has been "a continuing themefrom administration
to administration "and that "its extent seems to have been proportionate to the administration 's
time in power"(Gleeck 1993:397), the Marcos administration was in power long enough to
leave its successors not onJy with an impoverished economy (Boyce 1993), but with a bankrupt
legitimacy of government as well.
Corazon Aquino exemplified the promise of a new quality of government seeking to re-
establish key democratie institutions and honesty in the administration of the country. The
Aquino administration not only wrote a new Constitution, it also tried to do justice to those
who had suffered damages due to the previous administration by establishing bodies such as
the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on Good Government. The latter
sought - with limited success - to recover the 'hidden wealth' of the Marcos family and its
associates. The office of the Ombudsman, which led the drive against corruption in the ranks
°f government, reported in 1997 that since 1990 the cost of corruption had decreased to 1.4
billion pesos annually, down from 55 billion annually in the twenty years before 1990 (PNA,
23 Jan. 1997). Thompson (1994) argues that the Cory government chose to dedicate its entire
administration to the consolidation of the newfound democracy and, to achieve mis goal, was
fiven prepared to compromise in the field of socioeconomic reform, in order to avoid the
forrnation of alliances between the old order of landlords, industrialists, and "disappointedjob
seekers in politics", which could trigger a takeover by the Reform Armed Forces Movement
(RAM): "The bloody August 1987 and December 1989 RAM-led coup attempts caused not onfy
Politica! chaos but severe economie harm as well. A sturdy post-Marcos economie recovery
slowed by thefirst and stopped by the second major RAM rebellion " (Thompson 1994:8)
political instability associated with the non-confrontational avenues pursued by the Aquino
administration had its own impact on the Philippine economy. Seven military coups, two major
Natura! disasters, uncertainty about the future of the United States' bases in the Philippines and
t"e possible impact of non-agreement on the political stability of the country kept foreign
exchange and investors out of the country. The malperformance of the Philippine economy,
certainly in comparison with other countries in the region, quickly undermined popular support
f°r the Aquino administration. Thompson cites Social Weather Survey figures showing mat
Aquino's net approval ratings dropped from 71 % in October 1986 to 35% in October 1987 and
to 1% in April 1992. By the end of its term, the national government lacked what Thompson
calls "performance legitimacy...based largely on the state of the economy and the honesty of
8°vernment"(ibid:l6)
In 1992, the newly elected president Fidel Ramos realized the importance of economie
Pfogress. Alongside his political wit and the respect hè enjoyed among the military, one
Nftportant method hè employed to rally the country behind him was the invention of a new state
myth. His Philippines 2000 was an effort to provide Filipinos with a fresh nation-building
^bition to become the next Asian Tiger economy by the turn of the century. The president's
'wn charisma and working hours served as symbols for this myth and how it could be
|chieved. Although the recent improvements in the Philippine economy cannot be attributed
Mirely to this new myth, it has undoubtedly contributed to the restoration of the political
e8itimacy of the administration, as reflected in the popularity of President Ramos. It is much
ttl°re attractive for citizens to identify personally with a country that can hold its own in Asia
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in terms of economie growth than with 'the Sick Man of Asia', as the Philippines was
perceived in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Despite a gradually improving image of government integrity and efficiency since the
EDSA revolution, surveys by the Social Weather Stations show that the general public
continues to perceive corruption in the ranks of government, including the judiciary, as one
of the major problems in Philippine society (Dayag and Laylo 1994:94-3:8, quoted in Aquino
1996:32-33). The moral credibility of politicians, government officials and Philippine society
as a whole is negatively influenced by continuous revelations of illegal activities on the part
of politicians, such as arms smuggle (De Guzman 1990), rape (Ilokos Governor Farinas 1993,
son of Governor Dy 1994, congressman from Mindanao, 1997), embezzlement of Government
Funds (Secretary of DOH 1996), murder and gambling (mayors in Cagayan Valley, 1992,
Mayor Sanchez of Calamba 1994), the awarding of government projects to relatives (DOH
secretary 1996, Sen. Maceda 1997), and perceived mis-allocations of public money, such as
the 49 million pesos spent on snacks by the members of the House of Representatives in 1993.
The latter case prompted particularly scathing columns by opinion leaders in the major
newspapers:
"No wonder Congressmen suffer from diarrhea. You eat P49 million worth of turon, or
banana wrapped in flour and you will. too. Turon is the poor man 's snack dripping in syrup
peddled by itinerant vendors....at best it sells at P5. = That means, every dayfor the last year,
each congressman ate J32 turons!.. .Last November, the House falso] bought 89 memorial plans
and 42 pension plans casting nearly P6.5 million.. .An ostentatious display ofdeath ? Not at all, if
you have lived a spartan life eating a hundred turons or so every day just sa you can serve the
public, you deserve to go in style.... What corruption? This is Rep. Marino Yulo talking. He is the
chairman of the House Committee on ethics. And hè wants to know what hè is supposed to
investigate \vhen reporters ask him if hè will do so... Yulo can investigate how congressmen
consumed P49 Million worth of turon and are about to consume several more millions for coffins
andflowers. We want him to hunt down bribers and grafters. There is more than probable cause
they can befound inplentiful numbers in the House " (Editorial comment, PDI Jan 31, 1994)
POLITICAL CLANS AND FAMILIES
As noted by McCoy (1992) and others (IPD 1992; Kerkvliet 1991; Wolters 1984; Wurfel
1988), family clans formed through real and ritual kinship, are the primary political
organizations for the establishment and maintenance of political power in the Philippines.
These clans are headed by a strong senior leader, usually a male (matanda in Tagalog, lakay
in Ilokano) and his following, or "led kindred, that is, all the persons who will support a leader
on the basis of being related to him, even though some may be more closely related to the
leader of an opposed kindred." (Fegan 1993:46). The Catholic religion, one Spanish legacy
that continues to exert a strong influence in contemporary Philippine society, combined with
the Filipinos' recognition of family ties right up to the fifth degree, has provided additional
means of establishing kinship. New ritual kin relationships are formed on major family
occasions such as a wedding or a baptism. Multiple patrons are invited to sponsor these
celebrations and in this way become relatives of the family. Not everyone can invite a mayor
or a congressman to sponsor his wedding.
Ritual kinship enables people from different social strata to address each other on equal
terms, using the affective term 'pare'. Nevertheless, this affectionate term needs to be used
with a sense of delicadeza (subtleness, sensitivity) between people of very different social
positions (wealth, political influence and age). The functional nature of kumpadrazgo is openly
acknowledged, but needs to be carefully managed as well. To avoid loss of face, both rich and
poor are expected to have the sensitivity to determine the level on which kumpare relations wil'
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work for them (see also the discussion below on the cultural value of hiya). Since politicians
have an extensive network of trusted fellow clan members among the landowning class, in the
business sector, and at lower elective positions, anyone can become a member of the 'led
kindred' (Fegan 1993) of a politician at his own level in the social hierarchy. The economie,
social and political functions of ritual kinship are openly referred to and are not considered at
odds with the affectionate connotation of becoming each other's 'kumpare' or 'kumare'. A
congressman delivering a speech for the newlyweds at their wedding party openly asserted his
role as their patron, saying:
"ifthere is any means by which I can assist you, either in a personal way or in my official capacity,
please do not hesitate to call on me." (Research diary, June 1993)
This functional nature of godfather relations holds true both for members of the economie and
political elite, to maintain and strengthen their position, and for the 'common tao' (people),
for whom kumpradazgo often has the function of an insurance policy that may be invoked if
the need arises. Although, in theory, these relationships can be activated or inactivated by
either party, this is seldom done openly. Rather, they may lie dormant for decades, until a
need or occasion arises where one of the parties considers the time ripe to remind the other
person of its existence.
LEGITIMACY THROUGH PATRONAGE AND BROKERAGE
The Institute for Popular Democracy (1992) and others (see e.g., Gutierrez 1994, McCoy
1993, Rutten 1994 and Thompson 1994) focus on the internal mechanisms at work in the
political system and, to a lesser extent, on its interactions with the bureaucracy. This
perspective is useful in explaining the political interference with the implementation of DENR
Policies described in the previous sections. Wurfel calls patronage politics a remedy for the
weak political and moral legitimacy of the State among the electorate through the establishment
°f an "indirect moral bond; local leadership is the crucial link between the mass and the
national elite" (Wurfel 1988:38). Rooted in, and modelled after, the historical relations
between local land-owning families and their clients, and reinforced by the political institutions
created during the building of the Philippine nation-state in the American colonial period (see
Section 7.2), the 'provincial elite compete among themselves for elective posts from national
{o municipal levels, and depend mainfy on the poor population for the votes. ..Candidates can
credibly present themselves to the electorate as indispensable conduits to state patronage,
thereby seeking 'Legitimacy through patronage' (Wurfel 1988:38)...Linked to this type of
Politics is the cultural frame of patronage and personaüzed reciprocity, and the image of the
Soodpatron... "(Rutten 1994:3).
The constituency to whom politicians must prove their worth to is not confmed to the poor
masses of the population, but includes elite interest groups upon whom politicians themselves
depend for their re-election. The maintenance of good relations with traders, other businessmen
and landlords is necessary to obtain initial campaign funds, because these entrepreneurs are the
local bridgeheads and vote-brokers of politicians, and are more in touch with the local situation
than Manila-onented politicians. Through economie ties (employment, informal credit,
ownership of tenanted land or residential lots) or through real and artificial kinship, these local
non-pol itical elite families can bring a politician voting blocks that are often as large as an
entire barangay. In return, the delivery of infrastructure projects and personalized assistance
in tirnes of need are part of Rutten's image of the good patron on the basis of which the rural
electorate, and their leaders measure politicians. The protection of local interest groups against
restrictions imposed by a national line agency like the DENR, which is charged with the
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protection of public resources agamst local overexploitation, is another such service rendered
by politicians. Local politicians representing their constituency in a larger body, be it the
Regional Development Council or the House of Representatives, are measured by the
effectiveness with which they defend the local, not the larger interest.
Boissevain (1969:379-386) distinguishes patronage from brokerage through the patron's
degree of direct control over the resources involved; patronage is concerned with protection
or helping a cliënt to óbtainfirst-order resources, i.e., those controlled by the patron himself.
Brokerage concerns assisted access to, or protection against, second-order resources, which
are controlled by persons other than the patron. In the performance of brokerage services, the
patron-politician undertakes to negotiate, on behalf of his cliënt, access to or protection against
these resources by managing relationships with the persons or institutions who have direct
control over these resources.
The personalized kumpadre relationship is central to patronage, in which a politician offers
direct financial assistance to a member of the clan, but is not required for a brokerage role,
where political power alliances of a less structural nature may replace the patron-client
relationship as the basis for the respective roles of broker and cliënt. Boissevain's definitions
(which basically originated in research on the Sicilian mafia) still need a Filipino cultural
dimension to replace the static, and top-down nature of relationships between patron and cliënt.
In the Philippines both patron and cliënt, rich and poor, must be mindful of the feelings and
behaviour associated with hiya. Often translated as 'sharne', this important aspect of Philippine
social relations is also associated with shyness, timidity, embarrassment or sensitivity (Bulatao,
1992:212). Neither of the parties in a relationship should publicly accentuate the disparity
between his power and that of the other, or the differences between their roles. 'Hiya'
motivates the poor to avoid contacts with the rich by which they are confronted with their own
"labels ofpoverty"üaough differences in "color of skin, condition ofone's teeth, posture and
gait, location ofone's home, workplace and school"'(Pinches 1991:178). On the other hand,
the observations Pinches made in a squatter settlement in Manila demonstrate that hiya is also
used by the poor as a counter-hegemonie instrument (ibid: 167). Rich people who ridicule them
or display patronizing forms of sympathy are referred to by the poor as no pansin (a person
who fails to recognize another person) or as matapobre, meaning that hè has a poor eye. The
ultimate damning qualification is to be referred to as walang hiya, a qualification which Bulatao
describes as "recklessness with regard to the social expectations of society and inconsideration
for the feelings of others, an absence of sensitivity to the censures of authority or society"
(Bulatao 1992:215).
Ruby Paredes eloquently argues that reciprocity and utang na loob (the inner sense of being
indebted to another person) are important values not only in equal social relationships but also
in the unequal dependency relation between patron and cliënt. Anyone who is perceived as
aloof and arrogant challenges the other person's sense of amor proprio, or dignity, which is
essential to make relationships work. "With reciprocity thus generating for each party o
continuous shift from giver to receiver, a bargaining dynamic becomes implicit in a successful
clientelist relationship" (Paredes 1989:50) As powerful as former Isabela governor Faustino
Dy was, hè fully realized the reciprocal element of his relationship with the electorale:
" ƒ do not have any power My power lies in the confidence the people have in me. Our system is
more patemal, it is the one we have adopted. We provide personalized services and in exchange
people are willing to support us". (Hon. Faustino N. Dy in PCIJ 1991:31)
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MODERN POLITICS, OLD PRINCIPLES
Ferdinand E. Marcos rose on the waves of politica! mobilization, identifying himself with a
newly emerging US-trained, technocratie, urban elite who regarded the old, landed families
frorn the rural areas who controlled the national legislature as backward and an obstacle to
national progress. Initially identifying himself with the forces pushing for social and agrarian
reform, however, hè gradually reinforced his position as the national Apo, the almost divine
boss of bosses. Fegan shows how rural clans and their leaders in the countryside "suffered a
Protracted eclipse" as a result of martial law, wnen the private armies of the magaling na
lalaki5 were disbanded by a powerful national army, and their networks proved of no use, as
°ne man pulled all the strings himself (Fegan 1993:88). Hence, Marcos did not end patronage
Politics but rather used it at the national level to build his own trusted oligarchy.
Today's leading political families in Cagayan Valley (see section 5.3.2) used to be among
the closest members of Marcos' political entourage, rising with him in political and economie
Prowess. The Cagayan Valley region, with its large Ilokano population, could be counted upon
as the Solid North, solid in support of fellow Ilokano President Marcos. How well-entrenched
these leaders were in their rural base became evident in the first elections after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution: in both 1987 and 1992, the large majority of representatives elected to congress
belonged to families previously associated with the Marcos regime (Gutierrez 1994f.
Using indicators such as the number of people who know their representative in Congress,
literacy rates, mass media exposure, and the lively interest among the population for national
and local politics, some would argue that the contemporary Philippine electorate is not as
Parochial as in the past (Wurfel 1988). In my view, however, these indicators offer no evidence
to counter the continued role of clientelism in elections. Describing the relationship between
urban squatters and political leaders in Metro Manila, Pinches examines democratie
Participation in the Philippines by analyzing the legitimacy base of its politicians. The poor
squatters of Tatalon legitimated national politicians primarily on the basis of the recognition
that, in order to win an election, a candidate has to spend a lot of money, and that they
thernselves simply do not have that kind of money (Pinches 1991:179). Other recognized
•ndicators of social status and leadership legitimacy in this poor community were credentials
gained through formal education and differences in consumption pattern. His fmdings
underscore the fact that even though only a minority of the Philippine electorate could still be
classifïed as parochial in orientation, this holds little information on the quality of democratie
Participation in the Philippines.
Drawing a parallel between elections and one of the most popular gambling sports in the
c°untryside, Rocamora (1995) and others point to the "cockfighting ethos" shared by voters
and candidates in elections, "...with the presidential race as the slasher derby rousing most
excitement. "(ibid:v\i). Local leaders expected to command a great many votes are courted by
Presidential 'bets' (Aguilar 1994), the personality symbols of temporary political alliances.
alliances are not formed on the basis of shared visions about how the country should be
. but on a combination of interpersonal chemistry and the prospects of obtaining a share in
tne spoils in the event of victory. Since support for the winner is the most crucial of the
that candidates for local government offices can expect from the national government,
Litcrally "very fine, true men" Males who get their way in contests with other men (Fegan. 1993:39)
6
- Benedict Andcrson. quoting Mojares in "The Dream Goes On", shows that even in the first elections after 20 years
"nartial law and the 1986 "People Power Revolution", 130 out of the 200 representatives elected to Congress belonged to
J*d'tional political families. (The survey was carried out by the Institute of Popular Democracy survey and appeared in the
"''ippine Daily Inquirer on 24 January 1988).
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the formation of final alliances between national and local campaigns remains uncertain until
the wola (likely underdog) and meron (likely winner) become more visible. As in the
cockfights, businessmen also invest in the campaign of the likely winner, hoping to see a return
on their investment once the fight is over. Only local leaders who can mobilize enough local
financial support can afford a prolonged wait-and-see period before picking their national
ticket. A national party might endorse a different local candidate, supporting him with funds
from the national campaign. Thus Philippine elections are not issue-based campaigns to win
voter support, but rather an expensive gambling game, in which temporary alliances of political
clans bet large amounts of money7, and the ultimate prize is control over state power and
resources (Aguilar 1994).
Modern, mass-based politics is a new twist on traditional patronage politics, but is not
incompatible with it. Media exposure has become a more and more important ingrediënt of a
successful election campaign, increasing voter insight into the distant world in which his
political representative operates. In my view, however, the fact that the Presidency, as well as
many seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives are occupied by comedians, movie
stars, sports heroes and other media personalities whose "onfy qualification is media exposure"
(Rocamora 1996:xxvi)8 is hardly indicative of a turnaround in traditional politics, but rather
underscores its endurance and viability in urban conditions. In the countryside, there is also
an important personality dimension to patronage politics; the voter knows the name of his
representative because of the popularity or tradition of the clan hè represents. In addition to the
tangible benefits delivered - especially as the elections come closer - the mystique of the
candidate's personality and charisma, built up by carefully staged, brief exposures, are also a
factor in rural elections.
Violence, or the credible threat of its use against those who venture to challenge the
authority of the May, continues to be an indispensable element of effective political power in
the Cagayan Valley region, both in brokerage aimed at the bureaucracy and in relations with
the client-electorate. If the benevolent patronage of opinion leaders in the electorale define the
popularity of a local politician, his credibility depends on muscle. Each local 'boss' finds his
own balance between the two, but neither one can entirely replace the other in effective local
leadership. According to McCoy, such 'warlordism' occurs especially in areas "where
instability wasfostered by the land frontier, protracted ethnic rivalry, or.. .[where]... local elites
formedprivate armies to defend their extraction ofnatural resources....-the basis for wealth
in many localities. After securing wealth and power in a locality through armed force,
provincial politicians can begin to barter votes to win both immunity from prosecution and
benefices in the farm of rents, cheap credit, or licenses" (McCoy 1993:15). This sequence
quite accurately describes the path to power of some of Cagayan Valley's most influential
political clans, as illustrated in Section 5.3.2. Many contemporary political leaders spring from
humble immigrant families, and rose to wealth and political prominence as recently as the
1970s. The founders of such 'dynasties' were brave men with powerful personalities who used
local politics as a springboard to higher public office, which could be used to establish an
"In the May 1992 polls, for mstance. to gel an entire slate of party candidates elected was estimated to cost more than
$ 100 million - nearfyfour times what it cost VS. President Bush to gel elected in 1988 - with estimates of the aggregate sul»
spenl in that campaign reaching $635 million" (Asiaweek 1992, cited m Aguilar 1994:177) ]
Former comedian Vicente Sotto garnered the highest number of votcrs m the 1992 Senatonal elections. Newly elected
Philippine President Joseph Estrada and Senator Ramon Kevilla used to hè action movie stars. Senator Freddie Webb was a
basketball star before jommg politics. In the 1998 elections another basketball hero, Robert Jaworski. and Ms. Loren Legarda.
until then a popular television journalist, were also elected in the Senate.
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independent economie base, some through the tobacco trade, others in the logging industry.
The descendants of these pioneer leaders are well educated and among the richest men in the
region, giving them the possibility to compete with contemporary forms of clientelism on the
political playing field.
SEIZING STATE RESOURCES: LOCAL VERSUS NATIONAL INTERESTS
The insights gained in this chapter point up the inadequacy of a bi-polar ' State-versus-local-
people' perspective, because of the different, often contradictory interest groups operating
within state institutions. Congressmen represent the state as much as policy makers,
bureaucrats and field officials, and the governors and mayors whom ei vil servants encounter
in the implementation of policies. These broad actor groups are themselves divided by conflicts
°f value and interest, too.
Members of the House of Representatives are elected through a winner-takes-all system of
fepresentation according to district. Thus national interest is guarded by politicians elected on
the basis of local, not national interest. In itself, however, this system does not create a weak
state led by a legislature which competes for national resources which are distributed over the
districts of the respective members, as demonstrated by the examples of the United States and
the United Kingdom, which also have a system of representation by district. Rocamora (1995)
attributes the weakness of the Philippine state to the continued influence of the United States
and other international actors on the nation-state after Philippine independence. In this view,
local leaders who were elected to the national level could not gain control of the nation state
due to these international interferences. Another factor frustrating Üie Representatives' hold on
the nation, in the perspective of Rocamora, was the American decision to create a presidential
forrn of government with a powerful chief executive.
In my view, the primary cause of the weakness of the State is precisely the opposite,
namely the fact that local strongmen have gained too much control of the state, using its
agencies to mobilize national resources for personal and local purposes. This principle holds
il all levels, as former President Marcos showed by granting TLAs to build and uphold his
Political alliances at the national level. Likewise, the short-term success of local politicians is
also determined by the degree to which they can use their influence to help entrepreneurs,
torest migrants and indigenous forest communities to gain access to the natural resources in
toeir area. Rather than the pursuit of a politically divisive socioeconomic reform agenda, the
°Ption to grant both the 'underprivileged' and private enterprise access to public resources is
an attractive avenue by which to deliver political results in return for electoral support. In so
d°ing, politicians repay a debt incurred during the last election campaign and lay the basis for
e-election (or for the election of a relative) the next time around. After elections,
representatives compete for national government resources that they need to reinforce their
'°cal legitimacy. By competing effectively for infrastructure funds and other budgetary
allocations (e.g., education and health), granting contracts and licenses to those who supported
them during the last elections, and protecting local people from negative impacts of national
Policies, local leaders prove their effectiveness as patrons of their constituency.
Por members of the House of Representatives, this continuous process of building,
^aintaining and shifting alliances is like playing chess on several boards at the same time.
Their power base comprises both national and local interest groups; at the national level, there
are the old boys' networks of lawmakers in Congress, with whom a congressman may need to
suPport certain legal initiatives unfavourable to his own constituency in order to secure for
heni, in return, the appropriations hè needs to deliver infrastructure and other projects. If
Unfavourable laws are passed, national politicians can return to their local chessboard, seeking
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the appointment of bata-bata (see Section 6.3.3) in key positions in the bureaucracy,
exemptions, and reinterpretations of these laws. Thus, many parts of the national territory and
electorate are 'owned' by local political leaders who succeed in "seizing the state"(Clark
Soriano, cited in Hedman 1994:19) This is the source of the fundamentally contrary roles of
locally elected politicians and nationally guided bureaucrats.
This notion of local versus national interests pro vides a new perspective on the concerted
efforts of the House of Representatives to develop a Local Government Code, in order to
'democratize access to the public domain' and to devolve DENR responsibilities and power.
Based on the Local Government Code, the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development
(PCSD) has successfully challenged the authority of the DENR as the principal guardian of the
natural resources on the island, and redefmed its role as a provider of technical assistance to
the PCSD in this task (pers. com, PCSD Chairman, 10/08/95) The successful efforts to curtail
the authority of the central government to issue Timber Licensing Agreements also parallels
this struggle for control over the use of natural resources between central and local government
units. Using the political bankruptcy of Marcos' policy to undo the power of local strongmen
and impose on the nation his own oligarchy, traditional political clans regained the initiative
in the House of Representatives. They succeeded in bringing about legislation to devolve more
resources and political and administrative power to the provinces.
The Local Government Code is aimed at correcting the longstanding imbalance in political
and economie power between "Imperial Manila" (Abesamis and Angelo 1995, quoted in Rood
1997:2) and the provinces. For centuries, Metro Manila syphoned resources and people away
from the provinces for purposes of a kind of 'national development' that widened the economie
gap between these urbanized centres and the rural periphery. It is questionable whether
devolution is the way to redress the resulting social and economie imbalances. In environmental
terms, devolution carries the risk of replicating the past national development pattern in the
provinces. The need for economie development, a priority for all elected officials in the poorer
countryside, is bound to increase pressures to mobili/e the 'untapped resources' of the logged-
over forest lands and the Pacific fishing grounds for short-term economie progress. The
chances of such a development pattern occurring are particularly realistic in the case of
Cagayan Valley. Due to its insignificant industrial sector, economie growth is concentrated in
growth centres, and the tax revenues of the Local Government Units rely strongly on
agriculture and associated processing and service agribusinesses. It remains to be seen whether
these new 'resource development' pressures will be balanced by a weakened DENR under the
new community-based resource management approach.
Before presenting some indications of how, in the aftermath of the corporate logging boom,
migrant labour and residual forest lands in the Sierra Madre are once again being mobilized
(Chapter 9), I will first examine more closely the historical roots of corporate logging and
forest migration, the two primary causes of deforestation in the Sierra Madre until 1990.
Chapter 7
The historical context of corporate logging
'«l Introduction
This chapter examines the historical roots of the corporate logging concept and the politica!
patronage and brokerage mechanisms which, as we saw in the previous Chapter, prevent
i°vernment officials in the DENR from dealing effectively with abuses committed by the
mdustry. Then, I move to the history of logging, especially focussing on the concept of large
scale, mechanized logging concessions, and the scientific thrust of arguments which for so
roany years were used to uphold the legitimacy of this forest management mode, in spite of
uicreasing signs of resource degradation and depletion. Finally, the role of the ethnic Chinese
m Cagayan Valley, perceived by many as the principal decision makers in the logging industry,
's discussed briefly and placed within the historical context of the position of this ethnic
minority within Philippine society.
With the exception of the monographs by Malumbres on the history of Cagayan, Isabela
and Nueva Viscaya and the more recent works by Keesing (1962) and De Jesus (1980), little
research work has thus far been conducted on the local history of Cagayan Valley. Insights
established in other regions, in particular central Luzon, have only limited relevance when it
comes to explaining developments in the Cagayan Valley, long isolated from the rest of Luzon
'v the mountain ranges surrounding it. Due to a higher population density, the proximity of
Metro Manila, and faster urbanization and industrialization, Central Luzon has always been
a more dynamic region, both socially and economically, than the vast and quiet plains of the
Cagayan River, where 80% of all households farm for a living.
Therefore, wherever possible my analysis is based on secondary sources, supplemented
w'th findings from my own limited archival research, as well as interviews with local people
'tth an interest in, and a knowledge of, the history1 of Region 02. More comprehensive
historical research will be required to complete and possibly correct my preliminary answers
0 the questions raised in this Chapter. Nevertheless, I was struck by the similarities between
descriptions of Cagayan Valley society during colonial rule and the situation I observed during
my own stay in the region, half a century after Philippine independence.
The search for the historical causes of contemporary events is not without risk. It is all too
•asy to 'reconstruct' a relationship between decisions and processes which, when seen in the
j'Iht of the facts and events of the times in which they took place, may not necessarily have
lnfluenced each other. And even if these links did prove to be entirely valid, this would in no
Way alter the responsibility of contemporary foresters, government officials, businessmen and
°Cal people for the way forest resources are managed today. In fact, tropical deforestation is
1 fairly recent problem in the Philippines, and even more so in the Cagayan Valley, where the
large-scale utilization of the Sierra Madre forests only began in the late 1960s. Nevertheless,
tnis chapter argues that the social and political processes behind the unsustainable utilization
3f the forests today can be better understood and dealt with in the context of their structural
Orilins in local history.
I am grateful to Rev Winfned Vermeulen, a Scheut missionary in the municipality of Solano. Nueva
who is himself preparing a se
Se"lernent history of Cagayan Valley.
Viscaya.  i  i l  i   cholarly work on the history of Nueva Viscaya, for his useful msights into the
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7.2 Historical dimensions of politica! patronage and brokerage
7.2. l Colonial rulers and the indigenous principalia
With the exception of forest tribes organized around family nuclei, such as the Agta (Griffm
1985; Headland 1986), Philippine pre-colonial society was already made up of social classes
who enjoyed different privileges with respect to mutual services. In 1583, Fr. Juan de
Plasencia, who studied the social structure of the country with the explicit goal of establishing
whether the findings could be used by Spain in the administration of its colony (W.H. Scott
1982), distinguished four so-called social 'estates':
Principales; a birthright aristocracy, with claims to services from the lower estates. The data,
or indigenous barangay leader2, always came from this group.
Hidalgos; 'free men', those who have acquired knighthood through payment or merit. The
hidalgos would pledge alliance to certain datus, but this was no guarantee of lifelong
loyalty; the datus had to prove their worth in the areas from which authority could be
derived, such as their sense of justice and their bravery in war.
Pecheros: the tribute-payers, sharecropping to pay back debts3. People from this estate would
have a birthright claim to cultivate a piece of land and pay 50% of their harvest to the
principales or the free men who collected the tributes for them.
Esclavos: the slaves, those without cultivation rights, owned by their masters.
The right to trial was reserved for those in the first and second estate, while the common
tribute-payers and slaves were totally dependent on their masters' interpretation of justice.
Chances of upward mobility were small, especially for those from the lowest estate, as
illustrated by the Filipino term timawa for someone who had been able to shrug off the burden
of slavery and become a free man. This term means as much as 'o/ze who escapes death by
chance, like someone who survives a hanging-sentence because the rope breaks' (W.H. Scott
1982:103)4
The earliest surviving Ibanag dictionary, compiled by Fr. José Bugarin (quoted in W.H.
Scott, 1994), indicates that lowland villages in Cagayan appear to have recognized only two
social sdtrata: the kammaranan or chief and the buwit, or tribute. Unlike the principalia in
other parts of the Philippines, the kammaranan could not distinguish himself by nobility, but
only through bravery in raids against other villages and the Kalinga tribes in the uplands - in
Ybanag the word 'Kalinga' was equivalent to 'enemy' and later acquired the connotation 'non-
Onginally the term datu meant captain, just as the term barangay onginally meant boat. Fr.Placencia relates the
seafaring notion of these terms to the pnvsihle arnval of the Philippines' Malay population by boat W H Scott, on the
other hand. assumes that the term boat actually stands for the one family from which barangays generally came. and where
the datu reigned with the uncontested authority of a ship's captain (W.H. Scott 1982:110).
W.H. Scott writes that, "although the ptcheros could not be legatly sold. their debts could be transferred from
one creditor to another, for profil and to their detriment" (W H. Scott 1982:107) A similar system appears to be at work
in the contemporary Cagayan Valley. In the late 1980s. for example, a hacienda in Isabela was sold by the heirs of the
deceased landlord. The 'righl to conduct business' with tenants was part of the deal. The credit accounts of the tenants
were handed over to the new owners. together with the land . the new landowner acquired the exclusive right to engage in
erop collaterals with the tenants, even though the land had already been mies in their name under agranan reform (see also
Chapters 8 and 9) Platteau (1995) calls this system of debt transfer charactenstic for areas where patron-client relations or
other permanent labour-tymg arrangements are at work
It is unclear whether this term applies as much to sixteenth-century lowland barangays m Cagayan as it did,
according to W.H. Scott (1982 and 1994) to Pangasman and the Islamic southern regions of the Philippines.
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Christian' - and by his wealth and ability to feed others in times of need. (W.H. Scott 1994'
267).
Despite stiff resistance, Spain managed to establish and maintain a garrison at the lower
Cagayan town of Lallo (then called Nueva Segovia) in 1595, 24 years after its authority had
been established in Manila. But the task of bringing this distant province of the colonial empire
under control by military means alone was not feasible: not only had Spain's armies become
thinly spread over the archipelago, few Spanish residents were looking forward to being
stationed in an area that was known to be "Very hilly and its air very unhealthy because of its
vast virginforests, as well as its still uncultivated terrains; to this effect must be attributed the
intermittent f evers prevailing endemicalfy there, which infallibly affect newcomers, while the
savages hardlyfeel their effects" (Mallat 1846:146). Moreover, Cagayan was a long sea voyage
away from Manila, and its indigenous lowland and forest tribes had a reputation for being a
"very strong and warlike people" (Keesing 1962:176), who lived in dispersed, inaccessible
communities with various cultural backgrounds and languages. They were constantly engaged
in inter-village feuds and did not recognize a single local leader, let alone a foreign leader,
above them (De Jesus 1980:115; W.H. Scott 1994:268). The only known exception to this rule
was the Ybanag Lord Guiab, who lived in Calamaniugan, some five kilometres away from
Lallo, and was described as respected among the other braves as a lord who "ruled his men like
a great captain, rewarding them with great largesse at others' expensefrom the much hè had
looted, and punished any liberty or disrespect they showed him with great rigor or for not
obeying the orders hè gave them"(Fr. Aduarte 1640, cited in W.H. Scott 1994:270). Thinking
they might gain in popularity by relieving the indios of this oppressive leader, the local Spanish
military decided against establishing friendly relations with him. After Guiab had demonstrated
his respect and friendly intentions by sending them rice, meat and other products of the land,
hè was invited to the Lallo garrison, captured and hanged. This early case of
"tnisunderstandings at the acculturation frontier" (Keesing 1962:210) deepened social divisions
among the local population, leading some communities to side with the Spanish in order to take
revenge on others, complicating the already volatile atmosphere.
Thus to gain control of Cagayan Valley, the cooperation of the leaders of each separate
tribe and faction had to be secured. Notwithstanding the noble intentions behind the decree of
King Philip II in 1594 to accept the indigenous leaders, treat them well and seek cooperation
with them, it was also unmistakably practical. Spain needed to collect taxes from the various
cultural communities in the archipelago. The earnings in the Galleon trade were neither secure
nor high enough to fmance the colonial administration in the islands; tributes might well
Provide a more stable revenue basis. The cooperation of recognized principalia selected from
atnong the indigenous elite, who were already used to receiving services and tributes from the
°rdinary people, was indispensable for the collection of these tributes. The scheme was
°rganized through so-called encomienda grants. "Originally a grant of lands in a conquered
country, it was soon extended to include the natives dweiling thereon, who were compelled to
W the land for the conqueror's benefit "(B&R in Benitez 1969:205). People who had been
instrumental in the Spanish conquest of the Philippines were given the right to collect tributes
from the population in their domain. The encomienda system was given legitimacy by offering
Christian education and a judiciary in return, just as Spain's overall "exercise of imperia!
Quthority was deemed secondary to the project of evangelization" (Rafael 1988:155-156) By
involving the religious orders in the pacification of the countryside, taxpayers could be
fegistered and proselytization served in the process. In addition to a judiciary and protection,
the indios were also given religious instruction in exchange for their tributes.
The first Dominican friars arrived in 1595, the same year that the military garrison in Lallo
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was established. A 19" century description of the conditions in which these young Spanish
farmer's sons were trying to bring the Cagayanos into the fold of the Catholic Church shows
the hardships they must have endured in these early years: "It is well known that Dominican
fathersfell gravely UI when they reach the missions, until they erected stone housesfor them. The cool
wind at night, loaded with dew and other exhalations of the mountains, easily penetrates the slits of the
wooden boards or bamboo walls of the usual run ofhouses. This irregular climate saps the energy and
causes the usual ailment suffered by the missionaries, the so-called spasm or a violent and involuntary
contraction of the muscles. It is a kind of burning fever which sometimes causes death or puts the
patiënt at the brink of death" (Zuniga 1973, or. 1893:410 )
The Dominicans also made note of the "tyranny " which the indigenous leaders exercised
over their people (De Jesus 1980:111); landownership was uneven, and the chiefs were
basically entitled to require the services of their subordinate fellow villagers at any time. But
these qualifïcations may not have been entirely objective, in view of the way they were used
by the Spanish administration to justify colonial rule, and the manner in which Filipino workers
themselves were treated. Both Filipino and Spanish writers of the colonial era describe the
maltreatment, slavery and exploitation of the indio workforce. As far back as the early
seventeenth century, concerns were raised in Spain about the "evils done to them "(De los Rios
Coronel 1620 in Benitez 1969:211) and the danger of the "complete destruction of the Indians"
(Hurtado de Corcuera, 1636 in ibid:2lO). Working conditions were harsh, especially on the
galleons and in the industries required to build them. Shipbuilding islands became depopulated
as workers died on the job, fled into the mountains, or even became illegal overseas workers.
Of the 75 Filipino sailors on board the galleon 'Espiritu Santo' arriving in Acapulco in 1618,
only seven showed up for the return voyage to Manila. The tendency among Filipino sailors
to stay behind in Nueva Espana not only created manpower problems for the shipbuilding
industry in the Philippines, it also caused diffïculties of an entirely different kind for Spanish
export industries: "In Nueva Espana there are so many ofthose Indians who coraefrom the Filipinas
Islands, and who are engaged in making palm wine... that it will in time become a part reason for the
natives of Nueva Espana, who now use the wine that comesfrom Castilla, to drink none except what
the Filipinos make..." (de Pineda 1619, translated by B&R, in Benitez 1969)
The Spanish administration of Cagayan Valley destabilized an already tense relationship
between lowland communities and the uplands. There had al way s been occasional skirmishes,
as upland tribes came down to hunt in the grazing areas where herdsmen of the Gaddang tribe
pastured their cattle. In revenge for cattle rustling, brave men from the lowlands would engage
in upland raids, settling their own internal power struggles in the process. But such conflicts
were interspersed with peaceful periods, during which the inhabitants of the forest lands
bartered honey, beeswax and game meat for tobacco and rice produced in the lowlands.
Lowlanders would turn to forest-based traditional healers and aniteros, the shamans whom the
Ybanag believed to be in contact with the anitos. This was the term used by the Friars to refer
to all objects of indigenous worship. Animist devotion encompassed both benevolent anitos for
fertility, health, weather and warfare, as well as others who were feared because of their power
to cause illness, erop failure, death, or defeat at the hands of the enemy (W.H. Scott 1994:270)
This ambivalent relationship between individual lowland and upland communities turned
into a regional and more structured conflict as the forest lands became the refuge of untaxed
Filipinos, pagan believers and 'free' tobacco (see the next section). The Friars spearheaded the
reduccion, Spain's policy of concentrating Cagayan's scattered communities into a smal'
number of lowland towns, under the bells of the Catholic Church. The establishment of these
new settlements, typically built around a central plaza with the Church on one side, and the
worldly powers in the form of the town hall and the court of justice on the other, was a
monument to Spain's efforts at pacification. To force those inside the forest lands to corne
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down and submit to Spanish rule and religion, contacts between forest inhabitants and lowland
communities were discouraged, and trade with the upland villages was declared illegal (De
Jesus 1980:116-117). Government troops organized raids (entradas) into the mountains to
capture infieles or destroy their villages. The willingness of the Dominicans to accept their
share of the task of eliminating the mountain refuges of pagan culture is reflected in the
seventeenth-century account of the Dominican Bishop Diego Aduarte:
"In the province ofNueva Segovia, the religious laboured hard in the search through the mountains
and valleys, and other secret places, for the huts where the devil had been adored.... The natives
dared not take anythingfrom those places, or cut a reed or a tree from the natural growth of the
earth in them for fear of death.. .In the villages on the coast many such linie huts werefound, with
many little figures and idols in them. The religious burnt and broke the box.es with the offerings;
took the gold and the stones, and all the other offerings; and burnt and ground to dust everything,
and cast it into the sea5". (Translated by Blair and Robertson, in Keesing 1962:188)
The official justification for these raids into the forest lands was the need to bring Christianity
to the pagans living there, as well as the security threat they represented to 'pacified'
communities already living in the new settlements. Economie motives were of increasing
significance as the upland-lowland conflict escalated. At the end of the eighteenth century,
when Cagayan Valley became a source of export-quality tobacco leaves, qualified labour was
scarce. Since the existing farmlands were surrounded by extensive areas with agricultural
potential, the leaking of labour into the forest lands was economically counterproductive. To
maintain their income in tributes and ensure that their lands were cultivated, the religious and
administrative elite needed to discourage the buwit, or ordinary people, from running away,
not only by treating those who stayed well, but also by demonstrating their determination and
ability to punish those who fled, and were branded 'rebels'.
Through the entradas and the proclamation that all economie contacts between lowland
communities and uplanders were illegal, the principalia not only used state resources and
instruments to serve private labour interests, but also achieved a monopoly on the trade in
pagan products. The upland raids deterred others from leaving the lowlands and served the
desire of local leaders' to prove their bravery and gain social status; at the same time, they
were a vehicle by which to bring illegal forest products back to the lowlands. The ban on trade
with the uplands made these items scarce, and hence more expensive, while the Spanish
authorities were willing to turn a blind eye on contraband trade by the principalia in exchange
for maintaining stability and good relations with them (de Jesus 1980:118).
In the view of Wurfel (1988:4), following Constantino (1978), the pre-Hispanic elite lost
its self-confïdence together with its Malay cultural roots, as a result of its partial assimilation
into the colonial government. The psychological and cultural impact of datu participation in
Spain's exploitation of their communities must have been feit even more strongly after the first
Philippine war of independence. During the Spanish period, however, their collaboration
reinforced their leadership and brought them considerable economie gains. In addition to the
traditional patronage basis under their leadership, the colonial administration gave principalia
Ironically. a similar fate would hefall the religious orders themselves during the Philippine Revolution.
Worcester's accounts should hè assessed with care. in view of his ohvious lack of sympathy for the way Spain
admimstered the Philippmes. Nevertheless. I consider his book a valuable reference on the issue, because of the
quotations it contams of eyewitness accounts of the conquest of Cagayan Valley by the Katipunan. led by Simeon Villa,
in which the pillagmg of the convents. and the torture and humihations suffered by the friars are described in detail
(Worcester 1914:170-205). In central and southern Luzon. resentment agamst the Friars. particularly among educated.
nationalist Filipinos, was an important source of social unrest underlying the Revolution (Conolly. 1992).
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the means of brokerage between the local level and higher authorities to sustain and legitimize
their position6.
The fiïst contours of the added brokerage role for the indigenous elite are visible in their
position as intermediaries between the colonial administration and the people, as we saw in this
section. By the end of the eighteenth century a ban, and later a Government monopoly, on the
cultivation of tobacco, one of the region's principal agricultural products, created new
opportunities for recognized members of the indigenous elite to perform brokerage services and
consolidate their hold on the scarce agricultural labour force.
7.2.2 The Tobacco Monopoly
During the two-year period when Britain occupied the Philippines, Spain came to see how
vulnerable its hold on the colony was, due to the dependence of the colony's public budget on
the capital shipped from New Spain by the galleons. This umbilical cord between Manila and
Acapulco had been severed, exposing the colony's dependence on this source of income. Thus
after regaining control of the Philippines in 1764, Spain was conscious of the need to develop
alternative sources of income from the colony. This was not easy; the Spanish residents in the
Philippines were not particularly interested in developing agriculture or other natural resources
there. Twelve years after Spain had re-established its rule over the Philippines7, a French
visitor to 'the Manillas' referred disapprovingly to the state of the economy:
"They never cultivale or reap but for their annual feast. and most dreadful want is sometimes
attended by a dangerous secunty situation. The inhabitants, without emulation or motive, and y'et
labouring under the desire, which all men have, ofenriching themselves, turn all their views and
hopes towards the galleon, which saus every yearfor Acapulco... When it departs, for the dangers
to which it is exposed, though they do not attempt to remedy them; there are public prayersfor its
safe arrival; ifit returns, the news occasions joy throughout the whole island; but ifit is delayed.
fear and constemation invade all minds, and the report of its loss is a public calamity, which
spreads dejection and despair" (Msgr. Sonnerat, Voyage a la Nouvelle Guinee, 1776. In: Pinkerton
1807:538)
In 1781, encouraged by reports of the successful operation of a tobacco monopoly in Mexico,
Governor General Basco announced exclusive government control of the manufacture and trade
in tobacco products in the Philippines8. The purpose of the monopoly was to raise tax income
from the production and consumption of tobacco. According to Spain's crown attorney in
Manila there was considerable fiscal promise in this idea, as Filipinos were said to "learn to
smoke bef ore they learn to drink9" (De Jesus 1980:29 & plates after page 98). The hardship
The terms patronage and brokerage have been defined in the previous Chapter
Britain surrendered the city of Manila on March 17. 1764. after signing a peace treaty ending the Seven Years
War between Spain and England
The long delay between Spain's return to power in the Philippines and the eventual establishment of the
Monopoly was caused by the cash strapped state of the island government in the first few years after British occupation
There were insufficient funds to purchase tobacco leaves and to pay Monopoly officials (De Jesus 1980:30).
An observation that was confirmed by an American visitor after a visit to Cagayan Valley around 1920:
*Evervwhere in the country I was impressed with the fact that tobacco is a necessity rather than a luxury to the Filipmo
When the baby cnes. the husy mother doesn'l look aboutfor a rubber mpple She sticks a big cigar mto the baby s mouth
and goes on with her weavtng Children offive puffaway at cigars as big as candles and strong enough to knock a man
<fown"(Boycend:ll9)
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caused by the monopoly hit Cagayan hard: the cultivation of tobacco was banned here, to
prevent the smuggling of 'free' tobacco into the Monopoly's principal production area of
Bulacan and Gapan (Nueva Ecija). When Cagayan's provincial governor heard of the plans to
ban the cultivation of tobacco in his province, hè realized how difficult this was going to be:
"Although all over the islands tobacco generally serves as their bread and wine, in this province
of Cagayan, because ofits dimate and very humid condition, tobacco is the most effective medicine
for all their deficiënties" (Don Mariano José Mariano Cubells, Alcalde of Cagayan, 1785. In: De
Jesus 1980.128)
For almost twenty years, Cagayanos were not allowed to cultivate tobacco, even for their own
subsistence use. Not only did this decision deprive farmers of their traditional source of cash
'ncome, they were also obliged to buy this product from government tobacco stores. Widespre-
ad hardship arnong the population was the result, exacerbated by a number of natural disasters
and epidemics. Despite its vast areas with good soil and the fertile sediments deposited there
by the annual flood of the Cagayan River, people began to leave the province for Manila, in
search of employment as servants, soldiers and other casual employment (see 8.3.1).
The ban on tobacco cultivation increased tensions between the 'controlled' lowlands and
the free uplands, where tobacco cultivation was expanding, stimulated by a profitable
contraband trade with the lowlands. Indios in the lowlands were scrambling to fmd alternative
cash crops with which they could pay for their purchases at the estanquillos, or government
tobacco shops. Rice and white corn, the staple subsistence crops which people traditionally
grew, were replaced by cash crops and eventually became cash crops themselves, as areas like
Bulacan gradually developed shortages of food crops as a result of tobacco cultivation for the
Monopoly. The Monopoly also reinforced social inequalities in lowland society, whereby the
native elite were again the ultimate winners. A tobacco police force (the resguardo) was
aPpointed from among the principalia to enforce the Monopoly in the province.
In 1797 the San Francisco hacienda in Ilagan became the first Friar estate to be given
Permission to cultivate tobacco for the Monopoly. The decision could not fail to meet with
success, as the region had the ideal growing conditions for the plant. In fact, the Tobacco
Monopoly only became a profitable government enterprise after Cagayan Valley had been
designated a tobacco-growing area ,and its products were in great demand in Europe. From the
early nineteenth century until the end of the monopoly in 1880, Cagayan Valley's tobacco
output increased steadily, stabilizing at around 500,000 fardos10 per year (De Jesus 1980). This
means that prior to the American take-over of the Philippines, some 50,000 ha of lowland
farms were producing tobacco for the Monopoly (see Chapter 8).
The subservience of ordinary people towards their leaders which, as we have seen, existed
before the arrival of Spanish rule, was reinforced by the sudden rise in the demand for tobacco
from the Cagayan Valley. Since labour was so much scarcer than land and the demand for
agricultural products was rising quickly, as it had done during the early nineteenth century,
landowners were inclined to devise ways of binding labourers to them. In his framework for
the analysis of changes in patron-client relationships, Platteau (1995) proposes three other
variables - in addition to the scarcity of unskilled labour - which determine the resilience of
these relationships or their transformation into other labour tying arrangements: other
economic opportunities for the rural elite, the skills required to grow the erop, and the Ie vel
°f social control exercised by the elite over the workers. Where economic opportunities were
One fardo (or a quintal) of tobacco equals 100 'sticks' of 50 leaves each. and weighs approximately 46 kg.
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concerned, tobacco was the best way of earning a cash income following the prolonged period
of hardship in Cagayan Valley. From a skills point of view it also made sense to try and
establish more structural ties between labourers and landowners: tobacco growing is labour-
intensive and skill undeniably translates into leaf quality. The social hold of the elite on the
workers was also strong enough to allow them to rely on the labour of the ordinary people, as
we saw earlier. I believe that from the moment that Cagayan starled to produce tobacco for the
Monopoly, traditional forms of patronage, whereby commoners occasionally provided their
leaders with labour, evolved into more structural labour-binding arrangements, such as the
personalized relationship of patronage between landowners and sharecrop tenants. The State
provided landowners with various kinds of institutional support to reinforce these asymmetrical
labour-tying arrangement. By giving a small group of outstanding farmers privileged positions
with the monopoly as leaf-graders, the landowners seeded their peons within the social circles
of the cultivators. When tobacco growers brought their leaves to the warehouses of the
Monopoly, they were at the mercy of the graders, who could undergrade the leaves and keep
the monopoly prices for particular classes of leaf quality outside the reach of the farmers. The
traders were backed up by the tobacco police, who were not only despised because they
protected corrupt graders, but also "because they brought along friends and relatives on their
inspection tours and requisitioned provisions for the entire retinue, paying for the cows,
carabaos and chickens they appropriated less than afourth of their market value" (De Jesus
1980:145)
In addition to the resguardo, government officials were also becoming involved in the
tobacco trade, either directly or through agents. They extended credit to tobacco farmers during
the cropping season, in exchange for payment in tobacco leaves; they then sold them to the
Monopoly at guaranteed prices, making a handsome profil11. The tobacco monopoly thus
rewarded cooperating members of the indigenous elite with new means of reinforcing their
wealth and influence, and Iransforming Iheir pre-colonial righl to demand occasional services
from their subjects into slructural labour bonds for the produclion of specified cash crops.
The demise of ihe Monopoly, by ihe end of ihe nineleenth century, and the subsequent
emergence of a new elile of pioneer immigrant farmers and merchants, did not structurally alter
this system. Wilhout challenging the basic social configuration of a small elile lording over a
large majority of poor agriculturalists, new leaders gradually look over ihe posilions vacated
by the traditional landowning elite in the lowlands. The political implicalions of ihe expanding
brokerage role of local leaders remained limiled as long as ihe only posilion open to a Filipino
was Ihat of gobernadorcillo or town mayor, and Ihe only persons enlilled lo casl Iheir vole for
Ihis posilion were their fellow principalia, landed people who could afford the poll lax (Wurfel
1988). This changed during Ihe American occupation of the Philippines, when Ihe United States
began to build up a Philippine nation-slale, using Ihe blueprint of its own system of democratie
representation.
Similar practices occurred m the sixties and seventies when the Philippine Tobacco Authonty and the
National Food Authonty offered guaranteed prices for tobacco and gram respectively.
I am using the term 'Filipino' here as a genene term for all groups indigenous to the Philippines. what the
Spanish reterred to as indios. During Spanish rule. only people of Spanish descent but born m the Philippines were
called Filipmos. Their positron in the social hierarchy of those days was just below the 'Peninsulares'. the Ibenan
Spanish who comprised the ruling class (Constantino 1992)
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7.2.3 The introduction of mass politics and district representation
"The nature of the nonpolitical patron-dient relationship which typically exists between landowners
and tenants in the rural Philippines is highly relevant to any analysis of the political system, not
only because landownership is so often combined with political leadership but also because this
reciprocal-aid relationship between super-ordinate and sub-ordinate, a social pattern that long
antedates the introduction ofnational elections in the Philippines. hos been taken over almost intact
into the political system" (Lande 1964:12)
From its early years of governance of the 'Philippine Islands' on, the United States attached
great importance to the establishment of Philippine government institutions. Aside from the
noble, albeit paternalistic motive to ''préparé the Philippines for a greater measure ofpopular
self-govemmenf (Malcolm 1936 in Bootsma 1986:13), more strategie motives also played an
important role in the early efforts of the United States government to pursue with vigour local
institutional development. In the United States itself, there was only fragile popular and
political support for the American presence in the Philippines, which was perceived by many
as a violation of the United States Constitution. Successive U.S. governments were forever
balancing its economie and security interests in the Asia Pacific Region on the one hand, and
domestic political vulnerability in the Senate and House of Representatives on the other hand,
where the Democratie Party opposed government policies involving a prolonged American
occupation of the Philippines.
After the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905, Republicans also starled to consider the
option of Philippine independence, to avoid being drawn into a war with Japan over these
strategically located islands. Within ten years, the groundwork for a new Philippine legislature
had been laid. But when the Democrats first lost their majority in Congress in 1918 and then
the presidency in 1921, the Republican President Harding, a professed opponent of Philippine
independence, stalled the process. In 1935, when Japan was again flexing its military muscles
and decided to attack Shanghai, American lawmakers passed the Tydings-McDuffy Act, setting
a definite timetable for Philippine independence. Manuel Quezon was elected President of the
Predecessor of the Republic, the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands. Just before the
outbreak of the Second World War, Quezon made a final effort to keep the Philippines out of
the imminent war between the United States and Japan by proposing to advance the date for
Philippine independence (Bootsma 1986:102). The Japanese occupation of the Philippines in
1942 led to another four years of delay in the 'redemption' of the Philippine Republic declared
by General Emilio Aguinaldo on June 12, 1898.
Until the end of Spanish rule, democracy was limited to the election of the gobernorcillo
(town mayor) by a selected group of principalia, consisting of barangay captains and
distinguished former holders of elective office (May 1989). Their power was naturally
restricted to the municipal level, as access to provincial and national levels of government was
the prerogative of Spanish citizens. The power of a mayor was based on his credibility with
his peers, who all lived in the poblacion, the administrative, religious and economie centre of
the municipality. The United States government envisioned the gradual enlargement of the
electorate and the number of elective government positions. Higher leadership positions that
hecame elective were the provincial governorship in 1903, membership of the National
Assembly in 1907, and the Philippine Senate in 1916. Property qualifications were eliminated
ar>d general voting rights granted to males over 18 years of age in 1935; women were not
included until four years later. By abolishing the poll tax and prioritizing mass education,
ordinary citizens were also encouraged to vote (Wurfel 1988).
In the 1930s, a 'nouveau riche' category of merchants and entrepreneurs joined the race
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for provincial and national political office. Cagayan's immigrant merchants, many of them
mestizo Chinese, had built up their economie base after the collapse of the Tobacco Monopoly
in 1880. Most towns in Cagayan Valley had Chinese sari-sari stores, where the retailing of
general merchandise was combined with informal moneylending services (De Jesus 1980:191)
The increasing economie and political influence of these 'political adventurers' presented a
challenge to the long-standing monopoly which the indigenous aristocracy had on local
government offices, which rested on their indispensable role as intermediaries between the
Spanish authorities and their own local clients:
"The period ofpapeletas (credit papers issued by the cash-strapped Monopoly, GT) in the 1860s
and the monopoly 's abolition m 1880 exposed the Cagayan principales to these new farces. In the
economie field, enterprising Chinese traders challenged them for control of provincial commerce.
In politics, aggressive parvenus, exploiting the opportunities openedbyfree trade in tobacco, used
their wealth to capture local political power "(Dz Jesus 1980: 201)
The old elite voluntarily retired from the competition for public positions it no longer deemed
respectable, because of the many political neophytes who were gaining access to elective
offices (De Jesus 1980:192). Because they owned most of the agricultural lands, they
nevertheless mamtained indirect political influence through the extended followings of their
tenants. Later in the twentieth century, as landownership declined in economie and political
significance, mis informal influence of Cagayan's indigenous, landed lowland tribes would
decline still further, as they were increasingly outnumbered - and economically outperformed -
by immigrant farmers and merchants seizing the opportunities offered by an expanding, more
capital-intensive agricultural sector (see Ch 8).
The democratie impact of American efforts to expand popular participation in Philippine
government was confounded by the decision to opt for a winner-takes-all representation by
district, styled after the United States system of government. Anderson (1988, following a line
of argument presented earlier by Kerkvliet and Larkin) notes that this system gave local
leaders, wealthy landowners and entrepreneurs the opportunity to use their clientèle as a
springboard to gain access to the State. As the electorate for higher office was too large to
manage through the personalized patron-client relationships alone (Lande 1964), and the costs
of election campaigns were growing accordingly, economie wealth and the brokerage functions
increased in importance: access to the public budget and resources was another means to
patronize a growing electorate. However, it was still up to the voter to supply the patron and
his clan with a recognizable form of help. The American policy of extending the number of
elective offices not only upward, but also downward provided an avenue for doing so. Under
the elective position of municipal mayor, the barangay captains and their councilmen also
became dependent on popular vote. In order to be assured of the popular support of a larger
electorate, trusted members of the clan were sponsored in order to get them into these lower-
level positions. In return for the open endorsement and financial support of the leader of a clan,
these local politicians mobilized popular support for the election of the clan leader at a higher
level of public office. Election campaigns for these more prestigieus and powerful offices were
much costlier than those at the local level This meant that only leaders with a sizable 'led
kindred'13 (Fegan 1993) had a chance of getting access to provincial or national power and
See section 6.4 for brief discussions of the Fegan's use of the term 'led kindred'
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resources: "Politica! families under their matanda"1 - together with factions composed of
alliances of such families under an effective leader- became the mam political units in the
countryside" (Lande 1964:50)
As a result of the creation of a national legislature composed of district representatives, a
new phenomenon appeared in Manila: a Filipino ruling class (Anderson 1988.11). Unlike the
distant Manila elite of Spanish tunes, these families were firmly rooted in the countryside. To
a large extent, the success of local leaders in higher elective offices was defmed by the
effectiveness with which they were able to appropriate provincial or national resources for local
purposes. As a result, the national legislative debate revolved mainly around district
competition for national resources, both ftnancial and natural. Consecutive presidents have had
to respond to these local claims by forging brittle alliances with these local leaders in the
legislature. The use of national means and resources for local patronage politics became a
cornmon element in contemporary Philippine politics. This was what Governor Taft saw
coming when hè warned the members of the first National Assembly not to adopt "the most
marked evil of American politics: the spoils system" (Taft 1901 in Bootsma 1986:14).
The mobilization of public resources for local electoral purposes, already found in 19th
century accounts of local elections in Batangas, for example (Paredes 1989: 29-34) appears to
have expanded after the declaration of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935. In the five years
after its establishment, government expenditure increased by 250 percent, with the share of
public works, outlays and investments increasing from 10% to 40% of total government
disbursements. Only 10% of the funds were earmarked for the provinces, chiefly for the
construction of 'barrio roads'. Secretary of Finance Antonio de las Alas told James Weldon
Jones, the insular auditor and acting High Commissioner that these provincial projects were
"park... they were not projects that would last past a few rains or a typhoon; that is was for
election purposes". Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon said of these projects that 'ït
gave the humble ones a little money" (Nakano 1996:12). In 1991, one year before the
synchronized elections were scheduled to be held, the House of Representatives approved the
establishment of a Countryside Development Fund (CDF). The fund, quickly dubbed the Pork
Barrel, enables senators and members of the House to finance development activities in their
constituencies directly.
By 1993, 2.95 billion pesos ($105 million) was allocated to the Countryside Development
Fund, or 12.5 million pesos for each member of the House of Representatives, 18 million for
each Senator and 20 million for the Vice-President (Clarke 1995:78). Clarke notes that the use
of the Countryside Development Fund for the maintenance of patronage-based politics "enables
Politicians to reward NGOs and POs that provide electoral and other farms of support". In
section 5.3.2 we saw how a political family was able to use its CDF funds directly to maintain
its hold on a seat in the House of Representatives. Public money may be channelled into a
Private election campaign through CDF-funded projects or by setting up new NGOs to build
goodwill for the candidate by means of development assistance and dole-outs. Through a
combination of overpricing and rigged bidding procedures, other CDF-funded infrastructure
projects may be granted to a contractor closely associated with the family. In exchange for his
favoured status, the contractor pledges to deposit excess funds directly into the campaign fund.
How well the historical legacies of political patronage and brokerage have been woven into
the fabric of modern mass-based elections was illustrated by the visit of President Corazon
In Tagalog. matanda hterally means 'old man', hut lts political connotation is that of an adult. married male who
has grown children. is head of his own household. and can speak for it m public affairs because his father is dead or
Politically retired (Fegan 1993).
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Aquino to Cagayan Valley in the run-up to the 1992 elections. For nearly two decades, the
Governor of Isabela, Faustino N. Dy, had been one of Cagayan Valley's most influential
politicians, commanding the Solid North vote in favour of the Marcos administration; his
support would mean certainty over a considerable share of Cagayan Valley's approximately one
million votes. The outgoing governor was courted by all the candidates running for the
presidency. They all pledged financial support15 for the election campaign of the Governor's
own candidates for lower elective offices, including three of his sons who were running: one
to succeed him, one for congressman and one for mayor of Cauayan, the clan's political home
base.
In the year before the elections, President Cory Aquino helped the old governor Dy to
realize what hè called "the obsession ofthepeople of Isabela", a new provincial capitol costing
over 12 million dollars. Within a year, she made two visits to Isabela, and pledged another 40
million dollars for the rehabilitation of the Maharlika nighway connecting the National Capitol
Region and the North. These gestures were all the more remarkable because Dy used to be a
close friend of Benigno Aquino, but had given up his resistance to the Marcos family in the
early seventies, becoming one of its staunchest supporters, even after the murder of his
erstwhile friend in 1983.
On the day Mrs. Aquino came to Ilagan to formally inaugurate the building, an improvised
plywood marker with the words 'Ninoy Aquino Lake' had been placed in the pond that had
naturally formed between the National Highway and the elevated new Provincial Capitol. The
fact that public funds - from the Presidential Special Fund - were in fact mobilized for political
purposes, namely to secure support from the Solid North for the campaign of her anointed
successor Fidel Ramos was openly referred to when
"the President reminded the Isabelinos that P2 billion worth of infrastructure had been built in the
province dunng her term. Dy said his province mates knew how to repay a debt of gratitude... This
is the true reconciliation of the Aqumos and the people of Isabela, the President said... The Isabela
leaders welcomed the President at the capitol building, one of the most opulent nanonwide, which
reportedly used over 220,000 boardfeet ofnarra and other hardwood." (Philippine Star, 28 March
1992)
In the presence of President Aquino, the leader of the other leading clan in Isabela, Rep.
Rodolfo Albano Jr. and an already ailing Dy raised their hands in unity and pledged the support
of the people of Isabela for the Ramos-Osmena campaign. Fidel Ramos indeed became the next
President of the Philippines, but this was decidedly not due to the Isabela vote: a few day s after
Aquino's visit to Isabela, the governor shifted his support to another presidential candidate. His
three sons won the elective positions they were running for, and Faustino Dy Sr. died one year
after his sons had assumed office. The Ninoy Aquino marker quickly disappeared and a few
months later the lake was filled in.
The episode shows both political patronage and brokerage at work in an election campaign.
Dy played his role as the spokesman of the people of Isabela, negotiating with the national
authorities for a building which hè says is the highest priority of the people His success in
securing these funds adds to the political prestige of his clan, both in the province and for
purposes of national coalitions, and hè urges their leaders to travel to his residence so as to
secure the votes of this following. Dy used this strategie position to secure the safe handover
of political power from his generation to the next, and to expand its presence to the House of
A well-inforrned Chinese tobacco trader alleged that tohacco tycoon Lucio Tan personally flew to Isabela to see
the governor, offering 20 million pesos in cash to gain his support for the campaign of one of other the presidential
candidates.
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Representatives. His relationship with Cory Aquino illustrated the classic exchange of labour
and favours between cliënt and patron; here the cliënt promised to deliver votes in exchange
for financial help. In this case, however, the 'asymmetry in the power to initiale the terminating
move', normally skewed towards the patron (Platteau 1995.767), lay entirely with the cliënt,
as Cory had no local means to secure her benefits from the deal. The Dy clan feit the backlash
from their broken promise when President Fidel Ramos assumed office, but their local
influence was strong enough to prevent a split-up of the province, masterminded by a rival clan
and supported by the President, and to retain the governorship in the 1995 elections.
In my view, the democratie reforms introduced by the United States administration
hastened the decline of the waning political influence of Cagayan Valley's indigenous elite of
landowning lowland tribes. At the time the American electoral reforms were implemented, the
local elite had just suffered serious setbacks due to the collapse of Spanish rule and the Tobacco
Monopoly, which had long served to cushion their position of leadership. Their hold on scarce
labour, and some of the best tobacco lands, had always provided these leaders with a structural
basis for their good relations with the Spanish authorities. On their own, in a rapidly changing
economic context, they were unable - or unwilling - to recognize new realities, such as the
growing importance of merchant capital in agriculture and the arrival of Ilokano land-seekers
in the region after 1925 (see Chapter 8). Agricultural areas expanded beyond the old haciendas
in the floodplains of the Cagayan River, and new settlements were established, turning the
indigenous lowland tribes into a cultural minority in their ancestral land.
As we saw in section 5.3.2, many of today's leading families in Cagayan Valley are of
unmigrant descent. Their founders were ordinary peasants and petty traders in their place of
origin, who could not gain from the advantageous position of recognized members of the pre-
colonial, landowning elite in Cagayan Valley16. These self-made leaders resemble Fegan's
wagaling na lalaki, or "men who get their way in contests with other men" (Fegan 1993:39),
rising to power through the ranks of local politics. They use each office to build up the
Personal wealth required to expand their resources and following, enabling them to reach the
next office.
A historical legacy which these families made use of in their ascent to political power was
the Spanish strategy of recognizing hand-picked local leaders. By supporting and protecting the
leader of their choice, a supra-village network of local leaders was established to serve supra-
village policy objectives, such as the reduccion and the Tobacco Monopoly. Modern political
clans work along the same principles, except for the fact that after American electoral reform,
local leaders not only had to have the endorsement of fellow principalia, but the vote of their
clientèle as well. Legacies of the political and administrative reforms carried out during the
American colonial period are clearly visible here. Leadership at the local level became a
condition for gaining access to newly created higher elective offices. Conversely, brokered
access to national means, either directly or through other members of the clan, became an
'niportant source of political legitimacy, as well as the means to sustain patronage services for
an growing electorale at the local level. Local leaders who managed to use their rural power
°ase to gain access to the nation-state were eventually the recipients of another highly profitable
source of income: it was soon after the start of the United States administration that the first
large-scale, mechanized logging operations got underway in the Philippines.
In other parts of the Philippines. political clans of Chinese ancestry profited from the U.S. government's bargam
Wies of haciendas formerly owned by the Spanish Fnar orders (Anderson 1988) Chapter 8 contams a brief discussion on
">e Friar lands m Cagayan Valley
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7.3 Corporate logging: made in the USA
"The history of the utilization of Philippine forests is unique among Southeast Asian
countries andprobably unique in the entire tropics, in that exploitation developed more
rapidly and with a higher degree oftechnical efficiency than in other similar areas.
For this situation, the American occupation is probably responsible. American
entrepreneurs entered the Philippine forests, bringing with them mechanized logging
techniques largely from the Pacific Northwest of the United States. Philippine enter-
prises developed on the American model, so that today Philippine exploitation
techniques are the most technically advanced in the Asiatic and Pacific tropics"
(Bedard 1957:7)
This upbeat account by an American forester, assessing the Philippine forestry sector at the
beginning of what were to be the boom decades of commercial logging operations, quite rightly
claims American credit for the strong recovery of the sector after the Second World War. A
country that in the late eighties would be the first in Southeast Asia to face the near-depletion
of its forest resources had been a pioneer in the introduction of steam-engine pulleys, railways
and mechanica! sawmills in logging operations, in the early 20*1 century. This section
investigates the background of the American colonial policy of introducing large-scale,
mechanized logging operations to the Philippines, and assesses how the industry developed,
until it came to a near standstill almost one hundred years later. Special attention is given to
two actors of particular importance to the logging industry: foresters and the paradigm guiding
their industry, and the ethnic Chinese community, to whom the misfortunes of the corporate
logging industry are often attributed.
7.3. l Overcoming labour constraints in forest utilization
Throughout the Spanish colonial period, logging in the Philippines was not directed towards
commercial timber as a commodity in itself, but served mainly the local furniture and
shipbuilding industries. The isle of Mindoro and the Southern Sierra Madre province of
Tayabas (nowadays known as the Quezon and Laguna provinces) and Nueva Ecija in Luzon
were the principal sources of lumber for the wharves of Cavite. The fame of galleons built of
Philippine mahogany was established during sea wars between England and Spain in the 18th
century; the English wrote that "..of the two thousand [balls] that were fired at it, not one
passed through it...n. (B&R 38:41)
The few surviving written accounts of the timber industry during the Spanish period show
that shortage of labour was the critical constraint limiting log production. Although the
volumes extracted during these years were small compared to the logging rates of the twentieth
century, the timber requirements for the construction of warships and trading galleons required
a massive workforce, as the following account from the early seventeenth century shows:
"When one is lost, it is necessary to build another, and that means the cutting ofwood. Six or eight
thousand Indians are assembledfor that task, and go to the mountains. On themfalls the vast labof
of cutting and dragging the timber in."
The same observer warned the King of Spain that
"the islands are at the end oftheir resources, as f ar as the Indians in them are concernedfor it i$
they who bring the timber from the forest for the said shipbuilding.." (Hurtado de Corcuera to King
Felipe IV, July 1636, in Blair and Robertsen 1903, Vol 26:289 Quoted in Benitez 1969:210)
Thus the most pressing concern during this period was not the depletion of the forest but rather
the depletion of the workforce in the areas where shipyards were located (Mindoro, Masbate,
Marinduque, Cavite, Laguna). Shortage of labour explains why the industry continued to
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confine itself to areas close to coasts and waterways, even after the second half of the 19"1
century, when the Spanish colonial administration began to see the opportunities of cutting
timber for other than local construction purposes, and entered into the business of selling
timber in Spain and on other foreign markets .
During the late Spanish period, concerns about timber depletion prompted the establishment
in 1863 of the first forestry bureau in the Philippines, the Inspeccion de Montes. The bureau
consisted of 66 expert foresters, 64 rangers and 40 additional staff, such as clerks, draftsmen,
etc. (Phil.Com. 1904:70). Filipinos were not allowed to occupy the more important positions,
which were filled by members of the Spanish Corps of Engineers. Sebastian Vidal y Soler, the
first head of the Spanish Forestry Bureau in the Philippines wrote that:
"theprecious woods that are produced m the extensive forests of the Philippines are worthy ofbeing
recognized in Europe, l even dare to say that they have no likely rivalfor the construction ofships,
and asfar as I know there is already a great demandfor these in armories and shipyards, where
there is a great consumption of the best wood of the British Indies, with which the forests of the
Philippines can very worthily compete" . (translated from Vidal y Soler 1874: 6)
The first Philippine timber licenses were made possible by a Spanish Royal Decree of October
30, 1867. The Chief Forest Inspector quickly encountered problems with this new instrument,
for once a license had been issued, the Inspeccion de Montes lost control over its use by the
licensee:
"granting individuals the right to extract fabulous amounts of wood, with the hidden motive,
undoubtedly, of acquinng a document which protects them in case they are caught in the act of
illegal speculation. The waming came from that industnous chief of the political-military district,
where I was made to see the dire impacts of these licenses for the public forests ofCebu and Bohol,
already pitifully abused, and wherein one could assure oneself that, in short, not a single timber
tree can still be found. . . " (translated from Jordana y Morera 1876: 15)
To deal with these early manifestations of failing government control of private timber cutting
licenses, 12 new Forest Protection Offices ('Plazas de Monteros') were established on February
9, 1873, to combat widespread illegal logging. The limited speed with which timber cutting,
Icgal and illegal, took place confmed deforestation during the Spanish period to a few locations,
notably areas lying close to the sea or inland waterways.
Shortly after the United States had assumed the administration of the Philippine Islands, on
April 14, 1900, a new Bureau of Forestry was established in Manila and Major George P.
Ahern appointed as its first director. His orders did not specify his duties, but allowed him to
ernploy 4 foresters, 2 rangers, a stenographer and a translater (Roth 1983). In his first report
to the Bureau of Insular Affairs in Washington, D.C. hè described the forestry legacy left by
Spain as follows:
"In many of the islands the good timber hos been cut away to within about three miles from the
coast. But as we leave the centers of civilization, we soon run into virgin forests. . .After three
centuries of civilization in the islands, wefind but 6,000,000 acres improved out of a total area of
63. 000,000 acres... (Bureau of Forestry of the Philippine Islands (July l, 1901- September l, 1902)
Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department p. 472)
American administrators sent to the Philippine Islands took a great interest in developing
the potential of its natural resources, including the extensive and still largely virgin forests. The
Philippine Commission pressured the War Department in Washington to speed up the passage
of laws to stimulate the development of the country's natural resources. Initially, however, both
Governor Taft and the Commission received explicit orders from Washington not to make any
changes to the Spanish laws governing forestry and even to cancel all existing licenses, with
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the exception of firewood and gratuitous licenses, "especial care being taken in each case not
to issue more than actual necessity demands" (Cable of the US Secretary of War to Governor
General Taft, September 21, 1901). This cautious policy of the Bureau of Insular Affairs was
relaxed after the visit of Secretary of War Elihu Root to the Philippines in 1902. Upon bis
return to the U.S., Root wrote to the President of the United States that "more than a thousand
mining prospectors, mainly American, are already scattered throughout the Islands, waitingfor the
enactment ofsome law under which they may acquire rights to mining claims covenng their discoveries
of minerals. The public lands have never been surveyed and no facilities have been afforded for the
Filipinos to acquire title-from two tofour hundred thousand natives are now living as squatters on these
lands waitingfor some homestead or settler's law under which they may become owners of the land they
till, orstill other lands." (Root in Philcom 1902:26)
In Manila, the Philippine Commission saw government charges on timber extraction as a
welcome source of revenue by which to rund, among other things, the organization of a
bureaucracy. Maintaining the Spanish policy of issuing timber licenses for the nominal sum of
one dollar per concession, and levying forest charges on the basis of the volume extracted, the
Bureau of Forestry estimated that 'the value to the Philippine Government of the above timber
is more than 100 $ gold per acre...." (Bureau of Forestry 1902: 471). Another factor which
led the Commission to allow private entry into the forest lands was the 'timber famine'
prevailing during these years: the demand for wood was high due to reconstruction efforts
after the Philippine Revolution. Lumber was generally imported from the United States and
prices remained high.
For many years, American foresters continued to assume that "stripped of their showy
farms, the tropical forests of the Philippines are more nearly like temperate forests than they
are different from them.." (American Forester H.N. Whitford (1909), quoted in Roth 1983:
45). The main constraint was the fact that their exploitation still relied entirely on manual
labour and the pulling power of the carabao; the large trunks in the virgin forests were almost
impossible to feil and, once felled, could only be pulled from the forest with great difficulty.
To put these large trunks to economie use, mechanization was required, in the form of
"tramways or cable systerns... which will take comparatively large capital" (Philcom 1903:343).
Easing the labour constraint through mechanization, Ahern argued, would require a shift frorn
one-year licenses to longer-term agreements between the Government and private enterprise
"to justify companies in installing plants large enough to carry on lumbenng operations over
considerable tracts under the supervision of the forestry bureau" (ibid)
Ahern's call to introducé large-scale mechanized logging in the Philippines did not go
unheeded. In 1904, just three years after the arrival of Howard Taft, the first U.S. governor
of the Philippines, the American Insular Lumber Company (ILCO) was granted the exclusive
rights to extract timber from a 300 km2 virgin forest stand in Northern Negros. Six years later,
in 1910, a new College of Forestry was opened at the University of the Philippines. By 1920,
14 timber concessions and 40 sawmills were operational countrywide (see Map 7.1). By 1948,
600 rangers and 182 foresters had been trained, 23 of whom had studied forestry at Yale
University (Tucker 1992: 108)
The introduction of mechanized logging was not only a novelty in the Philippines but in the
whole of Southeast Asia. Dutch botanist Dr. Treub was quoted by an American forester named
Barrington Moore as saying that "the Americans had made more progress in forestry in the ten years
in which they have been in the islands than any other nation in all the time in which they have been &
the tropics" (Moore 1910:154). The enthusiasm of the Dutch government prompted the decision
to send its chief forester in Dutch East India, Mr. Kerbert, on a mission to the Philippines to
see whether the mechanized logging operations of ILCO could be replicated in Sumatra, where
the Dutch had not yet set up a forest service. Forester Kerbert was much impressed with the
Map 7.1 Corporate logging concessions in the Philippines, 1920
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activities of the Americans in Negros, especially the steam donkeys, railway systems, and
machine sawmills used by the company. He recommended the purchase of similar hauling
equipment for logging operations in Sumatra, and the hiring of five American foresters to assist
the Dutch colonial government in getting forest exploitation underway.
In addition to his positive impressions, Kerbert also mentioned certain drawbacks of the
ILCO method, noting that the felling of the "giant trees" found in Negros "destroys so many
of the residual trees [only trees that measured less than 50cm in diameter at breast height were not
cut, GT] that the cutting area looked as if it had been clear-felled" (translated from Kerbert
1908:544). A colleague of Mr. Kerbert's, A.Th. L. Salverda, in a reaction in a later volume
of Tectona, expressed more reservations about the sustainability of the new American approach
for tropical forestry, characterizing it as a system that "does not deserve but to be called forest
devastation, and which hos now been introduced in the Philippines in an even more ruinous manner!
Not a tracé of reforestanon or land improvement! Everything is geared towards an exploitative system
which can only lead to the destruction of the capital which the area represents" (translated from
Salverda 1910:529)
Around this same time, American foresters also began to raise the alarm, concerned about
the sustainability of the large-scale mechanized logging operations in the Philippines. Many
attributed the forest losses to kaingin (slash-and-burn) agriculture, but some were also
beginning to have second thoughts about the appropriateness of American forestry practices for
these tropical forests. Brown and Matthews, two American foresters who made an inspection
tour of the forestry sector in the Philippine Islands in 1914 formulated their doubts as follows:
"Wefind theproblem to be that ofremoving within the shortest possible rotation a large amount
of accumulated wood capital which is not producing, but is pernaps deteriorating due tofungus
and insect attack and which is, nevertheless, so integral a pan of the forest that its removal
endangers the very existence of the forest" (Brown and Matthews (1914) Dipterocarp Forests:
545, quoted in Roth 1983:47)
The Philippine Bureau of Forestry discarded such efforts 'to discredit the Philippine lumber
industry' as inspired by American lumbermen trying to maintain their monopoly in the timber
trade (Philcom 1912:107). The number of company timber licenses steadily increased until the
outbreak of the Second World War, as Philippine mahogany became a prized wood in the
American market. lts popularity was due not only to its mechanical properties, which made it
ideal for furniture making and wood panelling, but also to its modest price: 2 m3 of Philippin6
mahogany cost one dollar in Manila and could be sold in San Francisco for 25 dollars, which
was still around 10 dollars below the price of comparable American lumber. The modest price
was due in part to the low taxes levied by the Philippine government on lumber exports
(Kerbert 1909).
The Philippine Bureau of Forestry wanted to speed up the development of the forestry
industry in the Philippines by offering easy terms to American firms willing to make
investments in forest concessions. In a press release, Major Ahern described the terms of the
arrangement:
"The forestry bureau now hos available a number oftracts rangmg in sizefrom 35 to 300 square
miles, with one or two of much larger size, awaiting applications... A concession costs
nothing... .[and] there is no special form of application for this privilege. A mere letter will suffice
The letter should contain a rough description of the tract desired, the amount of capital to be
invested, the size and kind of plant to be installed..." (Letter of Major George Ahern to the Bureau
of Insular Affairs in Washington DC, dated April 2, 1914)
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The only condition that tirnber licensees had to comply with was a minimum17 annual cut. For
example, in the case of a 38,000-ha concession in Lanao, Mindanao, at least 60,000 m3 had
to be extracted during the first two years, 42,000 m3 in the third year, and 84,000 m3 in each
subsequent year (the licenses were valid for twenty years)18. By 1914, 11 corporate Hcenses
had been issued to American, British, Chinese, German, Spanish and Filipino entrepreneurs.
Having lost its sovereignty in the Philippines, Spain was now fully aware of the commercial
potential of the forest resources in its former colony. Spain's ambassador to the United States
wrote to the U.S. Secretary of State that: "Hitherto the authorities ofthose Islands have made
no objection whatsoever to Spanish subjects coming to pursue the industry of exploiting the
forests and woods in that country but, according to repons received, those same authorities
are now requiring the renewal of the operation permits with the purpose, apparently, of
"withdrawing those formerly granted to Spanish nationals" (Letter of Alexandro Padilla,
Ambassador of Spain to the United States, to Henry L. Stimson, American Secretary of State,
dated February 28, 1933).
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Fig.7.l presents an historical overview of developments in log extraction from the Philippines'
Public forest lands since the late Spanish period. The introduction of mechanization enabled
lhe Americans to improve exploitation rates. After 1920 the demand for Philippine lumber
began to rise in international markets, particularly in Japan and the United States. Between
1^02 and 1940, lumber exports increased twenty-fold, from 46 million to over l billion
boardfeet. By then, there were 163 sawmills operating in the country, turning out 1.7 million
boardfeet per day and employing over 70,000 people (Tamesis 1963:86).
The Second World War left the logging industry decimated, but local reconstruction works
In the post-colontal period, logging compames were formally hound by a maximum allowable cut to be extracted
°m <he forest concession every year.
Based on these extractable volumes, the logging intensity was in the order of 40 m]/ha, roughly half the
"Kensity prescribed under the Philippine Selective Logging System during the 1970s.
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and a strong Japanese demand for Philippine hardwoods stimulated a quick recovery (ibid:87).
By 1962, total log extraction had reached 3 billion boardfeet (or 7 million nf), the start of a
decade during which extraction rates by the corporate logging industry peaked. The equivalent
of the aggregate volume of logs extracted between 1902 and 193219 was taken out annually in
the late sixties and throughout the seventies. According to official records, logging operations
produced between 10 and 15 million m3 of commercial timber every year, and these data
probably underestimate actual extraction rates by 50-100%. Factors contributing to these
maccuracies include widespread violations of forestry regulations in timber concessions and
the poor reliability of forestry statistics (Kummer 1992e, 1995).
Throughout the history of corporate logging in the Philippines, there were visible signs of
a contracting forest resource. While some observers, particularly those in the forestry
profession, pointed to forest occupants and their slash-and-burn system of agriculture as the
mam cause of deforestation, environmental and opposition groups questioned the sustainability
of large-scale mechanized logging operations. In addition to political pressure to keep up the
influx of hard currency from timber exports, there was a strong scientific drive behind the
continuous opening-up of new areas of old-growth forest. Pioneer Filipino foresters educated
at the College of Forestry of the University of the Philippines, and the generations educated
by them in Los Banos and other provinces, were equipped with a forest development concept
that was introduced during the American period, and almost religiously maintained until the
eclipse of the logging industry in the late 1980s.
7.3.2 The'Forest Development'view
"The flgures show how groundless were the apprehensions of those who feared the ruinous
exploitation of Philippine forests by great lumber companies. At present timber is growing much
faster than it can be cut and many of the forests would be greatly improved by the systematic felling
of the old trees which have reached maturity and will soon begin to decay if not converted into
lumber." (Director, Bureau of Forestry in Phil. Com. 1904 (year Nov l 1902 to Dec 22 1903: 576)
Since the establishment of the country's first college of forestry in 1910, Philippine foresters
were reared in an atmosphere associated with heavy machinery, economie progress, and the
conquest of previously impenetrable tracts of wilderaess. Their venture was a risky one,
requiring a combination of daring and responsibility: logging was for real men. The prestige
associated with forestry reflected on the profession as a whole; foresters were the chief decision
makers in the conduct of logging operations on the ground, they occupied senior positions in
the Bureau of Forestry, which oversaw the operations of TLA holders and had a scientific
monopoly on the study of Philippine forestry.
Perceiving old-growth forests as an idle resource that needed to be 'developed' in order
to become more productive, foresters formulated and supported the government policy of
leasing out large tracts of old-growth forest to private companies. Logging was seen as a
sylvicultural treatment which was part of an improved management regime that natural forests
required to achieve higher sustained yields of commercial timber. The Philippine Selective
Logging System was developed by Filipino foresters after independence and has remained one
of the cornerstones of Philippine forestry ever since. It is aimed at a higher growth and yield
of commercially interesting timber-tree species, whereby all 'overmature' and a percentage of
'mature' trees are removed from the canopy. By reducing competition for light and nutrients
The aggregated volume of commercial timher extracted from the Philippine forests between 1902 and 1932 was
16.3 million m' (DAC 1932:165)
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between commercially interesting and lesser species, and by suppressing the growth of the
'atter, higher yields of commercial timber are attained (see also sections 4.4 and 5.2.2).
The Philippines inherited its forestry tradition from the United States which, in turn, was
strongly influenced by the way European forests were managed. In Europe, the idea that the
economie productivity of forests should be upgraded and controlled developed between 1765
and 1800, in response to the need which countries feit to achieve more predictable and stable
flows of fiscal revenue from the logging industry (J.C. Scott 1998). Forest inventories, timber-
stand classification, and tree-marking activities were carried out in forest plots which had been
carefully defined to ensure that they were representative, enabling the early European foresters
to calculate the revenue that a certain forest might yield: "For the forest scientist
(Forstwissenschaftler) the goal was always to 'deliver the greatest possible constant volume
ofwood"" (Lowood 1991, cited in J.C. Scott 1998:14)
To achieve a constant output from a given forest area, stable, laboratory-like conditions
were required. Sustainable development as defined under the Philippine Selective Logging
System assumed that after the opening-up of the old-growth stand, the residual forest had to
be protected from further timber extraction for a period of at least 25 to 30 years. By creating
the right mix of ages and commercial species, it was believed that logged-over forest could be
managed with a view to attaining the maximum growth and yield level. In many cases, and for
a variety of reasons, this underlying view of forests as controlled sylvicultural laboratories
devoid of uncontrolled human activity bas not been matched by reality. Even before
independence, when the scale and intensity of corporate logging was only a fraction of that
during the Marcos period, neither the government nor the companies themselves were able or
willing to ensure those stable conditions. In the period just after the establishment of the Bureau
°f Forestry, only trees marked by employees of the Bureau were allowed to be cut; however,
this task proved too much for an organization plagued by under-staffing, red tape and
corruption (Moore 1910; Roth 1983; Tucker 1992)20.
The 'forest development' view disregarded the fact that many forests were actually
'nhabited by indigenous and migrant communities. Forests had to be protected against local
People, whose land use practices were incompatible with the long-term viability of large-scale
corporate logging. Colonial and Filipino foresters expressed the view that kaingin agriculture
and carabao logging by upland dwellers stood in the way of rational forest management, as can
bc seen in the following quote from American forester Barrington Moore, after encountering
slash-and-burn farms in old-growth forests during his tour of several early Philippine forest
concessions:
"Caingins are a system ofshifting cultivation in forest lands, which is destructive in the extreme.
To make a Caingin, the Filipino moves into a body of fine virgin timber and begins by cutting all
the undergrowth hè makes no pretense ofplowing or even scratching the ground, but merely
pokes a hole with a stick and puts in the seeds. Neither does hè keep out the weeds. The result is
that within a couple of years, the area is so overgrown that it hos to be abandoned. He then moves
on and destroys another valuable piece of forest" (Moore 1910:78)
In 1931. when Dutch adat scholar F.D.Helleman paid a visit to Arthur F. Fisher, the director of the Bureau of
*"orestry, to look for matenal on indigenous land rights. the latter lamented: "This is the tragedy here: you and others have
a Koal to aan for. not us. We simply do what our hands happen tnfind and try to do that as honestly and well as we can.
"hether we do the nght thing. I do not know really. I om aware that our politicians. and I myself too. perceive the
Clrcumstances in which these people live too much as if they are the same as ours - and nothing is less trut - and that we
"°ve overly imposed our will upon these people. rather than to help them progress based upon their own conceptions and
Pr"iciples but I mamtain nevertheless that our policy is good and educating because it is honest and selfless and creates
i*" and order m that muddie, where corruption is thriving and all kinds of mjustices abound daily." (In: Helleman
1931:19. translated by GT)
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Ignorance of the technical, social and cultural dimensions of indigenous and immigrant systems
of fire-and-fallow farming long prevented foresters from taking a more balanced view of both
the interaction between large-scale, mechanized timber extraction, and modes of forest
utilization practised by the people residing there. Aside from the abovementioned aspect of
forestry training, their social background also stood in the way of getting into a more
constructive dialogue with forest-based people, especially in the early years of forestry
education in the Philippines, when "coming from elite families, they uniformly assumed the
inferiority of illiterate peasants and mountain tribes and dismissed the traditional ecological
knowledge systems of hill peoples as unimportant" (Tucker 1992:108)
Only by 1988, the inaccuracy of Philippine government statistics on forest decline began
to surface, revealing that only a very small percentage of the original old-growth stands
remained and that large areas of residual forest were not ready for re-logging by the end of the
first cutting cycle, or had been converted into marginal brushland, upland farms and grassland
areas. However, the dominant view on the causes for the problems in what used to be the most
progressive timber industry in Southeast Asia continued to point towards the occupants of those
forests. In a letter accompanying a request for a forestry sectoral adjustment loan from the
Asian Development Bank, the secretaries of the DENR and the Department of Finance wrote:
"...five major causes lie at the root ofour deforestation problem, first andforemost among these
is what we call the kaingin problem.... Typically, the kaingmeros resorted to slash-and-bum,
shifting cultivation and, over the years, this process resulted in the complete destruction of forest
cover in aboutfive million ha of land." (ADB 1988, Appendix 19).
Views of people as problematic actors in forest management were not only resilient among
Filipino foresters; Dove (1992, 1995), Peluso (1995) and Wiersum (1997) also draw attention
to the role of professional bias in the forestry profession, which long prevented foresters from
taking a serious interest in local perceptions about what forests are, what purposes they serve,
and how they are best managed. Dove deplores the paucity of studies on this institutional aspect
of the implementation of forest policies and programmes. For many years the social
background of government foresters, their training and implicit differences in value systems
between them and the people living in forests kept both groups locked into an unproductive
stalemate of mutual distrust.
Nevertheless, the encroachment upon residual forest areas by land speculators displaced
logging company employees, and farming families without access to lands in other agricultural
areas contributed to the problem of deforestation and forest degradation. In 1985, an estimated
8 million people were estimated to reside in the Philippine forest lands (Cruz et al. 1992:19)-
By the late 1980s, the relationship between forest residents and the logging industry gradually
thawed, as the logging industry transformed itself from a corporate to a community-based
activity. Both forest migrants and indigenous residents of the Sierra Madre profited from
employment opportunities and transport for goods traded with the lowland economy. Forest
occupants were hired by timber licensees and their contractors, and labourers who had been
brought along as company employees became migrants themselves, or were eventually replaced
by permanent forest residents who did the cutting, yarding and loading work for contractors
in the lowlands. As we saw in the preceding chapters, contractors first began to finance the
activities of carabao loggers illegally, sending trucks to bring out the product and negotiating
with civil and military authorities for package deals involving accommodated access. By the
early 1990s, community-based resource management was widely accepted to be the most
promising approach to forest development.
The cooperation between logging contractors and forest occupants is probably one of the
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major reasons behind deforestation in the Philippines. Forest stands failed to recover from the
first cut, but were instead gradually stripped of all marketable products and then converted into
marginal farmland. The combined activities of migrants, indigenous forest peoples and logging
contractors were a threat to the sustainability of each activity on its own, including the -
traditional resource uses of indigenous forest tribes. More intensive hunting techniques had to
be used in disturbed, contracting areas of natural forest, and soils less suitable for agriculture
were planted with cash crops and tenure markers to secure income and informal ownership (see
Chapters 8 and 9).
In spite of the limited number of logging concessions where selective logging did indeed
induce a higher sustained yield, the 'forest development' view proved resilient. Kummer (1995)
niakes a convincing analysis of the political use of postwar forestry statistics, including
inconsistencies which appear to have been deliberately manipulated, or withheld, during the
1970 and 80s, so as to prevent the deteriorating state of the Philippine forests from being made
Public. Reactions in the Philippine Lumberman, the professional Journal of the forestry sector,
to the closure of the Insular Lumber Company, the country's first large-scale, mechanized
logging concession, illustrate the unwavering belief in the industry which still prevailed. In
1934, forest depletion had already compelled the company to abandon its first concession area,
writing off a considerable capital investment in railroads, sawmills and harbour facilities. But
'hè company continued to see the Philippine forests as "a virtually inexhaustible supply of
desirable hardwoods" (ILCO 1960); in 1968 it moved its processing facilities once again,
finally closing down completely in 1984, when operations on the last site had ceased to be
viable. A young forester, writing about the closure of the company, said that:
"the dying of ILCO is only one ofmany similar cases in the history of Philippine Forestry.
Many other timber concessions had similar deaths and all the others will follow if current
malpractices are not corrected" (Serrano 1985:21)
His reaction highlights the 'malpractices' associated with corporate logging, including
corruption and the violation of rules and regulations guiding the industry. The concept of
developing old-growth forests through selective logging, whether by companies or by
communities, is not questioned. Others in the discipline continued to express their unqualifïed
support for the continuation of corporate logging in old-growth forests. In one of a series of
articles designed to influence the national debate on a total ban on corporate logging, the words
°f a former company forester of ILCO, one of the most respected foresters in the Philippines,
continued to echo the views of his early American predecessors:
"Since the dipterocarp forest is a self-replenishing and therefore perpetuable resource, even
though logged, logging is not the problem. The protection of the forested logged over or
residual forest from kaingineros is the Number One problem." Reyes (1989:13 )
This emphasis on the renewable nature of dipterocarp forests provided consecutive govern-
ments with a scientific rationale to justify the continuation of a system of timber-extraction
from public forests that it could clearly not control, with serious adverse environmental and
s°cial impacts. After decades in which logged-over forests had received no protection from
'Uegal logging and conversion, Philippine foresters continued to advocate the 'development'
°f old-growth forests, brushing off past failures as a question of seeing that the Government -
and later communities - were better organized.
As we saw in Section 5.2.2, forestry policies underwent a significant shift in orientation
after 1986. Forest occupants, once considered the principal culprits in the deforestation crisis
are now perceived by the bureaucracy as "the ultimate solution to environmental degrada-
trion" (Joey E. Austria, head of the DENR Indigenous Communities Affairs Commission in
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the Manila Chronicle, 28/10/1996). These changes represent an opportunity for progress, both
in socioeconomic and environmental terms. However, prospects for realizing more effective
protection for the last tropical moist forests in the Philippines may be dimmed by the continued
influence of the 'forest development' view in external professional assistance to the
communities concerned, and in the development of management plans for the community
forestry areas. While iicenses may be cancelled or suspended by law, ideas may take a long
time to be erased from the minds of foresters, politicians and local people. The expectations
they have of community-based forest management will continue to be influenced for some time
by a long tradition in which forest development was directly associated with log ponds, and
truckloads of timber being shipped to lowland markets
7.3.3 The logging history of Cagayan Valley
The natural boundaries of the Cordillera, Caraballo and Sierra Madre mountains protected the
rainforests of Cagayan Valley corporate logging operations almost right up until independence.
Throughout the Spanish colonial period, there was no timber-cutting for commercial purposes
in Cagayan Valley, aside from incidental firewood garnering to serve the local curing plants
of the tobacco industry. The Inspeccion de Montes was well aware of the extensive forests in
the region:
"Although its mountains are rich with timber, the people are not actually benefiting from it, other
thanfar the natural necessities of building their houses and small boats for river travel" (Ramon
Jordana y Morera 1874: 15)
Scarcity of labour, the same constraint encountered by the Spanish authorities in the Southern
Sierra Madre and other forests located in the proximity of the shipbuilding yards also presented
itself in the scarcely inhabited Cagayan Valley. The absence of a North-South road network
of any significance, the necessity of crossing the many tributaries of the Cagayan River, and
the limited transportation possibilities offered by its shallow waters precluded the development
of a viable forestry industry here:
"The often total impossibility ofextracting the woods, the difficulty and expense of the transports
overland, and the no less costly transport by river, together with the immense distance that the
lumber ships had to cover in order to bring these woods to Manila, the only important market, wiU
ensure that this situation will continue for some time..." (Semper, 1861 in Jordana y Morena 1874)
It appears that this forester, the first chief of the Spanish forestry bureau, was quite concerned
about the negative environmental impacts which the issuance of timber Iicenses in the forested
catchments of the Cagayan River might have on lowland agriculture:
"As we go about issuing concessions in these areas to individuals, we should take into account the
influence of these forest masses on the distribution of the waters, and make sure that reducing these
forests will result m the ennchment, and not the sterilization ofthefertile valleys of this province.
(Jordana y Morera 1874: 14)
Such concerns continued to be more or less hypothetical throughout the American
administration of the Philippines. The energetic efforts of the Bureau of Forestry to attract
private investments in large-scale and mechanized logging elsewhere in the country did not
begin to affect Cagayan Valley until many years after independence. Although a number of
private concessions were issued, these were mainly for the collection of firewood needed for
the curing of tobacco leaves. While the commercial extraction and processing of timber
led to the development of a minor industry, this never entailed investments or activities on the
scale of those pioneered by ILCO in Negros. The limitations this imposed on the extractive
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capacity of these concessions is illustrated by the case of Divilacan, Isabela which was allowed
to cut 2900 m3 in 1903, but actually managed to extract only 113 m3.
The largest number of concessions and sawmills in the region lay in Cagayan: 30 in 1903,
increasing to 35 in 1908. The total volume of wood extracted by these concessionaires was
3,446 m3; the 27 timber licenses in Isabela and the lone concession in Nueva Viscaya extracted
1,496 and 73 m3 of timber respectively (Philcom 1908). Until 1924, the total capacity of the
4 registered sawmills operating here (3 in Cagayan and l in Nueva Viscaya21) was less than 70
m per day (see also Map 7.1). The lack of economie interest aroused by the option of
corporate logging in Cagayan Valley in the early years of the twentieth century is illustrated
by the fact that in 1912 a concession in Abulug, Cagayan advertised by the Forestry Bureau
as one in which "red lauan, white lauan, apitong, narig, narra... and guijo are to be had in
considerable quantity" was still being offered in 1924 (Philcom 1912:103 and Fowler 1925).
Until 1924, Cagayan Valley was relatively isolated from the economie and political hub of
the country. Three foot trails were used for the trade between central Luzon and southern
Cagayan Valley: one was a low route from Dupax to Pantabangan, while the second ran from
taugan (Aritao) to Pangasinan. The third trail, between the towns of Sta Fe and San José, was
turned into a gravel road in 1924 (Philcom 1925) and approximately 40 years later into what
's presently known as the Dalton Pass route. After the opening of this road, Nueva Viscaya
quicldy overtook Cagayan as a timber producer. The relative importance of these provinces in
the national logging industry is indicated by the forest charges collected from the various
Provinces in 1924: 1,245 pesos from Cagayan and 2,771 from Nueva Viscaya, compared to
l ,57 pesos from Negros Occidental (where the large ILCO concession was operating), and only
surpassed by Bukidnon (5,844) and Iloilo (5,247). In Isabela, logging had not yet started; the
forest charges collected from this province amounted to exactly one Peso and 20 centavos.
On the basis of the limited sources of information on the settlement history of Cagayan
Valley, which are presented in the following chapter, it must be concluded that the logging
mdustry in the region only began to expand approximately forty years after agricultural
expansion had taken on momentum here, in the early 1930s. In Cagayan, the Abulug
concession was ultimately developed by Taggad Industries, Claveria in 1947. One of the first
Private concessions to cut timber in the Sierra Madre ranges of Isabela was granted to a tobacco
trader in San Mariano in 1952; until the early 1960s, operations there depended entirely on
nianual labour. In 1978, during a visit to the Kalinga forest tribes of San Mariano (the largest
tovvn in Isabela, covering an area of over 200,000 hectares of forest land) W.H. Scott observed
that
"Despite at least fwo centuries of slash-and-burn swidden farming and 20 years of logging so
intensive the sound of power saws was audible in most sitios, I saw no significant areas of cogon
grass or raw erosion, Where the hillsides were not actually smoldering with the fires of new
swiddens, they were densely covered with either centuries-old timber or thick bamboo groves and
hectares ofbananas" (W.H. Scott 1982:167-8)
This more or less casual claim that logging had been underway here for almost 20 years by the
tune W.H. Scott visited San Mariano supports findings from interviews and secondary sources
*hich indicate that commercial logging in Cagayan Valley only took off as a major,
mechanized industry around 1965, starting in Nueva Viscaya and Cagayan, reaching Isabela
a few years afterwards. In his description of the Philippine lumber industry in the early 1960s,
f°r instance, Tamesis (1963) made no mention of forest industries in Cagayan Valley at all. A
fe\v years later, when Wernstedt and Spencer made their tour of Cagayan Valley, the three
The lone sawmill of Nueva Viscaya was located in Bayombong and operated by the provincial government
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areas where forest industries of some significance had developed were still the same as those
indicated on the Forestry Map presented by Fowler in 1925: Claveria, Cagayan, Aritao, Nueva
Viscaya and San Agustin, Isabela (Wernstedt and Spencer 1967). The authors note that the
Cagayan River cannot be used by barges, and see the poor quality of the region's road network
as a reason for the stagnation in an industry which in other parts of the country had expanded
rapidly after Philippine Independence (see 7.2). By 1966, when these authors were in Cagayan
Valley, the Maharlika highway was only a gravel road, interrupted by tributaries of the
Cagayan River where commuters and commercial goods were ferried across by boat.
In 1974 the cementing of the highway went no further than the northern parts of the
province of Isabela.22 On the basis of government data from that year, the Philippine Atlas
speaks of an "extensive expansion of logging operations during the past few years, particularly
in the upstream provinces (FAPE 1975:47). This is supported by informal discussions and
interviews with several foresters in the region, and the fact that the first College of Forestry
in the region was set up in 1969. The aggregate log production of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva
Viscaya reached 832,727 cubic metres in fiscal year 1972-1973, turning Isabela and Cagayan
into the top log-producing provinces in Luzon. Father Vermeulen witnessed the opening up of
Quirino, a few years after the province had been established in 1971:
"...In 1976, l aften travelled to Maddella from Cordon. I used to see bumt tree-stumps all the \vay.
These lands were left behind by the concessionaires but the trees were too large for people to be
able to cut them, many ofthem were Tagalogs, not used to that kind of hard physical \vork. They
putfires at thefoot of these trees to kill them slowly. These families were very poor, they produced
charcoalfrom the leftovers of the logging industry. You could smell it when you met them, they
always smelled of charcoal" (pers. com., rev. Vermeulen, April '96)
Regional office data on the number of timber-licensing agreements in Cagayan Valley show
that of the 11 concessions issued in Quirino, only 6 were still operating in 1980. During that
year, there were a total of 42 active logging concessions in Cagayan Valley; the total volume
of timber that the Bureau of Forest Development allowed these companies to cut from their
concessions was in excess of two million cubic metres per year (see table 7.1). Given the fact
that such regulations were not enforced, the actual timber extraction rate during this period
must have been higher.
The logging boom lasted almost two decades. During the peak period, between 1969 and
1982, an average 22,000 ha of virgin dipterocarp forest were logged annually (BFD 1987). In
view of the annual allowable cut, this figure translated into an extracted volume of 100 nf per
hectare of old growth. Countrywide, logging intensity (as expressed in the extracted volume
per hectare) increased substantially between 1950 and 1970 (Bautista 1994b:30), probably as
a result of the introduction of the Selective Logging System in the Philippines in 1954, which
contained a new formula for the calculation of the annual allowable cut Prior to 1950, an
average 44 cubic metres of timber was extracted per hectare. The first drop in logging volume,
which occurred in 1983, was due in part to a return to the lower original logging intensities
resulting from the new AAC formula, and the fact that of the 17 logging concessions operating
in Nueva Viscaya and Quirino until 1982, 13 ceased operating in 1983. The second, and fïnal
drop in logging operations occurred after 1989. As noted in Chapter 6, this drop is attributable
largely to the appointment that same year of a new Regional Executive Director of the DENR
Together with the Philippine army and a multi-sectoral forest protection committee, this non-
Based on the provincial profiles m the Atlas, which make exphcit mention of the cnmpletion nf the national
highway in Isabela and that in Cagayan "Only a very smallpercentage ofns roads are hard-surfaced" {Philippine Atlas
1974)
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forester brought about the suspension and cancellation of more than half the region's corporate
timber concessions, and substantially reduced the allowable cut of those that remained.
Moreover, in 1992 a nationwide log ban was announced in old-growth forest, and from then
on re-logging secondary stands was only permitted if the residual stand had a standing stock
of 67 cubic metres of commercial timber. Although most of the region's old-growth forests had
been logged by the time these changes came about, the Sierra Madre was still largely covered
residual forests of varying tree crown cover (see Chapter 3).
ï»bèe7J Annual Allowable JCut of Corporate Timber Concessions in Cagayan Valley
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Thus corporate logging only acquired more significant proportions in the northern Sierra
Madre some fifteen years after the national logging boom starled in other parts of the
Philippines This delay was due to the inaccessibility of the region, the poorer quality of its
forests and the reputation of those forests as a stronghold of the New People's Army. Due to
tne pronounced dry season in Northeastern Luzon and the frequent occurrence of tropical
storms, the forests of northeastern Luzon are said be of less commercial value than those of the
s°uthern Philippines. The strong presence of the NPA inside these forests further discouraged
'nvestors from setting up operations in this part of the country. Despite this delay, the forests
°f the Sierra Madre were about to be depleted of commercially interesting species around the
Same time that national policies began to curtail the activities of logging companies.
It was not until after the EDSA revolution that the revamped bureaucracy was able to get
some degree of control over forest utilization rates and practices in Cagayan Valley, heeding
a warning issued by the RP-German forest inventory of 1988, which concluded that 33% of
^ region's legal forest lands had been denuded and that 'in order to keep Region 02 a prime
J°rest area, immediate steps must be taken before too many forests have been converted or
degraded" (BFD 1987:41). The same report also concluded that between 1969 and 1981, 7,900
"a of residual forest were converted annually, compared to 22,000 ha of old-growth forest
logged each year. The report sa w landlessness as the most important cause of the loss of forest
resources during the period 1969-1981, taking the variable "forest destruction per capita" as
ar> indicator of the relative land scarcity in each province. The sparsely inhabited provinces
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of Kal inga Apayao and Quirino, with the highest per capita forest areas (1.2 ha vs. a regional
average in 1987 of 0.44), also have the highest per capita forest destruction rates 18lm2 and
131 m2 per annum respectively. The report concludes that "these figures indicate a high
percentage of landless farmers in theseprovinces" (BFD 1987:43). The validity of this causal
relationship is open to question: if few people live in an area and forest conversion - as a result
of a combination of extractive activities23- is roughly equal to the rates in more densely
populated areas, the area of forest lost will always be higher. This theory was touched upon
in Section 2.2 and its relevance will be examined again in the following chapter, which deals
with the history of lowland settlement and forest migration in Cagayan Valley. But before
discussing the deforestation phase that followed the large-scale extraction of commercial
timber, I will conclude this chapter with a few remarks on the role of the Philippine Chinese
in the corporate logging industry in Cagayan Valley.
7.4 Logging and the Cagayan Valley Chinese
7.4. l Introduction
Corporate logging was an industry which almost from its inception was characterized by a high
degree of politicization. Windfall profits were to be made by those who managed to secure a
timber concession from the government. This made it possible for them be generous when it
came to sharing the proceeds of their activity with Government officials who had granted them
that privilege. This section deals with one such group of actors who gained access to the
majority of licenses in Cagayan Valley via a centuries-old strategy for dealing with its uncertain
position in Philippine society. As we explore the role of Chinese entrepreneurs in the region's
timber industry, it is important to keep mind that in other parts of the Philippines other
dominant groups or families played a similar role as decision makers in the logging industry
in their own areas at the start of timber-licensing. It is no coincidence that in the case of the
Cagayan Valley, the logging boom (see Section 7.3.3) coincided with the rise and fall of the
Marcos administration. To avoid the risk of stigmatizing this particular ethnic community by
highlighting their role in the logging industry, it should also be noted that the majority of
labourers, contractors, politicians, bureaucrats and field officials who shared in the bonanza
of the seventies and eighties were Filipinos. The aim of this section is to examine the role that
the Chinese entrepreneurs actually played in an industry which, as a whole, provided direct and
substantial benefits to all actors involved.
7.4.2 Brief historical sketch of the Philippine Chinese
Different claims have been made regarding the earliest date of trading contact between China
and the Philippines. Wu and Wu (1980, cited in Te Velde 1994) place these initial contacts in
the seventh century, while others tracé the origins of Sino-Philippine trade back to the Zhou
dynasty between 1966 and 221 BC (Peplow 1991). By the lOth and llth centuries, Chinese
products were regularly reaching the Philippines, while the earliest written accounts in Chinese
on trade between China and Ma-i (also spelt Ma-yi, or Mait, the Chinese names for the
Philippines) date back to the 13th and 14th centuries (ibid:16). The earliest known evidence
of trade between Cagayan Valley and China, either directly or through the Ilokos province,
dates back to the 16th century, when the Ibanag buried their chiefs with elegant black textiles
Kalinga Apayao had the largest TLA of the Region. the Cellophil Corporation, which was 190.000 ha in
size. with an AAC of 400.000 m3/yr. (Records of the DENR Regional Office. 1994))
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with gold-embroidered images of lions, fabrics which had clearly been made in China
CW.H.Scott 1994:264).
Ever since these early trading contacts there has been a community of ethnic Chinese in the
Philippines, i. e., "people who speak and understand Chinese, who have undergone someform
°f Chinese education and who observe Chinese customs enough to be considered by themselves
<*nd their neighbours as Chinese" (see 1990 in Te Velde 1994:9). In 1990 it comprised between
600,000 and l million people in 1990, or roughly 1.5% of the population. Before examining
in more detail the role of the ethnic Chinese in the Cagayan Valley logging industry, I will deal
with the more general question of why they have always conducted themselves so obviously
as a community, attaching great importance to establishing and maintaining close relationships
with each other, and with their relatives in China, although they have also forged strategie
alliances with local and national authorities in the wider society around them. The answer is
to be found largely in the uncertain position they have occupied within Philippine mainstream
society since colonial times. 24
Until the late eighteenth century, economie life in Manila more or less revolved around the
galleon trade. Spain's colonial administration of the Philippine islands depended heavily for
rts income on Manila's strategie position as a transshipment point between Southeast Asia and
Spain's silver mines in Mexico. The majority of the Philippines' small Spanish community of
Priests, officials, businessmen and soldiers, which only began to exceed the 2000 mark after
*hz opening of the Suez canal in 1869 (Roth 1983), lived in or near Manila, and looked down
°n trade as a less than honourable way of making a living. Thus while Spain's occupation of
the Philippines placed the Chinese in the unpleasant position of being looked down upon and
even socially ostracised, it also presented them with a new economie opportunity: exploiting
distant markets via the galleons. Jesuit historian Francisco Colin gives a enthusiastic
description of the wide range of Asian products traded through the Philippines to New Spain:
"The pearls and precious stones of India, the diamonds ofNarsinga and Goa, the rubies, sapphires
and topazes and the cinnamon of Ceylon, the pepper ofSumatra and Java, the claves, nutmeg and
other spices of the Moluccas and Banda, the silks of Persia, the wool and carpets of Ormuz and
Malabar, the rich hangings and bed coverings of Bengal, fine camphor from Bomeo, balsam and
ivory of Abada and Cambodia, civet of the Lequios and silks of all kinds from China - raw and
woven in velvets andfigured damasks, taffetas and other cloths ofevery texture and design and
color..." (Fr. Colin in Bain 1984:110)
Referred to as sangleys, a term which literally means 'merchant' but which had a negative
connotation due to the contempt of the Spanish for the profession (Tan 1988), the Chinese had
to live in so-called parian villages outside Intramuros, segregated from the Spanish and indio
People. In 1764, when Spain regained Manila after two years of English rule, all the Chinese
*ho had collaborated with the English army and authorities were expelled, reducing their
number to under 1,500 by the end of the eighteenth century (Anderson 1988). As world
cornmodity markets opened up in the nineteenth century, export-oriented agriculture gained in
'TOportance, and the Chinese were suddenly seen as potentially useful in opening up markets
for the crops produced in this new sector (Wickberg 1965). As a result, the immigration ban
°n Chinese citizens was abolished in 1834, and Chinese immigration was openly encouraged.
The Manila trading companies vacated when the Chinese were expelled had been temporarily
handled by mestizo Chinese, descendants of itinerant traders and Filipina mothers. These
24
For a more comprehensive discussion, see Edgar Wickberg's "The Chinese in Philippine Life" (1965, New
"aven: Yale Umversity).
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mestizo Chinese now fanned out into the provinces to engage in agribusiness.
The American period brought economie prosperity to the Philippine Chinese. Although the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1934 limited the influx of Chinese to those with professional
qualifications, traders and their direct dependants, Chinese businesses in the Philippines were
able to expand and diversify by opting for industrial activities and moneylending. After
independence, however, the vulnerability of their economie gains again became apparent:
Public Markets were nationalized in 1948, the retail trade in 1954, and the rice and corn
industry in 1960, and all the businesses in these areas which were owned by foreigners were
liquidated. Such unexpected encounters with how were perceived and treated in the Philippines
explains why many Philippine Chinese retained their Chinese citizenship even after having lived
in the country for many years. However, they no longer had the option of leaving the Philippines
after China closed its borders in 1949, isolating them from their relatives at home. Many
Chinese survived by changing business, by using Filipino fronts, or by entering into common
law marriages with Filipina women, which made it possible to own land, set up a business and
acquire timber licenses without having to give up their Chinese nationality.
However, through a combination of thrift, economie competitiveness and, later on, license-
based rent capitalism, the Chinese community has secured a more secure position within
Philippine society. Former President Marcos realized the potential of establishing good
relations with the affluent community of ethnic Chinese (Carino in te Velde 1992:11) In 1975,
hè established formal diplomatic relationships with the People's Republic of China and laid
down new conditions under which the Chinese who were illegally employed could apply for
citizenship, an opportunity of which many availed themselves (Te Velde 1994:39).
Nevertheless, the ethnic Chinese continue to be a cultural minority that is too conscious of its
vulnerability to socioeconomic and political changes in mainstream society to abandon its
longstanding strategy of maintaining strong cultural and economie ties with each other and,
either individually or collectively, with other key actors in society.
7.4.2 The role of the Chinese in the Cagayan Valley wood industry
The ethnic Chinese community in Cagayan Valley is still believed to number less than 10,000,
not even 0.5% of the total population. Chinese tobacco traders were the first to arrive, from
the late nineteenth century onwards. Equipped by wealthy relatives in Manila with 'substantial'
cash advances to establish their businesses in the province (Te Velde 1994; pers. com, Engr.
Masigan, Nov. 1994), they entered into the business of buying and selling tobacco leaves and
the papeletas that growers had been given during the last years of the Monopoly. These were
credit papers that guaranteed future payment for tobacco leaves already delivered. In this
manner, Chinese traders were able to provide the agricultural credit that farmers needed to
continue cultivating their crops. A second, and larger influx of Chinese migrants occurred
during the American period, when the cultivation of tobacco once again flourished, and the
Chinese were given more freedom to play their traditional role in the country's economie
development. These migrants became isolated from their relatives at home when China closed
its borders in 1949, but after the normalization of Sino-Philippine diplomatic relations in the
1970s, a third wave, consisting largely of relatives of those who had arrived before the Second
World War, settled in Cagayan Valley.
Members of the ethnic Chinese community were among the most influential decision
makers in the corporate logging industry in Cagayan Valley. Interviews with key informant»
in the DENR, local academies and people who worked for the TLA holders and their
contractors in Cagayan Valley confïrm reports by Vitug (1993) and the Philippine Centre for
Investigative Journalism (1991) that most of the Sierra Madre logging concessions issued
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between 1965 and 1975 were granted to Manila-based associates of President Ferdinand
Marcos, many of whom were of Chinese descent. DENR records on the complicated ownership
constructions of logging companies confirm that often the majority of those serving on the
Board and holding shares of logging enterprises active in Region 02 have Chinese family
names. While that does not necessarily mean that the ethnic Chinese were in full control of
these enterprises, it does appear to confirm other reports that people of Chinese descent played
an influential role in corporate logging in Cagayan Valley.
Table 7.2 Chinese participation in Timber Licensing Agreements, Cagayan Valley, 1992
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"B: Shareholder minority/majority refers to the names of the persons concerned, and thus provides no information
on the number of shares held by these shareholders
Of all the Chinese concessionaires operating in the Sierra Madre since 1970, Don Alfredo Lim
Was the most influential. During the 1980s, hè managed a conglomerate of logging firms with
access to over half a million hectares of rainforest in the Sierra Madre (Vitug 1993:16). Lim's
'°gging operations were farmed out to local contractors in return for royalties, paid out per
cubic metre. Lim amassed this conglomerate of concessions through his personal relationship
with President Marcos. That link enabled him to pressure the Bureau of Forest Development
to take action against violations of forestry regulations in a neighbouring concession, so that
when it was suspended or cancelled, hè could set up a new company to handle the concession.
At the local level, Lim maintained his good rapport with political clans in Cagayan Valley, who
brokered forest access between Lim and the New People's Army. Both the NPA and political
brokers in the lowlands shared in the revenues resulting from such operations. Several
8°vernment officials confirmed that the provincial governor of Isabela was in a position to
e*tract logs from several forestry concessions in his province, either directly or through
sharing agreements, in return for protecting them from harassment by the NPA (Lopez
1994:35, see also 5.3.2).
In 1994, Aggabao and Te Velde (1994) conducted the first and thus far the only survey in
recent years on the Chinese business community in Cagayan Valley, more specifically, on the
relative importance of the wood industry in their overall business portfolio. Because the Dutch
researcher spoke Chinese, and her Filipino counterpart was a forester with an extensive
^etwork of trusted contacts in the wood industry, the results of this survey must be considered
^ first reliable glimpse behind the scènes of the inaccessible Chinese business community in
;~agayan Valley. Before presenting the major findings of the survey, a number of remarks are
'n order on its scope and timing:
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1) The corporate logging industry had already contracted signifïcantly during the year this
survey was carried out. As we saw earlier, the heyday of the wood industry in Cagayan
Valley was the period 1970-1990; of the 24 corporate timber concessions still operating in
Cagayan Valley in 1990, 19 were owned by Chinese. Because of the legal prerequisite for
sawmills to be connected to a TLA, the same ratio applies here. The majoriry of mini-
sawmills are owned by Filipinos (Aggabao 1994, citing DENR records). At the same time,
small-scale wood-processing industries were expanding in 1994 because of new government
initiatives to secure the supply of raw materials for these industries by legalizing carabao
logging through community forestry projects.
2) The use of a legal business as a front for illegal activities has been commonly practised,
particularly in the highly regulated wood industries. Hence official statistics and secondary
data on a relatively inaccessible group like the Chinese can yield only limited insight into
the actual composition of their business portfolio. This made it difficult for the researchers
to verify their findings by comparing them with existing information from secondary
sources.
In the eight towns covered by Üie survey, two large sawmills and five corporate logging firms
were still operating, all managed by Chinese entrepreneurs. These logging activities were a
relatively minor component of overall Chinese business interests: out of 679 Chinese
enterprises, only 28 were involved in logging or wood-processing industries. Chinese
participation in the furniture industry - by the time of the survey already a much more
important sector than logging - was minimal: less than 2% of the 675 furniture-making shops
were owned by Chinese entrepreneurs. The importance of the logging industry in the overall
range of economie activities engaged in by the ethnic Chinese community in Cagayan Valley
is now small and declining; 67% of the local Chinese earn a living in the trade and merchandis-
ing of bulk products like grain and cement, the transport sector, and in grocery and hardware
stores stocking a wide variety of products, many from China. Financial services, especially
informal money-lending, is the quintessential Chinese business in Cagayan Valley. Around the
time corporate logging began to decline in üie Sierra Madre, the influence of this activity on
deforestation began to increase, as I will show in Chapters 8 and 9. By fmancing small scale
logging, consumptive and crop-production loans in the lowlands and the introduction of the
same crops on the farms of forest migrants, the ethnic Chinese continue to be influential actors
in the changing patterns of land use and ownership in Cagayan Valley.
It would be true to say that the ethnic Chinese have played two more or less consecutive
roles in the deforestation of the Sierra Madre. First, Manila-based Chinese opened the old-
growth forests of the Sierra Madre, protected by the President of the Philippines and his
associates in the bureaucracy. Relatives and trusted local members of the Chinese business
community own most of the local contracting companies extracting forest products from the
TLA concessions on a royalty basis. As on the national level, a relatively small number of
Chinese in Cagayan Valley were in the logging business. The following chapters will examine
how agribusiness and informal moneylending, the activity that brought most Chinese to the
region from the late nineteenth century onwards, are currently taking over from logging'
highlighting the second major role played by the Chinese in forest migration and deforestation
in the Sierra Madre.
7.5 Conclusion
During its first fïfty years of independence, the Philippine government managed the people and
natural resources of Cagayan Valley in a manner suggestive of the way the nation itself was
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governed during four centuries of colonial rule. Having taken upon itself the sacred mission
of bringing development to the people and forests of Cagayan, and supported by the patronage
of local political leaders, the national government enabled Manila-based entrepreneurs to log
the lion's share of old-growth forest stands in the Sierra Madre. The ancestral land rights of
the indigenous forest tribes were disregarded, the longstanding tradition of mutual fear and
hostility between these groups and lowland communities was reinforced, and forest occupants
were portrayed as the cause of the failure to achieve sustainable forestry operations by means
°f the Selective Logging System. By declaring all forests state property, defïning corporate
timber licenses as the sole legal mode of access to these lands, and declaring all the forest-
based activities of 'forest occupants' illegal, government officials became the brokers between
Ais large resource-base and various members of the citizenry, companies, forest occupants and
indigenous forest people, with private stakes in the forest lands.
A few hundred years earlier, self-interest, mixed with the holy mission of Christianization,
led Spain to occupy the Philippines. Colonial rule was established by linking up with
indigenous principalia, who facilitated Spain's extraction of tributes from the local population.
Ancestral rights to the land and resources of Cagayan were denied when all lands were declared
the property of the King of Spain. When it proved impossible to bring upland tribes under
control, the traditional enmity between these two groups of Filipinos was exploited in order to
strengthen the position of the local elite. The Spanish authorities acquiesced in their monopoly
°n the trade in their prohibited products. Through the imposition of a tobacco monopoly, the
discrepancies between the indigenous elite and the majority of poor farmers were intensified,
and brokerage functions were added to the existing patronage role of the elite, reinforcing their
leadership position.
The role of these rural leaders, who resembled their pre-colonial predecessors in the sense
that their reign was also based on a combination of magnanimity and intimidation, is crucial
to an understanding of the similarities between these two epochs in the history of Cagayan
Valley. Processes of social reform, which in other parts of the Philippines had been set in
lotion in the nineteenth century, did not reach Cagayan until the collapse of the Tobacco
Monopoly, some years before Spain lost the Philippines to the United States in 1898.
Cagayan's social structures were therefore handed over virtually intact to the new colonial
iovernment, the only significant modification being that a newly emerging mercantile elite now
°ccupied the leadership positions which under Spanish patronage had been reserved for pre-
colonial village chiefs. Motivated by a mix of economie interest and the need to convince the
American electorale of its democratie mission to 'préparé the Philippines for self-rule', the
United States swiftly introduced its own system of representation-by-district into the
"hilippjneSï playing into the hands of local leaders whose clientèle now became a means of
iaining access to a new level, where leadership could be Consolidated: the nation-state and all
toe natural resources the Philippines had 'inherited' from its colonial rulers.
When Major Ahern introduced the system of public licenses for private logging
c°rporations in the early twentieth century, his aim was to provide an incentive to invest in the
required for mechanized logging. This incentive proved effective in attracting short-
private investment into the forestry sector, but failed to persuade the majority of
c°mpanies to commit themselves to the sector in the longer term. Not many entrepreneurs were
Prepared to invest resources and capital into the long-term productivity of a leased resource,
'et alone in a slow-growing natural forest owned by a government that could easily alter its
Policies before the investor was able to enjoy a return on his investment. Instead,
c°ncessionaires opted for the economically rational strategy of limiting their forestry
engagement to short-term investments in mechanized systems of timber extraction, and putting
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earnings frorn that activity into other, more profitable sectors of the economy. Thus the marmer
in which the Cagayan concessions were handled by their holders and contractors, many of
whom share Chinese origins, tells us more about the sustainability of this concept of leasing
out public forests to logging corporations than about the sustainability of the business practices
of the ethnic Chinese who owned or managed many of the logging concessions in Cagayan
Valley. Government-owned natural resources are bound to succumb when the revenues froffl
their extraction are not used to ensure their long-term productivity but invested in other, more
rewarding, sectors of the economy. The question of whether this same - economically rational -
behaviour would have occurred under other tenurial arrangements cannot be answered in the
case of the Philippines, as this has been tried only in a few corporate concessions in Mindanao,
where the conversion of large parts of these concessions into plantations of fast-growing
species limits their validity as examples of the management of sustainable natural forests.
The large area of undisturbed forests retumed to the Philippine people at independence was
accompanied by a set of political and social legacies from the colonial period that not only
helped to speed up deforestation after independence, but also kept most of the revenues from
the utilization of these common resources out of reach of the State and citizenry until the early
1990s, by which time natural forests in most parts of the Philippines had been decimated or
degraded. During the fïrst fifty years of independence, the imprint of four centuries of Spanish
and American occupation have proven so resilient as to prevent the country from achieving
social and environmental sustainability in the forestry sector. In fact, as the remaining
corporate logging licenses are about to expire, the stage may be set for what may well be the
final phase of the deforestation process in the Sierra Madre: the colonization of the abandoned
concessions by migrants from nearby provinces, converting residual forests into commercial
croplands for corporate processing industries in the lowlands. This is the subject of the next
two Chapters.
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Chapter 8
Perpetual Land of Promise;
forest migration in historical perspective
^ • l I ntr od uction
Population growth, and the accompanying increase in the demand for timber, fuelwood and
agricultural land, are commonly seen as factors contributing to tropical deforestation (see
Section 2.2.2). The rapid loss of Philippine forest cover did indeed go hand-in-hand with a
steady increase in the population. However, as Figure 8.1 illustrates, other factors of
Potential influence on forest cover, such as corporate log extraction rates and the national
debt, also changed dramatically in the postwar years. Between 1962 and 1992, the national
debt rose from 1.5 to 30 billion dollars (Boyce 1993; NSO 1995). During the same period,
Eovernment records (cited in Bautista 1991) show that 230 million cubic metres of premium
hardwood were extracted from the country's natural forest stands. As we saw in the
Previous chapter, there is poor congruence between official records and actual log
extraction levels. This, and the high extractable volume of 100 nf per hectare which is
assumed, means that at least four million hectares of old-growth dipterocarp was opened for
logging during this period. But does the fact that forest decline and population growth were
correlated in statistical terms teil us how population growth influenced deforestation? This
chapter aims to answer this question for the case of the Sierra Madre.
Issues dealing with the relation between population growth and deforestation are
influenced by undercurrents of - largely implicit - ideology. In the Philippine context, for
example, in questioning whether population pressure per se matters that much to
deforestation one risks playing into the cards of anti-family-planning groups, such as the
mfluential Roman Catholic Church. On the other hand, a focus on population growth as the
key cause of deforestation loses sight of the politica! and economie dimensions of
environmental degradation, and may be interpreted by progressive groups as naive and
conformist. My investigation does not take sides on this issue. Accepting the relevance of
the population-resource equation for sustainable development, this chapter approaches the
Question via one of the causes of deforestation identifïed in Chapter 4: forest migration. I
will begin with a brief sketch of the region's agrarian history, examining how its migration
balance with neighbouring regions changed over time. Combining a limited amount of
secondary data with assumptions derived from general land-distribution patterns in the
Philippines as a whole will make it possible to estimate the per capita availability of
'armlands in the Cagayan Valley lowlands. To gain a better idea of the possible role of
constrained access to farmlands as a possible source motive in forest migration, I will give
s°nie indication of the way the region's farmlands are distributed among the farming
Population. Illustrations of landowner response to the various land reform initiatives
undertaken this century point up the resilience of this distribution pattern. The role of credit
ls then examined as a factor contributing to the poor results of land distribution policies. I
c°nclude with an overall synthesis of the context of forest migration to the Sierra Madre.
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8.2 Contours of the original landscape
Cagayan Valley has always been one of the Philippines' most sparsely populated regions.
Still, archeological fmdings suggest that the province of Cagayan was among the first
inhabited areas on the island of Luzon. The oldest known artefacts of human habitation in
Cagayan Valley were found in the Musang Caves in Penablanca, Cagayan and date back to
12,000-9,000 B.C. Excavations at Palanan Bay revealed the post-hole settings of two
houses, evidence of human habitation between 2,500 and 1,500 B.C. (Bellwood 1985:223).
Scott (1981) attributes the early inhabitation of the area to the natura! savannahs and open
floodplains of the Cagayan river, which offered early inhabitants open hunting grounds.
Bellwood (ibid.) concurs, and hypothesizes that if there had been lowland rainforests here,
as in most other parts of the Philippines1 these would probably have been reduced or
broken up during the dry glacial periods, creating savannahs that have been sustained by
the region's pronounced dry season and the rain-shadow effect of the mountain ranges
surrounding it2.
Travel accounts of early visitors to the region indicate that not all grasslands here are of
natural origin. While most towns in Cagayan Valley are today surrounded by vast areas of
cultivated land and 'idle grasslands' (Maus and Schieferli 1989), Dean Worcester3, made
the following observation after his visit to Isabela in early 1900:
"the whole province of Isabela, practically, with the exclusion of the territory inhabited by the
wild people, is included within the towns. You can find a virgin forest within the limits of a
mwicipality" (Phil. Com. 1910:562).
However, an earlier traveller writing about his southbound passage through the town of
Cabagan, one of the oldest settlements in Cagayan Valley, noted that "from the road via
Cabagan there is nothing else to be seen hut grosse s and reeds... " (Jordana y Morera 1874:
15).
Neither impression can be accurately verifïed, since there are no geographical or land-
use surveys prior to 1900 (U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey 1900:3). The first American
government administrators managed the natural resources of the Philippine Islands using
maps largely based on nineteenth-century data compiled by the Jesuit friars of the Manila
Observatory. Annex D shows the map of Nueva Viscaya, Isabela and Cagayan which they
prepared, and which were published by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey in 1900. Maps
8.1 and 8.2 are examples of the kind of land-use information that the American
administrators had on land use in Cagayan Valley. Map 8.1 is a late-nineteenth-century
navigation map of the northern half of the Cagayan River, the region's main transportation
artery until well into the twentieth century. This map confirms the observations of both
Botanists are generally agreed that when man first reached the Philippines, the archipelago was largely covered
hy thatform ofvegetation called a tropical rainforest" (W H. Scott 1981:5).
"there have been 20 full glacials within the past 2 million years. and the same numher of intervening true
mterglacials There is still some disagreement about the duration of the glacial-mterglacial cycles, bul present views seef
to favour long glacials of about 100.000 years, separated by much shorter mterglacials of about 10,000 to 30,000
years The major worldwide effects ofglaciation were to lawer sea-levels, vegetatton zones and temperatures, and these
changes were all feit quite strongly in tropical latitudes" (Bellwood 1985:18-19)
Dean C Worcester was a member of the first and second Philippine Commission. Secretary of the Intenor of
the Government of the Philippine Islands until 1913 and is descrihed as "the most mftuential man m the Philippi"es
between 1901 and 1912" (Gleeck 1976, cited in Sullivan 1992:99). After his career as a senior government official, hè
developed considerable business interests in the Philippines, particularly in the coconut mdustry, cattle raising and shipP'n8
Sullivan (1992) offers a detailed analysis of Worcester's role in the American admimstration of the Philippmes.
Map 8.1 Navigation Map of the lower Cagayan River, 1898
Map 8.2 Forest Map of northeastern Luzon, 1908
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Map 8.3 A comparison of 1908 and 1950 forest boundary, Northern Sierra Madre
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travellers quoted above. The presence of scattered grasslands and cultivated lands is
indicated, notably on the northwestern flanks of the river, while forest vegetation appears to
have been present along most of the eastern banks of the river from the town of
Calamaniugan in the north to Tumauini in the south (an enlarged version of this map and its
legend is also provided in Annex D). Map 8.2 (overleaf) is a computer-scanned version of
the region's oldest known forest map, produced in 1908 by the Bureau of Forestry. With
the course of the Cagayan River projected on it, this map shows that in several places the
Sierra Madre forest does indeed touch the banks of the Cagayan River in several places.
Again, however, the inaccuracy of this map makes it difficult to draw any real conclusions
on the region's original forest cover: the dotted line on map 8.3 compares the forest
boundary indicated on the 1908 Forest Map with the one indicated in my own 1950 forest
cover map (see Chapter 3), which is based on aerial surveys conducted by the U.S. Army
between 1949 and 1952 (Clement & van Dijk 1994). While some changes may be attributed
to in-migration and agricultural expansion during the first half of the twentieth century - as
will become clear in the following section - the differences are probably due largely to the
rather sketchy nature of the older map.
As imperfect as the maps 8.1 and 8.2 may be, they do seem to support the hypothesis
that parts of the extensive savannah landscape in the rolling lands directly bordering the
flood plains of the Cagayan and the Magat did indeed exist before logging or agricultural
clearing took place on any significant scale. The importance of cattle exports from the
Cagayan Valley to Ilokos and Central Luzon (De Jesus 1980:130) during the Spanish
colonial period also seems to confirm this. One area where pre-colonial pastures occurred
was on the western banks of the stretch of the Cagayan River running between the present-
day municipalities of Cauayan and Ilagan, Isabela. Here herdsmen of the Gaddang tribe,
one of Cagayan Valley's indigenous lowland tribes, were moving from place to place with
their cattle, a lifestyle that was incompatible with the Spanish policy of reduccion (see
Chapter 7). Skirmishes with Spanish soldiers gradually pushed the Gaddang southward, to
Diadi in Southern Nueva Viscaya, where they faced new problems, as the grasslands here
were the ancient hunting grounds of Ifugao and Ilongot tribes from the nearby mountains4.
According to Father Vermeulen, a Scheut missionary who studies the history of Nueva
Viscaya, when elderly Ifugao talk about 'their river', they do not mean the Ibulao River
upstream of Aritao, but the Magat, which runs from Bayombong to Ilagan across the Mallig
plains. On their hunting trips, the Ifugao had to cross this river to reach open grasslands on
its eastern banks, towards the Sierra Madre. This would indicate that prior to the Spanish
occupation the forests of the Cordillera stretched all the way down from the province of
Ifugao to the Magat River. In the view of Father Vermeulen, most of the grassland areas
now visible between Ifugao, Nueva Viscaya and Quirino are man-made and date from the
twentieth century5. The fact that many of the extensive grassland areas visible in Nueva
The town of Cordon derives lts name from these tensions hetween the lowlanders and Ifugao and Ilongot forest
tribes. Here, on the present-day boundary of the mountamous area of Diadi, Nueva Viscaya and the provinces of Isabela
and Quirino. a military cordon was established to protect travellers agamst hostilities between Ifugao from the Cordillera
and headhuntmg Ilongot from the Sierra Madre.
Vermeulen told me that Scheut missionaries hunted for monkeys in a village called Bakir Na Dakkal, meaning
'the great forest', and located between the Ifugao capital of Lamut and the town of Bagabag. Nueva Viscaya. He also
quoted a missionary who visited the area between Lamut and the present town of Diffun, Quirino in 1927 and spoke in his
travel diary of "Ifugao m the forest". In a letter m Vermeulen's possession, an American soldier serving in what is now the
police compound m Bayombong, writes about deer-huntmg trips m the area between the compound and the river, an
indication that they did not need to cross the Magat river (in a westward direction) to reach the Cordillera forest, 'that is
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Viscaya today are of fairly recent origin may also be concluded frorn the words of a friar
who worked in that province in 1895 and wrote that "stockraising is not prospering fiere,
because of a lack of pastures " (Fr. Francisco Carrozal in Malumbres 1918:483).





— •• — Nucva Viscaya & Quirino
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Sources: Agncultural censuses; NSO 1995; Data ftimished hy DA Tuguegarao. Cagayan
In the 20"1 century, the region's non-forest areas began to expand. Fig. 8.2 shows the
changes in cultivated farm area in the Cagayan Valley and its three major provinces (the
province of Quirino was carved out of Nueva Viscaya in 1971). The total area of cultivated
farmlands expanded from 78,796 hectares in 1918 to more than 600,000 hectares in 1991.
Although some expansion took place before independence, by far the largest area (400,000
ha) of farmlands was added after 1948. The following section examines the region's
settlement history in more detail.
8.3 Migration and agricultural expansion in the Cagayan Valley lowlands
8.3. l Late Spanish period: tobacco farmers migrate to Cagayan
Throughout the Spanish colonial occupation, Cagayan Valley was a sparsely populated
province; its indigenous lowland communities, such as the Ybanag, Gaddang, Itawi and
Yogad, lived in scattered settlements along the lower and mid-reaches of the Cagayan
River, where the its most extensive floodplains lay. In addition to these lowland tribes, who
are of Malay origin, there are the negrito Agta or Dumagat: they are of Australoid origin,
and are believed to have migrated to the Philippines before the Malay or Austronesian
groups began to arrive, five or six thousand years ago (Scott 1994:11). The Agta lived in
the forest lands, conducting occasional barter trade with the communities in the lowlands.
The already small population living along the banks of the Cagayan decreased further
Howfar the forest reached during that time On the other hand, there were also some savannas already in the surroundings
ofLamut, so says Galves. who made some expeditions to Kiangan herween 1810 and 1820" (pers. com. Rev Vermeulen.
April 1996)
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during the first two centuries of Spanish occupation; seventeenth-century census data show
a decline in the registered population in Lower Cagayan from 20,200 in 1591 to 2,400 in
1612 (Keesing 1962:27). The decrease is believed to have resulted from a disinclination to
register among Cagayanos, because this required them to pay tribute and take religieus
education. After a period of gradual recovery in the eighteenth century, the registered
population, or number of tributes, dropped again after 1780 during the economie crisis
caused by the ban on tobacco cultivation in Cagayan Valley (see Section 7.2.2). The
economie situation worsened after strong typhoons in 1788 and 1789, followed by plagues
of locusts and rats. Thus in Cagayan the ban on tobacco production defeated its stated
purpose of raising government revenue from the production and sale of tobacco, as farmers
were deprived of what had until then been their most important source of cash income: "In
the end, famine conditions reduced people to eating the animal hides used in chairs and
saddles and made them vulnerable to the epidemie which then ravaged the province" (De
Jesus 1980:130) Faced with these hardships and the continued collection of tribute, people
fled the province in their thousands and enlisted as soldiers or went into service in private
homes as coachmen and domestic helpers:
"The natives, abandoning theirflelds, go to Manüa and other provinces to seek a better fortune
and to leave behind the miseries of their land; and it is surely most lamentable to see the biggest
province in area, [endowed] with excellent soil, not to say the best on the island of Luzon,
reduced to the small number of 8,000 to 9,000 tributes" ("Informe sobre la Provincia de
Cagayan, y decadencia de ella desde se proivió el plantio de tabaco, y estanco de este", Archiva
de la Provincia de Nuestra Senora del Rosario, appr. 1790 in ibid.: 135)
In 1797, Hacienda San Francisco in Ilagan became the first estate in Cagayan Valley to be
allowed to grow tobacco for the Spanish Tobacco Monopoly. The northern part of Nueva
Viscaya, the contemporary province of Isabela, had superior growing conditions for
tobacco: the mountainous climate was less harsh than that of northern Cagayan and the
salty influence of the sea wind was not a problem here. Between 1830 and 1850, the region
overtook Gapan as the top producer of prime cigar tobaccos for the Monopoly. In 1851,
tobaccos from this area won a gold medal at the London Universal Exposition. Eight years
later this led to the establishment of the province of Isabela in honour of Isabela, Queen of
Spain (Corpus 1997.121). lts municipalities of Cabagan and Tumauini in the north were
taken from Cagayan, and its other municipalities, including Palanan on the Pacific coast,
from the southern province of Nueva Viscaya.
As the international fame of Cagayan Valley tobacco further boosted demand, the
scarcity of agricultural labour was being increasingly feit, and the Monopoly began to
subsidize the migration of tobacco farmers to Cagayan Valley. Since most economie
exchanges with Manila took place via the Cagayan River and the northern towns of Aparri
and Tuguegarao, Ilokos Norte was the logical province to look for immigrant tobacco
growers. Despite objections from the Alcalde, or provincial governor, of Ilokos, who
feared the loss of tribute, between 1849 and 1881 several incentive packages were offered
to encourage farmers to migrate to Cagayan Valley. Immigrants were allowed to settle
anywhere they wanted to and cultivate any erop they wanted to, although there were
additional benefits in store for those opting to grow tobacco. They were allowed to farm
barrios of their own and received financial assistance in the form of loans, to help them pay
off debts in their place of origin and to cover the cost of travel and establishing a home in
Cagayan. They were not required to pay tribute during the first eight years according to the
1849 decree, later reduced to the first two years in the 1881 decree. Migration remained
free throughout the Philippines, but these incentives were only offered for migration to
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Isabela and Cagayan (De Jesus 1980;
Malumbres 1918).
The incentives did not spur any
substantial inflow of migrants; there
were not many from Bohol or the
Visayas, with the exception of one group
of Muslims from Balangigi Island (Sulu
sea), who arrived in Echague and started
to cultivate corn and tobacco. Spain also
looked to China as a source of labour; in
1850, more than 200 Chinese migrant
labourers were offered a five-year
exemption from the payment of tribute if
they wished to cultivate tobacco. Spain's
Chief Forester, Don Ramon Jordana y
Morera, wrote pessimistically about the
likelihood that the population would ever
rise above the density of 5 inhabitants
per km2 recorded in the 1865 census:
"... the climate, thatfeels very unhealthy
because of the most abundant humidity
that the rivers, ricelands and forests
maintain and because of the mosqmtos
that stagnant pools fill the atmosphere
with, will hamper the growth of the
population.. "(Jordana y Morera 1874:
22)
However small the number of Ilokano tobacco-growers who arrived in the second half of
the nineteenth century in comparison with later waves of immigrants from the south, their
labour was of great importance for the development of the tobacco haciendas during this
period: by 1880, the majority of the workers in the industry were Ilokano (Malumbres
1918). The early migrants settled mainly in the lower reaches of the Cagayan River, where
there were large floodplains suitable for the cultivation of native tobacco. New settlements
were built near the river, where Spanish authority had more or less stabilized, and there
was protection against hostile attacks by infieles. Based on Cagayan's peak production of
716,899 fardos of tobacco in 1872, and taking from Box 8.1 an average yield of 14 fardos
per hectare, an estimated 52,800 ha of tobacco haciendas was devoted to growing tobacco
for the Monopoly at the end of the nineteenth century. Most administrative and economie
contact between Cagayan Valley and the outside world went via the northern route, as
reflected in the fact that by the end of the Spanish administration of the Philippines, three-
quarters of the population of the upstream province of Nueva Viscaya was classified as
'wild' in the 1903 census (Keesing 1962:177).
De Jesus 1980: l stick = 16 leaves, l fardo
= 30 mano = 300 sticks
Cureg, pers.com. 1994: l stick = 50 leaves,
l fardo = 100 sticks =5000 leaves)
l fardo = 100 sticks = quintal
l bale = 2.5 fardo = 250 sticks
l quintal = 46 kg = fardo (5000 leaves)
l bale = 125 kg = 2.5 quintal 110 kg -l- 15
wrapper
vd Muijzenberg (1973:77), Nueva Ecija: 60
fardos per quinon= 2.8 ha = 20 fardos/ha
Cureg, pers. com, 1994: 12 bales/ha = 30
fardos/ha = 3000 sticks/ha (four times 2-3
or 4 leaves = 10-12 leaves per plant),
10,000 plants/ha = 110,000 leaves/ha = 9
bales/ha (23 fardos/ha)
de Jesus: 6400 plants/4460m2( = l .67x
1.67m), yield of 25-31 fardos/ha
Production records never show yields of
more than 7 bales = 17.5 fardo/ha. At 10-
12,000 plants per hectare, that means 7-9
leaves are harvested per plant
1992 Price: 750P -1000 P per quintal
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8.3.2 The American period: colonization of the southern lowlands
"The province possesses vast resources. The forests of the Caraballo and the Sierra
Madre are almost untouched as a resu.lt of the lack of transportation. There are
extensive tobacco lands which are available for homesteading or can be leased very
cheaply from the Government. The grasslands of the slopes offer great possibilities
for cattle industry. Muchfish is caught in the rivers and game abounds in the grassy
plain and in the forests. ... Better transportation facilities and government
encouragement would assuredly result in increased immigration, settlers and
labourers being the chiefneed of Isabela" (U.S. Coast & Geodetic Survey 1900:167)
Throughout the Spanish period, scarcity of labour had constrained the development of more
agricultural lands in response to the market opportunities offered by the tobacco industry,
and colonial policies to stimulate migration to Cagayan Valley did not signifïcantly ease this
constraint. The inaccessible Caraballo mountains probably prevented a northward extension
of the influx of Ilokano settlers into central Luzon between 1820 and 1920, when the role of
commercial agriculture expanded and population growth had eased labour scarcity in
neighbouring provinces (Roth 1983). Larkin refers to this as the 'century of the frontier',
when the central Luzon plain was cleared, "world commerce arrived in the Philippines and
the archipelago became irrevocably tied to the rest of the world" (Larkin 1982:613).
Out-migration from Ilokos was spurred by several factors. Larkin stresses the rapid
population growth in Ilokos and its environmental constraints (poor soil and low rainfall),
which limited the minimum size of a viable farm, as well as the decline in payment for
farmers offering wage labour, and the speculative motives of landowners using freely
available labour to expand their land holdings and trading businesses. Lewis (1991) adds
the enterprising, opportunity-seeking nature of the Ilokano as a factor which stimulated out-
migration from Ilokos.
The fact that these migrants did not push onwards to the north may be attributed to the
presence of unoccupied lands in central Luzon and to the inaccessibility of the Caraballo
and Sierra Madre mountains sheltering Cagayan Valley. This barrier was lowered, if not
removed, by 1924, when one of the trails across the Caraballo was widened into a dirt
road. Another 45 years would pass before this access route to the north was upgraded into
the Dalton Pass Road.
The opening of the Dalton pass sparked a greater response to an earlier government
incentive, the 1904 Homestead Act, which offered Philippine citizens aged 18 and over the
right to open up a plot of public land up to a maximum of 24 hectares for farming
purposes. Once the settler could show that 20% of his land was actually cultivated and that
his house and family were there, hè was entitled to a patent to the land5.
In the late 1920s, the option was added of turning a homestead patent into a real title if
a patent holder could prove hè had cultivated the land since July 4, 1926. From 1952
onwards, evidence of having paid taxes on the land since 1945 became sufficient ground to
claim ownership, even if the land had not been cultivated, provided it had not been
occupied by another person (Noblejas 1961).
The homestead patent was not equivalent to an ownership title. since K Is not conclusive proof of title and
c°nfers na better right than that conferred by the patent. A patent which attempts to convey land to which the Government
n"a not title at the time of its issuance vests no title m the patentee as against the real owner" (Noblejas 1961:87).
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Cagayan Isabela Nueva Viscaya Cagayan Valley
Sources: PhilCom repons 1903 - 1932, Commonwealth of the Philippincs 1939
Table 8.1 Homestead Applications & patents issued, Cagayan ValleyJ904-1937 (Ha.)
Nueva Viscaya Isabela Cagayan Cagayan Valley
Applied Patented Applied Patented Applied Patented Applied Patented %Patented
1904-1926 38.398 9.180 114.391 21.149 84.690 28.543 237.479 58.872 24,8
1927-1937 30.582 3.734 196.283 62.569 70.362 15.112 297.227 81.415 27,4
1904-1937^ 68.980 12.914 310.674 83.718 155.052 43.655 534.706 140.287 26.2
Source: Philippine Commission Repons, 1904-1937
Initially, the Act did not meet with much response; the Directer of Lands attributed the low
number of applications to the Filipino's attachment to his place of origin: "the Filipino is
not a pioneer, and his traditional tendency is to live in the neighbourhood where hè was
bom and not to seek new land.." (Report of the Director of Lands, fiscal year ending on
June 30, 1909: 25). Worcester mused that farmers probably did not sense the urgency of
registering their clearings because: "the natives just move onto a piece of land, cultivate it
until it begins to run down and then move on to another, and no one says them nay...-"
(Worcester in 'Hearing of House Committee on Insular Affairs' 1910:545). In the case of
Cagayan Valley, however, after 1924 in-migration, mainly of Ilokanos from the Ilokos and
central Luzon regions, into the southern provinces of Cagayan Valley began to accelerate
(see Table 8.1 and Fig. 8.3). There was a rapid increase in the number of applications after
1924; in the ten years between 1927 and 1937 nearly twice as many people applied as in the
previous twenty years. The abundance of land is reflected in the average size of the
application: 17.4 hectare per household. The slow response of the Bureau to the
applications is noteworthy. As the end of the pre-war American presence in the Philippines
approached, less than 30% of the area submitted for patenting had actually received a
positive response. For the Philippines as a whole, the situation was not much better;
between July 26, 1904 and December 31, 1937 homestead applications were received for a
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total area of 6.2 million hectares; applications covering 2.2 million hectares had been
approved and actual patents issued for 701,000 ha (or 12%). The Philippines Herald Mid-
Week Magazine of September 11, 1940 calls attention to opportunities for landless people to
benefit from agricultural subdivision projects being developed by the government in various
regions, 'especially those traversed by roads'. In Cagayan Valley, 40,000 hectares of
"vacant public lands, of positive value for agriculture". (Philippine Commonwealth
1939:13-14) were developed for immigrante in Allacapan (Cagayan), Echague and Gamu
(Isabela), and Pinnapagan (Nueva Viscaya).
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These public investments in support of migration into less populated areas were intended to
"solve the agrarian problem arisingfrom congestion of population in xmall and poor- quality
soil areas and last but not least: it makes the people happy and contented, the outstanding
bulwark of a strong and stable government." (Dans 1940:2).
Pre-war agricultural expansion was most rapid in the province of Isabela, which means
that most migrants passed through Nueva Viscaya on their way there, opting not to settle
there but to move on until they reached the empty rolling lands adjacent to the valley floor
of the Cagayan River in Isabela. No doubt this had to do with the above mentioned tensions
between the lowlanders and forest tribes from the surrounding uplands, as well as the
extensive forest cover of this province. In-migration and agricultural expansion in Nueva
Viscaya only accelerated after 1960 (see 8.3.3).
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During the American occupation, the production of the region's vintage native cigar
tobaccos grew back to the levels recorded in the best years the Monopoly (see fig 8.4).
American smokers appreciated the quality of Manila cigars: consumption jumped from
698,000 in 1902, to 90 million in 1912, and to 230 million in 1923 (Galang 1949:29).
Cagayan still produced the top quality leaves, as this regulation shows7:
"To be classed as Standard, cigars must be manufactured under sanitary conditions from good
to clean, selected tobacco, properly cured and seasoned, of a erop which hos been harvested at
least six months, exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva
Viscaya" (AO 35, Section 9, Tobacco Inspection Regulations for Leaf and Manufactured
Products of Tobacco, Bureau of Internal Revenue, March l, 1918. In: Paguirigan and
Madamba 1927:88)
In an il lustrated hook on the Philippine Islands. American publisher William Boyce writes that soon after the
American take-over. the American markei was flooded with a large volume of low quality cigars. Soon alterwards. an
American *could no langer say, as hè puffs away at a Philippine cigar well. this is certainly made of Manila rope\" as
cxporters improved the quality of their product and orders went beyond the capacity of the cigar factories in Manila. In a
footnote hè mentions that Mr. Olsen (one of the buyers of the Sta Isabel estate) "a farmer Chicago boy, naw a successful
tobacco manufacturer's agent in Manila" sends him 100 cigars every months, and that hè prefers them to Havana cigars.
(Boyce, n.d.: 117)
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Cagayan Valley's share of the national tobacco output was about 45%; other major tobacco
areas of the early twentieth century were La Union, Ilokos, Pangasinan, Sulu and Cebu.
Thus by 1920 the entire area of farmlands in Cagayan Valley that used to produce for the
Monopoly was again under tobacco. Cagayan and Isabela each produced about half of the
region's tobacco output. The more delicate leaf tobacco came from Southern Isabela
(Echague, Jones, Angadanan), while northern Isabela (Cauayan, Naguilian, Reina
Mercedes, Ilagan, Tumauini, Cabagan, San Pablo, Sta Maria) and Cagayan (Tuguegarao
and Gattaran) produced mainly wrapper leaves.
8.3.3 After independence: logging and agricultural expansion towards Isabela
During the 1960s, the Ilokos provinces gradually overtook Cagayan Valley as the
Philippines' leading tobacco-growing area. The lighter and more aromatic Virginia
tobaccos, used for the production of cigarettes, grew better there and were more in
demand, as cigarettes replaced cigars as the leading tobacco product. The production of
native tobacco increasingly required government intervention, including the establishment
of a National Tobacco Administration in 1964, and legislation that for every bale of
Virginia tobacco, the NTA was required to buy a fixed amount of native tobacco against
guaranteed prices (pers. com., Engr. Masigan, Oct 1994).
In the postwar Philippines, the "Land for the Landless" slogan continued to be translated
into giveaways of public lands rather than redistributive policies, and more settlers were
invited into the public forest lands. A National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA)8 was established to "help speed up the free distribution of
agricultural lands in the public domain to landless tenants and farm workers who are
citizens of the Philippines and to encourage migration to the sparsely populated regions..."
(Noblejas, 1961:76). These new measures to encourage resettlement resulted in increasing
in-migration into the southern lowlands of Cagayan Valley (and the other frontier regions,
such as southern Mindanao and southern Tagalog); the importance of postwar immigration
is reflected in the speed with which the region's farm area expanded during these two
periods (see Fig. 8.2). Between 1918 and 1939, nearly 100,000 ha of new agricultural
lands was developed, whereas 200,000 ha, or 62% of all the farmland cultivated in Isabela
and Nueva Viscaya in 1970 was opened up between 1948 and 1970.
The majority9 of the immigrants arriving in Cagayan Valley between 1960 and 1970
came from the more densely populated10 regions of Ilokos and Central Luzon. But a
relatively small number of skilled labourers employed by the first logging corporations
entering the southern provinces during this period were also part of this influx. Bicol,
Metro Manila and Mindanao were the regions where these skilled labourers were recruited,
after having developed skills as chainsaw operators, tree-cutters, bulldozer operators and
truck drivers in logging operations there. The combined inflow of colonists and logging
company employees produced a 61% population growth in Nueva Viscaya between 1960
and 1970. An abundance of unoccupied lands remained, if we may believe American
Repuhlic Act 1160, June 18, 1954
The Ilokos and central Luzon regions together produced 78% of all migrants arriving in Cagayan Valley between
1960 and 1970 (Flieger 1976 in Zosa Feranil 1994:336-340)
In 1960. the population densities of the Central Luzon, Ilokos and Cagayan Valley regions were 137, 113 and 33
inhabitants/W respectively (Conception 1983 in Zosa Feranil 1994 :327)
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geographers Wernstedt and Spencer, who were almost lyrical about their visit to the
Cagayan Valley in the mid-1960s:
In-migration will occupy the still vacant lands, population will increase at a rate greater than
the national rate, the variety of agricultural production will increase, the total agricultural
surplus may grow still larger, the patterns of urbanism and industrial processing will tend
toward greater variety, complexity and maturity, and the region will play a more significant
role in the national economy than hos been the case in the past. For the present, one answer to
the Philippine problem of population pressure on the land can still be: "Go North, young man,
go North" (Wernstedt and Spencer 1967:328)
None of these predictions came true; regional population growth initially followed the
national trend, falling below it after 1980, as Fig. 8.5 illustrates. The declining demand for
the region's tobaccos did not lead to diversification but rather to a shift to the production of
grain. As we saw earlier (Chapter 3 and Section 5.3.1), rice and corn occupied 98% of all
cultivated lands in Cagayan Valley in 1991. Agro-industrial development was practically
non-existent, as both crops were produced largely for consumption or processing
elsewhere, maintaining the region's strong reliance on agriculture. In terms of per capita
domestic product, Cagayan Valley was still the second poorest region in the country in
1990. Temporary off-farm employment opportunities in the corporate logging operations,
and the growing disparity in population density between the Valley and its neighbouring
regions (Zosa Feranil 1994:327, table 2) could not alter the fact that immigrants were
increasingly outnumbered by people leaving the Valley in search of greener pastures.
The increasing importance of rural-to-urban migration is the main characteristic of out-
migration in the period 1960 to 1970; young females with little formal education
represented a disproportionately high share of those attracted by the new employment
opportunities in the industrializing regions of southern Tagalog, Metro Manila and central
Luzon (Zosa Feranil 1994). These new opportunities not only stimulated out-migration
from the region, but also syphoned off potential immigrants who might otherwise have
opted to settle in Cagayan Valley. For these reasons, Cagayan Valley's role as a net
importer of migrants from other regions was not to last beyond the 1960s.
8.3.4 Population growth and the post-1970 migration pattern: an analysis
Nationwide, the post-1970 migration pattern has four main characteristics (Zosa Feranil
1994: 348-358):
• consolidation of the rural-to-urban bias in interregional migration
• influence of /Vzfraregional demographic trends on population growth greater than that of
mterregional migration
• increased importance of short-distance migration
• rural migration increasingly oriented towards the uplands.
For reasons that I will address in Section 8.4, Cagayan Valley was no exception to the
tendency for intraregional demographic trends to gradually outweigh the importance of
interregional migration after 1970, except for the importance of forest migration. The
region continued to experience a steady influx of migrants, but the significance of their
numbers was declining in comparison with the growth of the resident population (Tables
8.2 and 8.3).
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*ln 1980, Kalinga Apayao and Ifugao were administratively re-situated in the Cordillera Region. Their populations are
regarded in this tahle as part of the Region02 population. The population of the Batanes islands has nol been included here.
Source: NSO 1995
Although only just, in 1975 the Cagayan Valley became a net emigration area: the inflow
of farmers from Ilokos and Central Luzon remained below the out-flow of people to the
urban centres of central and southern Luzon. In terms of population growth, the annual
influx of 3000 to 7000 migrants into Cagayan Valley was almost negligible in comparison
with the region's own annual population increment of 53,000 persons. The same held true
for a major in-migration area such as Metro Manila, which between 1975 and 1980 had a
net migration balance of 174,100 people with the 11 other Regions; during the same period,
its population increased by nearly one million people. Since population growth kept pace
with the national average of approximately 3% per year between 1948 and 1980, the
average population density, 60.9 persons/km2 in 1980, remained approximately half the
national average. In the next decade, population growth slowed to only 2% percent per
annum, and it was only because of the administrative realignment of two of the region's
most sparsely populated provinces, Ifugao and Kalinga Apayao, to the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) that the area went from the nation's least populous region to
its second least populous region (after CAR), with a population density of 87 persons per
km2, almost the same as the 1960 national average (NSO 1995)



















































































The declining significance of mterregional migration in relation to i/tfraregional population
growth raises fewer questions than the fact that at this time Region 02, as thinly populated
as it was, was already becoming a net exporter of migrants. Moreover, some of the
country's most densely populated regions - central Luzon, Ilokos and the National Capital
Region - either border on Cagayan Valley or can be reached within a few hours. In the
1970s, at least, there must have been relatively good prospects of fmding free lands in
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Cagayan, as only a fraction of the farmlands developed by 1990 were then cultivated, and
logging companies were creating access routes to potential farming areas inside the public
domain. Why did such a lightly populated area as the Cagayan Valley loose rather than gain
population through migration?
An initial exploration points in three directions. First, there is the proximity of Metro
Manila, the country's largest urban-industrial conglomeration, where strong economie
growth created opportunities for non-agricultural employment here, syphoning off migrants
who might otherwise have opted to develop new farmlands in Cagayan Valley. Although
the influx of migrants into Cagayan Valley increased slightly between 1960 and 1980", the
outflow of young, unskilled workers from the region to Manila grew more rapidly. This
increasing migratory trent from rural to urban areas was a countrywide phenomenon during
this period (Zosa Feranil 1994:328).
Secondly, the expanding logging industry only attracted immigrants during the first ten
years of its rapid expansion in Cagayan valley. Soon afterwards, there was less need to
import skilled workers, as sub-contracting became popular among TLA concessionaires
(see 6.2.1). The employees of these local contractors were all from the region, thus
reducing demand for labour from surrounding regions.
A third factor that must have discouraged inter-regional migration to Cagayan Valley
after 1970 was the unstable Peace and Order situation in Region 02, especially after the
declaration of martial law in 1972. During this period the New People's Army established a
stronghold in the Sierra Madre, protected by influential politicians in the region (Jones
1989; Lopez 1994) and with the logistical and fïnancial means extorted from the timber
industry (Vitug 1993). NPA units carried out raids against institutions and individuals
associated with the political and military establishment in the lowlands, abducted
government officials, and threatened owners of ranches and estates. The local population
was more acutely involved in the government's counterinsurgency operations through the
establishment of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) in 1988,
whereby firearms were distributed among villagers. This move, which was officially
intended to enable civilians to protect themselves against armed attack, also contributed to
the occurrence of violence between rival political factions. Raids, political murders and
robberies that were officially attributed to the NPA were seen locally as the work of hired
goons and CAFGUs, used to settle personal and political scores. Under these conditions,
settling in Cagayan was not a particularly attractive option.
Therefore, we can conclude that since the 1970s agricultural expansion in Cagayan
Valley, has been a predominantly m/raregional process, which took place quite separately
from demographic changes in the surrounding regions. In Chapter four I already indicated
that this also held for the most recent category of land-seeking forest migrants. This leaves
us with the question of why, especially after 1990, people from the scarcely populated
provinces of Cagayan Valley and the Cordillera ventured into the forests of the Sierra
Madre to establish farms there. The following section examines in more detail the scarcity
of farmlands in the lowlands.
Between 1960 and 1970. an average 8.250 people migrated into Cagayan Valley annually; this figure decreased
slightly between 1970 and 1980. to an average 5,000 per year (Tables 9. 15 and 23. Zosa Feranil 1994).
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8.4 A first assesstnent of f arm land scarcity in the lowlands12
Actual land scarcity is higher than the average population densities found in the previous
section would suggest, for the following reasons:
- The vast majority of the Cagayanos are 'huddled together' in the settlements close to the
river, while half the region's land area consists of virtually uninhabited grasslands,
classified forests and non-classified public lands. As we saw in Section 4.2, in 1990 the
Valley was home to at most one percent of the region's population.
- Cagayan Valley has the country's lowest urbanization rate; in the 1990 population
census only 24.3% of the population was registered as holding urban residence
(compared to 48.5% for the country as a whole, see Chapter 3). Many people residing
in urban areas also derive part of their income from farming, either directly or via
sharecropping. According to the 1990 population census, of the region's 1.4 million
people aged 15 and older, 356,000 were farmers, forestry workers or fishermen,
144,000 had 'elementary occupations' (including farm labourer), and 485,000 had 'non-
gainful occupations' (including housewives and pensioners) (NSO 1990). Hence it is
safe to assume that at least 80% of the population of Cagayan Valley depended directly
on agriculture for a living.
- Land ownership, as well as access to tilling rights is unevenly distributed. I will return
to this point shortly.
On the basis of these assumptions, and on data presented earlier on the total area of
farmlands available in the region in 1980 and 1990, Table 8.4 calculates the farming
population per square kilometre of farmland in each province. Having no access to other
than aggregate results of the 1990 census, this table uses projections of the total population
and their distribution over rural and urban areas, in order to arrive at indication of the
average area of farmland available per rural household. The aggregate results of the 1990
census are given to indicate the accuracy of these projections. The table also assumes the
total area of cultivates farmlands in the lowlands to be constant after 1990. The resulting
estimates, ranging between 88 and 247 persons per km2 of farmland are of the same order
as the average population densities in the Regions of Ilokos (277/knf) and Central Luzon
(340/km2), which lost most of their forest cover decades ago and functioned as source areas
of land- seeking migrants for many decades. Census data on arable land and gross
population size in 196013 gathered by Van den Muijzenberg (1975), in a study on rural-to-
urban migration in relation to access to agrarian resources in a densely populated barangay
in Nueva Ecija, produced farmland densities of well over 500 persons/km2. But still, few
people from this area opted to leave for Isabela and Mindanao, in spite of a clear preference
for agriculture over other sources of livelihood. Instead, young males with little access to
agricultural lands 'circommuted' between their rural homebase and Metro Manila, engaging
in casual employment there during periods of slack demand for agricultural labour in their
hometowns. The casual nature of their employment and the low level of earnings kept them
This section focuses on land scarcity in the lowlands of Cagayan Valley. lts relevance for the migration motives
of migrants from Ifugao province has yet to hè ascertamed. A detailed study of Ifugao migrant commumties in Quirino
province is to be found in the forthcommg dissertation of Ms. Esther Moonen (Moonen. m prep.).
These calculations led to the following farmland densities in Central Luzon m 1960: Bulacan 895, Pampanga
770, Pangasman 823, Nueva Ecija 351. As urbanization rates were nol taken imo account, these figures probably
overestimate actual densities by 25% (urbanization rate m Central Luzon was 30% m 1970. Zosa Feranil 1994:367)
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from bringing their families to Manila, even though they spent several months per year
there (Van den Muijzenberg 1973:369). This same practice was observed in the first phase
of the process by which new forest migrants from Ifugao and the nearby lowlands migrated
to, and settle inside, the Sierra Madre (see Section 4.3.1). The agrarian population densities
presented below confirm that the lowlands of Cagayan Valley may well be a source area for
shuttling newcomers currently establishing new farms inside the Sierra Madre.
Table 8.4 Changes in people-to-land ratio in three provinces of Region 2 (1980 - 2020)


















































































* The provinces of Nueva Viscaya and Batanes are not mcluded here, as they have little or no relevance for contemporary
forest migration into the northern Sierra Madre
1 Based on Census 1980 and NEDA (1991)
2 Projection based on moderate fertility declme and moderate mortality declme
3 Census 1990 (NSO, 1990)
4 NSO 1990
5 GTZ Inventory of Forest Occupants (1989)
6 CVPED Team III (1994)
As we saw earlier (in Fig. 8.2), the total area of land in Cagayan Valley under cultivation
with rice and corn rose rapidly between 1960 and 1992; the aggregate area for these two
crops doubled, going from 334,000 hectares in 1960 to 650,000 hectares in 1992, and
stabilizing at that level in the following years. A small portion of this increase was the
result of farmers' switching from the cultivation of the region's native tobacco to the less
labour-intensive and more marketable corn. The total area of tobacco lands in Region 02
declined from a peak of 28,000 hectares in 1964 to just under 5,000 hectares in 1991,
recovering somewhat in 1992 (see Fig. 8.4). The point here is that these are relatively
small areas, and hence most of the expansion of lands under rice and corn must be
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attributed to the development of new farmlands during this period. As a result, per capita
available tarmland (the ratio between total farmland and total population) remained fairly
constant at around 0.3 hectares (see Fig. 8.6). Taking differences in urbanization rates into
account, changes in the average area of farmland per rural household in Cagayan Valley did
not differ greatly from the national average (see Table 8.5).
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On the basis of the foregoing, we may conclude that, even though the region's population
density continued to be well under the national average, the level of farmland scarcity in the
Cagayan Valley more or less corresponded to the national level. Nevertheless, this region
retained a much larger share of its original forest cover than the country as a whole. The
seemingly low population densities in this region mask the fact that farmland was not
actually more freely available here than in other parts of the Philippines, clarifying my
earlier finding that interregional migration to Cagayan Valley declined in significance after
1970.
In view of the fact that farmlands were already quite scarce in the period 1970-1990,
there must have been other major obstacles or disincentives preventing a major migration
movement towards the Sierra Madre at this time. Kummer (1992a) found that overall road
density accounted for 75% of nationwide variations in the 1957 forest cover of the
Philippines. Once roads are in place, changes in agricultural area become more
significantly related to forest cover, as accessible forest lands are converted into farms. In
effect, forest migration was facilitated by the numerous bulldozers and trucks of the logging
companies operating throughout the boom years of timber extraction and the construction of
access roads into the Sierra Madre. I will return to this point in the summary of this
chapter, where the issue of access to lowland farmland is integrated into the overall set of
source and destination motives which are of relevance for forest migration. But first we will
examine the issue of land distribution, in order to gain a better understanding of the
possible role of land pressures in the decision of migrants to leave the lowlands in search of
better livelihood opportunities in the Sierra Madre.
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8.5 Farmland distribution and agrarian reform
The average farm area per capita recorded in the previous section overestimates the farming
area that the majority of smallhold farmers in Cagayan Valley actually have at their
disposal, because they do not reflect inequalities in land distribution. A nationwide
inventory of land ownership carried out in 1988 showed that in the Philippines as a whole,
half of all agricultural land is owned by the 5.8% of landowners with farms of 12 hectares
or more. At the other end of the scale, 65.7% of landowners with farmlands of three
hectares or less together owned only 16.4% of all the agricultural land in the country
(Putzel 1992b:28-29).
The ambition of the most recent agrarian reform initiative, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform (CARP) law, promulgated by the Aquino administration (Republic Act n° 6657,
1988), was to distribute 10.3 million hectares of land in 10 years' time. Like all the earlier
policies designed to alleviate rural poverty and landlessness, this ambition was to be
realized largely by handing over public lands, not private estates, to smallholders. In the
case of the CARP law, 6.5 million hectares or 65% of the area involved in this 'land
reform policy actually represented an expansion of agricultural area into the public domain,
under the DENR's social forestry and free-patent programmes.
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform prescribed a maximum retention limit of 5 hectares of
land for each owner, plus 3 hectares for each heir over fifteen years of age (Putzel
1992:273). The largest holdings were the first to be subjected to agrarian reform,
irrespective of the erop cultivated there. The predecessor of CARP, Marcos' Operation
Land Transfer (PD 27 of 1972), only covered tenanted lands under rice and corn. Under
CARP, all landless farmers and farm workers qualified as beneficiaries of agrarian reform;
they would amortize the value of the lands granted to them over 30 years at 6% interest, to
be paid either directly to the landowner or to the Land Bank of the Philippines. This
institution was set up specifically to finance the purchase, distribution and development of
CARP lands. With the Land Bank acting as the intermediary financing institution, the
landowner was compensated on the basis of a Standard valuation formula, receiving 25-35%
of the value of the land in cash and the remainder in government bonds.
Considering the fairly recent history of human settlement and agricultural expansion in
Cagayan Valley, the estates formerly owned by the Spanish friar orders probably make up
approximately 10% of the region's total farmland. Friar estates were found only along the
lower reaches of the Cagayan river, north of its confluence with the Magat River, near
Ilagan (see Section 8.3.1). As in other parts of the Philippines, most of these large land
holdings were kept out of America's deal with the Vatican to purchase these lands for
redistribution. Because of their relatively small aggregate area, the friar estates have little
hearing on the overall land distribution pattern in Cagayan Valley today. However, we will
take a brief look at these lands and the failed American attempt to redistribute them, not
only because the Cagayan Valley is still un-described as far as the friar estate issue is
concerned, but also to illustrate the argument pursued in the remainder of this section by
means of one of the earliest examples of frustrated land reform in the region.
8.5.1 Cagayan Valley's friar lands: the first land reform that failed
Tomas de Comyn, a former general manager of the Tabacalera company calls the friar
orders the most considerable class of proprietors of estates in the nineteenth-century
Philippines (de Comyn 1969, or. 1820:20). Friar estates were created by royal decree and
gradually enlarged aftenvards, partly by annexation and partly as a result of deathbed
perpetual land ofpromlse... 323
donations of lands which had originally been granted to deserving Spanish laymen (Roth
1977). The oldest tobacco lands in Cagayan and Isabela were developed, owned and
managed by the Dominican Order, to whom the religieus instruction of the entire area now
known as Cagayan Valley was entrusted in 1595 (Malumbres 1918). Augustinians, 'the
fathers of the soldiers' (pers. com. Father Vermeulen 1996), had preceded the Dominicans
sometime before 1595, and had built a monastery in the capitol of Nueva Segovia. The
Dominicans took over their work, first in the lower and middle reaches of the Cagayan
river, up to its confluence with the Magat River, and from 1740 onwards in the upper
reaches, the contemporary Nueva Viscaya and Quirino (Keesing 1962). The Dominicans
did not confme themselves to spiritual labour but were active in agriculture; many of them
were farmer's sons themselves, who left for the seminary at the age of 23 or 24; they
"ïooked to heaven as priests, and looked to the earth as farmers" (pers. com. Re v.
Vermeulen, Apr. 1996)
After the 1896 Revolution, inspired in part by anti-Friar resentment among the educated
Filipino elite (Conolly 1992; Cushner 1986; Roth 1977), the new American administration
was eager to gain goodwill by purchasing the friars' lands for redistribution among the
local population. On December 23, 1903, the government of the Philippine Islands, the
Philippine Sugar Estates Company Ltd., the Tabacalera Company, the British-Manila
Estates Company and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands signed a contract for the
sale of 164,127 ha of agricultural land in Laguna, Bulacan, Cavite, Bataan, Cebu, Rizal,
Isabela and Mindoro. Lacking public revenues or financial reserves, the Government
financed the purchase price of the lands, $7,239,784.66 with United States government
bonds, repayable in 30 years at 4% interest. The Philippine Commission hoped to recover
most of the cost of the Friar land purchase by reselling the land to individual cultivators and
corporations.
In Cagayan Valley, the only estate included in the friar land purchase was Hacienda Sta
Isabel, consisting of 49,727.50 acres (roughly 19,000 ha) of floodplain lands on the west
bank of the Cagayan River near the towns of Ilagan and Naguilian. Dean Worcester
testified before the Committee on Insular Affairs in the House of Representatives that only
a small portion of the estate was cultivated at the time the United States government bought
the land, and the number of agricultural holdings on the estate was "nearly negligible"
(Philcom 1910:521). The Director of Lands, C.H. Sleeper, testified that there were only 93
occupants on the estate, holding a total of 59.48 ha, while another part was occupied "by
sotne wild people"" (ibid.:263). The remaining unoccupied lands on the estate, an area of
19,448 ha, was offered for private lease or sale.
The early development of Hacienda Sta Isabel probably had to do with the fact that the
land had been granted to the Augustinian order by royal decree on November 24, 1879,
only 30 years before. Three other new estates were covered by the same decree: one on the
right bank of the Pinacanauan de Ilagan granted to the Recoleto order, one on the left bank
of that same tributary of the Cagayan river granted to the Franciscans, and one near
Gattaran, Cagayan granted to the Dominicans (Malumbres 1918:134-135). The description
of the boundaries of the Recoleto estate indicates that this is the one which later became
known as Hacienda San Antonio14; this is confirmed by the fact that Malumbres calls this
estate a contemporary of Sta Isabel and a jewel in the crown of the Tabacalera company in
Isabela:
The estate was named after Don Antonio Lopez y Lopez, apparently a well-known figure during his lifetime (no
further details are given on his role in society) .
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The hacienda house is byfar the best among those of the Company in this Province. We paid a
personal visit to this beautiful Hacienda of San Antonio and we were totally enchanted with the
grandiosity of the Casa Hacienda, of its warehouses and the delightful panorama that offers
itselfwhen one looksfrom the verandas of the house" (ibid.:591)
Three of these estates were granted to the friar orders specifically to promote the cultivation
of tobacco, white one, Hacienda San Francisco, on the left banks of the Pinacanauan of
Ilagan river, was given to the Franciscan Friars for their 'Hospital of the Sacred Waters'.
The year after the Friars had been granted these new Haciendas, the Tobacco Monopoly
went bankrupt after a period of fmancial trouble and delayed payments to tobacco growers
going back to 1863 (De Jesus 1980). Most likely, therefore, these estates only became fully
developed during the early decades of the twentieth century. This also holds true for
Hacienda San Luis, which had not yet been established by the time Sta Isabel and San
Antonio were donated to the respective orders of friars.
There is less certainty about the date of establishment of other, private haciendas
mentioned by Malumbres; Haciendas Comilles and Ammobucar are located "close to the
parcel which Mr Moriones gave to the Augustinian fathers" (Sta Isabel), and was owned by
Don Manuel Nieto Sr, leader of a prominent family in Ilagan, who later served as private
secretary of President Manuel Quezon15. He also mentions the Malanut estate, or Hacienda
San Marian, a small estate which was managed by a German tobacco trader who had
apparently acquired a considerable position in the tobacco trade in Isabela:
"in the vicinity of Ilagan, tobacco is the only industry, because with the exception of some
people engaged in tree-cutting, everyone is subjected to a certain foreigner, called Don Oton
Fichler, who monopolizes this industry and that of beeswax in the surroundings of a small
hacienda which, in the words of the local people, is located in Malanut." (Malumbres
1918:481)
Hacienda San Mariano had a tobacco-curing plant owned by the Compania Germinal, to
whom Fichler delivered his produce. Near the Sierra Madre, where wood required for the
curing process was found, there were two plants owned by Tabacalera. In addition to
Fichler, there were two other German hacenderos in Isabela in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. German merchant Julius Baer of the Manila-based fïrm Baer senior und
Cie, bought his first 138 hectares of tobacco land in Isabela in 1869, resettling 200 farmers
there, to overcome local labour shortages. In the early 1880s, hè acquired another two
tracts of land here of 481 and 241 hectares (Salazar 1997b:138). The San Francisco
hacienda, presently known as Hacienda Moldero (on the eastern floodplains of the Cagayan
River near Tumauini), used to be owned by a German national by the name of Lohmann.
During the period 1880-1887 there was a boom in German-Philippine trade; tobacco from
Isabela and Cagayan was a major component of the Philippine exports to Germany16. In the
first half of the twentieth century, Cagayan Valley had the Philippines' second largest
German community (Salazar 1997a)
Manuel Nieto Sr. was also the politica! godfather of Delfin Albano, the first memher of the Albano family to
enter the House of Representatives (see 5.3.2). The Nietos still owned hacienda Sta Isabel during the 1950s (pers. com.
Engr. Masigan, March 1996)
John W. Burton, m an mterestmg paper on "British tnterests in the Philippine American War", pomts towards the
rapid expansion of German economie interests m the Asia Pacific Region by the end of the 19th century He hypothesis is
that this development was one of the reasons for British support for the American mtervemion in the Philippine War of
Independence (Burton 1996).
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Out of all these, plus the other tobacco estates developed by the Dominicans in Cagayan
and northern Isabela, together comprising up to 52,800 hectares of tobacco land (as we saw
in section 8.3.1), only Hacienda Santa Isabel, with its 60 hectares of cultivated land, were
included in the Friar Lands purchase. With labour still scarce, especially here, the Friars
prevented the sale of their productive, tenanted tobacco lands, causing the operation to
entirely miss its mark in Cagayan Valley17. The Philippine Commission was well aware of
the limited gain of their Friar lands purchase:
"The transaction was in the nature of a bargain. "We had no right to compel the friars to sell.
We did not ge t all we wantedfrom them and we had to take some things that we did not want,
and among the things we did not wish for were these vacant estates, but in order to complete
the transaction it was necessary that these estates should be included". (Worcester in Phil.com.
1910:434).
The Orders also created new management configurations that would make it appear as if
they were no longer the owners. In this marmer, the lands would not be recognizable as
former Friar properties, but would still provide the Catholic Church with a source of
income:
"Nearly all the immense agricultural holdings have been transferred by the three orders - by the
Dominicans to a gentleman named Andrews, by the Recoletos to an English corporation and by
the Augustinians to another corporation; but these transfers do not seem to have been out-and-
out sales, but only a meansfor managing the estates without direct interventions of the friars, or
for selling the same when a proper price can be secured. The friars seem to remain the real own-
ers" (Philippine Commission 1904:48).
As we know, most of Cagayan Valley's old tobacco estates were located in the present
province of Cagayan and had been developed by the Dominican Friars. The entire area of
the estates formerly owned by the Dominicans (60,461 hectares in the Philippines as a
whole) was conveyed to one of the first American teachers to settle in Cagayan:
"the Dominicans conveyed their land holdings....to one Andrews, an Englishman living in
Manila, under a promotor's contract... Andrews organized a company under the supposed
existing laws of the Philippines, known as the Philippine Sugar Estates Developing Company
(limited)" to which hè conveyed all the Dominican Lands, with the exception of a small estate
known as San Juan del Monte, containing 156 hectares, which was held under such trust
conditions as to prevent its sale..." (Phil.comm. 1904:496)
The wording of this quote suggests that the Commission was not clear about the precise
name and background of the family concerned. Based on my own interviews in Cagayan
Valley, the person that the Commission refers to as the Englishman Andrews is in fact
Claude Edgar Andrews, the Irish-American founder of a prominent landed family in
Cagayan, which still owns considerable tracts of land there, including old floodplain farms
°n the banks of the Cagayan River and its tributaries, and residential land near the old town
centre of Tuguegarao, including the San Juan del Monte area. According to one of his
grandchildren, in his day the old Mr. Andrews was 'the Godfather of Tuguegarao', without
whose blessing no business could be started there. A 1960 publication on the province of
Cagayan and its well-known American and Filipino citizens features the Andrews family as
"the first family to own a car in Cagayan". According to this source, Andrews arrived in the
in 1902, as one of the American teachers sent by the United States
Sta Isabel and the San Jo.se Hacienda m Mmdoro were two exceptions: the other haciendas were located in more
densely populated areas But these two empty haciendas were also the largest of the 23 estates included in the deal.
Without them. the fnar lands deal would have covered only 120,000 hectares mstead of 164.000.
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administration to set up a school system in the country18- He founded schools in
Tuguegarao, Alcala, Gattaran, Baggao and Laoag, Ilokos Norte. The land holdings of the
family were derived in part from his marriage to Maria Gonzaga, daughter of a landed
family in Alcala (Rivera Castillet 1960:454). My conclusion that many of the church lands
in Cagayan were acquired by this American teacher appears to be supported by the fact that
a considerable portion of the Dominican lands were located in Cagayan which, together
with Pangasinan, was the missionary territory of this order. The Irish background of Claude
Andrews may have been the reason why the Manila-based members of the Commission
erroneously referred to him as an Englishman.
The four church estates in Isabela ended up in the hands of the Tabacalera company,
after they had initially been bought by Antonio P. Casal, a director of the company who
also owned large tracts of land in other regions19 (Putzel 1992b:48). After 1960, as demand
for the native tobaccos produced in the region dwindled, Tabacalera put up its three Isabela
estates for sale; San Luis went to the San Miguel corporation, San Antonio and Sta Isabel
were offered to the government but were eventually acquired by the newly established
ANC A company. This enterprise was owned by Antonio Carag Sr, a leading businessman
from Cagayan who was closely associated with Eduardo Cojuangco, a Marcos crony with
considerable interests in the coconut industry, and Juan Ponce Enrile, then Minister of
Defence in the Marcos cabinet (see section 5.3.2). The estates were exempted from
Operation Land Transfer by a special presidential decree. Although Cojuangco's plan to
develop the estates into coconut plantations was halted by the concerted opposition of the
tenants and their supporters in the Church (see Putzel 1992b: 150-152), the estates are still
intact today. The once magnificent Casa de Hacienda, now owned by a Chinese trader, still
has something of the splendour witnessed by Malumbres.
Anderson views the purchase of the Friar estates by the United States, and the
subsequent resale as a move which played into the cards of a newly emerging Chinese
mestizo elite, falling into their hands "like ripe mangoes" (Anderson 1988:6). The politica!
and economie significance of the Friar land deal was less significant for the Cagayan Valley
region. Some former Church estates, such as the Tabacalera estates near Ilagan, were
eventually acquired by businessmen with political connections. Because of the number of
voters living in these estates, their control continued to be of decisive value in the outcome
of elections in this particular district. However, in view of their limited size, in comparison
with more recently developed lands, and the relatively recent ascent to power of Cagayan
Valley's political and economie elite (see Chapters 5 and 6), the significance of the failed
American Friar land reforms lies less in their influence on the overall land distribution
pattern, and more in the example it set for land-reform policies to follow, with similar
results.
This date is prohahly inaccurate, as Mrs Andrews must have entered into an agreemenl with the Dommicans
before the date on which the Friar Lands were purchased in 1903.
According to Putzel. the sale to Mr Casal took place m 1880. i.e., iess than one year after the lands had been
granted to the rehgious orders by Royal Decree (Putzel. 1992b:48). To confuse maners still further. the lands were
acquired and developed by Tabacalera two years later, according to the same source This would mean that even Sta
Isabel. the only estate that was classified as a Friar estate was no longer Church property hy the time it was classified as
such and bought by the Government In any case. the three largest Tabacalera estates have thus f'ar not been redistributed.
either as a result of the Friar Lands Act. or under the various land reform policies that succeeded H
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8. 5.2 Indications of unequal land distribution
The task of acquiring a clear insight into how the land ownership pattern in Cagayan Valley
developed after independence, when the bulk of the region's farmlands were opened,
requires a separate study. Here the discussion will be limited to a number of indications that
the distribution pattern is unlikely to differ substantially from the national pattern cited
above.
In 1953, the Philippine Department of Finance and the United States Special Operations
Mission in the Philippines conducted a survey on landed estates (defmed as landholdings of
50 ha or more)20 in all provinces (Sorogon 1955). The survey recorded 13,859 owners
nationwide who together owned some 2.4 million hectares of agricultural lands. Only l % of
these owners were corporations, and the majority of the private owners - 85% - owned
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Table 8.6 shows that, in Cagayan Valley, Cagayan contained the largest area of landed
estates. These data also show that the ownership of the new lands developed during the
American period was not evenly distributed. The early monographs on Cagayan, Isabela
and Nueva Viscaya by Malumbres (1918) confirm that migrants developing a new piece of
land would often enter into new sharecropping arrangements with local people claiming
ownership to these lands once they had been developed. American forester Barrington
Moore saw this practice as one of the causes of the existence of large areas of uncultivated
grasslands in the country:
"all the Cogan land, though uncultivated, is claimed by some Cacique (prominent Filipino
villager) or other. So that, if a man should have the energy to till it, the Cacique would come
along and seize the erop, though hè hos no valid rights to the land and cannot cultivate it
himself. The injured man is, ofcourse, too poor to take the matter into court" (Moore 1910:80)
The purpose of this survey was to "obtain background Information to form the basis for estimating the tax
Potential from a progressive national land tax "(Sorogon 1955: 1).
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Facing this risk, and lacking financial reserves to overcome the initial period of getting
established in the area of destmation, migrating tenants saw the advantage of maintaining
contact with, and support from the landlord in their place of origin. In some cases,
landlords literally led their tenants from Ilokos and La Union to unoccupied lands in Central
Luzon (Larkin 1982). By lending the pioneers tools and carabaos and providing cash
advances, they maintained links with the cultivators which enabled them to set cropping
patterns and share in the production2'. Owners of idle lands in the lowlands, and pioneer
forest migrants with claims to large areas of ublag (fallow slash-and-burn fields) still
practice this system of tolerated or invited occupation of their lands on the basis of a
sharecropping or leasehold agreement. After a grace period of one or two seasons, in which
no tertia is due, the sharecropping or leasehold agreement comes into force.
Agrarian reform probably had a less significant impact in Cagayan Valley than in the
neighbouring province of Nueva Ecija. In the 1960s, that province was selected by United
States and Philippine govemment officials as a showcase, designed to demonstrate that
agrarian reform was actually taking place. According to Kerkvliet (1991:32), Nueva Ecija
was selected because of "its importance to the naüon's rice supply, its active peasant
organizations and its history of unrest". Haciendas in Central Luzon also shifted from
sharecrop tenancy to personal cultivation by landlords, with the use of machines and semi-
permanent labour contracts, all strategies designed to avoid redistribution (ibid. :33).
All over the Philippines, the major agrarian reform programmes carried out since 1972
suffered from slow implementation. Landowners first lobbied for the watering-down of the
scope and coverage of agrarian reform laws and men succeeded in delaying and evading the
implications of what remamed of those policies (Leonen 1993; Putzel 1990, 1992a). In
1992, for example, only 140,000 ha of CARP lands covered by Notices of Acquisition had
actually been valued and paid (Leonen 1993:277). Recent official records of the Department
of Agrarian Reform pertaining to the performance of the CARP programme in Cagayan
Valley suggest a fairly favourable situation. According to the report, 48,845 ha of private
and government-owned lands were distributed to farmer beneficiaries in Cagayan Valley in
1994, equivalent to 198% of the target set for that year (DAR 1995:5). As the following
section illustrates, however, cultivators may still be tied up with the original owners, and
use a considerable part of their harvest to pay rent for lands registered in their name.
8.5.3 Landowner strategies to consolidate holdings through semi-compliance
"On our way to the landowner's house, we drive through a seemingly endless, rolling landscape
of grasslands and cornfields. We see a large herd ofcows, grazing eroded posture lands; a little
further, young fresh-green com plants mingled with the dark brown colour of newly ploughed
land. Turning left, we pass some 20 simple bamboo houses with cogon roofs, built alongside the
access rood of the large, concrete house of the landowner that towers on the hilltop. The house
hos none of the class of the 19-century casa Hacienda in San Antonio. It appears to have been
built recently, is not painted yet. lts location, square shapes and the barbed wire fence
surrounding it rather turn it mto a something of afortress. The owner greets us cordially when
we enter the compound. Behind hun, three men armed with automanc rifles scan the
surroundings through binoculars. The owner calls them 'alalai', or helpers, and says they are
For these early migrants. migration did not mean i step forward m the direction of sell-rehance "Peasants
never rontrotled the marketing of their own crops. for this activity remained in the hands of native landlords and
entrepreneurs and foreign husinessmen. hence the move of settlers onto the frontier only perpetuated their dependency"
(Larkin 1982:617)
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administration to set up a school system in the country18. He founded schools in
Tuguegarao, Alcala, Gattaran, Baggao and Laoag, Ilokos Norte. The land holdings of the
family were derived in part from his marriage to Maria Gonzaga, daughter of a landed
family in Alcala (Rivera Castillet 1960:454). My conclusion that many of the church lands
in Cagayan were acquired by this American teacher appears to be supported by the fact that
a considerable portion of the Dominican lands were located in Cagayan which, together
with Pangasinan, was the missionary territory of this order. The Irish background of Claude
Andrews may have been the reason why the Manila-based members of the Commission
erroneously referred to him as an Englishman.
The four church estates in Isabela ended up in the hands of the Tabacalera company,
after they had initially been bought by Antonio P. Casal, a director of the company who
also owned large tracts of land in other regions19 (Putzel 1992b:48). After 1960, as demand
for the native tobaccos produced in the region dwindled, Tabacalera put up its three Isabela
estates for sale; San Luis went to the San Miguel Corporation, San Antonio and Sta Isabel
were offered to the government but were eventually acquired by the newly established
ANC A company. This enterprise was owned by Antonio Carag Sr, a leading businessman
from Cagayan who was closely associated with Eduardo Cojuangco, a Marcos crony with
considerable interests in the coconut industry, and Juan Ponce Enrile, then Minister of
Defence in the Marcos cabinet (see section 5.3.2). The estates were exempted from
Operation Land Transfer by a special presidential decree. Although Cojuangco's plan to
develop the estates into coconut plantations was halted by the concerted opposition of the
tenants and their supporters in the Church (see Putzel 1992b:150-152), the estates are still
intact today. The once magnificent Casa de Hacienda, now owned by a Chinese trader, still
has something of the splendour witnessed by Malumbres.
Anderson views the purchase of the Friar estates by the United States, and the
subsequent resale as a move which played into the cards of a newly emerging Chinese
mestizo elite, falling into their hands "like ripe mangoes" (Anderson 1988:6). The political
and economie significance of the Friar land deal was less significant for the Cagayan Valley
region. Some former Church estates, such as the Tabacalera estates near Ilagan, were
eventually acquired by businessmen with political connections. Because of the number of
voters living in these estates, their control continued to be of decisive value in the outcome
of elections in this particular district. However, in view of their limited size, in comparison
with more recently developed lands, and the relatively recent ascent to power of Cagayan
Valley's political and economie elite (see Chapters 5 and 6), the significance of the failed
American Friar land reforms lies less in their influence on the overall land distribution
Pattern, and more in the example it set for land-reform policies to follow, with similar
results.
This date is prohably inaccurate, as Mr. Andrews must have entered into an agreetnent with the Dominicans
tefore the date on which the Friar Lands were purchased in 1903.
According to Putzel. the sale to Mr. Casal look place in 1880. i.e.. less than one year after the lands had been
Bfanted to the religious orders by Royal Decree (Putzel. 1992b:48). To confuse matters still further. the lands were
acquired and developed by Tabacalera two years later, accordmg to the same source. This would mean that even Sta
'sabel, the only estate that was classified as a Friar estate was no longer Church property by the time it was classified as
such and bought by the Government. In any case. the three largest Tabacalera estates have thus far not been redistributed,
e'ther as a result of the Friar Lands Act, or under the various land reform policies that succeeded it.
330 chapter 8
Another successful strategy by which landowners were able to delay or obstruct the
redistribution of their land was through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme. The
CARP law mandates the Government to buy the land following a Compulsory Acquisition
procedure. This entails a fixed value for irrigated land (39,000 Pesos/ha), while rainfed
land is valued according to a Standard formula of 2.5 times the average annual yield of all
crops harvested on the land. By entering into a VOS procedure, Government and
landowners are supposed to reach agreement on the price of the land. Putzel (1992) cites
numerous examples, including one from Isabela. in which landowners take advantage of a
provision in the 1988 CARP law which states that the landowner's compensation should no
longer be based on the value on which previous tax declarations had been based - obviously
the cheapest deal for the Government, as landowners undervalued their lands to reduce their
tax payments - but rather on the fair market value of the land. This value was the average
of the Assessed Market Value (derived from a recent tax declaration), the market value
(based on sales of comparable land in the vicinity), and the owner's Declared Market Value
(Puztel 1992b:238-240). The scheme did indeed encourage landowners to offer land for
sale, but as Putzel demonstrates, it is highly susceptible to abuse. Attorney Leon Baua, an
influential trader and political power broker in Isabela, told me about a case in which hè
was personally involved:
"There was this very enterprising man at the Department of Agriculture who was able to get
certificates from the files of the municipality, providing evidence of the sale of small parcels of
land which should set the value of one hectare at something like 60,000 to 80,000 pesos. Xerox
copies of such evidence were required for the assessment of the land hè was going to sell, so
everything was forwarded to the Central Office in Manila. Bef ore proceeding there himself, hè
came to me and asked for a little money to pay his bribes and so I gave him 15,000 but also
warned him that this might get exposed. All went smoothly until it arrived at the Secretary 's
desk; and so a Congressman called up poor Juico22 who could not do anything but to issue the
cheque. The mistake the guy made was to be very talkative about it. He could have made a lot
of money just setting xerox copies of those Deeds of Sale hè was able to get and all other lands
could have been valued in the same manner. Our mayor approached him, saying that everything
over 35,000 pesos per hectare would be for him ifhe would help him. Manang Lilia also wanted
the value of her lands upgraded so that she could get a good selling price. So we talked to the
Register of Deeds (ROD), and they were able to produce all the documents. But then when the
case came out, she was not able to sell her land, and here comes the BIR (Bureau of Internal
Revenue, GT) asking her to pay the tax.es according to the new value...She was able to arrange
for these taxes to be paid from the proceeds once these lands were sold, but later on she
requested the ROD to adjust the value of the land back to the original lower value " (research
diary, March 1996)
The possibility of making substantial financial gains from land sales through the Voluntary
Offer to Sell scheme was eliminated after it was reported in the press. Nevertheless, the
VOS scheme still offered the option of postponing the date of actual land transfer by
continuing negotiations on the value of the land. Pending such an agreement, the
Department of Agrarian Reform advises farmers to continue paying their share to the
landowner until such time as his compensation has been paid by the Land Bank.
Other strategies to prevent the disintegration of family property included the re-titling of
lands among family members and the development of family corporations to manage the
In 1988, Philip E. Juico became the firsl Secretary of Agrarian Reform under the Aquino Admimstration One
year later, media reports about abuse of the VOS procedure forced him to resign.
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property. Corporate landholdings were exempted from redistribution "provided it is not
economically feasible and sound to divide the land" (Section 29, RA 6657). The CARP law
prescribes that in such a case, the Corporation either has to be collectively owned by the
worker-beneficiaries, or must voluntarily divest itself of a proportion of its stock and share
it among them. Landowners in Central Luzon were also employing these tactics to avoid
losing ancestral property, distributing lands among their kin until they "ran out ofrelatives"
(Kerkvliet 1991:38). A landowner in Isabela described how little bureaucratie obstacles are
encountered when land registration records are 'doctored':
"The Register of Deeds (ROD) is a place where anything is possible. All the big families here
have distributed their land over so many of their children, I was surprised to see some of these
lands are still in the name of their ancestors who are already dead!"
(research diary, March 1996)
Agrarian Reform officials at the local level cannot fully distance themselves from the
influence of landowners, agribusiness entrepreneurs and their political allies, who want to
retain properties that either they themselves or their ancestors have built up. Personal
relationships naturally develop between local officials and land owners, who travel in the
same social circles, meeting at the annual town fiesta, during birthday celebrations for
political and municipal leaders, in church on Sunday and afterwards at 'Sunday school' (the
cockpit arena). There are not many poor or landless people who are on such friendly terms
with politicians or members of the bureaucracy, and mis is a disadvantage in a government
context where personal relationships play a role in the interpretation of policy.
8.5.4 Land reform and informal credit
Up to now, I have discussed the local impact of agrarian reform in the light of the
fundamental goal of turning farm tenants and labourers into owners - or, in the ISF
component, steward - of agricultural land. An underlying element of this goal, i.e., how
smallholders raise the capital to buy their land, requires separate attention. Rural credit,
which was already gaining in importance following the introduction of high-yielding rice
varieties in the late 1960s, became an even more crucial factor in lowland agriculture as a
result of Land Reform. Farming families, who generally borrowed the agricultural inputs
required for the new rice varieties, as well as for basic consumption items during the
growing season, now needed to generale cash as well, to cover the annual amortization
Payments23 to the Land Bank or the original landowner. Those who were unable to pay this
arnount at the beginning of the season were compelled to search for a financier for their
newly acquired land. In some cases the landlord was willing to take on that role. In other
cases a moneylender, with whom a stable informal credit relationship had been established,
might also handle the amortization. Such informal loans to service land amortization are
expensive - interest rates often exceed 100% per annum - especially considering they were
used to finance downpayments on agrarian reform loans with an annual interest rate of six
Percent. A landowner who transformed his old sharecropping relationship with his tenants
into a new corporate leasehold system justified this move by saying hè had helped them to
stay out of the hands of usurers, by fmancing their shift to leasehold tenure himself:
"We consider our tenants as our relatives. They inherited these lands from their fathers just like
us. When they were offered the possibüity to acquire the lands in leasehold, they urged me to
Rural households with a regular cash income due to remitttnces by members with urban or overseas employment
"ave probably adjusted more easily to these changes.
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borrow money to finance them, because the Chinese ask so much! Of course there are some
recipients of agrarian reform who can manage on their own, but so many others have now
become dependent on a trader. That is why rny uncle was able to enter into an agreement with
the Operation Land Transfer in 1988, just before the CARP law was signed. Be/ore, all our 151
ha were in the name of my grandfather. Through our agreement with the OLT, we subdivided
the land in principle, but we manage it through a family trust in which my undes, and my two
brothers and two sisters participate. Since my uncle went to the U.S. two years ago, I have been
the administrator. And the farmers are happy'. We only get a one-quarter share of their net
Harvest, that is, after they have deducted their inputs. And when they bring our share, we pay
for their fare." (manager of a small agricultural estate in Isabela, in research diary December
1994)
This form of informal financing of the purchase and annual amortization of land transfer
perpetuates - indeed intensifies - the economie relationship between cultivators and
landowners cum moneylenders. The debt exposure of the farmer is raised, as rent payments
are no longer paid only for access to land, production loans and consumptive credit, but
also for the annual mortgage on the land. For money lenders, on the other hand, the
informal financing of Land Reform amplifies the amount of capital they have tied up in
agriculture and complicates their chances of recovering loans from defaulting farmers. If a
moneylender takes care of the annual mortgage payments to the Land Bank, the farmer
loses the de facto, but not the de jure ownership of the land, since the land must remain
registered in his or her name.
The informal, semi-legal nature of this arrangement makes it harder for financiers to
recover consumptive and production loans from farmers with mortgaged lands. Before,
landowners had the ultimate option to deny tenants tilling rights on the land. Nowadays,
evicting a farmer in irrecoverable default from land which is still his de jure property
(though the title may be under mortgage) is more difficult, as the farmers may bring their
case to the Department of Agrarian Reform. On one occasion, I entered a municipal
Agrarian Reform office and encountered a group of three farmers dressed in rags and
accompanied by their wives and children (usually a sign of how vital the outcome of the
discussion is for the househoid), who were engaged in serious conversation with an official.
A landowner from a nearby hacienda was also present, and hè was loudly expressing his
dissatisfaction with the protection that the Department allegedly gave to tenants, especially
after the DAR official decided that the case would have to be settled in court. With barely
concealed anger hè told the official:
"Why is that? I don't think we still need to go to court. If there is really a fellow who is so
hardheaded that hè does not want to go along with the landowner, we should be able to kick
him out! It is only because of this Land Reform that these people are now even harder to deal
with. And how can we control them ifwe cannot even evict them from our land? It's clear that
you are really prejudiced; you only look at the interests of these people, but how about us, the
landowners?" (Research diary, Dec 1994)
A financier (either the former landowner, or a trader) who finds that one of his tenants is no
longer creditworthy has the option to deny the farmer further credit, but allow him to
continue cultivating the land, and get a share of whatever it produces. This is an
unattractive proposition for the farming househoid, who will find it very difficult to live in
the lowlands without access to credit, but also for the trader/financier, who has to accept a
lower productivity level of land which hè informally owns, and sees a smaller area produce
his preferred cash crops. Decisions are not taken overnight; if the farmer is an elderly
person, for example, whom the trader has known for many years, hè may be allowed to
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cultivate the land using a erop that requires less in the way of external inputs (such as white
corn or peanuts), and with a correspondingly lower credit ceiling. With nothing else but his
labour to offer in return for his irrecoverable debt, hè may be asked to do casual labour for
the trader as well:
"You know this Hacienda hos not really been a good thingfor me. Now I am thinking ofmoving
out and all I want is my money back. You will be surprised to see my books! Some farmers have
balances of 40 to 50 thousand pesos owed to me! And then we still have to pay for their needs.
Sometimes they spend 4000 Pesos on medicines alone. Every year they add another 2000 to
their balance until it reacties 20,000 and then I teil them you can now cultivate anything, just
share with me whatever you produce there, but I cannot lendyou any more money". (Research
diary, Dec. 1994)
This situation, in which leaseholders build up such debt arrears that they are forced to
cultivate their land without inputs and are confronted with the steadily declining
productivity of that land, underscores the criticism of land reform formulated by Hayami et
al., who contest the assumption underlying traditional land reform programmes that
resource allocation under sharecropping is less efficiënt than fixed-rent leasehold or owner
cultivatorship, because sharecroppers supposedly have less incentive to apply optimal levels
of labour and other inputs (Hayami et al., 1990:8). The authors, citing an overview of
empirical and theoretical studies (Otsuka and Hayami 1988), show that the shift to leasehold
tenancy, in fact, had a negative impact not only on land productivity but also on
socioeconomic equity, as tenants no longer shared the risk of erop failure with their
landlord, and lost their traditional access to the credit they needed for the supply of
agricultural inputs and daily needs.
A defaulting farm household that finds itself unable to live off the small income
produced by a lowland farm without the use of capital inputs, must consider other options,
if it is to escape indebtedness. In all options, the important thing is for the household to
increase its cash income; one way to achieve this is for the trader to offer urban or overseas
ernployment to one of the farmer's daughters through his recruitment agency24. The salary
loes to the agency and, after the necessary deductions, is channelled to the household.
Another option is to propose that the farmer or one of his sons move elsewhere, to the
nearby forest lands, say, and cultivate cash crops there.
The chances of finding a new source of credit are remote. Local traders exchange
information about each other's clients and respect the mutual exclusivity of dealing with
them. Should a borrower nevertheless succeed in tapping another source of credit, perhaps
because of conflicting lender interests, there is a possibility of retaliatory violence, if only
as a warning to other borrowers.
Another element which reduces the likelihood of a borrower running away from his or
her financier is that, like in the former tenant-landlord ties, trust, and a mutual sense of
°bligation regulate the relationship between financier and borrower to some extent as well.
Richer families are anxious to maintain their social image as people who are sensitive to the
needs of their tenants and borrowers, not least because of their role as political brokers
(Chapters 5 and 6) (J.C. Scott 1986; Kerkvliet 1991). The following quote from a
trader/moneylender 'taking care' of more than 600 families shows how hè creates a physical
distance between himself and his lenders, in order to avoid direct confrontations with clients
24 If overseas employment is offered by a financier, this automatically increases the family's debt exposure by the
recruitment fee generally charged by recruitment agencies: approximately 20.000 pesos per position. Young daughte
a serious risk of ending up m the entertainment industry.
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requesting help:
"/ om really too softhearted, l can never refuse people when they come to the house. I stay away
from the store no\v, because l want my son to start running our little business, l have installed a
payphone at the store, and my clients can just call me from there. I do not want to see these
people all the time. They can call me at the house and l will give instructions to my son on
whether or not to give them money. You see, my children are already blaming me, they teil me,
'Daddy, that is our money you are wasting' "(Research diary, March 1996)
On another occasion, the same trader told me that despite his patience, hè sometimes has to
take charge himself and draw the line in front of his clients, to make sure they stand by
their obligations:
"When I was young we used to make sure every peso l was lending would make at least 60
pesos a year. Now, we 're happy if our peso earns twenty pesos! You know, I am not trying to
make money out of the sweat of my tenants. I don 't mind if they can 't pay me immediately. I
have a certain income in mind every year. Bul last year, l saw that there was no positive
development and so I called them and said 'l know you always pray for me that I will have a
little income, but I must teil you that this year your prayers have not been heard, so you better
start paying some of the money you owe me!' And now, the money is coming in, hahahaha! It 's
just a psychological war, you know..." (Research diary, March 1996)
In his study of East Asian land reform in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, Hayami notes
that the success of these early programmes was due not only to the existence of a reliable
database on land ownership and tenure relations, but also to the unified, well-organized
tenant force, with a long history of cooperativism and unionization (Hayami 1991:158-159,
cited in Srinavasan 1993; Hayami et al. 1990:2) In Cagayan Valley the institutional and
political context in which farmers establish credit relationships is more problematic,
particularly when it comes to managing cooperatives and community leadership.
Recognizing this problem, the 1988 agrarian reform programme included a Beneficiaries
Development component. This component provides for special-assistance funds to be
granted to so-called Agrarian Reform Communities, covering such activities as agricultural
extension, training in cooperative development, infrastructure development, and agricultural
credit. The institutional component is aimed at stimulating cooperative links between
farming households, who are often managing their farms on the basis of a single, individual
'lifeline' running between them and a landlord or informal moneylender. A recent progress
report published by the Department of Agrarian Reform acknowledges the difficulties
encountered in this area, noting that since 1988 a total of 25,213 Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committees have been established, but that 'most of these do not work as an organization"
(DAR 1995:22).
Successive agrarian reform programmes in the Philippines appear to have had only a
limited impact in this realm. I am referring to the fact that sharecroppers locked into
vertical relationship with their landlord or moneylender, and with religious and political
leaders, continue to have difficulty in establishing the horizontal social and economie ties
with each other which they need to reduce their dependence on those vertical ties. As a
result, they remain individual indebted smallholders who cannot build up the financial
buffers they need for modern, investment-based agriculture. This individual exposure to the
financial risks of capital-intensive farming has intensified, and became more structural in
nature, with the growing need to gear farm production not only to the repayment of
informal credit, but also to amortization payments to the landowner or the Land Bank
Credit exposure increases the economie risks of normal fluctuations in climatic conditions.
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erop health, and personal circumstances. For reasons which I will elaborate in the next
chapter, land ownership is in effect losing significance as a basis for informal credit.
8.5.5 Conclusions with regard to access tofarmland in the lowlands
On the basis of the findings presented above, the following conclusions may be drawn
regarding access to farmland in the Cagayan Valley lowlands:
1) Overall, the land distribution pattern in Cagayan Valley is probably less skewed than the
national average, due to the relatively recent origin of the majority of the region's
farmlands. Former church lands, transformed into corporate tobacco estates and the
region's lone sugar estate in Cagayan make up a smaller percentage of the region's total
farmland area than the national average of 30 %25.
2) Nevertheless, the majority of farming households have access to a smaller patch of
farmland than suggested by the per capita average of 0.3 ha. Moreover, many farmers
do not own the lands they cultivate, but continue to produce under sharecropping or
leasehold arrangements, either with the original landowner, the Land Bank, or an
informal moneylender fmancing their purchase of redistributed lands. The payment
made in exchange for the right to cultivate the land further reduces the area each farm
household actually has on which to make a living.
3) The introduction of high yielding grain varieties, the ensuing intensification of lowland
agriculture, and the capital required to finance the acquisition of redistributed farmlands
by smallholders have all contributed to an increasing role of credit, or capital, as the
key-factor determining access to farmland. The added economie risks of lowland
farming brought about by these developments increase the likelihood that the poorest
farmers will no longer be able to earn a living in the lowlands. This not only acts as a
positive source motive in forest migration, but may also basten forest conversion in the
Sierra Madre, due to changing land-use practices there. The initial indications of the
increasing role of informal credit in upland farming are discussed in Chapter 9.
8.6 Forest migration-in-context
After establishing, on the basis of the settlement history of Cagayan Valley, that forest
migration to the Sierra Madre is a predominantly z/zrraregional process, this chapter
examined the distribution of farmlands in the region and assessed the impact of agrarian
reform on access to these lands. Answers to these questions are conducive for a better
understanding of the driving forces behind forest migration in northeastern Luzon. Fig. 8.7
presents the insights gained here, and combines these with relevant findings of earlier
Chapters, thus composing an actors' field of forest migration to the Sierra Madre.
People only become forest migrants when the possibilities to make a living become
seriously constrained in their place of origin. Other considerations, such as a desire to
remain near services such as hospitals, schools, markets and roads, carry greater or lesser
weight with individual people, but they lose significance if the primary goal of securing a
satisfactory income is no longer realized. Access to credit is an increasingly crucial
condition for agricultural production in the lowlands. If a moneylender closes the credit
hne, or a farmer's son has no place to farm, alternative options must be considered, such as
moving to Manila in search of employment, seeking oversees contract work, or finding off-
National share of aggregate area under coconut, sugar. bananas and pineapple in 1992 (NSO 1995)
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farm employment in the region. Until the late 1980s, the prospect of settling in the Sierra
Madre was relatively unattractive: logging companies were still posting forest guards in
their concessions, the New People's Army was thriving thanks to 'revolutionary taxes'
levied on the logging industry, and there were regular armed encounters with the army.
Nevertheless, a number of pioneers and followers established small settlements there and
succeeded in making a living.
By the early 1990s, when the DENR began to cancel corporate logging concessions, the
security situation improved. Around this time, the Department began developing a series of
policies to deal with forest migration in a more people-oriented way. They were seeking
more participatory methods of managing the logged-over forests of the Sierra Madre and
stabilizing the forest frontier. With logging employment cut off, and slash-and-burn
(kaingiri) farming prohibited, the DENR had to offer alternative livelihood opportunities to
migrant communities. Tenure instruments such as the Stewardship Certifïcates were
developed, agricultural extension programmes offered, and free seeds and fertilizers
distributed, in order to encourage upland farmers to switch to permanent farming. This kind
of support for forest migrants compares favourably with the forms of government assistance
enjoyed by farmers in the lowlands, where consecutive land-reform policies feil short of
implementation and failed to bring tangible economie progress to cultivators. The rising
cost of living in the lowlands, stagnating or decreasing yields on the monocropped lands,
progressive indebtedness and, in some cases, invitations from pioneers or moneylenders to
make a new start inside the forest lands combine to form a set of positive source motives
which stimulate migration to the Sierra Madre.
DENR policies to discourage further forest migration are counteracted by the initiatives
of local politicians, by whom the growth of the constituency, the 'normalization' of
conditions in the forest lands (i.e., accessibility, services, Peace and Order) are perceived
as favourable for the economie progress of those they represent, for the government budget
allotted to their area and, therewith, their own political future. Another reason why forest
migration is encouraged by local elected officials is that it is the least controversial way of
granting lands and a livelihood to the poor, without having to redistribute the lands of local
elites, whose support is essential for a good election campaign. Local elected officials
prefer to see the DAR achieve its land distribution goals inside the public domain.
The Department of Agriculture, in close cooperation with the agribusiness sector, is a
leading actor behind the region's preoccupation with the production of rice and corn.
Servicing the demand of consumers and food production industries in the country, its
mission is to stimulate cereal output. There are various ways of achieving this, but none
appears as cheap as expanding the area under the erop into the public forest lands. The
DA's reliance on cereal production is in turn due to strong demand in the rapidly growing
urban economy of Metro Manila and other areas. The Government's Philippine 2000
programme, aimed at turning the country into a 'tiger economy' by the next century, is
hearing fruit, resulting in increased buying power for urban consumers.
This overview of the actors' field of forest migration sketches the situation as it is at the
moment. If we compare this motivational model with the initial overview of source and
destination motives presented in Box 4.5 (Section 4.3.3), we see that in the late eighties and
early nineties, several considerations were transformed from negative motives (discouraging
migration) into positive ones (stimulating migration). This helps to explain why up until
1990 the number of pioneers and forest migrants who entered the Sierra Madre was limited,
even though a dense network of access roads had been created by logging companies in the
preceding twenty years. The construction of access roads into previously inaccessible forest
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areas is a widely recognized deforestation facilitator, almost irrespective of local population
densities. Klimmer (1992) found that overall road density accounted for 75% of nationwide
variations in the 1957 forest cover of the Philippines.
Empirical evidence suggests roads played a role in setting the deforestation pattern in
the Sierra Madre, too. Timber concessions on the western slopes of the Sierra Madre
encountered more problems related to illegal extraction and spontaneous in-migration than
those on the Pacific slopes, which contained the majority of the region's old-growth and
well-recovered residual forests. The absence of a road traversing the Sierra Madre from the
population centres in Cagayan Valley to the sparsely inhabited Pacific coast also prevented
an influx of forest migrants to these eastern slopes. Another factor that discouraged forest
migration during the corporate logging boom in Cagayan Valley was the robust economie
growth of the Philippine economy in general and that of Metro Manila in particular,
creating realistic livelihood alternatives to forest migration during the period 1965-1980.
One major explanation for the moderate numbers of forest migrants up until 1990 lies in
the region's traditional divide between the settled, and later Christianized and educated river
people, on the one hand, and the free, uneducated and untaxed forest people on the other.
Forests were perceived the home of ghosts and spirits, cattle rustlers, anti-Spanish infieles
('heathens') and, after the Spanish occupation, renegade soldiers. During the decade of
corporate logging, the Sierra Madre became a stronghold of the New People's Army, which
marked it as a critical area that could not be visited without serious risk to life and limb.
Upland settlements experienced regular raids by the Philippine army, modern-day versions
of the entradas which used to be undertaken by the Spanish authorities against uncaptured
upland residents. The unstable security conditions in the uplands go a long way towards
explaining why Cagayan Valley did not follow the national deforestation trend between
1970 and 1990. If the implementation of government policies was hampered by the fear of
forest guards and other government personnel to be "taken for an interview" while on duty
inside the forest lands, the unstable Peace and Order situation did to some extent
compensate for these constraints on policy implementation. It is probably no coincidence
that one of the folk explanations for the NPA acronym was 'National Park Administrators'.
The imposition of martial law and the start of the large-scale corporate logging boom
took place during roughly the same period in Cagayan Valley. The end of Marcos' rule in
1986 also meant the end of corporate logging, weakening the ideological and financial basis
of the NPA in the Sierra Madre, and forcing NPA bands to rely more on upland residents
for their sustenance. Intensified army raids, infiltration, divisions in the ranks, and a
communication campaign to encourage rebels to return to the fold drained the strength and
popularity of the movement.
In the lowlands, one negative source motive that deterred people from forest migration
probably lay in the expectations initially raised by the two land-reform policies legislated
after 1970, Operation Land Transfer and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Lowland farmers were presented with the prospect of becoming the owners of the lands
they tilled, or at least upgrading their tenure from sharecropping to leasehold tenancy. For a
time, this prospect may have meant that fewer people were inclined to leave the lowlands.
By the mid-1990s, however, it became clear that agrarian reform had only a limited impact
in terms of creating a more independent middle class of farmer-entrepreneurs. Some of the
intended beneficiaries of these programmes never received their title, others were compelled
to take out additional loans to finance their downpayments to the first landlord or the Land
Bank, and some lost their newly acquired title after defaulting on loans taken out against a
land collateral.
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The government's ineffective efforts to bring about tangible changes in the livelihood of
poor farmers in the lowlands coincided with new and more constructive policies for upland
communities. Illegal forest occupants became the stewards of denuded forest lands, carabao
logging went from an illegal activity to a sanctioned one, and forest communities became
the focal actors in natural resource management within the public domain. The influence
that these, and other area-specific projects for the benefit of forest communities, will have
on the overall balance of source and destination motives for newcomers' decision whether
or not to follow the example of pioneers and logging labourers cannot be accurately gauged
yet. Inadvertently, however, these initiatives may well contribute to the problems they were
intended to solve, by attracting additional migrants into the forest lands, and away from the
areas where government policies are no longer believed to offer poor people and their
offspring real prospects for a better future.
Chapter 9
Hybrid corn, rural credit,
and the future of the Sierra Madre
9.1 Introduction
The history of relations between the Sierra Madre and the lowlands may be subdivided into
three phases. During the first phase, indigenous forest people were engaged in occasional
barter trade with lowland villages. Contacts were incidental and conditioned by socially,
culturally and later politically motivated enmity between the forest tribes and the Valley's
indigenous river people. During the second phase, which began during the colonial period,
lowland-based entrepreneurs and their followers began to enter the Sierra Madre in search of
forest products, culminating in the corporate logging boom between 1965 and 1985. This
period also saw the arrival of land-seekers in the Sierra Madre. In the third phase, the initial
contours of which are described in this chapter, forest migrants and traders are the leading
actors, and upland agriculture the key activity.
This chapter is of an exploratory nature, dealing with the potential implications for forest
cover of one specific option through which forest migrants seek to increase their agricultural
income. Having Consolidated a number of reports and field observations made during the
period 1990-1998,1 will focus on the increase in the cropping of hybrid corn on upland farms,
and on a possible relationship between the production of this erop and credit relations between
forest migrants and informal moneylenders in the lowlands. The argument pursued here is that
the potential environmental implications of this mode of integration of upland farming into
lowland markets, are such that further research is warranted into the underlying mechanisms.
First, to more precisely define where and under what conditions it occurs, and second, to
identify feasible alternatives aimed at a more sustainable ways of integration.
This exploration begins with a brief introduction devoted to hybrid corn, the erop that I
have selected as the indicator of the process examined here. Section 9.3 presents the findings
on which I base the argument pursued in this chapter, and identifies factors conducive to the
production of hybrid corn on upland farms. Many corn cultivators on both upland and lowland
farms stated that they had credit relations with lowland-based informal moneylenders or with
their relay stations in the uplands, and that these loans had to be repaid in grain, rather than
money. Section 9.4. l examines the possible link between credit and erop choice, by describing
the informal moneylending business, and identifying the arrangements through which informal
moneylenders, mainly grain traders, manage credit relations with forest migrants.
The adoption of a high-risk, investment-based erop such as hybrid corn by forest migrants
seems to contradict the commonly accepted view that marginal smallholders opt for a risk-
avoidance rather than a profit-maximizing farming strategy. Section 9.5 places this apparent
contradiction in the perspective of the increasing importance of access to credit, in agriculture
and personal finance for farming households in the market economy. Section 9.6 then
synthesizes the insights gained in the previous sections into an encompassing actors' field in
an attempt to explain the production of hybrid corn by forest migrants. Having assessed the
Potential environmental implications of this development in Sections 9.7 and 9.8, the
conclusion of this chapter draws attention to the key role of capital formation at the household
level in bringing about alternative and more sustainable land uses in the Sierra Madre.
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9.2 Corn: from staple to corporate cash erop
"The province of Isabela is said to be the onty one in the Islands where the people have
adapted themelves to the use ofcorn as a substitute for rice. This condition appears
to have been brought about by the conflict in the time of horvest between rice and
tobacco ... now by the use ofcorn, they are able to give all their time to transplanting
tobacco when the season comes around." (Director of the Department of Agriculture,
cited in Philippines Free Press 1908:16)
As this quote shows, corn is a traditional staple of the northern provinces of Cagayan Valley.
The sequential cropping of tobacco and corn dates back to the early colonial history of
Cagayan, before its native tobaccos became one of the Philippines' leading export
commodities'. Although rain-fed rice was grown near some northern towns, labour-intensive,
wet-rice cultivation was not yet practised in the lower reaches of the Cagayan river. During
the second half of the nineteenth century, when revenues from the tobacco trade enabled some
farmers to buy, rather than produce, their own food, rice imports from Ilokos Norte and Nueva
Viscaya satisfied local demands (De Jesus 1980:181). Although the loads brought in on
horseback from Nueva Viscaya2 represented only a small portion of these imports, the province
was plunged into a depression when Isabela could no longer affbrd to buy rice, because the
government tobacco monopoly had stopped paying for its purchases in cash (ibid.: 182). The
total area of farmland producing corn increased steadily with the expansion of cultivated
farmlands during the twentieth century, rising sharply after 1985, when the new corn varieties
were introduced (see fig. 9.1).
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By 1995, some 200,000 of Cagayan Valley's 244,000 ha of corn lands were planted with
yellow hybrid varieties (BAS-Region 2, 1996)3. A mission statement by the then president of
San Miguel Corporation, one of the largest agro-industrial conglomerates in the Philippines,
illustrates the industrial origins of the new corn varieties:
"It is not easy to convince farmers to take the risk involved in breaking with tried and true
practices that havefed his family, however meagerly, for generatiom... When the new hybrid
rice was developed, with all its evident advantages, it took about twelve years for the farmers
in the Philippines to accept the new hybrid and feel at home with it. I believe it will take
considerably less time for corn. My estimate is that it will take about four years. The momentum
is already there" Karen (1985:150, quoted in Vellema 1994:14)
A major difference between this mission and the earlier introduction of high-yielding rice in
rural farming areas is that in the case of rice, there was no change in the orientation of
production. As in the traditional varieties, hybrid rice was a food erop that gave producers the
freedom to sell either the entire harvest or only that portion necessary to repay production
loans or, alternatively, to fïnance all the inputs from other sources, and store the rice for the
use of the household (Diemer 1990:81). By contrast, yellow hybrid corn, the most common
variety, is used almost exclusively as a raw material in the production of stockfeed. Roasted
or boiled, it is eaten as a snack, but unlike the traditional white varieties, yellow corn is not
suitable as a staple for human beings. Thus the replacement of white corn by yellow makes the
household less self-sufficient in its food supply. Storing the erop, rather than selling it directly
after harvest, only makes sense if this is done in order to benefit from future changes in market
prices.
A second characteristic of the new varieties further discourages farmers from storing the
harvest for future sales: hybrid corn is sensitive to decay, due to moisture and rodents. Without
modern, dry-storage facilities, the risk of post-harvest losses outweigh the potential economie
gains to be made by storing the erop until market prices recover. These first two characteristics
make hybrid corn, and especially the yellow varieties, a pure cash erop, just like sugar, cotton
or soybeans, and result in a third quality: poor price stability. In the socioeconomic setting of
Cagayan Valley, most small farmers do not have storage space of the quality required by this
erop. They have no alternative but to immediately sell their harvest to traders, who have the
necessary transport facilities and warehouses. As a result, price slumps occur during the
harvesting months of September and March. There is very little that farmers can do about poor
price stability, as they lack the capital to invest in high-quality post-harvest facilities; in
addition, it provides economie opportunities to entrepreneurs engaged in the business of
trading, storing and transporting bulk grains. By investing in warehouses and trucks and by
purchasing large volumes, they can always get the erop for the lowest price. Returns on
investment are earned in the months to follow, when the constant demand for yellow corn by
the Philippine stockfeed industry drives up prices.
A fourth aspect of hybrid corn production is the fact that the higher yield potential of the
new yellow corn varieties is only achieved if producers make use of agrochemicals;
investments in the form of certified seeds, fertilizers and pesticides are fmanced through
production loans. At the end of the season, these investments are paid back with cash earned
from the sale of the harvest or in grain. If yields are increased, and labour requirements for
3 DA reports like most other sources cited in this chapter, do not specify whether hybrid or traditional corn vanet.es
were used Hyhrids cannot be distinguished from traditional varieties by color. By the mid-nineties. however, the traditional
varieties still cultwated in the region were almost exclusively white Although hybrid white corn variet.es are also producec
already, in my mventory l always assume that where sources refer to 'yellow corn', they mean hybnds, and 'white corn' te
t>e the traditional varieties. unless specified otherwise..
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erop maintenance slightly4 reduced, these inputs will generale higher potential returns on
labour for producers adopting the new varieties (see Annex C)
The introduction of hybrid corn links farm production to an integrated industrial
manufacturing chain, which encompasses the development and production of new seeds, the
agrochemicals they require, stockfeed, livestock and the high-value end products supplied to
consumer markets: meat, eggs, dairy products and related food products. This high degree of
integration enables companies to achieve a certain level of standardization, quality control and
efficiency. A small number of integrators, including Cargill, Ayala Corporation and the San
Miguel Corporation, control the entire trading and marketing of corn in the Philippines (PPI
1991:9, cited in Velema 1994:13). These companies must have a certain degree of influence
on farm production conditions, output level and quality. This is especially important in the case
of certified seeds, as Velema noted in the case of the Pioneer Seed Company in General Santos,
South Cotabato. To obtain a greater degree of supervision and standardization of the
production process, the company enters into direct production contracts with selected farmers.
Qualified growers are contracted to produce certified seeds, using the exact farming practices
and inputs stipulated by the company. In the production of hybrid corn, large processing
corporations enter into exclusive contracts with grain traders who can produce a certain
quantity and quality of corn by a certain date. A grain trader who is interested in becoming a
registered supplier of the San Miguel Corporation, for example, must supply a minimum bulk
of 200,000 bags of corn, roughly the erop produced by 5,000 hectares of cornland, by a
specified date. This means that they must also get prior supply and quality assurances from
producers. In other words, hybrid corn makes farm production less flexible because it requires
the use of certified seeds and inputs, and reduces the mutual freedom of farmers and traders
in the marketplace. Section 9.4.2 discusses this point in greater detail.
Unlike industrial cash crops such as sugar, hybrid corn does not require the use of heavy
equipment, and is therefore quite suitable for production on smallholder farms. Large-scale,
mechanized corn production offers the economie advantages of scale and quality control, but
is obstructed by the Philippines' agrarian reform laws, which prioritize rice and corn lands for
redistribution. Due to this legal obstacle, hybrid corn is produced in a hybrid production mode,
which has plantation-advantages of scale and control under the boundary condition of the
Philippine policy to preserve the smallhold mode of farm production. Delivery contracts
between traders and processing industries in Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog are
replicated at the local level.
9.3 Hybrid corn: the coming erop in upland farming
Several CVPED students report the production of corn on upland farms, in a few cases
specifying whether the variety used was yellow or white, traditional or hybrid (Polet 1990;
Doedens 1992; Veth 1992; De Frel 1993; Bakker 1995; Dros 1995; Dirkx 1995). Polet, for
example, mentions that yellow corn has all but replaced white corn in the "flat lands along the
rivers and creeks", and that farmers experienced difficulties in paying back loans they took out
to get the capital inputs the erop requires, because of a 50% drop in prices during the
harvesting season (Polet 1990:70). Aquino, who worked in the same area as Polet in 1990,
confirms the cultivation of yellow corn in low-lying and accessible areas near rivers and
streams (Aquino 1991:82), and notes that only migrants who had access to such areas used
With or without the use of agrochemicals, corn is an easy erop, which does not require much maintenance during
the growing season; its large leaf surface area and well developed root system enables the erop to compete effectively for
both light and nutnents.
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the capital inputs required in the production of this erop. Dirkx (1995) reports that migrants
sometimes finance these inputs in part with money earned by a member of the family who has
alternative sources of cash income, such as carabao logging or remittances from relatives with
urban or overseas employment. Doedens (1992), Veth (1992), De Frel (1993), and CVPED
Team IV (1994) mention the production of hybrid corn in migrant settlements, noting that these
households acquire the greater part of their staple from the lowland market, where they buy
white corn and rice with money earned in the cultivation of cash crops. De Frel specifically
addresses the role of credit in the choice of crops. His case study describes a community of
lowland farmers who illegally occupy a 4000-ha reforestation project near the Maharlika
highway. With great difficulty, due to repeated fïres and poor management since its inception
in 1949, the project had managed to establish more than 3000 ha of plantation forest, some of
which developed into mature stands of pine. From the early 1980s on, migrants began to
encroach upon the area with a view to developing new farmlands there, and by 1988 only a
little over 500 ha of plantation remained. Because these farmers were illegal occupants of a
reforestation area, they had no land collateral, so they cultivated hybrid corn to get the
collateral for informal loans from grain traders (De Frel 1993:83). All the above references
dealt with corn cultivation in ploughed bangkag lands, including the use of fertilizers and
occasionally other agrochemicals.
In a study among newly established forest migrants who came from a nearby barangay in
the lowlands, Romero observed the cultivation of hybrid corn in recent forest clearings. This
practice enabled these migrants to grow hybrid corn without the use of agrochemicals,
reportedly because "according to them, newly deared areas have high fertility and low
incidence of pests and diseases" (Romero 1991:65). Soil degradation and increasing
competition from weeds necessitated the constant clearing of new forest areas, speeding up the
conversion of farmlands into Imperata grasslands. Cash income from the dry-season erop
enabled these farmers to hire a chainsaw for the clearing of areas to be cultivated for the first
time during the coming wet season.
Two CVPED student reports make mention of an active government role in the
introduction of hybrid corn on upland farms. In De Frel's case, despite the fact that they were
living on a government reforestation project, migrants had already been visited by extension
workers from commercial companies and the Department of Agriculture. In so-called
'advertising deals' interested migrants were given free seeds, provided they bought fertilizers
and sold their harvest to the seed company (ibid.:34, 50). Kusters (1991) reports on a case in
Cagayan where native varieties of white and red corn (subsistence crops like upland rice) used
to be the predominant uma crops. Extension workers of the Department of Agriculture
regularly visited this area to assist farmers in the adoption of new hybrid corn varieties, both
white and yellow. Potentially higher yields and revenues persuaded farmers to switch to these
crops, particularly against the background of a dwindling income from carabao logging. Free
certified seeds and agrochemicals were also provided in the forest settlements I visited in 1996,
and these were cited by several respondents as the reason they had switched to the new erop.
The Department of Agriculture acknowledges that it is actively promoting the adoption of
hybrid corn by forest migrants5.
In 1992, a survey among five migrant communities located at a greater distance from the
In an interview with the regional director of the DA about the distribution of free seeds and agrochemicals. and
the role of his department in the increasing production of hybrid corn m the forest lands, officially under of the techmcal
mandate of the DENR. hè smiled and said: "/ guess we are one of the culprüs there" (Research diary, March 1996)
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national highway6 found that migrants in the most remote sites devoted their uma lands to the
production of annual staple grains, followed by fallow periods with cash perennials like
bananas and coffee. Of the 37 farming households interviewed in this survey, only 8 planted
corn and only 3 sold a portion of the grain they produced. In the few cases where farmers were
producing hybrid corn, in uma or bangkag fields, the sites were the most accessible in this
survey, Puerta and Pinotulan7. The author concluded that when certified seeds and inputs were
used, the income earned by farmers was spent almost entirely on paying back the loans taken
out to cover these investments (Dirkx 1995).
My own 1996 appraisal of six upland settlements, three of which had also been included
in earlier surveys, was intended to establish whether upland farmers on these sites were
switching to the production of hybrid corn, and to determine which motives and factors led
them to make that decision. On my way to and from these sites, I saw large new tractors
ploughing lands that had al way s been part of abandoned ranches; closer to the forest fringe,
banana plantations were being converted into cornfields, and as we entered deeper into the
Sierra Madre, corn continued to dominate the scenery of rolling bangkag fields surrounding
the older, more accessible settlements. Table 9.1 summarizes the results of this study.
Table 9.1 Cultivation of hybridjrqrn in relation to other variables
Sito/brgy
Descr. in Box No
N" of households
Mode of access














































































* See Annex E
Hybrid corn answer categories
1 no hybrid cora
2 hybrid corn in uma, no inputs






To provide a better insight into conditions which, on the basis of rapid assessments in these
six migrant settlements, appear to influence the decision to grow the erop, the description
includes three boxes in which a brief profile is given of settlements where 1) no hybrid corn
was yet being produced; 2) the erop was grown in uma fields; and 3) the forest migrants
devoted their entire bagkag farm to the production of hybrid corn, using agrochemicals.
Amistad, Pinotulan (Gattaran). Puerta, Malayo. Musinga
In Pinotulan, hybrid com was cultivated in only 3 of the 12 farms included in the survey Ahout half of the
residents here cultivate not only upland farms, hut also irrigated ncefields in the lowlands. mamly as tenants. At the time of
the survey. the upland farms had only recently heen reopened after a long period of disuse due to the insurgency.
1)
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MALAYO AND AMISTAD: NO PRODUCTION OF HYBRID CORN
Box 9.1 The frontier sitio of Malayo, Musinga, San Mariano, Isabela
N" of households
Mode of access
Year of arrival of first migrants
Corporate logging period
Distance to residual forest
Distance to road
Distance to nat'l highway
Distance to market
Hybrid corn production










The sitio of Malayo is located at the tip of the last logging road constructed in this part of the Sierra Madre by
logging companies in 1989. The first migrant to settle here, in 1965, was an Ybanag farmer from Tumauini,
Isabela. By 1996, thirteen households were still in the sitio, now isolated as a result of the end of commercial
logging in 1989 and a powerful typhoon in 1993. The logging road that used to connect Malayo with Musinga
has become a narrow, winding foot trail along landslides and deep erosion gullies, running through a landscape
made up largely of 7-foot cogon grasses and burnt tree stumps. Up until 1993 this trail was surrounded by residual
forest, the leftovers of repeated logging operations by TLA and salabadiok contractors in the area. In that year,
a typhoon tumed large forest areas into a highly combustible rubble of fallen trees and dried leaves. The fire that
raged here shortly after the typhoon turned nearby residual forest into open grasslands. Economie activities in
Malayo revolve around water logging, rattan extraction and the production of staple food; during the dry
season, the males bring logs, lumber flitches and rattan poles down to the lowland town of San Mariano via the
shallow river which runs along the sitio. During the dry season, women produce subsistence crops like peanuts
and root crops on ublag lands in the direct vicinity of the sitio. The men have time for only one erop per year;
they préparé their fields and do their planting in October and November, when the rains of the wet season make
rivers too dangerous for log transports. Only a few new clearings are made every year; newcomers have arrived
sporadically since the logging company pulled out in 1989. White corn and upland rice, intercropped with beans,
vegetables and bananas, are the main crops produced in both bangkag and uma during this period. Despite the
loss of its banana plantations in 1993, and the necessity to walk for two hours to get to the nearest school, sari-
sari store or midwife, in the absence of reliable public transportation, the households say they are happy here and
have no intention of going back or moving closer to service centres.
These cases concern two sitios located in the proximity of residual forest. Features common
to the sitios Malayo and Amistad are their limited accessibility and the important role of
unmechanized timber extraction in the livelihood of the migrants residing there8. Malayo is
inaccessible to trucks throughout the year, while the trail leading to Amistad can only be used
by six wheel drive vehicles during the dry season. The reason that hybrid corn is not cultivated
in Amistad, despite its relative proximity to the lowlands and its accessibility during summer,
is the relative affluence of these migrants, mostly pioneers and followers; the production of
vegetables and timber generales a basic cash income, so that there is no need for a new cash
erop. In both these sitios there is a relative abundance of 'convertible lands' in the vicinity,
as well as a minimal in-migration by newcomers. This makes it possible for residents to
maintain long fïre-and-fallow cycles, a precondition for the cultivation of upland rice. On foot,
it takes an hour and a half to hike from Malayo to Musinga, the nearest barangay, where one
or two passenger trucks a day pass by on their way to the lowland market of San Mariano.
Two similar cases, one from Cagayan and one from Isabela. are reported by Dirkx (1995) and Bakker (1995).
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2) CASES WHERE HYBRID CORN is GROWN IN UMA LANDS, INTERCROPPED, WITHOUT INPUTS
Box 9.2 Sitios Minanga and Ibon, Baliuag, Penablanca, Cagayan
N" of households
Year of arrival of first migrants
Corporate logging period
Distance to residual forest
Mode of access
Distance to road













The residents are newcomers, mainly tenants and landless labourers from the vicinity. H is a four-hour climb
along a foot trail to the frontier sitio of Ibon; for the first two hours the traii runs through the Rodriguez ranch,
and then through residual forest and bamboo groves. The residual forest in Minanga is almost a monoculture of
bamboo; there is apparently no interest in developing these stands for commercial purposes, and recent migrants
who clear these forests simply burn them. Ibon, the last barangay of Baliuag, is bordered by secondary forests
of excellent quality, and old-growth forest is within half a day's hike from Ibon. This old-growth forest is closest
to the National Highway on the western slopes of the Sierra Madre. The residents of Ibon attribute the stability
of their forest to the absence of a road link with Baliuag, and the pioneer migrants say that if a road were opened,
this would resuk in a 'golpe' or wave of migrants coming up the mountain. A total of 83 Stewardship Certificates
have been issued to the pioneers and followers in the two sitios. Since 1993, new migrants have been arriving in
both sitios. One group of six families, all relatives from adjacent lowland barangay, have settled in the residual
forests adjacent to the pioneer's land. Logging is not important as a source of cash income; they clear more land
each year and grow a variety of food and cash crops (upland rice, ginger, beans, bananas, coffee), using an
extensive fire-and-fallow system. In 1995, hybrid corn was intercropped for the first time on their farm, thanks
to free seeds distributed by the Department of Agnculture. In Minanga, located between the ranch and the sitio
of Ibon, former tenants are clearing ublag land owned by a pioneer; they get the first two crops, and from the
third erop on, the owner takes hls share. The barangay of Baliuag lies 15 kilometres from the National Highway
and 25 kilometres from the Regional Capital of Tuguegarao. Part of the town's firewood requirements are
supplied by Baliuag, which is one reason why the road between the highway and the barangay is well-maintained
and there are regular public transport services. The captain of Baliuag estimates that half the farmers have
switched from white corn and tobacco to hybrid corn, using inputs acquired on credit, and sell to traders in
Tuguegarao. _^
As a result of the forest migration process described in Chapter 4, the population of frontier
sitios is composed mainly of migrants of the newcomer category, who entered the forest lands
under harsher economie conditions than former logging workers (the dominant group in cases
l and 2). In these cases, corn production occurs on both newly opened and older uma lands.
In contrast to other areas, where the adoption of corn in fire-and-fallow farming has been
interpreted as an adaptation to the shortening of fallow periods and accompanying declines in
soil fertility (Rotmensen 1988:11), here yellow corn is planted on newly opened uma soil,
enabling migrants to produce a erop without using fertilizers. The relatively high fertility of
freshly opened forest soils makes it possible to incorporate the erop into the rotations of the
other uma crops, such as upland rice or bananas in the seedling stage.
The newcomers of sitio Ibon had planted hybrid corn in an old uma, after receiving seeds
for free from the Department of Agriculture; before risking their most fertile, newly opened
lands to a new erop, they first experimented its cultivation to see how it would do. Traditional
corn varieties are more commonly produced on older uma lands, where they compete fairly
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effectively with weeds and cogon, which sprout as soon as fertility levels decline. If corn is
intercropped, the following combinations are common (see Section 4.6 for a more detailed look
at upland farming practices and crops):
- Corn or upland rice, monocropped
While upland rice is almost invariably the first erop sown in the uma after clearing, corn
can still be cultivated in the following seasons because it is better able to suppress weeds
and compete for nutrients. Without the use of agrochemicals, hybrid corn produces better
yields in newly developed umas. In that case, the farmer can produce a cash erop without
investing in fertilizers and agrochemicals, using the natural fertility of the soil.
- Corn or upland rice, mungbeans andpeanuts, intercropped or in blocks
This is a low investment mix of subsistence-oriented and cash crops, which often follows
the wet season erop of upland rice; it is less suitable for the first cropping period, when the
rains and winds of the monsoon cause a higher risk of yield losses due to moulds, rot,
erosion or landslides.
- Upland rice or hybrid corn, intercropped with bananas or other fruit trees
Seen in young umas in less fertile areas or in areas between uma and ublag stage. A strong
and reliable demand, such as the market for bananas, stimulates the early intercropping of
fruit trees in uma areas. In agricultural expansion areas, where long-fallow systems prevail,
fruit-bearing trees, such as bananas and coffee are already interplanted in the first or
second uma erop.
The case reported by Veth (1991) also concerned newly arrived forest migrants, who were
used to growing hybrid yellow corn in their place of origin, in Cauayan, Isabela. Doedens
(1992) and Bakker (1995) report three cases of older, relatively inaccessible settlements on the
forest frontier in Isabela and Quirino where hybrid9 corn was cultivated on uma farms by
migrants who did not own a carabao or whose lands were not suitable for plough-agriculture
in an upland community that was adjusting to the decline in logging income. Of the 23 farmers
in my 1995 survey who were growing yellow corn in uma land, 8 used this strategy. Forest
migrants who do not own or use a carabao, or whose lands have been opened too recently to
allow ploughing, or are too far away to be accessible to logging trucks cannot shift to the
cultivation of yellow corn in its most intensive form. The above methods of incorporating the
erop into their fire-and-fallow farms do not require the use of fertilizer or other agrochemicals
in any quantity. All the fallow crops are expected to do is to generale a little supplemental cash
income; a horse or a carabao sledge can be used to bring these modest quantities to relay
stations near the logging road and from there to the lowlands.
3) HYBRID CORN, INCLUDING AGROCHEMICALS, IN BANGKAG FARMS
The second case where hybrid corn was extensively cultivated (see Table 9.1 and Annex E)
concerned a barangay of pioneers that had been resettled in the 1980s, because of the Peace
and Order situation. The new location is relatively accessible, and not too far away from the
lowland town of Tumauini, Isabela. As part of Üieir resettlement, they were granted individual
ISF Stewardship Certificates (see section 5.2.3) to lands on a government-sequestered ranch.
To turn these grasslands into productive farm areas, they took the conventional option of
producing two crops of corn per year, with the use of fertili/ers and pesticides. Until the early
9
The reports only mention 'yellow' corn, and do not indicated whether hybrid seeds were used. For the same reason
"lentioned in note 2. these were most likely hybrid varieties. too.
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199Os, many people in this barangay were strongly involved in carabao logging; and income
from this activity may have been used to finance capital inputs needed in the ISF lands. As
government restrictions on timber extraction tightened, and accessible timber stocks dwindled,
corn production became an increasingly important component of the income of these migrants.
The relative proximity to the highway and the lowland market influenced the adoption of
hybrid corn and the existence of credit relations between these farmers and lowland-based
informal moneylenders. The case described in Box 9.3 concerns a much more remote migrant
settlement, which until recently was equally dependent on logging income but is now
increasingly keying labour and resources to agriculture.
Box 9.3 Barangay Musinga, San Mariano, Isabela
204 (1990 pop = 1000)
1965
1965 - 1992





in bangkag, with external inputs
N° of households
Year of arrival of first migrants
Corporate logging period
Mode of access
Distance to residual forest
Distance to road




The Musinga floodplain and the natura! stream running through it have probably long been an inhabited, open spot
in the forests, which is why the logging camp and log pond were set up here. According to Mr Tuliao, part of
the first group of land-seeking migrants to settle here, the name Musinga originates from the Agta word singa,
which means dancing; this is where the Agta danced to the music of the logging company employees. Corporate
logging was just starting when Mr. Tuliao arrived and was largely conftned to the vicinity of San Mariano;
loggers were still using two-man barrot saws and only minimal mechanical equipment,. The followers, mostly
Ifugao and Ilokano labourers of the logging companies, found the floodplains of "lower Musinga" occupied and
settled. on a nearby hilltop, the area which is nowadays called Upper Musinga. In 1988, others moved there too,
after a disastrous flood had destroyed many houses in lower Musinga. Mr. Tuliao and other early migrants say
that when they came to Musinga, typhoons were not doing mat much damage, as the hills around the floodplain
were fully forested. Nowadays, commercial timber is far away, half a day's hike from the barangay.
Nevertheless, carabao logging continues to be an important source of income here, and the three sons of Mr
Tuliao are prominent leaders in the business. People from San Mariano lend chainsaws to operators in Musinga;
some other migrants own chainsaws, which they were given in lieu of unpaid salaries when their logging company
went bankrupt. 'Salvage' lumber (supposedly produced using stumps and abandoned logs) is transported to San
Mariano via the river that passes Musinga. In 1992, all lowlands and the rolling bangkag lands around them
were still growing white corn. A year later, a severe typhoon destroyed all Musinga's banana plantations,
and in 1994 Mr. Tuliao pioneered the cultivation of hybrid corn. His harvest enabled him to buy his second
kuliglig (small farm tractor). In the dry season of 1995, the logging road connecting Musinga with San
Mariano was graded and partially gravelled. In November of that year, other pioneers, as well as more recent
migrants, also planted hybrid corn in their ploughed lands, acquirmg capital inputs and cash advances from a
trader in San Mariano.
Both cases where hybrid corn was produced by capital-intensive methods in bangkag farms
involved older, fairly well-established settlements; the first migrants settled here in the early
years of the corporate logging period around 1965. In both cases, the introduction of hybrid
corn followed a period of decreasing or less certain cash income from other sources. Forest
access became more difficult, due to deforestation and stricter bureaucratie controls. In
Musinga, banana plantations had recently been severely damaged by a typhoon. Another
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common factor is the proximity of a road that is passable by truck during the summer months,
when the main corn erop is harvested. If we compare these two cases, it appears that distance
is less relevant than reliability: as long as the road could be 'negotiated' by a six-wheel-drive
logging truck during the dry season, the financial risks of investing in the cultivation of this
perishable erop were acceptable to cultivators and financiers.
Based on the reasons given by migrants and traders for their cropping and investment
choices, there appears to be a link between the adoption of hybrid corn and informal loans.
Migrants producing hybrid corn by capital-intensive methods often use the erop to service
loans from a moneylender, most often a grain trader in the nearest lowland town. My own
1994/95 survey on the cropping pattern and credit relations of 88 farm households in Isabela
and Cagayan (59 migrants and 29 lowland farmers)10 pointed in the same direction. Table 9.2
summarizes the results of this survey.
Table 9.2 Hybrid corn production and informal credit, survey results (1995)
Lowland Farmers Forest Migrants





- with credit, using inputs
- with credit, not using inputs
- no credit, using inputs





- with credit, using inputs
- with credit, not using inputs
- without credit, using inputs
^without credit, not using inputs
Total n°. using inputs
Total n", not using inputs
Total n", statmg production loans
Total n", stating consumptive loans
Total n°. stating minor loans (from
relatives)
























































































for rice and corn cultrvation with credit. This is due to the fact that some farmers produce both nee and corn on credit.
Before discussing the results, a word of caution is in order regarding the conclusions to be
drawn from this survey. It was not conducted on the basis of a representative sample of
lowland and migrant settlements in Cagayan Valley. Of the 59 upland farmers interviewed in
The onginal number of respondents interviewed in this survey was 109; 21 interviews were either incomplete or
coniained internally contradictory answers, and were therefore not included in the analysis
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this survey, 12 lived in the accessible upland barangay of Dimatan. This survey did not cover
any of the other settlements included in table 9.1, and covers settlements located within a 35-
kilometre radius of Cabagan, Isabela, where the CVPED staff who conducted the survey,
reside. Related to the same 'constraint' is the fact that all households interviewed by means of
this questionnaire lived in relatively accessible areas, which helps to explain the high degree
of market integration reflected in the results. As noted above, the purpose of this survey, and
of the chapter as a whole, is to draw attention to a relatively new development, the contours
of which only began to emerge towards the end of the period covered in this research. Further
studies will be necessary to determine more precisely the extent of this development and the
mechanism propelling it.
The following conclusions may be drawn on the basis of the results shown in Table 9.2:
1) Cultivation of hybrid corn
Half of the lowland farmers and 40% of the forest migrants interviewed produced hybrid
corn. I must qualify this result by adding that 20 of the 24 forest migrants producing
hybrid corn were from Pauikan and Dimatan, both pioneer settlements located
approximately 10 km from the National Highway. Furthermore, the survey highlights the
importance which the forest migrants continued to attach to producing at least a part of
their own rice staple: of the 24 farmers cultivating hybrid corn, 22 cultivated upland rice
as well. Only 7 of the 59 upland respondents did not cultivate upland rice or irrigated rice.
As expected, the vast majority of forest migrants cultivated rice on uma land, without
applying fertilizer or other agrochemicals. The reverse was true of lowland respondents,
70% of whom used capital inputs in the production of rice.
2) Use of capital inputs
In line with the previous results, the use of capital inputs is still more common among
lowland farmers than among their colleagues in the forest lands; 86% of the lowland
respondents produced rice and corn using capital-intensive methods. Conversely, 83% of
upland households used no external inputs. The minority of 10 forest migrants who used
fertilizers and pesticides had access to ploughed and - in 4 cases - irrigated lands (talon).
3) Informal credit
The majority of all respondents stated that they were engaged in informal credit relations,
ranging from minor loans from relatives to several thousands of pesos borrowed for
medical treatment, tuition fees, or the purchase of a farm tractor. The seven lowland
farmers, who stated that they did not have any debts emphasized that they were consciously
avoiding loans, because of the high cost. With one sole exception, these households had
access to substantial land holdings or to other sources of cash income, such as carabao
logging or a remittances from a family member with urban or overseas employment. The
majority of lowland farmers had gotten substantial loans from informal sources, usually
grain traders. These loans served both production and consumptive purposes.
Nearly all forest migrants responded that they had occasionally received minor
assistance from "relatives", "neighbours" and "people we know", borrowed without interest
and only in an emergency. Of the 21 upland households, who said their loans were due for
repayment by the end of the season, 15 were cultivating hybrid corn in bangkag land.
However, only five of these corn-growers indicated that all or part of Üie loan was used to
acquire capital inputs. Six of the ten who did not use capital inputs produced corn in order
to pay off consumptive loans, and the four others said they had no debts. Another eight
upland farmers grew hybrid corn on uma lands; four of these had also borrowed from
outsiders, while the other four owed nothing or only small amounts to neighbours and
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relatives. Of the 18 forest migrants in this sample who cultivated traditional corn varieties,
only two had debts to be settled with outsiders.
In the previous Chapter, debt failure emerged as a possible factor behind the migration of
newcomers into the forest land. This survey shows that similar informal credit relaüonships,
both among farmers and between farmers and outsiders, occur in migrant settlements in the
Sierra Madre. The overall pattern that evolves from these results confïrms earlier reports and
the observations made in my 1996 field appraisal: upland farming is gradually being
transformed from a capital-extensive, subsistence-oriented activity into the conventional pattern
in the lowlands, whereby farmers borrow capital to cultivate, and cultivate - at least in part -
in order to pay off loans. Neither in the uplands nor in the lowlands are these informal loans
used exclusively to purchase capital inputs; more often, in fact, consumptive purposes are
served.
The adoption of hybrid corn varieties and informal credit relations seem to go hand in
hand. Whether the choice for hybrid corn flows from the need to generale more income in
order to pay back loans, or is a means of gaining access to credit remains unclear. To examine
the possibility of a link between erop choice and credit in more detail, I will now take a brief
look at the informal money-lending sector in the Philippines, and the changes it has undergone
as a result of the Green Revolution and agrarian reform.
9.4 Crop choice and informal credit
9.4.l The importance of the informal sector in rural credit
For many years already, informal moneylenders have played an important role in the rural
credit market of the Philippines. In 1961, a nationwide survey on the borrowing practices of
farm households, found that 1.1 million of the 2.4 million farmers interviewed had taken out
cash loans that year, 88% with informal sources (BCS 1961, cited in Sacay et al. 1985:80).
Twenty years later, 60% of a sample of 870,900 small farmers stated loans with informal
lenders (TBAC 1981 in ibid). In Cagayan and Isabela, where smaller surveys were carried out
in 1976 and 1978, more than 80% of rural loans came from informal sources (TBAC 1981,
in ibid.-.&l; PCAC 1981:56, table 24).
In line with the growing need for production loans in an intensifying agricultural sector,
the role of input dealers, grain traders, and farmer-moneylenders increased in the informal
credit markets, at the expense of the traditional providers of informal credit: landowners and
sari-sari store operators. Before 1960, landlords provided 61% of the total amount of loans
in the informal sector within Philippine rice areas (Esguerra 1993:11). Due in part to agrarian
reform, this proportion has since declined, as confirmed by Mangahas et al. (1976); in their
1976 survey involving 538 share tenants and leaseholding farm households in Nueva Ecija,
only 2-3 of every 10 leaseholders were still borrowing from their former landlord, compared
to 7-8 of every 10 sharecroppers. As noted by Fegan (1981), Sacay et al. (1985), Kerkvliet
(1991) and others, traders, grain-millers, dealers in farm inputs, and rich farmers have taken
the place of the landlords by fmancing the increased capital requirements of lowland farmers
growing high- yielding rice varieties. Between 1968 and 1978 the number of entrepreneurs
engaged in informal moneylending in Isabela, Bulacan and Camarines Sur increased by over
400%. All of the 168 entrepreneurs interviewed in this survey were engaged in informal
moneylending (PCAC 1981).
Government-owned financial institutions repeatedly found themselves unable to participate
effectively in the high-risk market of small-scale agricultural credit. Subsidized credit
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programmes often resulted in low recovery, despite favourable interest rates. A major
government attempt to enter into no-collateral credit with rural smallholders was the 'Masagana
99' credit scheme (Tolentino 1987). In its peak year 1974-1975, Masagana financed 800,000
farmers, collapsing soon afterwards under widespread loan default (PCAC 1981). The latest
comprehensive agrarian reform programme also included a credit component, in which the
Land Bank intervened on behalf of tenants and landless farmers by buying lands from estate
owners and offering gradual repayment schemes on soft terms. However, many beneficiaries
entered into informal loans to finance their mortgage, effectively losing their title soon after
the land was registered in their name (see 8.5.4).
Acquaintance, trust, and social control mechanisms are critical in rural finance
(Yotopoulos and Floro 1991:144), especially when the borrower is a poor farm household with
few assets that could serve as a collateral. The size of many formal lending institutions means
that they are under bureaucratie control, making them less attractive for these small-scale
lending activities. For this reason, formal banks 'contract out' such labour-intensive and
personalized rural lending operations to informal moneylenders. Credit-worthy borrowers with
access to formal banks borrow capital there to finance agricultural and consumptive loans to
small farmers (Agabin 1988; Geron 1988 cited in Esguerra 1993:31; Larson 1988). The
practice of fmancing a combination of production inputs and day-to-day needs during the erop
establishment period is an advantage which the informal sector has over formal banks. By
offering a mechanism which caters to needs which are beyond the management capability of
these banks, the informal financial sector ".. .performs a useful function in providing asset-poor
households with a way to gain access to credit. In particular, credit-tying as a collateral
substitute makes borrowing possible for rural households who would otherwise go without
credit" (Esguerra 1993:35)
9.4.2 The erop collateral
In the eyes of professional traders, land titles and cultivation rights are an unpopular form of
collateral. First, because few farmers own the land they till, and even if they are the owners
'on paper' as a result of land reform, the remaining mortgage on the land limits its collateral
value. And second, because land is not a free trade commodity. The land market is artificially
constrained by agrarian reform laws, which increase the tenurial protection of cultivators and
place limits on the area of farmland one may own, thus pushing land prices down below their
free-market value. The last resort in the case of loan default, to take up farm production
themselves, is not attractive to traders either. Thus "so long as money tenders had no security
for the loan aside from taking over part of the farm in case of default at the harvest, rural
capitalists were unwilling to lend except to neighbours on whom lenders had adequate credit
ratings... in practice, lenders left the defaulting farmer as a kind of tenant, taking 50% of the
net erop like old landlords" (Fegan 1986:168). Substitutes for land as collateral are third-party
guarantees and the threat of losing borrowing opportunities in the future. Another effective
security is to ensure that one is the first to be paid at the end of the cropping season. Fegan
describes how traders in Nueva Ecija developed integrated agribusinesses, entering into
contracts which encompassed the supply of certified seeds, agrochemicals and threshing
services to rice growers. This last component was vital:
"By operating across linked markets for several inputs, and with an inescapable collection
mechanism in the thresher, Vito made higher profil than in single markets, because of his
contractual monopsony. At harvest Vito's thresher, run by a son, collected debts plus interest and
its own 6% of the gross, with priority over any other charge on the harvest, allowing him to lend
without risk "(Fegan 1986:164)
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Several other authors (Esguerra 1993; Esguerra and Meyer 1992; PCAC 1981; Sacay et al.
1985; Yotopoulos and Floro 1991) also mention the compulsory sale of the borrower's erop
to the moneylender as a common form of collateral in informal credit. A survey in Munoz,
Nueva Ecija, showed that 106 out of 172 informal credit contracts were based on this condition
(Esguerra et al. 1992: 157). Most informal credit lines encompass both production and non-
production loans: whoever borrows for production also borrows for consumptive or emergency
needs (Mangahas 1991:71).
Thus a erop collateral, which is often mentioned in the survey s presented above, involves
the guaranteed delivery of a specified erop at the end of the season, in exchange for a loan
which often comprises both production-oriented and consumptive components. The maximum
amount the farmer may borrow is roughly equal to the expected yield at the expected market
price during the harvesting period. If the cultivation of the erop requires the use of fertilizers
and other agrochemicals, these are included in the overall credit ceiling. The remainder may
be accessed through cash ad vances, or if applicable, purchases of consumption items in the
store of the moneylender. The loan is only repayable in grain, not in cash. In some cases, the
trader/moneylender demands delivery of the entire erop and, if there is any balance income
left after subtracting what the farmer owes, hè enters this in his accounts as the amount that
the farmer can use for nature purchases in his store. This system of market interlinkage11
combines in a single agreement the purchase of agricultural inputs, the allocation of the
farmer's labour, and the sale of his erop. In this way, farmers cultivate a erop that buys them
a consumptive credit line in the informal moneylending market.
By interlinking markets for capital inputs, crops, consumer goods, and labour, informal
moneylenders are in a better position than formal lending institutions to recover these loans.
When it comes to decisions on priorities in debt payment, the informal lender who also
provides daily needs on credit naturally has to be serviced first. The absence of a consumptive
loan facility reduces the competitiveness of formal banks and government-sponsored credit
programmes in comparison with the informal sector, even though formal banks can offer lower
interest rates to farmers with a land collateral. In the 1980s, the nominal interest rates of
formal banks were 10-15% per annum, while those in the informal sector ranged from 30%
to 98% (Sacay et al. 1985)12.
The practice of tying farm labour to the production of particular commodities through
informal credit has been employed in Philippine agriculture for many decades. During the
1930s, landlords reinforced their tenants' sense of obligation towards them with advances, both
in kind and in money, "not only because of the high interest rates, bul also to keep tenants tied
to them" Peltzer (1945:94, cited in Wolters 1984) . Local usurers made use of their political
and social relations with the administrators of government-sponsored rural credit programs to
borrow capital at the normal interest rates (then 8% per year), and demanded interest rates of
100-150% per year from their clients, to be repaid in grain (Wolters 1984: 118).
An example from the 1920s illustrates the force with which credit may tie farmers to a
erop, despite negative incomes incurred by the cultivators. In a comment on the table
presenting net farm incomes from the cultivation of tobacco in Isabela and Cagayan Valley,
Market mterlmkage refers to a transaction between two parties in relation to the exchange of two or more
commodities or services. Imked through the transaction m an essential way (Braverman and Srmivasan 1980)
From the lender's point of view. real interest rates are lower because of transaction costs and the drop in market
prices which generally occurs at the time of harvest If loans are repaid in grain, as is usually the case in informal
moneylending. these costs can largely be avoided through grading and price cartels between traders. or recovered by storing
the gram until prices recover after the post-harvest glut.
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the authors wrote:
"The title of the table should be reversed, that is, the tobacco growers' annual net loss from a hec-
tare The average loss per hectare for the 235 farms represented in the survey in the Cagayan
Valley, therefore, was P96.46..."
Loans with tobacco traders were seen as the reason that farmers nevertheless opted for the
cultivation of tobacco:
"The tobacco growers as a whole are always in debt...and have one source of cash, and that is
tobacco. And tobacco as a erop is wholly at the mercy of weather fickleness on the one hand and
of the tobacco leafbuyers on the other... There is no question but that the farmers are veritable
victims ofusurers." (Paguirigan and Madamba 1927:103)
Studies on the cultivation of hybrid rice varieties in Nueva Ecija also showed farmers growing
a erop in exchange for minimal or negative returns on their labour. By interlocking the markets
for threshing services, agricultural inputs, and personal credit, traders could make a profil on
the production of a erop that was not profitable to the cultivators (Fegan 1986, Kerkvliet
1991:46).
In the case of hybrid corn production in Cagayan Valley, interlocked markets for
agricultural inputs, credit, consumer goods, and crops turned the grain market in the region
from one concemed with erop prices to one concerned with erop producers. In her study of
credit relations in the production and trade of highland vegetables on Cebu island, Hendriks
(1997) observed competition among traders to establish suki, or long-term business
relationships with vegetable producers, or with the middlemen representing them in the market.
Here credit, although limited to the field of production loans and delayed payments for
products delivered, serves as the principal means of establishing guaranteed erop delivery.
People who wanted to join the vegetable trade market faced the problem that most farmers -
and their products - were already tied to a trader through a suki relationship. To enter into the
trade, others had to find their own sukis (ibid.:\59). Hendriks concludes that, in addition to
the personalized nature of normal suki relations, which are based on trust, these ties between
traders and producers derive much of their stability from the credit base which underlies them.
The security of delivery of perishable vegetables may be seen as one rationale for a
marketing system operating exclusively by means of suki relations. The vegetable traders run
considerable risks: prices are established at wholesale markets in the early hours of each
market day, when products must quickly find their way to the consumer. Strong variations in
supply cannot be solved through storage, and may result in immediate economie loss. In a
study of vegetable marketing contracts in Indonesia, the existence of crop-delivery contracts
was also interpreted as a reaction to uncertainty in the market place, and therefore more likely
to occur when the product being traded (in that case, chillies and cabbage) is perishable and
subject to price fluctuations (Braadbaard 1994:148)13. The explanatory value of this analysis
for the production of hybrid corn probably turns on the part of the farmer-producer: the erop
must be taken from the farm to the market as soon as it has dried sufficiently. For traders, on
the other hand, grain moving and storage is an entirely feasible and even profitable activity,
because of the considerable price fluctuations between the harvesting months - when all the
growers are harvesting and delivering their product, and the later months. Moreover,
A 1981 study on informal rural financial markets by the Presidential Council on Agricultural Credit draws a
similar conclusion. acknowledging the exorbitant amounts farmers pay for informal loans. but considcnng these as
transaction costs for the high risks involved in small-farmer financing "Private moneylenders. creaüvefy adapt their
lending techniques to local conditions and henceforth convert the substantialfy large expected losses into actual profits"
(PCAC 1981:23)
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supplying one trader exclusively has no positive price effects for the farmers, who receive the
prevailing market price as it prevails during the harvesting period. Unlike the case of
perishable products, part of a trader's profits from contracts tying credit to the guaranteed
supply of grain are earned in the storage of the erop.
In sum, traders have three motives to tie farm labour to the production of commercial grain
through credit:
1) high risks in this sector of the credit market, in which uncapitalized, collateral-less farmers
participate, exposing themselves as well as their creditors to considerable risk of default.
To enhance the chances of recovery, the trader ensures that hè is the first in line to be paid
in grain after the harvest.
2) guaranteed delivery contracts with corporate buyers in Metro Manila, Bulacan, Laguna and
Nueva Ecija, whose production process requires the guaranteed delivery of specified
volumes of grain at specified dates in the future. If they have no assurances of delivery
themselves, it is risky for traders to enter into these lucrative and prestigieus contracts.
3) increased profitability, because of reduced competition. The trader can unilaterally (albeit
within the boundaries laid down by traders in a certain locality) define the balance between
the cost of borrowed cash, consumption items and farm inputs, and the value of the erop
(including the grading of its quality).
Linking personal credit to a production loan, and taking the guaranteed delivery of a specified
erop as the only way of re-paying the loan, reduces farmers' freedom in the marketplace.
Traders who supply farmers with commodities for household consumption, certified seeds, and
agrochemicals on credit can set the prices on all these products at liberty, including the interest
rates charged over these products, and the price of the erop with which the debts can be repaid.
The farmer cannot choose to sell his harvest to the highest bidder and repay his loan in cash,
but agrees to deliver his entire erop to the moneylender, or at least the equivalent of the
amount hè borrowed. A trader who allows repayments in money runs the risk that the farmer
will actually borrow from more than one moneylender, and that hè may therefore not be the
first one to be paid after the sale of the erop. Poverty continues to prevail among the farming
population of the Philippines. In 1988, 74% of the rural families making a living by agriculture
were living under the poverty line, and corn farmers were among the poorest (Balisacan 1992
in Srinivasan 1993:3). Informal credit exposes poor farmers with few if any financial buffers
to the risk of having to devote a growing proportion of their labour to debt service, either
through paid labour or the delivery of specified farm or forest products. The trader determines
the erop, but the farmer bears the risk of its cultivation. In the case of hybrid corn, the risks
include not only climatic adversities and fluctuations in yield, but also the instability of prices
paid for hybrid corn, which range from 5 pesos per kilo during the harvesting period to 10 to
12 pesos in the cropping season. Due to the risk of decay and the absence of adequate on-farm
storage facilities (see Section 9.2), farmers have no other option but to ensure that their erop
reaches the warehouse of their moneylender as soon as it has dried properly. This rationality
causes a glut, which may cause the value of their erop to fall short of the amount to be repaid.
In contrast to sharecrop tenancy, where the landlord's share also depended on erop yield, a
disappointing yield or price results in a negative balance, which must be paid with the next
erop (see 9.8)
A critica! review of the role of moneylenders and debts in agriculture, such as the above,
calls to mind a neo- colonial negative perception of credit as a "kind ofillness, for which a cure
should be fouruf or the image of moneylenders as "unscrupulous rich people who impose
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wicked, crippling terms on their helpless mortgagers" (Hill 1986:84-85). I subscribe to the
essential role of the informal credit sector in rural economies, the entrepreneurial courage of
those engaged in the activity, and the rationality of discounting recovery risks in interest rates.
Indeed, the poorest households may well be those who have no access to credit and are
therefore left to their own devices in dealing with fluctuations in income and expenditure.
However, while objections to moral undertones in critical writing about informal credit
markets in developing countries are a useful warning against ideological bias, her view of
informal credit as inconsequential for the formation of socioeconomic inequalities in rural
societies (Hill 1986:83) borders on positivist naivety. And as I argue in this Chapter, current
moneylending practices are neither entirely unproblematic from an perspective of forest
protection and sustainable land use.
9.4.3 Commercial grain: the post-logging business opportunity
Private traders handle by far the largest share of the total grain production in Cagayan Valley.
The government-run National Food Authority, which offers a guaranteed price for selected
crops, including rice and corn, plays only a minor role in the market; in Isabela the NFA's
62,000-ton storage capacity amounts to roughly 10% of the aggregate capacity of private
warehouses (Province of Isabela 1993). Even though the NFA offers higher prices, farmers
prefer to sell their erop to private traders, since it does not offer the option of buying
consumption items and production inputs on credit. Moreover, the NFA only buys from
farmers who can show a land title or emancipation certificate14, conditions which most forest
migrants are unable to meet. For this reason, I will confine the discussion to the role of private
traders and moneylenders.
Floro and Yotopoulos (1991) distinguish loans from trader-lenders and better-off farmers,
which generally involved the bonded sale of output, and loans by farmer-lenders, in which a
land collateral, including cultivation rights, was often required. At hè time of their study, in
1984, it was already clear that land was not the preferred collateral for trader-lenders. The
primary concern of non-cultivating lenders is an assured volume of trade, to reduce the
marketing risk and lower the cost of borrower-monitoring and debt failure. For farmer-lenders,
who are themselves directly involved in agricultural production, one purpose of lending money
to other farmers is the prospect of gaining cultivation rights over additional lands. Partly
because of this difference in motives, trader-lenders and farmer-lenders also target different
groups: traders deal primarily with richer farmers, who have more land, higher expected
output volumes, and lower default risks. Farmer-lenders may even prefer to enter into high-
risk loans with poorer farmers who are will ing to use the land or usufruct collateral in such a
loan (Floro and Yotopoulos 1991:152-153). Box 9.4 shows that within this category of small-
scale moneylenders, there are some who serve as relay stations for larger trading companies
in the lowlands. Remy Castillo finances the crops and personal expenses of upland farmers,
partly with her own capital, and partly on behalf of a large grain trader in the lowland town
of Tumauini, Isabela.
The emancipation patent is part of Presidential Decree no. 27. the Operation Land Transfer (the predecessor of
the Comprehensive Agranan Reform Law) and is issued to former tenants who quahfied as beneficianes, in preparation of
the fmal issuance of land mies by the Register of Deeds (see also Chapter 8)
hybrid com, rural credit and the future of the Sierra Madre 359
Box 9.4 Remy Castillo, trader and moneylender in the uplands
There are now nine traders in the upland barangay of Dinuman. Like Remy, many built up a business capita! with
earnings made elsewhere. The richest of the local households, who only recently entered into the trading and
moneylending business, has four relatives working abroad, one of whom is married to a Japanese man. Remy
combines the businesses of running a small sari sari store with grain trade and moneylending. She supplies the
migrants of Pauikan and Tibunuan with cash and consumption items on credit, in return for the delivery of grain.
She only entered into the grain business in 1993, after having built up a starting capital as an Overseas Contract
Worker in Malaysia in 1991 and 1992. Mr. Rolly (Rolando) Go, a big grain trader in the lowland town of
Turaauini (and also the financier of forest migrants in Dimatan (see Box 9.3), supplies Remy with fertilizers and
agrochemicals. In 1994, Go supplied more than 40,000 pesos worth of agrochemicals to upland farmers through
Remy's store. Remy says she delivered "far more than thaf in yellow corn at the end of the season. This year
her utang [debt, GT] to Mr. Go is over 70,000 pesos, but that amount includes a cash loan of 17,000 Pesos for
the recruitment fee of a niece who wants to go abroad. Remy also provides consumptive credit to the Ifugao
migrants who arrived recently, but says that they have a ceiling of 1000 pesos "since they are very slow in paying
back. Others people here have debts as high as 12,000pesos. Sometimes even the horvest is not enough topay
il back" Officially, there is no competition between the traders here; they all offer the same prices and charge the
same interest rates. But according to one of the residents, this is only the official story; in reality, competition
takes place behind the scènes, through confidemial deals under different conditions. Later, another informant adds
that getting credit is still not that easy if you are new and you have no collateral; for these borrowers, most
moneylenders here require a guarantor. (Research diary, March 1996)
Her case shows that the system of credit-bound, exclusive delivery of hybrid corn is
reproduced between traders. People with a minor starting capital, accumulated from sources
other than farming, start their own small trading shops. Through their contacts with traders in
the lowlands, to whom they supply upland products traded in their small businesses, the option
of managing a credit facility on behalf of these entrepreneurs presents itself. Social
acquaintance is a core element in informal credit, and this relay mechanism is necessary to
bridge the distance between the trader in the lowlands and the upland community. For the same
reason, banks in the lowlands relay their rural lending schemes with smallholders through
traders and other informal moneylenders in the lowland towns of Cagayan Valley. These
moneylenders are much more immersed in the local context than banks, and thus better able
to decide whom to fmance and how to recover these risky loans. The erop collateral, and the
combination of consumptive and productive components in personal loans are sufficient
conditions for profitable moneylending and reduce the need for legal collateral, such as a land
title. This, in turn, opens up possibilities to fmance forest migrants who cultivate public lands
in the Sierra Madre.
An aspect which adds to the attractiveness of the Sierra Madre as an opportunity to expand
or enter into an agribusiness and moneylending scheme is the fact that competition in this
market is not run entirely through price mechanisms. Farmers who have already entered into
a credit-bound erop production contract with one trader cannot supply their products to another
trader, as they are not allowed to pay back their loan in cash. The best way to develop or
expand a position in the lucrative grain-trading market, therefore, is to link up with new
borrowers cum erop growers, such as forest migrants.
Agribusiness and informal moneylending are profitable activities. Umali (1987, cited in
Esguerra and Meyer 1992:153) reports returns to investments 'mpalay trading of 100 to 257
percent, but, as Esguerra and Meyer note, it should be kept in mind that profitability is
confmed to a few months per year, and depends strongly on the volume handled. The variation
in incomes earned by various traders can often not be discerned on the outside of their shop,
or lifestyle in the rural towns where they are based. Here, many maintain an astute image of
petty business, often a small hardware or sari-sari store, a restaurant or at the weighing scale.
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A second lifestyle, in the anonymity of Metro Manila, remains outside the view of their local
clients. There, their children are sent to the best schools in the country, investments are made
in real estate, and a Western lifestyle is within reach15. A young tobacco trader and
moneylender regularly complained to me about heavy losses, on the order of hundreds of
thousands of pesos, after a weekend at the nearby casino, and showed me his carefully bidden
Rolex watch, worth more than 20,000 US dollar, after returning from a trip to Hongkong.
During a visit to Europe, another trader-cwm-politician disclosed to me the profits hè was
making since hè became involved in the grain trading business: delivering 10,000 cavans
(450,000 kilos) of rice to a buyer in Manila every month, selling at 675 P/cavan grain that had
a real cost of 500 Pesos per cavan, hè and his partner were making 2 million pesos, or 80,000
dollars a month from this deal alone.
The logging industry created new wealth among logging contractors, sawmill operators,
and government and company personnel. After 1990, when the industry began to contract,
these investors saw an opportunity to enter into agribusiness and moneylending. In addition
to new capital, the logging industry also generaled a large area of potential farmlands in the
Sierra Madre. The business history of the Argueza family, traders in San Mariano, who
contracted the first migrants of Musinga to grow hybrid corn in 1995, shows how the trading
business has always managed to seize each new opportunity that presented itself in twentieth-
century Cagayan Valley:
1917-1965: TOBACCO TRADE
Liza is the mestiza daughter of an Ybanag mother, Nenita Argueza and a mestizo Chinese
father, Cayetano Li. Because of the uncertainties accompanying Chinese business enterprises
in the Philippines, the family always used the mother's name, and Liza continues to do so. The
late Mr. Li, or Argueza, was born in 1902 and migrated from Manila to Ilagan in 1917.
According to the old Mrs. Argueza, her husband arrived in Ilagan "only 15 years old and
without even one Peso. He staned out bringing tobacco to Manila, selling it there and bringing
the farmers their money afierwards. In 1942, we fled because of the war and went to San
Mariano, also because there was no tobacco trader here yet. We continued to trade in tobacco
until the earfy 1970s, and we were the ones holding the license to sell to the National Tobacco
Administration. But the Government wanted to take control of the trade and they established
the PTA; Delfin Albano was managing it then. So we staned to sell to the PTA. The farmers
could not sell straight to the PTA, because they wanted us to classify the leaves first. There was
a classifier at the PTA too, but hè was not good, that is why farmers preferred to sell to us.
Also because we paid them cash, while the PTA gave them papeles, credit papers that the
farmers couldn 't cash until the PTA had money again. But tobacco went down after 1970; you
see, the traders and the farmers had found something better m logging, so nobody was
interested in cultivating tobacco any more "...
The beginning of large-scale mechanized logging in the Sierra Madre was not related to the
declining demand for tobacco; nor was the timber industry the only possibility that traders had
to deal with the tobacco crisis. As we saw in the previous chapter, agriculture was expanding
rapidly during this period, which was also marked by increasing erop yields due to the
introduction of modern rice varieties. In San Mariano, however, with its 200,000 hectares of
forest land, logging became the number one business opportunity in the next twenty-five years:
There appears to bc a considerable differcncc in the lifestyles of younger and older gencrations of traders.
particularly those of Chinese descent Rlderly Chinese often grew up as the children of poor and hardworking immigrant
families and, with the exception of expenditures for schooling, are more conservative in their lifestyle than their offspring
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1965-1990 COMMERCIAL LOGOING, WOOD-PROCESSING, RETAJL TRADE
"In 1952,1 became the fint logging concesslonaire here. We were thefirst ones to open up the
roadfrom Minanga, and all of the cutting had to be done with the barrat saw! 'Ever' sawmill
also workedfor my concern, but their bulldozer was really what we call 'tupac-tupac': one day
it works, the next day it breaks down. Later, I was able to get two trucks from Roxas and Nueva
Ecija. Our workers came from Mountain Province, because the people here in San Mariano
were not interested. From 1963 onwards, more people came in. Thefirst sawmill was set up
in 1965. We were still cutting wood very near the town during those days; one truck could go
up and down to the cutting area three times a day. Our concession was 1,200 hectares, so we
didn 't do all the logging ourselves. We simply collected the rayalties from other operators.
When Marcos decreed that small concessions had to be Consolidated in bigger corporations,
J gave our concession to my son. and it was incorporated with 14 other small concessions. But
this was not a good setup, some people were hiding money and eventually the Corporation
broke up, and anybody could log anywhere in the concession! After the concession went, we
decided to go into salabadiok and start our own sawmill. Again, big sawmills closed and small
sawmills sprang up, and now it is only my son who is still doing some wood business. So
tobacco wentfirst, then logging also ended, and we went into the grocery business. We set up
the biggest grocery store in San Mariano! Six years ago we closed it because I was getting too
old. Right now, the farmers are asking mefor tobacco inputs again; the price is very good,
3000 pesos per bate of native tobacco! But I am old now, my children make their own
decisions.
One of the earliest corporate concessionaires in the Region, this family was engaged in large-
scale mechanized logging throughout its boom-and-bust cycle between 1965 and 1990. The
story of the old Mrs Argueza shows that the family initially had difficulty responding to the end
of the logging industry; many people in the town used to be employed either by the sawmills
and logging contractors themselves, or by one of the enterprises serving the industry, such as
restaurants and bars, automotive repair and weiding shops, and retail stores. Economie
hardship in the years directly following the first logging moratorium imposed here in 1989
forced customers to opt for the cheap public market rather than for the fancy supermarket. The
next generation discovered a new business opportunity in the trade with migrant communities
who had settled in the hinterlands of the town:
AFTER 1990: CREDIT AND COMMERCIAL GRAIN
The family's old wooden house still dominates the centra of San Mariano. It is centrally
located, right next to the public market where the logging trucks used to load their supplies for
the labourers, and where nowadays the same trucks deliver the hundreds of upland families
coming to San Mariano every Sunday morning to hear Mass and buy necessities. The open area
on the ground floor of the house holds nothing but two scales to weigh the farm products
delivered here. Liza's daughter is a chubby girl with Chinese looks. Fluent in Chinese, Tagalog
and English, she tells us that she goes to the Chinese high school in Cauayan. Cesar, my
research partner in the field, asks how much the enrolment fee is and she answers casually,
"30,000pesos per semester'. Stunned, wondering if hè could possibly have understood the girl
correctly, Cesar replies "per semester?"; at his current salary of 5000 Pesos per month, his
three young daughters will clearly not be able to enjoy the same kind of schooling.
Liza takes me to her tiny old desk in the corner to explain how the corn-buying business
works. She says: '7 was a plain housewife before; my brother used to run our wood business
here. Before that, my parents traded here, in tobacco andpeanuts. l only entered the business
three years ago, and it is doing very well. I deal only in corn, and the system works like this:
We get our fertilizer from Cauayan. What we do is to give the farmer fertilizer and seeds on
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credit, and every month a little bit of cash money until Harvest time There is a ceiling to their
credit, depending on the number ofbags offertilizer that they take: one bag offertilizer is good
for one hectare and their maximum credit is 10,000 Pesos, that is for everything, including the
family needs. There is no guaranteed price for their product, but it should notfall under 6
pesos, otherwise the farmers cannot make anything. The price is now 6.60 to 6.80 per kilo. We
normally live in Manila, but I am here for a few days because the erop is coming in. We also
sell kuliglig [farm tractor, GT] and other machinery, but only those who can take 4 bags or
more qualify to get one on credit. We bring our corn to the piggeries and poultry integrators
in Bulacan and Bataan; that is why we do not do milling here; the integrators are toofar away.
My business is doing well; when I started in 1991 my tumover was 500 bags offertilizer, in
1994 it went up to 700, and this year it was 2000 bags. And the same goesfor the other traders
here. Our business prospects are very bright, more lands are opened up every year!"
The business history of the Argueza family follows the economie process of Cagayan Valley
as a whole over the past century. Starting as tobacco traders, they abandoned that sector as it
declined during the mid-1960s and shifted their investments to the newly developing logging
industry. By the 1990s, when most of San Mariano's forests had been either repeatedly logged
or converted, they shifted again, this time to retail trade and, more recently, to input dealing,
credit and the grain trade. The trading history described above is not exceptional for San
Mariano: of the ten entrepreneurs here who were involved in grain trade and moneylending
in 1996, nine used to have substantial interests in the local timber industry.
After the lowlands, migrant settlements in the uplands present the next expansion
opportunity for the lucrative moneylending and agribusiness sector. Those already involved
seek new investment opportunities for earmngs made in other activities; others have left behind
the wood industry and are looking for new opportunities for trade with upland communities.
Yet another category of new entrepreneurs invests directly in the mechanized conversion of
former ranches and idle grasslands into cornfields, purchasing farm machinery and hiring
labourers to manage the farm. For non-resident traders, such as the Argueza family, this last
option is less attractive; the main idea behind each change of businesses has been to make
short-term, quick-turnover local investments, and to use the returns on these investments in
other sectors of the economy, such as national or foreign real estate, stock, manufacturing, or
consumer goods. At the end of my interview with her, Liza took a piece of paper and, in a
quiet confidential voice, explained one part of the background of this business strategy:
"There are traders and financiers here, just like me, who do not stay here in San Mariano because
- I do not know ifyou believe m these things - U is our Chinese belief that the place where San
Mariano was built has no goodfortune. You can see that this place looksjust like a sink, a hole
in the earth, and therefore this place is not good for money to prosper. To make it prosper you
need to bring it out of here." (Grain trader m San Mariano, March 1996)
Needless to say, the investment strategy pursued by this family has turned their belief about
the lack of economie prospects in the town into a self-fulfilling prophecy. This family has
consistently limited lts economie stakes to rapid-turnover capital investments in the production
and extraction of timber and cash crops, instead of making long-term investments in land
improvement (such as irrigation and grassland rehabilitation) or the development of a local
processing industry. Returns on capital are mvested in the National Capitol Region, in foreign
enterprises, real estate and imported goods Interestingly, we saw earlier that a new trading
enterprise works exactly the other way around: capital earned elsewhere, e.g, in overseas
employment, is invested in the establishment of a local sari sari store, and eventually in the
business of buying and selling farm products An interesting difference between the small
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relay-trader just starting out (Box 9.4 ) and this well-established agribusiness in the lowlands
is that in the latter case, the owner is onJy a part-time local resident. By living in the National
Capitol Region, she has access to Information on lucrative and secure investment opportunities
there, enabling her to reverse the roles of the rural and urban investment base, extracting
capital from former to invest in the latter.
9.5 Credit as a risk-avoidance strategy
Having examined why traders accept, and even prefer the contractual delivery of a specified
erop as collateral in rural lending, the question remains why forest migrants enter into these
arrangements, which compel them to take the highest risks associated with credit and capital-
intensive agriculture.
The process of agricultural intensification has been explained, and critically examined,
from several perspectives. In her influential theory on 'the conditions of agricultural growth',
Boserup (1965) explains the adoption of new farm technologies from a perspective of
population numbers and land availability. Traditional long-fallow systems of shifting
cultivation combine high labour productivity with low productivity per unit of land area. Such
a land-use system is rational under conditions where land abundance and labour scarcity
combine. Field studies of traditional, long-fallow swidden agriculture in Southeast Asia
confïrm the high labour productivity of these systems compared to, say, permanent rice
fields'6, and emphasize the interwovenness of indigenous cultural elements and land-use
practices as characteristic of the resilience of these systems (Conklin 1957; Dove 1985;
Rappaport 1979). For this reason, Boserup argues, farmers resist intensification until
population pressure forces - and enables - them to adopt shorter fallow periods and,
eventually, permanent cropping techniques with a higher productivity per area unit, at the
expense of labour productivity. Thus it is population growth that makes intensification possible
and necessary. Before raising two other criticisms of the Boserup theory, I must first point
out that the low average population density of the Sierra Madre raises doubts about its
explanatory value for the dual processes of market incorporation and agricultural
intensification currently seen in the Sierra Madre.
Conelly argues that the losses in labour efficiency which in Boserup's view make farmers
hesitant to abandon shifting cultivation can be reduced, and even converted into gains, if this
transition includes the introduction of new technology, such as farm mechanization, high-
yielding varieties and agrochemicals (Conelly 1992:204). The use of hybrid seeds, fertilizers
and pesticides elevates the overall input-output balance, preventing soil exhaustion as a result
of more intensive cropping strategies. Though based on a more positive perspective, Conelly's
criticism echoes concerns about traditional slash-and-burn farming expressed by the above
mentioned scholars, to the effect that agricultural intensification runs the risk of distorting the
proven sustainability of the relationship between indigenous forest peoples and their
ecosystem.
A second criticism that has been raised concerning explanations of agrarian transition from
the perspective of people-to-land ratios is a lack of differentiation and contextualization. Dove
emphasizes the "futility oftrying to explain this development [agricultural intensification, GT]
as a pure exercise in agronomy. and the necessity of relating it to the broader ecological,
demographic and, especialfy, economie andpolitical context" (1985:33). In areas where forest
Dove found the returns on lahour of the shifting cultivation practiced by the kaniu pcople in Indonesia to hè
between 88% and 276% higher than thosc achieved m imgated agriculture (ibid :5.6.13. cited m Rotmensen 1988:4)
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migrants start to develop a notion of land scarcity, they do not respond to it uniformly, rather
each reorganizes his livelihood. and the role of agriculture in it, in a manner which hè
considers feasible in his own situation. Household composition and the availability of labour
plainly play an important role in this response, but so do factors such as the household's
sociopolitical network, its internal decision making structure, access to alternative livelihood
options, and personal attributes of the members of the household, such as health, cognitive
skills and personality (Eder 1984). The land-labour ratio alone does not suffïce as an
explanatory tooi for agricultural intensification.
Many forest migrants, and especially those in the most recent category of 'newcomers' (see
Section 4.3.2), resemble the subsistence-oriented peasants described extensively in the
political- economie school of thought on agrarian change in developing countries (Friedmann
1980; Hyden 1980; J.C.Scott 1976, 1985; Wolf 1969). Peasants rely mostly on household
labour for their farm production, prioritize their own land in the allocation of that labour and
follow a safety first approach of securing the household's own subsistence needs, especially
staple food, first. These characteristics hold true for recent forest migrants. After arriving in
the forest lands, these households must first secure their own food intake, using their own
labour, and giving priority to clearing and cultivating forest land that they perceive as theirs.
Peasants strive to maintain a certain degree of economie self-reliance, by limiting their
degree of incorporation into the national and international market economy (Eggink and Ubels,
1984:50-54). Hyden (1980) analyzed the strategies through which Tanzanian peasants
remained 'uncaptured', i.e., not fully dependent on monetary exchange for basic needs. In this
view, the continuous deterioration of the terms of trade between agricultural and non-
agricultural products is seen as an important rationale for this conscious avoidance of a full
integration of peasant production into commodity markets. To be able to buy the same amount
of non-agricultural commodities, peasants would either have to produce more and more of
their commodity, or adjust their labour and capital investments in their crops. The alternative
is to reduce consumption, which is tantamount to impoverishment Through this process,
called the simple commodity squeeze (Bernstein 1979:427), heavy reliance on the market is
perceived as an important cause of poverty, land degradation and, eventually, the displacement
of the poorest peasants - those with little land, labour or investment capital - to marginal lands
(Blaikie 1985). A vicious circle of economie marginality and exploitative environmental
management practices then evolves, accelerating soil degradation, erosion and, in relevant
areas, loss of forest cover:
"... socio-political and economie marginality produces eco-demographic marginality, i.e.,
marginal people are [...] quite lüerally pushed into marginal places" (Wisner 1976, in Blaikie
1985:125)
While forest migration to the Sierra Madre indeed appears to relate to economie
marginalization in the place of origin, particularly in the case of newcoming forest migrants,
this does not necessarily mean that these migrants consciously avoid being re-connected with
the market, or moneylenders. After an initial period of getting established inside the forest
lands, my findings rather suggests that they seek to re-integrate into the lowland -economy.
Aside from basic economie motives, such as the need to generale cash to buy consumer items
they cannot produce themselves, that tendency could also be understood in the perspective of
the Region's longstanding tradition of patronage and strategie submission, as described in
Chapters 6 and 7 Status and security are, in fact, sought through the maintenance of
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economie, political or social ties with rich and influential people17.
Better-off migrants, those with good bangkag lands, engage in the capital-intensive mode
of cash erop production, and in doing so, take on considerable loans. For this group, building
up a reliable channel for personal fmance and erop marketing contributes to economie
consolidation. Owners of a chainsaw or a carabao may switch to hybrid corn as a way of
sustaining their link to a personal financier in town, whom they used to supply with timber.
Some farmers enter into credit relations involuntarily, by force majeure: a financial setback
caused by illness or death in the family, a wedding or a baptism, or typhoon damage. For
those who lack financial buffers or collateral that could give access to cheaper loans with
formal lenders, seeking a personalized agreement with a moneylender in town is the only way
to solve such a crisis. This way of entering into more risky livelihood strategies was
recognized by James Scott:
"A critical assumption of the safety-first rule is that subsistence routines are producing satisfactory
results. What ifthey are not? Here the rationale af safety-first breaks down. To continue the same
routines means to go under m any case and it once again makes sense to take risks: such risks are
in the interest of subsistence. Peasants whose subsistence formulas are disintegrating due to
climate, land shortage or nsing rents do what they can to stay aflaat - this may include switching
to cash crops, taking on new debts and planting risky miracle rice..." (J. C. Scott 1976: 26)
In my view, therefore, the opening-up of an informal credit account and the choice of a new
erop that comes with it could also be interpreted as a redefmition, rather than as a breakdown
of the safety-first strategy. Farmers may well consider the increased risks involved in the
cultivation of hybrid grain to be an acceptable trade-off for the security of building up, or
maintaining, social security in the form of a stable relationship between the household and a
better-off trading family in the lowlands. With no access to formal sources of credit, becoming
a suki of an informal moneylender is a privilege.
The temporal distribution of income from various sources of livelihood also makes it
attractive for farmers to have a credit line. Since the main cropping season for hybrid corn is
the dry period between December and March (when the danger of erop decay due to moulds
and fungi is lower and access to the forest lands at the time of the harvest is assured), income
from corn production is enjoyed before the harvest. in the form of cash advances by the
moneylender to whom the farmer has committed his erop. This is favourable because during
this period swollen streams and slippery roads constrain the delivery of carabao logging
products to the market, and other options to earn cash are also hard to find. Thus the expected
income of the corn harvest is enjoyed during a period of relative economie hardship.
While better-off farmers and forest migrants tend to cultivate hybrid corn in their bangkag
fields in the capital-intensive marmer (Box 9.3), poor migrants residing in the proximity of
unclaimed residual forest land can plant corn on the uma, without the necessity to invest capital
'nputs (Box 9.2). These migrants may also have a small credit line with a local sari-sari store
or with another farmer who is better-off. The corn erop then becomes one way of repaying the
loan, in addition to providing labour on the farm of a fellow farmer-moneylender. Because of
the modest harvest to be expected from the production of corn without inputs, the amounts
A personal expcnence which illustrates how alive this cultural element still is in the contemporary Cagayan
Valley was when a colleaguc approachcd me with a request to lend him a significant amount of money tbr a two-day period
He explamed that his son was participatmg in a contest at his school The winner of the contest was the child who could
show the highest amount in cash that hè had heen ahle to mobilize from his family s social network Since all that was
necdcd was to hè ahle lo show the money. l was assured. my loan was going to hè returned to me the day after the contest.
which was clcarlv nol ahoul the childrcn's own qualifications. hut rather the net worth of lts patrons.
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involved in these credit deals are smaller, and paid labour often continues to be an important
mode of repaying these.
Having illustrated the importance that fanners and forest migrants attach to access to
informal credit, the question remains whether this mode of accommodating the credit needs
of poor, individual farmers and forest migrants enhances the stability of the livelihood of these
households. I would argue that for the majority it does not. First, the conditions under which
informal credit deals are made are unduly expensive for the borrowers, because of cartel
practices between traders in the same town (as we saw in the previous section). The
interlinking of markets for labour, crops and credit further reduces the farmer's freedom in
the marketplace, and the income hè is capable of realizing from each erop. A third aspect
concerns the challenge that access to credit poses to financial management capabilities within
the household. The common pattern is that men receive the payment for crops, forest products
and cash advances, while the women are directly responsible for the well-being of the
household. Women are the first to expenence the consequences of how the male head of the
household manages revenues and cash advances:
On our way to Musinga, Cesar and l rode on the roof of a weapons carrier, overloaded with
goods bought by the passengen in San Manano today. The atmosphere became morefestive as we
moved on. A woman bnnging boxes of Ginebra, cigarettes and snacks for her sari-sari store in
Del Pilar was domg a good business with the men sitting around us. Gin and cigarettes paid for
in cash were passed around among the men, who were cracking jokes and pressing us tojoin them.
By the time we arrived in Musinga, some of the men were so drunk they needed help tofind their
way back home. (Research diary, March 1996)
Alcohol abuse and gambling (such as cockfights and the jueteng number game) are common
among men in upland areas, exacerbating social and economie stress in households which are
often having trouble making ends meet. Probably daling back to the commercial logging days,
when teams of single males would spend weeks on end inside the forest lands, drinking sprees
continue to be one of the few sources of entertainment in upland settlements. In the only
survey conducted by CVPED students among forest migrants, alcohol and cigarettes accounted
for approximately 10%of overall expenses (Bakker 1995, see Section 4.8) While alcohol is
inexpensive (0.3 litre of San Miguel gin costs ten pesos), local brands of cigarettes cost 12
pesos a pack. These costs gain in perspective when compared with the 30-50 pesos to be
earned per day by doing paid farm labour in the uplands. A local mayor emphasized the
regular occurrence of drinking and gambling incidents in poor barangays as avenues for the
poor to temporarily escape from the daily struggle for survival:
"You look at the nch when they drink- they enjoy, they laugh, they crack jokes and boost about
their lives. For these poor people, dnnkmg is a 'one-day suïcide', just toforget their wornes for
a while, the faces ofthefamily they have tof eed" (Hon. Rodolfo T. Albano, in research diary,
June 1996)
But even for households not affected by excessive spending on alcohol and gambling, it is
difficult to refuse an immediate cash advance in exchange for the delivery of a future erop. A
family from a quiet forest barrio arriving in a busy public market, after a long and
uncomfortable ride through the hot grasslands of the western Sierra Madre, faces a world of
products beyond its reach. A colourful variety of utensils, garments, vegetables, canned fish
and fresh meat, snacks and soft drinks, music. advertisements and the bells of ice cream
vendors all cry out to their unfulfilled expectations about their own quality of life, and indeed
create new ones The prospect of enjoy ing some of these consumption items now, simply by
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accepting the invitation to "just sign here"18 is one of the strongest appeals of informal credit.
In essence, therefore, the initiative to establish an informal credit relationship - and the
cropping decision emanating from that relationship - seldom lies entirely with either the farmer
or the trader. In some cases, existing credit accounts develop into more comprehensive
production contracts, as a result of one of the above mentioned emergencies in the farmer's
household. In other cases, farmers actively seek credit in order to cultivate a new erop; this
helps them acquire the necessary capital inputs, or invest in farm mechanization. And finally,
traders also take the initiative, offering a package of consumptive and production-oriented
credit, in return for exclusive access to a specified product.
In Section 9.7, and in the conclusion of this chapter, I will return to the implications that
the credit-bound production of cash crops, in particular hybrid corn, is likely to have for future
land use and forest cover in the area. To that end, I will first present the actors' field that
synthesizes the actors, motivations, alternatives and structural factors that together lead to the
adoption of this particular livelihood option by forest migrants.
9.6 The actors' field of hybrid corn production in the Sierra Madre
The increasing role of upland farming in helping migrants to secure cash income is
fundamental to the development under study in this chapter. Forest migrants, under the terms
of stricter DENR restrictions on the extraction of forest products, rely to a greater degree on
farmlands for their income. There are few alternative options. Carabao logging is no longer
facilitated by the mechanized logging operations of timber concessionaires, and is therefore
confined to areas within the action radius of the carabao; moreover, it continues to be illegal
outside the community forestry project areas. Agricultural labour is poorly paid and is only
the choice of migrants who have a small credit account with the sari-sari store of a local
'pioneer' or 'follower' (see Section 4.3.2). Investments in agroforestry or tree crops are
unattractive due to the low level of tenurial security that migrants have over their farmlands.
The Certificate of Land Ownership Agreement (CLOA) issued by the Department of Agrarian
Reform does not apply to public lands, and the Certificate of Stewardship issued by the DENR
grants only a temporary security of tenure. The option of converting existing upland farms to
corn and opening up new forests for the production of cash crops requires relatively minor
investments and produces a quick cash income.
Fig. 9.2 shows a number of secondary actors who encourage migrants to opt for this mode
of agricultural change in the uplands. Catering to their need for cash and a stable credit and
marketing channel, traders and other informal moneylenders require the guaranteed delivery
of a specified cash erop in exchange for a loan. By opting for the erop collateral, informal
moneylenders ensure that they will be the first to be paid after the harvest. It also gives them
an approximate idea of the volume of grain that they can expect to have in their warehouse by
the end of the season, which makes it possible for them to enter into secured delivery contracts
with corporations which produce fertilizers and process corn into stockfeed.
Alternative business opportunities, such as the marketing of timber or other farm crops are
'ess attractive, the former because of the DENR restrictions on logging, the latter in view of
the limited demand and industrial processing capability in the region. For forest migrants,
accessibility is a precondition for external capital investment in the production of hybrid corn;
' "the traders have their extension men in the barrio. where the people can gel money ïou do not need collateral.
they wtllju.it teil vou to sign and then you can have 1.000 pesos Most often they only accept gram in payment" (Landowner
'n Isabela. in research diarv. March 1W6)
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Fig. 9.2 Action-in-Context explanation of hybrid corn production in the Sierra Madre
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traders need the assurance that the product can be transported soon after the harvest from the
farm to their warehouse, where it can be protected from decay due to moulds and rodents.
Government actors, including the DENR, also support the increasing production of hybrid
corn in the forest lands. The DENR must offer stewardship holders and other forest migrants
a livelihood option other than timber extraction, but lacks the expertise to deviate too far from
the conventional farming systems practised in the lowlands. The majority of bureaucrats and
field officials in the DENR were trained in forestry rather than agriculture, and the DENR
must rely on technical expertise from the Department of Agriculture for its extension material
on u p land farming, in which hybrid corn is recommended as the annual erop to be incorporated
into upland farming techniques.
The Department of Agriculture actively pursues a policy aimed at increasing the output of
commercial grains, as I showed in Section 5.3.1. The Department's Six-Year Medium-Term
Plan identifies rice, corn, livestock, poultry, coconut, sugar and fish as priority commodities
in agricultural development. The central role of hybrid corn in the department's agricultural
development drive could be seen at the annual agricultural fair, held during the same month
at the DA experimental station in Ilagan. Hybrid corn cobs had been draped around many of
the farm machines on display, several producers of certified seeds and agrochemicals had
displays, and DA officials were wearing jeans jackets distributed by one of these companies,
showing a yellow corn stalk surrounded by the logos of the DA and the sponsor.
In addition to these so-called 'integrators', companies producing fertilizer, stockfeed and
processed food, as well as banks and politicians also play a role in the increasing cultivation
of hybrid corn in the uplands. Formal banks find a welcome partner in the informal
moneylenders. Their greater level of social immersion and the possibility of setting up loans
which link consumptive and production-oriented components make informal moneylenders
more efficiënt managers of these small-scale credit accounts with small farmers than the banks
themselves. By lending informal moneylenders the capital they require for their credit
operations, these banks can participate in the business opportunities of commercial smallholder
farming without having to worry about labour-intensive borrower supervision or low recovery
rates. For politicians, a greater degree of economie development and the integration of the
uplands into lowland society are likewise attractive. First, because all politicians want
economie progress, and second, because in the patronage politics which is still in place in most
rural towns, moneylenders can serve as political bridgeheads to garner votes during election
time. Moneylending traders contribute to the election campaign of a politician who promises
to fund the rehabilitation of roads providing access to new business opportunities in the Sierra
Madre (see Section 6.4 and 6.5).
The final level of influence shown in fig. 9.2 is the Philippines' national consumer market.
The expansion of hybrid corn production to the forest lands is related to the increasing demand
for products derived from it: meat, eggs, snacks and fast-food products. Companies
Producing these commodities naturally respond to this demand. The bulk of products marketed
by the Philippine livestock industry are destined for the country's domestic consumer market.
The Philippines produces between 4.2 and 4.7 million tons of yellow corn every year, 80%
of which comes from the so-called SOCSARGEN area in southern Mindanao. comprising the
provinces of Sultan Kudarat. South Cotabato and Sarangani island. Cagayan Valley produces
less than 10% of this volume (NSO 1995: 374). The country is facing increasing shortages in
the local supply of yellow corn, leading to regular petitions, notably from representatives of
the livestock industry. to lift or reduce government import tariffs; on all volumes imported in
excess of the annual quota set by the Philippine government an import duty of 80% is levied,
compared to 35% to imports within the normal quote. Officially, these import restrictions
370 chapter 9
serve to protect corn-growers from price falls due to international competition. As a result of
falling production levels in the country's main corn-producing regions19, the livestock industry
repeatedly requested the Philippine government to be allowed additional imports of yellow
com to relieve shortages, which were projected to run between l and 2.7 million tons in 1997
(PNA 27/5/97). In a press release issued in September 1997, Agriculture Secretary Salvador
Escudero said that a decision by President Fidel Ramos was needed to allow the importation
of an additional20 300,000 metric tons of yellow corn (and 29,000 tons of frozen beef'; at the
minimal import tariff of 35 % "... in consideration of the need to ensure thatfeeds are available
to the livestock industry at affordable prices " The Secretary added that in 1996 and 1997, the
domestic use of beef and carabeef (carabao beef) for meat-processing had increased by 25.3%
and 41.2% respectively (PNA 11/9/97). Overall, the Philippine livestock industry, especially
the hog and poultry producers, were reported to be expanding at a rate of 10-15% per year
(PNA 11/5/97).
Two factors contribute to the strong demand for meat, poultry products and processed food
in the Philippines. One is population growth: although the rate is now somewhat slower, the
Philippine population is still increasing by more than 2% annually. At this rate the population
would reach 100 million by the year 2010. The second factor is consumption patterns: these
are related to the country's economie progress and corresponding changes in food preferences,
especially in the rapidly expanding urban areas. More protein-rich diets are becoming
affordable to more Filipinos, as wealth increases under the robust economie growth triggered
by Philippines 2000, which the Ramos admimstration hopes will turn the country into a tiger
economy by the year 2000.
I believe that an analysis of the role of population growth in the deforestation in the Sierra
Madre is incomplete unless these dimensions are taken into account. The previous chapter
demonstrated that forest migration to the Sierra Madre has been a predommantly intra-regional
process, which was not influenced by the higher population density and scarcity of farmland
in neighbounng regions. Fig. 9.2 shows that the strong demand for hybrid corn in Cagayan
Valley is directly related to the growth of the national population, in particular the growing
number of Filipinos who can afford a Western-style food consumption pattern. I will come
back to this point in my concluding remarks.
9.7 Implications for future forest cover in the Sierra Madre
The actors' field examined in the previous section shows two avenues by which the expansion
of hybrid corn-producing areas into the Sierra Madre takes place. One is the conversion of
grasslands and bangkag areas into cornfields, and the other the opemng-up of residual forest,
which has more direct implications for forest cover. From the point of view of protecting the
forest, the adoption of hybrid corn in bangkag farms in the uplands is less problematic, at least
in the short run. This is because migrant households cultivating bangkag lands are generally
better-off and therefore in a position to take the risk of borrowing inputs and cash in exchange
l,ow farm-gate pnces are nne reason behmd a shift to the production of hananas. pcanuts and silage among com-
growers m Mindanao I hè latter product, like livestock foddcr. generales a higher return on lahour. as it can hè harvested
earher. hefore the corn stalks have matured. and does not require the millmg and drying operations connected with gram
production
Earlier that year. 145 000 metric tons of yellow corn had already heen imported from China.
Between 1976 and mid-1993. beef imports were banned in the Philippines
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for a future corn erop. The adoption of hybrid corn is unlikely to cause displacement, or the
necessity to open up additional areas for supplementary income. From a soil-management
perspective, however, permanent corn production impairs the chemical or mechanical
properties of upland soils. The studies of Dros (1995) and Van der Veen (1996) referred to
above emphasize the low levels of mineral nutrients, especially nitrogen and phosphorus, and
organic matter in these soils, and the greater risk of acidifïcation. Analyses of bangkag soils
under permanent corn showed evidence of pH (H,O) levels around 4.0, a ruil point lower than
that of the most acidic uma (Dros 1995: 94). Siebert and Belsky (1985:288-291) also found
that acidity levels rose in former uma soils in Leyte, after they were subjected to intensive
annual production. The use of chemical fertilizers with sodium and ammonium compounds
does not solve the problem, but rather hastens this process, accelerating the deterioration of
soil structure and water-holding capacity (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 1981:66, cited
in ibid.). In comparison with upland rice, corn production probably reduces mechanical soil
erosion to some extent. During the erop establishment stage, weeds can be left to grow since,
unlike upland rice, its leaves and roots are large enough to compete effectively for light and
nutrients. After the harvest, soils become less exposed as farmers leave plant residues lying
on the land to allo w carabaos to graze there (Henkemans 1993: 43).
Owners of bangkag lands often cultivate uma land as well, either for the cultivation of food
crops or alternative cash crops like bananas (see Section 9.3). Once the bangkag farm is
devoted to the production of cash income, these farmers still have the option of expanding their
uma lands in order to retain a certain degree of self-sufficiency in food or diversity of cash
crops. As we saw in Chapter 4, pioneers and followers sometimes invite newly arriving
migrants to cultivate their bangkag lands under sharecropping agreements, while they open up
new uma lands themselves. Others hire special clearing teams, paying them in cash on a per-
hectare basis, to speed up the expansion of uma lands they can claim as theirs. The option of
using paid labour enables well-established migrants to accommodate a new erop by expanding
its holdings beyond its own labour limitations, until all convertible land in the vicinity of the
settlement has been occupied. For these households, too, devoting existing farmlands to a new
cash erop is likely to speed up forest clearing.
An indirect forest cover impact of the cultivation of hybrid corn in the capital-intensive
manner. under individual crop-for-credit contracts, is related to its role in stimulating forest
migration. In Chapter 8, we saw that the risks associated with the credit-driven cultivation of
hybrid corn by poor smallholders hasten socioeconomic differentiation, and tends to create a
class of marginal. impoverished and indebted farmers and landless cultivators. This mode of
agricultural intensification in the lowlands thus causes an additional migration push for those
who still have the courage, labour and means to start a new farm in the Sierra Madre. For
forest migrants without bangkag land, the production of hybrid corn is always connected with
forest clearing. This extensive mode of corn production has immediate negative consequences
for forest cover: the erop stimulates migrants to engage in more extensive fire-and-fallow
cycles, since this makes it possible to produce hybrid varieties without the use of fertilizer. If
forest migration gains momentum in the years to come, as I expect it to do on the basis of the
arguments presented in the previous chapter. the outright conversion into cornlands of residual
forests within the reach of accessible roads is likely to speed up forest loss.
Three case studies of Philippine upland communities who went through a successful
transition from slash-and-burn farming to agroforestry and irrigated agriculture indicate that
these groups took take these steps forward because land had become scarce or would no longer
support the annual crops they used to grow, or because law enforcement had been tightened
(Pujisaka and Wollenberg 1992; Conolly 1991; Eder 1979, 1981). To a varying degree, forest
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migrants in the Sierra Madre face similar trends, particularly those residing in older
settlements. Agricultural expansion and carabao logging no long offer very promising
alternatives for income losses suffered due to the end of most corporate logging activities in
the early 1990s. The common factor that enabled the upland communities in the studies cited
above to make the transition towards more sustainable land uses was the availability of local
capital, accumulated through logging activities. These funds were used to fmance investments
in the establishment of agroforestry farms and irrigated rice lands. This - in my view - critica!
prerequisite for the transition to an economically more stable livelihood is pre-empted by the
introduction of hybrid corn based on individual credit relations between uncapitalized forest
migrants and moneylenders in the lowlands. Uncertainties in yields and market prices,
combined with constraints on the household's internal financial management capability, delay
the accumulation of savings with which forest migrants could, either individually or
collectively, put converted forest lands to a more productive, diverse and sustainable use.
Unlike lowland farmers, migrants are in a position to respond to erop failures by planting
cash crops in newly cleared forest soils, or by offering their moneylender alternative products
(bananas, lumber, rattan) as a means of correcting a negative balance. Thus corn cultivation
is subsidized with natural resource capital, i.e., forest soil fertility and forest products. The
following section illustrates this on the basis of a recent community forestry project in Isabela.
A cooperative of four upland barangays sought to restructure an unrecovered corn production
loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines, using revenues from a community-based logging
operation.
9.8 Subsidizing corn production with logging revenue: the Miramar Cooperative22
Four upland barangays, with a total population of approximately 3000, are the participants in
the Miramar Cooperative. Until 1988, these barangays were bustling with economie activity:
logging companies set up their field offices, workshops, log ponds and sawmills here, near an
overflow bridge that connected many of the logging roads leading into the Sierra Madre with
the provincial capitol of Ilagan. As a spin-off of the corporate logging industry, many small-
scale enterprises had also developed here, including furniture shops, charcoal producers,
chainsaw repair shops, bars and restaurants. All these downstream economie opportunities
suffered as a result of the steady decline of logging after 1988. For those who remained, there
were few other economie options but to shift to farming. Soon bangkag lands that had not been
cultivated for many years were producing hybrid corn, and new uma lands were being carved
from the large area of logged-over and reforested lands near these barangays. In these new
farmlands, too, hybrid corn became the most important erop.
Until 1994, the production of hybrid corn was financed largely through individual deals
between local residents and private traders in the town of Ilagan, including Sunshine Agri-
Supply, a Chinese-owned agribusiness enterprise, and three other traders. After a period of
negotiations, the Land Bank agreed to enter into a production loan with these upland farmers.
This was an innovative step for the Bank, which normally operates in the lowlands, financing
the transfer of land titles from owners of landed estates to agrarian reform beneficiaries, as
well as a erop production credit line for these lowland farmers. Another novelty was the fact
that the loan was linked to erop collateral, a common practice in informal moneylending, but
Matenal on this case was gathered in March and April of 1996. through interviews with members of the
Cooperative (including its president), the head of the local branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines, and discussions with
consultants who had been involved in the formulation of the CFP project for Miramar
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unconventional in the formal sector. Through a "Deed of Assignment ofExpected Produce" the
Land Bank assured itself of being paid - in grain - before any other lender. For logistical as
well as economie reasons, the Bank preferred to enter into a collective lending agreement with
a large number of farmers. In 1994, when the first loan was granted, the Miramar cooperative
had 95 members from the four barangays, who together cultivated 113 ha of corn. The canvas
for a local agribusiness enterprise to supply the Cooperative with inputs was won by Sunshine
Agri-Supply. This supplier was paid for these inputs only after the cooperative had sent
confirmation to the Bank that all inputs had been received in good order. At the end of the
season, Sunshine sold the grain on behalf of the Bank.
The first loan granted by the Land Bank involved the sum of 923,000 pesos. The interest
rate was 12% per year plus a 2% supervisory fee, well below the 30% interest normally
charged on three-month loans by informal moneylenders. The first erop was a success, and
so a second production loan was issued, maturing in October 1995. Due to a drought, this erop
failed. The Bank only recovered 300,000 pesos of this loan, including a payment of 203,000
pesos by the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PIC), leaving the Cooperative with a
negative balance of almost 700,000 Pesos. This loan was restructured, to enable the farmers
to repay the amount from four harvests to be produced in the next two years. Nevertheless,
the local director of the Land Bank was sceptical about his chances of recovering the loan in
that marmer:
'They always pay back their largest debt first - the one with the highest interest rates, to the private
ti-aders. What these traders can offer, and we cannot, is this cash advancefor their daily needs, for
food and education. That is why the farmers always go there first and sell all that they have produced.
We are the last to be paid, even though our interest rates are much lower. But we continue to lend to
them, because that is our mandate. And now we are even going into a new activity, this community
forestry, to give them additional income ". (Director of the local branch of the Land Bank, April 1996)
In early 1996, the Miramar Cooperative approached the Land Bank with a request for another
loan, this time in the amount of 1.4 million pesos. This budget was intended as seed capital
for the implementation of a two-year 'pilot harvesting activity' in an area of 4,845 hectares of
grasslands, shrublands and residual forests, which used to be part of two corporate logging
concessions in their area. Their operations ceased here in 1988, and their licenses ended two
years later. Under a government-sponsored project, the Miramar barangays were awarded a
community-based forest management agreement (a 25-year license, renewable for another 25
years) for the community-based management and development of this area. An NGO from the
Bicol region assisted the community in developing a two-year Operations Plan which, after
approval by the DENR, would serve as the basis for timber extraction activities fmanced by
the Land Bank loan.
As in ordinary carabao-logging activities, which always start with a cash advance by the
buyer, this loan was also intended to finance the initial felling, slicing, hauling and milling of
the first trees. After these were sold, this pump-priming phase would be over and the
repayment of the loan could begin.. By March 1996, the Land Bank approved the loan in
principle, subject to DENR approval of the Operations Plan. The Cooperative requested
permission to extract 1800 m3 of timber from the CFMA area that year. No Land Bank official
had actually visited the forest area; the Bank relied on the DENR's assessment of the forest
stand, which was the basis for entering into the community forestry agreement; it would only
release the loan after the DENR had approved the operations plan. An independent senior
forestry consultant, who hiked the 25 kilometres between the dirt road connecting the four
cooperating barangays and the proposed cutting area said that the stand did not meet the
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expectations raised by the tables underlying the proposed operations plan:
" When you looked at the stand-stock tables, you got the impression that it was almost a virgin
forest, but I can teil you that is not what it is. The TLA may have stopped in 1988, but the
salabadiok and the furniture shops came to take their share too; there is not a single harvestable
Narra there. This is the problem of the DENR: if you do not supervise, your system goes
nowhere..." (Dr. Roberto Arano, pers.com, April 1996)
The directer of the Miramar cooperative was optimistic that the Land Bank would soon
approve the new forestry loan, but also criticized the strict regulations laid down by the
community forestry programme, which explicitly prohibits the use of bulldozers and trucks
in the extraction of timber from the community's forest concession. Under the CFP
programme, the DENR requires that all extraction and processing is done manually, using the
carabao and the two-man saw. The forestry consultant cited above stated that anyone who had
himself seen the hardship involved in this return to the pre-American era of timber-harvesting
would have to agree that it was tantamount to "subjecting our people to slavery". Thus at the
very start of this new approach, the DENR was already under strong pressure to ease these
restrictions and allow a certain degree of mechanization in the extraction, transportation and
milling of timber from CFP areas23.
Miramar was a special example of formal moneylending in more than one respect. It was
the first time that the Land Bank used the system of lending capital with no other collateral
than the guaranteed delivery of an agricultural erop. It was also the first time that the Land
Bank in Ilagan gave a loan to an upland community, and the first time that a conglomerate of
four barangays was granted an agricultural loan via a multi-purpose cooperative. In 1996, the
Miramar cooperative became the first cliënt of the Land Bank to successfully apply for forestry
a loan with the Land Bank. As exceptional as the case was in 1996, it may not be for much
longer.
The once isolated, unknown and inaccessible forest lands are gradually being integrated
into lowland society. This is apparent in the expansion of informal credit practices and
cropping strategies from the lowlands to the forest lands. More established migrant
communities, such as those in Miramar, use the residual resources of the logged-over forest
to cover the extra risks involved in this process. Additional land is cleared for erop production
without external inputs. Revenues from the extraction of natural forest products are used to
service an agricultural loan. This additional burden on the sustainable utilization of poorly
stocked residual forests managed by migrant communities increases pressure to relax the strict
regulations on extractable volume and mechanization. The economie feasibility of community
forestry projects is already constrained by these limitations and their time-consuming and
costly preparation phase (Seve 1996, see also Section 5.2.2). Hence, in forest settlements with
access to extractable or convertible forest areas - as determined by policies, social network,
distance, roads, mechanization, etc. - the introduction of hybrid corn via individual crop-for-
credit contracts is bound to cause even greater pressure to relax these limitations and thus to
speed up forest degradation and conversion.
In 1997. the community hired logging trucks and a bulldozer to extract its allowahle cut In lechmcal term.s. the
operation differed only in scale from the former mechamzed logging operations (Research diary. March 1998).
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9.9 Conclusions
Poverty, tenancy and irrecoverable loans surfaced in Chapters 4 and 8 as negative source
motives in forest migration. This chapter has presented the first indications that migrants are
again entering into similar combinations of cropping patterns and loans once they have settled
inside the forest lands. The system of erop collateral, which is commonly used in credit deals
between traders and asset-less farmers in the lowlands, is a suitable method of extending credit
to forest migrants who, like many farmers in the lowlands, do not own the lands they till.
Of the commodities produced by forest migrants, agricultural crops are gaining in
economie and environmental signifïcance in comparison with forest products. As accessible
forest products become scarcer, migrants seek to compensate declining forest income by
increasing farm income. Agriculture is no longer geared mainly to the production of food and
some supplemental cash, but is developing into the economie mainstay of forest migrants. In
exchange for access to a stable credit and marketing channel, migrants all or part of their
farmland to the production of hybrid corn, a pure cash erop that already dominates the
agricultural landscape in the lowlands. This method is problematic largely from the point of
view of soil maintenance, and may not lead directly to additional forest clearing. Losses due
to erop failure may, however, be solved through additional timber extraction or the preparation
of a new uma, where the next erop can be cultivated without investments in agrochemicals.
In the Sierra Madre roads which are accessible by truck during the harvesting months are a
precondition for the capital-intensive mode of hybrid corn production. Because hybrid corn
is highly perishable, moneylenders are not keen to finance its cultivation unless they are
reasonably sure that the erop can be transported to their warehouse soon after harvest.
Poorer, and often more recent migrants incorporate the erop into capital- and labour-
extensive uma farms. The uma mode of hybrid corn production involves smaller volumes of
corn, and correspondingly smaller loans, often obtained from fellow migrants who are better
off, or the owners of sari-sari stores in the uplands. These smaller moneylenders may serve
as relay stations for larger traders in the lowlands. This second method of adopting hybrid
corn in the uplands causes additional forest clearing, either directly, as a means of creating
space for the production of hybrid corn, or indirectly, in order to expand an existing farm and
plant other subsistence crops in addition to corn. Once nearby forests have been cleared for
farming, early migrants may sell their ublag land to newcomers, or leave them to fallow and
move deeper into the forest, repeating the export of natural biomass and soil fertility there.
Farmers choose the path to be followed in commercializing upland agriculture, but
government agencies and private enterprises in the lowlands likewise play an important role
in determining these choices. Government extension programs, particularly those of the
Department of Agriculture and the DENR, promote the adoption of hybrid varieties in the
lowlands, and in the Sierra Madre, in order to achieve higher production and alleviate poverty
among small farmers. Local government units also influence the migrant's land use decisions,
by the way they maintain logging roads, facilitating the transportation of people and
commodities between lowland markets and the first service centres developing inside the forest
lands .By making the secured delivery of a specified erop a condition for a loan, informal
moneylenders also influence the land use decisions of forest migrants. In the past, land
ownership was the basis for large-scale production on haciendas. In recent times, credit now
serves as a powerful means of securing the production of large erop volumes by small-holders.
As the food processing industry responds to the changing consumption needs of a growing
urban population, the demand for hybrid corn continues to expand.
Opportunities to expand the trading volume of commercial grains are tightening; most rain-
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fed cornlands are already producing hybrid corn, and converting pasture lands into agricultural
lands requires considerable investments in land improvement and supervision. The accessible
farmlands and residual forests left behind by the logging industry offer a cost-effective
alternative. By contracting growers in the uplands, additional volume can be produced with
little more in the way of investment than rapid-turnover capital and inputs. With the risk and
economie cost of price and quality fluctuations fully in the hands of growers, these are
lucrative investments for traders and others in the business of storage and transportation, who
have the option to store the erop in their warehouses until prices recover from their post-
harvest slump.
The high cost of external credit constrains the accumulation of savings by the primary
producers themselves, either individually or collectively. As a result, a erop failure or some
personal adversity may trigger a vicious circle of increased credit exposure, corresponding
debt service payments, marginal returns on labour for erop producers, little opportunity to
save, increased reliance on informal moneylenders and so on. Farmers and forest migrants
dropping out of this spiral have few alternatives but to start a new farm inside, or deeper
inside, the forest lands of the Sierra Madre. In my view, therefore, capital formation at the
level of the primary producers is absolutely essential for this trend to be reversed and for other
measures aimed at a transition to bear fruit. This could take shape in various ways, such as a
local savings and credit cooperative, smaller credit groups or individual agreements. Local
investment capital will be necessary for the following reasons:
1) Returns on invested capital, which now flow out of the area into other sectors of the
economy, can be earned locally and re-invested in local productivity-enhancing measures,
mechanization, storage and processing facilities, and the like.
2) Farmers retain a greater degree of freedom as regards land use, erop choice, and the
selection of a marketing channel. This, in turn, enables them to benefit from competition
between traders, and to sell their product to the highest bidder.
3) This will lead to greater crisis resilience. If small farmers lack savings or assets of their
own, a personal setback or erop failure will almost inevitably compel them to enter into
expensive loans under the conditions described in this chapter. Although this aspect of
rural lending is a highly sensitive one in a context where poverty represents an almost
continuous emergency, local savings and investment facilities can - if carefully organized
- be used for this purpose.
Local capital accumulation is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a more sustainable
agricultural development course in the uplands to come about. Other measures, including the
reorientation of government extension programmes towards upland agriculture, stemming the
inflow of new forest migrants, and greater tenurial security are also needed to achieve a more
stable route towards the intensification of land use in upland areas. However, if farmers and
forest migrants can build up assets of their own, the impact of these measures will be greatly
enhanced. The experience with agrarian reform in the lowlands shows what happens if a
tenurial policy is not accompanied by simultaneous efforts in the area of rural credit, to enable
smallholders to retain their title. Both government actors and private enterprise, notably
traders and agribusiness operators, have a role to play in bringing this transition about.
By itself, a shift from forest product extraction and shifting cultivation to permanent and
market-oriented farming can slow down deforestation. Alternative modes of intensification
have been tried, both in Cagayan Valley and elsewhere in the world (National Research
Council 1993; Reijntjes et al. 1992; Savenije & Huijsman 1992). The range of alternatives
includes various combinations of erop, tree and animal production which conserve soil and
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water, enable farmers to maintam and improve land productivity using organic material, and
minimize the need for agrochemicals or other external capital inputs. Such alteraative
intensification paths may be expected to perform better, in both economie and environmental
terms, but they require investments in labour and capital that are often beyond the ability of
individual households to provide, especially in the early years (CVPED Team IV, 1994).
Much can be learned from courageous and creative local initiatives such as the Forest Farm
approach of the Kalahan Educational Foundation in Imugan, Cagayan Valley; Bio-Organic
Demonstration Farm and Training Centre of PA YOGA Kapatagan in Gamu, Isabela; and
similar experiences elsewhere, including the Sloping Agricultural Land Technology by the
Mindanao Baptist Rural Life Centre (CVPED 1992; Rice 1994; Henkemans 1994). All these
initiatives have been strongly market-oriented, entrepreneurial activities. In an early phase of
its development, the Kalahan, an indigenous forest people, starled the production of jams and
jellies made of fniits gathered from its forest reserves. One major aim of that development was
to become less dependent on logging and on external sources of cash income. PA YOGA was
not endowed with the Kalahan Foundation's asset of a 14,000-ha residual forest resource base,
but rehabilitated seven hectares of degraded pasture lands into highly productive bio-organic
farmland.
Initiated in 1986 as a group of socially concerned PArish YOuth of GAmu (later, the
acronym was re-interpreted into the more independent Parents and Youth of Gamu), and
assisted by a Belgian couple until 1994, PAYOGA was originally an awareness-building
exercise, in which concerned citizens discussed the causes of poverty and ways of increasing
self-reliance and income. Between 1991 and 1998, the cooperative built two demonstration
farms and training centres for low-external-input and sustainable agriculture. The programme
included the establishment of a simple manufacturing component, designed to lower the use
of expensive and ecologically unsustainable agrochemicals. A simple facility was built for the
production of bio-organic fertilizer based on erop residuals collected from nearby farms. By
combining mis with a carefully organized cooperative credit system24, members of this
cooperative were enabled to reduce their degree of reliance on external inputs and credit,
enabling them to become more independent managers of the production process on their farm.
By the mid-1990s PAYOGA had developed into a training centre for bio-organic farming.
In both the cases of KEF and PAYOGA the transition towards investment-based,
sustainable livelihoods made upland agriculture more dynamic and market-sensitive. Farms
were transformed by multi-functional and integrative land uses, combining high-value annual
cash crops, such as vegetables, fruits and ornamental flowers with trees for timber and
firewood, fish ponds and livestock. This is in stark contrast to the course of development
described in this chapter, which is characterized by a high degree of individuality, short-term
investments of external capital in erop production, a high degree of erop- and market-related
uncertainty and a tendency towards mono-cropping. These positive experiences show that the
local build-up of investment capital, the collective promotion of common interests, and
accepted leadership are essential elements for a transition towards a more intensive, sustainable
Access to credit is limited to members of the cooperative Before becoming a member. one participates in a series
of 6 pre-membership training sessions. dealing with the purpose and activities of the orgamzation To be able to borrow the
maximum amount of 5,0{X) pesos from the cooperative's credit facility. a farmer buys 1.000 pesos' worth of shares. forming
a team with three other members. If the loan is not repaid withm three months after it expires. the l .000 pesos is forfeited.
and the three others are obliged to pay the remamder of the loan Until they have done so, they cannot take out any other
loans from the cooperative This mechamsm of social control is replicated at the team level. by setting up credit clusters
consisting of 4 teams each. Thus. each team also monitors the recovery rates of three others as well (pers com- Gina Ruiz,
PAYOGA. March 1996)
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expectations raised by the tables underlying the proposed operations plan:
" When you looked at the stand-stock tables, you got the impression that it was almost a virgin
forest, but l can teil you that is nol what it is. The TLA may have stopped in 1988, but the
salabadiok and thefumiture shops came to take their share too; there is not a single harvestable
Narra there. This is the problem of the DENR: if you do not supervise, your system goes
nowhere..." (Dr. Roberto Arano, pers.com, April 1996)
The directer of the Miramar cooperative was optimistic that the Land Bank would soon
approve the new forestry loan, but also criticized the strict regulations laid down by the
community forestry programme, which explicitly prohibits the use of bulldozers and trucks
in the extraction of timber from the community's forest concession. Under the CFP
programme, the DENR requires that all extraction and processing is done manually, using the
carabao and the two-man saw. The forestry consultant cited above stated that anyone who had
himself seen the hardship involved in this return to the pre-American era of timber-harvesting
would have to agree that it was tantamount to "subjecting our people to slavery". Thus at the
very start of this new approach, the DENR was already under strong pressure to ease these
restrictions and allow a certain degree of mechanization in the extraction, transportation and
milling of timber from CFP areas23.
Miramar was a special example of formal moneylending in more than one respect. It was
the first time that the Land Bank used the system of lending capital with no other collateral
than the guaranteed delivery of an agricultural erop. It was also the first time that the Land
Bank in Ilagan gave a loan to an upland community, and the first time that a conglomerate of
four barangays was granted an agricultural loan via a multi-purpose cooperative. In 1996, the
Miramar cooperative became the first cliënt of the Land Bank to successfully apply for forestry
a loan with the Land Bank. As exceptional as the case was in 1996, it may not be for much
longer.
The once isolated, unknown and inaccessible forest lands are gradually being integrated
into lowland society. This is apparent in the expansion of informal credit practices and
cropping strategies from the lowlands to the forest lands. More established migrant
communities, such as those in Miramar, use the residual resources of the logged-over forest
to cover the extra risks involved in this process. Additional land is cleared for erop production
without external inputs. Revenues from the extraction of natural forest products are used to
service an agricultural loan. This additional burden on the sustainable utilization of poorly
stocked residual forests managed by migrant communities increases pressure to relax the strict
regulations on extractable volume and mechanization. The economie feasibility of community
forestry projects is already constrained by these limitations and their time-consuming and
costly preparation phase (Seve 1996, see also Section 5.2.2). Hence, in forest settlements with
access to extractable or convertible forest areas - as determined by policies, social network,
distance, roads, mechanization, etc. - the introduction of hybrid corn via individual crop-for-
credit contracts is bound to cause even greater pressure to relax these limitations and thus to
speed up forest degradation and conversion.
In 1997. the community hired logging trucks and a bulldozer to extract its allowable cut. In technical terms, the
operation differed only m scale from the former mechanized logging operations (Research diary. March 1998).
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9.9 Conclusions
Poverty, tenancy and irrecoverable loans surfaced in Chapters 4 and 8 as negative source
motives in forest migration. This chapter has presented the first indications that migrants are
again entering into similar combinations of cropping patterns and loans once they have settled
inside the forest lands. The system of erop collateral, which is commonly used in credit deals
between traders and asset-less farmers in the lowlands, is a suitable method of extending credit
to forest migrants who, like many farmers in the lowlands, do not own the lands they till.
Of the commodities produced by forest migrants, agricultural crops are gaining in
economie and environmental significance in comparison with forest products. As accessible
forest products become scarcer, migrants seek to compensate declining forest income by
increasing farm income. Agriculture is no longer geared mainly to the production of food and
some supplemental cash, but is developing into the economie mainstay of forest migrants. In
exchange for access to a stable credit and marketing channel, migrants all or part of their
farmland to the production of hybrid corn, a pure cash erop that already dominates the
agricultural landscape in the lowlands. This method is problematic largely from the point of
view of soil maintenance, and may not lead directly to additional forest clearing. Losses due
to erop failure may, however, be solved through additional timber extraction or the preparation
of a new uma, where the next erop can be cultivated without investments in agrochemicals.
In the Sierra Madre roads which are accessible by truck during the harvesting months are a
precondition for the capital-intensive mode of hybrid corn production. Because hybrid corn
is highly perishable, moneylenders are not keen to finance its cultivation unless they are
reasonably sure that the erop can be transported to their warehouse soon after harvest.
Poorer, and often more recent migrants incorporate the erop into capital- and labour-
extensive uma farms. The uma mode of hybrid corn production involves smaller volumes of
corn, and correspondingly smaller loans, often obtained from fellow migrants who are better
off, or the owners of sari-sari stores in the uplands. These smaller moneylenders may serve
as relay stations for larger traders in the lowlands. This second method of adopting hybrid
corn in the uplands causes additional forest clearing, either directly, as a means of creating
space for the production of hybrid corn, or indirectly, in order to expand an existing farm and
plant other subsistence crops in addition to corn. Once nearby forests have been cleared for
farming, early migrants may sell their ublag land to newcomers, or leave them to fallow and
move deeper into the forest, repeating the export of natural biomass and soil fertility there.
Farmers choose the path to be followed in commercializing upland agriculture, but
government agencies and private enterprises in the lowlands likewise play an important role
in determining these choices. Government extension programs, particularly those of the
Department of Agriculture and the DENR, promote the adoption of hybrid varieties in the
lowlands, and in the Sierra Madre, in order to achieve higher production and alleviate poverty
among small farmers. Local government units also influence the migrant's land use decisions,
by the way they maintain logging roads, facilitating the transportation of people and
commodities between lowland markets and the first service centres developing inside the forest
lands .By making the secured delivery of a specified erop a condition for a loan, informal
moneylenders also influence the land use decisions of forest migrants. In the past, land
ownership was the basis for large-scale production on haciendas. In recent times, credit now
serves as a powerful means of securing the production of large erop volumes by small-holders.
As the food processing industry responds to the changing consumption needs of a growing
urban population, the demand for hybrid corn continues to expand.
Opportunities to expand the trading volume of commercial grains are tightening; most rain-
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fed cornlands are already producing hybrid corn, and converting pasture lands into agricultural
lands requires considerable investments in land improvement and supervision. The accessible
farmlands and residual forests left behind by the logging industry offer a cost-effective
alternative. By contracting growers in the uplands, additional volume can be produced with
little more in the way of investment than rapid-turnover capital and inputs. With the risk and
economie cost of price and quality fluctuations fully in the hands of growers, these are
lucrative investments for traders and others in the business of storage and transportation, who
have the option to store the erop in their warehouses until prices recover from their post-
harvest slump.
The high cost of external credit constrains the accumulation of savings by the primary
producers themselves, either individually or collectively. As a result, a erop failure or some
personal adversity may trigger a vicious circle of increased credit exposure, corresponding
debt service payments, marginal returns on labour for erop producers, little opportunity to
save, increased reliance on informal moneylenders and so on. Farmers and forest migrants
dropping out of this spiral have few alternatives but to start a new farm inside, or deeper
inside, the forest lands of the Sierra Madre. In my view, therefore, capital formation at the
level of the primary producers is absolutely essential for this trend to be reversed and for other
measures aimed at a transition to bear fruit. This could take shape in various ways, such as a
local savings and credit cooperative, smaller credit groups or individual agreements. Local
investment capital will be necessary for the following reasons:
1) Returns on invested capital, which now flow out of the area into other sectors of the
economy, can be earned locally and re-invested in local productivity-enhancing measures,
mechanization, storage and processing facilities, and the like.
2) Farmers retain a greater degree of freedom as regards land use, erop choice, and the
selection of a marketing channel. This, in turn, enables them to benefit from competition
between traders, and to sell their product to the highest bidder.
3) This will lead to greater crisis resilience. If small farmers lack savings or assets of their
own, a personal setback or erop failure will almost inevitably compel them to enter into
expensive loans under the conditions described in this chapter. Although this aspect of
rural lending is a highly sensitive one in a context where poverty represents an almost
continuous emergency, local savings and investment facilities can - if carefully organized
- be used for this purpose.
Local capital accumulation is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a more sustainable
agricultural development course in the uplands to come about. Other measures, including the
reorientation of government extension programmes towards upland agriculture, stemming the
inflow of new forest migrants, and greater tenurial security are also needed to achieve a more
stable route towards the intensification of land use in upland areas. However, if farmers and
forest migrants can build up assets of their own, the impact of these measures will be greatly
enhanced. The experience with agrarian reform in the lowlands shows what happens if a
tenurial policy is not accompanied by simultaneous efforts in the area of rural credit, to enable
smallholders to retain their title. Both government actors and private enterprise, notably
traders and agribusiness operators, have a role to play in bringing this transition about.
By itself, a shift from forest product extraction and shifting cultivation to permanent and
market-oriented farming can slow down deforestation. Alternative modes of intensification
have been tried, both in Cagayan Valley and elsewhere in the world (National Research
Council 1993; Reijntjes et al. 1992; Savenije & Huijsman 1992). The range of alternatives
includes various combinations of erop, tree and animal production which conserve soil and
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water, enable farmers to maintain and improve land productivity using organic material, and
minimize the need for agrochemicals or other external capital inputs. Such alternative
intensification paths may be expected to perform better, in both economie and environmental
terms, but they require investments in labour and capital that are often beyond the ability of
individual households to provide, especially in the early years (CVPED Team IV, 1994).
Much can be learned from courageous and creative local initiatives such as the Forest Farm
approach of the Kalahan Educational Foundation in Imugan, Cagayan Valley; Bio-Organic
Demonstration Farm and Training Centre of PA YOGA Kapatagan in Gamu, Isabela; and
similar experiences elsewhere, including the Sloping Agricultural Land Technology by the
Mindanao Baptist Rural Life Centre (CVPED 1992; Rice 1994; Henkemans 1994). All these
initiatives have been strongly market-oriented, entrepreneurial activities. In an early phase of
its development, the Kalahan, an indigenous forest people, starled the production of jams and
jellies made of fruits gathered from its forest reserves. One major aim of that development was
to become less dependent on logging and on external sources of cash income. PA YOGA was
not endowed with the Kalahan Foundation's asset of a 14,000-ha residual forest resource base,
but rehabilitated seven hectares of degraded pasture lands into highly productive bio-organic
farmland.
Initiated in 1986 as a group of socially concerned PArish YOuth of GAmu (later, the
acronym was re-interpreted into the more independent Parents and Youth of Gamu), and
assisted by a Belgian couple until 1994, PAYOGA was originally an awareness-building
exercise, in which concerned citizens discussed the causes of poverty and ways of increasing
self-reliance and income. Between 1991 and 1998, the cooperative built two demonstration
farms and training centres for low-external-input and sustainable agriculture. The programme
included the establishment of a simple manufacturing component, designed to lower the use
of expensive and ecologically unsustainable agrochemicals. A simple facility was built for the
production of bio-organic fertilizer based on erop residuals collected from nearby farms. By
combining this with a carefully organized cooperative credit system24, members of this
cooperative were enabled to reduce their degree of reliance on external inputs and credit,
enabling them to become more independent managers of the production process on their farm.
By the mid-1990s PAYOGA had developed into a training centre for bio-organic farming.
In both the cases of KEF and PAYOGA the transition towards investment-based,
sustainable livelihoods made upland agriculture more dynamic and market-sensitive. Farms
were transformed by multi-functional and integrative land uses, combining high-value annual
cash crops, such as vegetables, fruits and ornamental flowers with trees for timber and
firewood, fish ponds and livestock. This is in stark contrast to the course of development
described in this chapter, which is characterized by a high degree of individuality, short-term
investments of external capital in erop production, a high degree of erop- and market-related
uncertainty and a tendency towards mono-cropping. These positive experiences show that the
local build-up of investment capital, the collective promotion of common interests, and
accepted leadership are essential elements for a transition towards a more intensive, sustainable
Access to credit is limited to members of the cooperative Before becommg a member, one participates in a series
of 6 pre-membership training sessions. dealing with the purpose and activities of the organization. To be able to borrow the
maximum amount of 5.000 pesos from the cooperative's credit facility. a farmer buys 1,000 pesos' worth of shares. formmg
a team with three other members. If the loan is not repaid withm three months after it expires. the 1.000 pesos is forfeited.
and the three others are obliged to pay the remamder of the loan Until they have done so, they cannot take out any other
'oans from the cooperative This mechanism of social control is replicated at the team leve), by setting up credit clusters
consisting of 4 teams each. Thus. each team also monitors the recovery rates of three others as well (pers com.. Gina Ruiz.
PAYOGA. Maren 1996).
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and economically rewarding mode of upland farming. Complementary to the need for
investments aimed at mobilizing local potential in this direction are policies to solve the
problems which continue to cause an inflow of poor migrants into the Sierra Madre.
At the other end of the economie spectrum, there is the growing domestic demand for
processed foods, and livestock products derived from cora, which links the deforestation of
the Sierra Madre to the growing and increasingly prosperous Philippine population. Unless the
recent economie turmoil in Asia will prove more than a temporary re-adjustment, this trend
is likely to be continue in the near future. Urbanization and increasing per capita income are
developments associated with the economie progress for which the country had so long been
striving, and which was fmally achieved during the 1990s. The macro-level options which
remain are population policy, more effective measures to increase the productivity of existing
farmlands, and a campaign to raise awareness about the environmental impact of changes in
lifestyle. The latter measure is an appeal that Western observers such as myself have no right
to make in view of the current disparities in wealth and resource utilization between citizens
in the developing and the industrialized world. If the Philippines' poor farming population had
a greater share in the increased consumer spending on food, they would be able to shoulder
more of the collective responsibility to protect the Sierra Madre, and keep it from being




Tropical deforestation is generally regarded as the result of two often sequential activities: the
opening-up of forest areas for the extraction of timber and minerals, and the conversion of forests
into other land uses. The first step in this process is often tolerated, if not actively promoted, by
the governments of countries in which these forests lie. The hard currency generaled by the
corporate extraction and processing of natural resources provides them with the means to
improve infrastructure and public services, or to pay off debt. Once there are roads leading into
large forest areas, company workers, landless migrants, land speculators and other outsiders
follow the logging companies into the forest, to collect other forest commodities and eventually
to clear degraded forest vegetation for slash-and-bum farming or ranching. Poverty, population
growth, and detrimental govemment policies are generally seen as the root causes of the fmal
phase in the deforestation process. Many studies on tropical deforestation have tended to focus
on this last phase, partly because it is here that the forest is irreversibly replaced by another land
use. However, the insights gained in this case study point to a staggered deforestation process,
one that starts with the extraction of various forest products and ends with conversion into
permanent farmlands or grasslands. By explaining deforestation from the perspective of
changing relations between the forest lands and lowland society, I have attempted to arrive at a
more refined understanding of that process.
One modification of the existing general deforestation theory is that - contrary to the common
view of selective logging as an activity that does not directly result in loss of forest cover -
corporate timber concessions have significantly reduced the aggregate tree crown cover in the
Sierra Madre. Between 1950 and 1990, when logging corporations had virtually exclusive access
to the region, the share of old-growth forests and forests with more than 80% tree crown cover
in the overall forest area declined from 35% to 14%. The share of low-density forests (i.e., with
10-60% crown cover) increased from 20% to 40%. The category with a 60-80% crown cover
remained more or less stable at 25-30%, but these were encroaching upon areas that used to be
covered with high-density forest. Only about 5% of the 750,000 hectares of forest analyzed in
the aerial photograph interpretations were cleared during this same period (1950-1990), which
is an indication of the limited number of forest migrants who entered the Sierra Madre prior to
1990. The aim of selective logging, i.e., to turn old-growth dipterocarp forest into a production
forest by improving the structure of the timber stand and protecting logged-over forest from
further extraction in the course of the 30-year cutting cycle, was not achieved in the majority of
forest concessions, least of all in those on the western slopes.
Selective logging only works if the residual stand is carefully managed after the first cut and
protected from premature additional cuts. The primary responsibility for failing forest protection
lies with those who held Timber Licensing Agreements in extensive areas of the Sierra Madre.
However, it was the responsibility of the Government, more specifically the Bureau of Forest
Development and later the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to verify that
licensees were abiding by the relevant forest regulations, and to impose sanctions on those who
were not. Thus one major cause of deforestation during the corporate logging period was
ineffective government supervision, specifically by the departments mentioned above. Before
elaborating further on that aspect, I take a brief look at the influence of roads against this
background of weak governance.
380 chapter 10
The forests on the nearly inaccessible Pacific slopes are in far better condition than those on the
western slopes of the Sierra Madre, where timber licensees, their contractors and illegal logging
operations have created a dense network of dirt roads. There were large timber concessions on
the Pacific slopes as well, and a small population which had settled in the vicinity of those
concessions. Government supervision, which had already proved ineffective on the western
slopes, was even less successful in the remote Pacific forests, and this is often used as an
argument in favour of opening roads across the Sierra Madre. However, the sole factor
responsible for these differences in forest cover is access. The vast majority of the local
population live in the lowlands of Cagayan Valley, and enter the Sierra Madre from the west.
During the decades of corporate logging, the majority of those entering the forest were engaged
in the premature re-logging of residual forests, as reflected in the higher degradation rates on the
western slopes. One can only conclude that, in a context where governments define natural
forests as public property - as was the case for 80% of the world's closed-canopy tropical moist
forests in 1980 - roads place greater demands on the effectiveness of government measures to
deal with extemal and internal pressures to put these resources to immediate economie use.
Where those measures are not effective - as in Cagayan Valley between 1950 and 1990 - roads
promote deforestation. But there is more to be said about the involvement of roads. Access to
markets may be an important reason for forest migrants to invest in more sustainable land uses,
once their communities have become better informed, entitled and organized to manage forest
lands and resources. Although there have been isolated investments in rice terraces, agroforestry
and tree plantations inside the Sierra Madre, specific studies will be needed to ascertain the
precise influence of the proximity and quality of access routes on such investments.
Historical factors, the result of nearly four centuries of Spanish and American rule, are at the
heart of the problematic role of successive governments in the management of the country's once
extensive forests. One colonial legacy is the public ownership of all unclassified lands, classified
forest lands and other untitled lands and natural resources. This principle, of Spanish origin,
legally reinforced by the American colonial administration at the beginning of this century, and
reconfirmed by the 1987 Constitution, dispossessed indigenous forest people of lands they
regarded as their ancestral domain. At the same time, the national government lacked the
expertise and the mechanisms to back up its exclusive claim to the twenty million hectares of
natural forest then present in the archipelago. With local people not entitled to protect their
forests, and the national government ill-equipped to do so in their place, public forests came to
be perceived as free commodities, to be appropriated on a first-come, first-served basis.
A second historical legacy, the policy by which parts of the public domain were temporarily
entrusted to private timber licensees, accentuated the discrepancy between government claims
and government capabilities when it came to forest management. Widespread violations of the
terms of these licenses took place without any serious risk of detection, let alone a reprimand by
the understaffed and underfunded forest agency charged with monitoring private access to the
public domain. The American initiative to stimulate private investments by setting up a
mechanized, large-scale logging industry made additional demands on the mechanism of
government supervision. By setting up a school of forestry at the University of the Philippines,
the United States introduced the country to the principles of scientific forest development, trained
local professionals to put them into practice, and provided successive government
administrations with a scientific justification for a logging boom that it had lost control of.
Corporate logging reached its peak in the post-war years, and finally collapsed after the end of
the Marcos administration in 1986. By the time logging was banned in all old-growth forests in
1992, only 3% of the Philippines' original forest cover had not yet been logged.
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The policy of the United States administration to model the new elective bodies of the
Philippines after those of its own democracy did nothing to increase the feasibility of its earlier
decision to create a 'national forest patrimony'. The choice of a system of representation by
district meant that laws defming private access to public forests were developed by a national
legislature with a predominantly provincial composition and orientation. In the rural areas where
forests are found, such as Cagayan Valley, patronage and brokerage services continue to be a
source of political legitimacy for members of the House of Representatives, provincial governors
and town mayors. These politicians may be appealed to by anyone, rich or poor, whose interests
are affected by a policy or a law. A politicians who fails to build temporary alliances at the
national level, in order to block the passage of laws detrimental to his constituents back home,
still has the option of intervening in the implementation of those laws by national Line Agencies,
such as the DENR. Local DENR officials, whose task it is to protect national forests from
unsustainable use, often find an elected official blocking their path.
To avoid confrontation, local bureaucrats and field officials seek to implement policies in
such a way that an impression of compliance is created, while at the same time extemal requests
for a flexible interpretation of policies can be accommodated. All the members of these informal
mutual accommodation networks share in the benefits derived from extractive activities which
exceed the legal limits. In addition to financial incentives, the benefits of participation include
career prospects and a measure of immunity from administrative sanctions. By the same token,
an appointed official who declines to cooperate must not only withstand the lure of these
incentives, but will have to face the possibility of administrative and even physical harassment.
The lack of political independence of the Bureau of Forestry and its post-Marcos successor, the
DENR, is rooted in the hold which an originally provincial elite continues to have on the power
and resources of the state. As part of the same strategy of protecting local forest users against
national legislative restrictions, members of the House of Representatives allocated to the DENR
resources which were sufficient to maintain the image of a nation with strict environmental
policies, but too small to permit it to effectively enforce those policies in their respective
constituencies.
In spite of the absence of effective protection, and the dense network of logging roads
providing access to the western slopes of the Sierra Madre, up until the late eighties the second
phase of the deforestation process, i.e.. the conversion of residual forests by land-seeking
migrants, took place on only a minor scale. At that time fewer than 150,000 people, or 5% of the
population of the region, were estimated to reside inside the Sierra Madre, a fact which may have
had to do with the presence of unoccupied agricultural land adjacent to the floodplains of the
Cagayan River. In the period 1960-1990, when corporate logging in Cagayan Valley was going
through its boom/bust cycle, there was also a significant increase in the amount of land devoted
to agriculture. The development of new farmlands was the work of people from the region itself.
By the time the Maharlika Highway was constructed in the early seventies, there were more
people leaving the region than entering it, despite marked differences in population density
between this area and the neighbouring Ilokos and Central Luzon regions. In any case, the
number of immigrants was insignificant in comparison with the region's natural population
increment. In other words, after 1970 forest migration was not the result of a 'population spill'
from highly populated neighbouring provinces to the less densely populated Cagayan Valley.
Rather, the Cordillera mountains and the lowlands of Cagayan Valley have remained the two
most important source areas of forest migrants in the Sierra Madre.
The relatively minor flow of forest migrants entering the Sierra Madre before 1990 cannot
be fully explained by the relatively low population density in these source areas. Given the
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region's low urbanization rate and the uneven spatial distribution of its population, the
availability of farmland is in the same order of magnitude as the national average, around 0.3
hectares per capita. One factor which helps to explain the relatively low number of people
venturing into the forest lands up until 1990 is the longstanding reputation of forests as the home
of wild people, spirits and rebels. Pre-colonial contacts between Cagayan Valley's scattered
villages of indigenous river people and the mountain tribes of the Sierra Madre and the Cordillera
were incidental, alternating between trade and armed conflict.
The Spanish conquest of Cagayan Valley rendered upland-lowland relations more structurally
discordant. The forest lands became the refuge of those unwilling to undergo proselytization and
taxation, and later - at the time of the Tobacco Monopoly - a source of 'free' tobacco and other
'pagan products'. Because of their scarcity and illegal status, the trade in these commodities was
a source of considerable profit to those who were tacitly allowed to engage in it, mainly members
of the lowland elite, upon whose cooperation the Spanish government depended to uphold its
rule. After independence, the Sierra Madre became a stronghold of anti-government groups once
again, now organized under the banner of the New People's Army. Logs became the new 'pagan
product', only accessible to those who had good contacts with the government as wells as
revolutionaries. Either by military means, or through negotiated pay-offs to the NPA, large-scale
logging was able to proceed, while forest migration was unattractive due to the risk of being
drawn into the armed conflict between the Philippine army and the NPA. Government policies
to brand migrants as illegal occupants of the forest, while holding out the prospect of a more
equitable distribution of existing farmlands served to further discourage migration.
One short decade after the 1986 EDSA revolution, the old contradictions between lowland
society and the forest lands were set for a final thaw. As the corporate approach to forest
management gradually declined in profitability and political support, migrant communities and
indigenous forest peoples gained recognition as key actors in the management of the Philippines'
logged-over natural forests. Simultaneously, factors which had thus far discouraged people from
venturing into the forest lands, became less importance. The NPA was losing ideological ground,
due to the increasing democratie legitimacy of post-Marcos administrations; without the
resources that used to be extorted from logging companies, it no longer posed the security threat
to forest migrants that it had during the seventies and eighties. In the lowlands, two ambitieus
agrarian reform programmes failed to bring about tangible economie progress, and this probably
helped to keep poor and landless farmers from contemplating forest migration during this period.
While government programmes in the lowlands proved to be of little use to the poor, forest
policies were progressively releasing publicly owned but privately managed forest lands and
resources to local people. As timber licenses were cancelled, and the last private forest guards
abandoned the concessions, existing migrant and indigenous forest communities still lacked the
authority, cohesion, and resources to protect this large area of residual forest against new
stakeholders A virtual open-access resource had been created, there for the taking by poor and
landless people from the nearby lowlands and the Cordillera region.
The principal livelihood opportunities that forest migrants have developed so far inside the
Sierra Madre are compatible neither with the long-term agricultural productivity of forest sous,
nor with forest conservation goals. The extensive fire-and-fallow (uma) farming techniques
which are used in areas with unclaimed residual forest do not exhaust soil fertility to the same
extent as the more intensive, shorter-fallow systems, but they do result in a shifting forest
frontier. The recent introduction of hybrid com into these extensive fire-and-fallow systems is
further aggravating their deforestation impact. Hybrid corn production in the ploughed,
permanent bangkag farms causes a deterioration in the chemical and mechanical properties of
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these prime upland farms, and is likewise unsustainable. To reduce economie risks, and losses
incurred in the production of hybrid corn, the early migrants who owned these lands had the
option of asking newly arriving migrants to either open up new lands for thern, or to cultivate
their corn farms while they engaged in carabao logging. Initially, the recent shift from large-scale
mechanized logging to small-scale carabao logging led to a sharp reduction in overall log
extraction from the Sierra Madre. However, the forest stands where migrants extracted their
timber had already been repeatedly logged in the recent past, and must be left to recover for at
least a decade before a sustainable yield can be extracted. The more distant forests, where higher
stocks of commercial timber are found, cannot be exploited without some form of mechanization
for the construction of access routes and log transportation. Should that option indeed become
an accepted part of community-based forest management, there would be little practical
difference between present and past logging operations.
Migrants settled in the Philippine forests well before the first community-based forest
policies were shaped. Timber licensees and their local contractors were hiring forest migrants to
produce logs for them, and furniture makers were ordering their Narra timber directly from
carabao loggers long before that activity was conditionally legalized. Thus in effect the
Department Administrative Orders granting timber amnesties to furniture-makers, sawmills and
hardware stores was only formalizing what was already common practice in policy
implementation. Likewise, the informal ownership of public forest land was already an accepted
basis for clearing and tilling among forest migrants before it was recognized by the government
through the Certificate of Stewardship. These examples of recent shifts in forest policies,
progressive as they may be from a social point of view, show that the DENR follows a defensive
line, legalizing violations of earlier policies which it failed to enforce. The handover of forest
responsibilities was not accompanied by measures to remedy longstanding weaknesses in the
enforcement of environmental laws. In fact, the 1991 Local Government Code further reduces
the DENR to a technical advisory body, while decisions on forest access are taken at the interface
of Local Government Units and forest communities. Given the resilience of patronage politics
in the countryside, there are insufficient checks and balances between these actors to ensure that
the local and supralocal benefits of forest protection and sustainable use will be given adequate
weight vis d vis short-term, local benefits to be derived from deforestation. A well-financed and
independent national environmental agency is indispensable, to ensure that local actors
incorporate democratically defined national goals of forest policy into their local management
considerations.
The main challenge in community- based forest management is at the level of the upland
residents themselves. Neither migrant communities nor the indigenous people's organizations
are the effective and homogeneous societies they are often implicitly assumed to be. Existing
leadership structures come under increasing strain when a large economie asset, such as a 16,000
hectare community forest area, or an ancestral domain title comes its way. Outsiders will find
internal support for offers to 'assist' the community in the 'development' of its resources. The
development and strengthening of cooperative institutions at the local level will require a
substantial investment in training, not only in leadership and organizational management, but in
the fields of forestry and the environment as well. The foresters who are now assisting the
communities in designing their management programmes, partly former logging company
employees and partly young university graduates, are products of a forestry education that
continues to have a strong technical orientation, with an emphasis on timber production.
Conventional principles of selective logging and forest development thus re-emerge in modern
community-based forest concessions. A resilient principle, which continues to underlie this
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conventional approach despite having been defeated in practice in nearly all logging operations,
is what may best be described as the 'take now, protect later' principle. As in corporate timber
concessions, the community is assumed to rotate its logging activities on a block-by-block
basis, extracting from each block the equivalent volume of what it is theoretically assumed
will grow back in the coming 25 years. In contrast to absentee licensees, forest communities
may be expected to have fairly strong motives to ensure that logged-over blocks are protected
from premature cuts, especially if the first condition is met, i.e., the presence of an efficiënt
collective decision-making institution.
A fundamental problem caused by the timber bias of the community- based forest
management approach is the fact that it tries to solve the short-term economie problems of
forest migrants through the extraction of a product which renews itself very slowly.
Agroforestry, bio-organic farming, and other sustainable strategies to protect soils from
degradation and increase their productivity have made very little headway in the Sierra Madre,
for several reasons. One of these is shortage of labour, especially in the poorer households,
who earn their income through the least rewarding options of slash-and-burn farming and paid
labour on the farms of better-off migrants. Exchange labour and communal labour, which
might be capable of surmounting these constraints at the level of the individual household, are
less common in the young and often culturally heterogeneous societies of forest migrants. The
shortage of investment capital, e.g., to buy seedlings or livestock, and to set up facilities for
the production of organic manure, also places constraints on possibilities for forest migrants
to make the transition to intensified upland use.
In my view, peasants do not necessarily consider the establishment of informal credit
relations to be at odds with a risk-avoidance livelihood strategy. Farmers and forest migrants
with lands suitable for plough agriculture have good prospects of being able to repay a loan
tailored to their expected erop yield. They attach importance to the establishment of a personal
credit line, because it enables them to buffer fluctuations in income and expenditure which they
cannot deal with on an individual basis. While the poorest migrants, with minimal access to
cash income, do not take on major loans, they are often granted minor credit accounts with
fellow farmers and store-owners, who have the option of demanding repayment through
agricultural wage labour, sharecropping deals, or the transfer of land-use rights, should these
borrowers build up irrecoverable arrears. Such individual credit-lines drain agricultural profits
out of the forest lands, limiting the accumulation of investment capital at the level of primary
producers, and constraining their freedom of erop choice and marketing channel.
In contrast to the alleged importance of land tenure as the key to sustainable land use, this
study underlines the role of capital as the fundamental factor determining access to land and
cropping patterns. Offering a combination of production-oriented and consumptive credit,
informal moneylenders are clearly more interested in crops than in land. This is due not only to
agrarian reform, which artificially constrains the free-market value of farmland, but also to a lack
of interest among trader-moneylenders in becoming actively engaged in farming themselves.
Thus a common form of collateral in informal moneylending is the exclusive delivery of a
specified erop, often hybrid com. The growing number of urban Filipinos who can afford a
Western, protein-rich diet is increasing the demand for processed food, meat, poultry and dairy
products and, consequently, for hybrid corn, the principal raw material involved in the production
of these items. While yields in the lowlands stagnate, despite the increase in the use of
agrochemicals, the expansion of hybrid corn production into forest lands is a cost-effective
alternative response to the growing demand for hybrid corn. Precisely because of the declining
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relevance of land ownership, crop-based capital investments are increasingly being made in farms
on public forest land. In fact, the availability of residual forests offers farmers and moneylenders
a back-up option, which may be cal led upon for the recovery of occasional losses incurred in the
case of a discrepancy between the expected and actual yield - or price - of the erop collateral.
In the coming decade, the future of the Philippines' last natural forests will be decided. For
the fïrst time in the history of the Philippines, forest migrants and indigenous forest communities
now have an opportunity to reverse the trends of the past. The main conclusion of this case study
is that a wide range of actors outside the forest, including policy makers, politicians, traders and
urban consumers, will co-determine how, and how many forest managers will seize that
opportunity. The present relations between the Sierra Madre and the population centres of
Cagayan Valley may be compared to those between Cagayan Valley and the national economy
of the Philippines in the early 1920s, when the American administration opened the fïrst road
link between the region and Central Luzon, ushering in a period of agricultural expansion and
resource extraction. By the mid- 1990s, preliminary access routes had also been laid out into the
Sierra Madre, and the fïrst government bridgeheads established there, ending the longstanding
isolated, and rebellious state of the forest lands. Lowlanders from Cagayan Valley are now
producing the fïrst social and biophysical maps of this last frontier, and planning its future. In the
course of this process, it will be useful to look back at the kind of economie progress that the
region's role as a source of unprocessed tobacco, logs and grain for the national economy has
brought to the primary producers of those products. Protecting the unique forests of the Sierra
Madre is, fïrst and foremost, a matter of preventing the nation's environmental history from
repeating itself on a regional scale in the twenty-first century.
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89746299 89746299 90786 1 .2 mossy 4 montane 9.4
2415301 2415301 2449 1 4 mangrove 03
not present in import
33435 590






FC_kj Hectares Category diff with FC50 % diff
1 13384 deforested -62919 -825
2 99826 low cover -100516 -502
3 228882 medium cover -27491 -107
4 318614 high cover -23206 -68
5 88114 mossy & montane -2672 -29
6 1623 mangrove -826 -337
total 750443 -217630 -225
968073












































































0 6 low cover
1 0 medium cover
0 6 high cover
1 2 mossy & montane
2 2 mangrove
08
Comment % of total
not present in import
not present in import
not present in import
not present m import
not present m import
not present in import













2 269876 Icw cover
3 231128 medium cover
4 128526 high cover




























ArcVïew data Idrisi data
Import k) Import Category FCid Area m Hectares total per FC ld Area in Hectares %diff Category Comment % of total
1 others 1 2651243 52148027 52149 0 0 deforested 68
2 notspeafied 1 not present m import
3 Ai not present in import
4 Ae not present in import
5 Ab not present in import
6 G not present in import
7 Gk not present in import
8 Od 1 49496 784
9 10d 2 160595861 309130100 310799 OSlowcover 406
10 30d 2 148534240
11 60d 3 195724763 195724763 197556 0 9 medium cover 258
12 80d 4 103979289 103979289 105271 1.2 high cover 138
13 80mv 5 96913071 96913071 98101 1 2 mossy & montane 128
14 80ma 6 1029567 1029567 1055 2 5 mangrove 0.1
15 not used not present in import
16 emptyfiekJs 1 not present in import
total 758924818 758924818 764931 08 1000
Error check/na,




FC_ld Hectares Category diff with FC90 %diff
1 48415 deforested -3734 -72
2 304204 low cover -6595 -2.1
3 196600 medium cover -956 -0.5
4 104357 high cover -914 -09
5 96386 mossy & montane -1715 -1.7
6 481 mangrove -574 -544
total 750443 -14488 -1.9
764931
Annex B



































Population Increment No of Area of Total forest Hectares
additional addttional area converted cleared per
households farmland into farmland Household
farming in required (ha) per year
Sierra Madre





























































C'alculations underlying estimated returns to labour of corn, rice and banana in upland
farms (table 4.12; all on a one hectare basis)




























pure cash erop, cultivated with certifïed seeds
40 kg x 30 Ph*/kg plus 30% credit cost = 1236 P
no ploughing, no other inputs
75 days (Numan 1995; Dirkx 1995)
10 cavans x 70kg/cavan x 6.5 Ph*/kg = 4550 Ph£
3314PH*
75 days/ha (Numan 1995)
45 Ph?/day
Cash erop, produced with agrochemical inputs
40 kg x 30 Ph£/kg = 1200 Ph£
Urea: l bag/ha = 380 Ph£
Ammonia topdressing (230 Ph£), Weedicide (100 PhP),
Pesticide: 100 Ph£
Cost of Credit: 30% of 1560 = 603 Ph£
Carabao: 800 Ph?
Total Investment: 3413 Ph*
Harvest: 12 carts = 30 cavans = 2,100 kg
2,100 x 6.5 - 3414 = 10,000 Ph£/ha.
73 days (Numan 1995)
140Ph£/day
Produced for regular, small cash income
suckers from other plantation
none
Saba variety: permanent plantation, 8 year productivity;
400 trees /ha yielding 100 pieces per tree per year (in years 2-
5). Average productivity 25,000 pc/yr
Farm gate price = 0.2P/pc
5000 Ph? /ha/yr
Once every 8 years preparation of new plantation = 20 days
+ planting 12 days, or 4 days/yr
maintenance/guarding l day per month = 12 days
harvesting 2 days per month, or 24 days/yr
Total 40 days per year
125 Ph£/day
Lakatan/Manila variety:
Every 3 years lose 8 months to reach full prod. of 45,000
pieces/yr = 31,111 pc/yr. Farmgate price = 0.3 Ph*/pc
9300 P
as above, but replanting every 3 years (11 days/yr), 47 days/yr
200 Ph*/day








Often the first erop after preparing a new uma; intercropped
with minor other food crops; produced for subsistence
rice. 15-20 kg/ha (60 PhP/kg, or save form previous harvest)
beans: 20 kg/ha (60 PhP/kg, or save from previous harvest)
none
100-110 days (Dirkx 1995; Numan 1995)
rice: 10 ca vans/ha = 450 kg (reported average yields in the
Sierra Madre range from l .5 to 5 cav/ha, with maximums of
17-20 cav/ha in fresh uma or after long fallow.
beans: 200 kg/ha
(450 x 8 + 200 x 15) - (1,250+1,200) = 4,150 Ph£ (erop
valued at shadow farmgate prices)
40 Ph£/day








in older uma, alternative staple, also produced for cash
25 kg/ha at 8 Ph£/kg = 200 Ph£ (or from previous harvest)
none
6 cavans x 70 kg = 420 kg/ha
75 days (Dirkx 1995; Numan 1995)
420 x 11 - 200 = 4420 Ph£ (no need to buy seeds; value at
shadow farmgate prices)
60 Ph?/day








Production goal: traditional staple, incidental sale of surplus
40 kg x 8 Ph£/kg = 320 P
Carabao: 800 Ph£/ha
10-15 cavans x 70kg = 840 kg/ha (10 Ph£/kg)
9 cavans/ha (Dirkx 1995: 560-720 kg/ha; Hayami 1996,
Mindanao 656 - 861kg/ha)
85 days (own estimate)
800 x 10 - 800 = 7200 Ph£/ha
85 Ph*/day
Annex D
Late 19th century map of Northern Luzon, Manila Observatory
Enlarged version of Map 8.1 and its legend
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Description of three cases from overview table 9.1
Box El The frontier sitio of Amistad, Baggao, Cagayan










Year of arrival of first migrants
Corporate logging period
Distance to residual forest
Mode of access
Distance to road
Distance to Nat'l Highway
Distance to market
Hybrid corn cultivation (1996)
Context
The first migrants amving in the sitio of Amistad were Ilokano tenants from the iowland town of Amulung.
They arrived in the 1950s, followed by relatives and, in 1968, by the first Ibaloy migrants from the Cordillera.
When Veterans Woodworks opened a logging road to Amistad in 1979, many people from Amulung followed.
tlokanos still make up 45% of the sitio's population. The forests around Amistad used to have exceptionally
dense stands of Narra, but local residents only realized this in the early 1990s, the same period when large scale
mechanized logging operations ceased here. Carabao logging continues to be an important source of
income here. Those who had been employed by the company continued logging with the chainsaws and
carabaos they had eamed. In 1994, there were 15 chainsaws in Amistad: 5 were fully utilized for logging
activities and operated by the owner; 6 were offered for rent for logging or preparing uma fields; and others
were declared to be 'for personal use'. There were 16 carabaos used in log hauling. Between April and June of
that year, a total of 72 trucks, each loaded with an average 2000 boardfeet (or 5 cubic meters) of Narra flitches
left Amistad. Against local prices of 6-8 Pesos per boardfeet (PI 5 in retail trading in Manila), this volume
represents a value of P 1,000,000,= (40,000 US$) Recently, the carabao logging association of the sitio was
legalized and awarded a 4,000 ha Community Forest Management Agreement. The Ibaloy migrants are
experienced upland farmers, producing beans and other vegetables for the Baguio market. Amistad has
relatively rich soils where a variety of cash crops including beans, citrus trees, bananas and coffee thrived well,
using long fallow fire and fallow techniques. The bangkag and talon lands are in the hands of the pioneers, one
of whom owns more than 100 hectares. Corporate logging operations ceased here in 1991; since then, the 7 km
logging track between Amistad and the nearest barangay is only accessihle for trucks and jeepneys
during siimmcr The logging road which used to run from Amistad towards the east is slowly developing
into a carabao t rail, bordered by wildlings of Narra and other original forest species. In 1994, the
Department of Agriculture, through the local barangay officials, ran a seed dispersal programme in the sitio;
while all families were supposed to receive l kg of certified corn seeds, only few actually planted the erop,
producing only minor quantities "tofeed the pigs". In 1996, migrants were clearing residual forest for the
establishment of plantations of the fast growing and fire rcsistant Gmelina arborea tree. Guaranteed
purchase contracts were offered b^a_new]y_established pulp mill in Solana. Cagayan.
Box E2 Sitio Laginday, San Mariano, Isabela (1991)








Hybrid corn in bangkag and intercropped in uma
Noof households
Year of anïval of first migrants
Corporate logging era
Modeofaccess
Distance to residual forest
Distance to road




Some twenty migrant households, mostly from Ifugao live in this remote sitio of barangay Dinuman. one of
the oldest forest settlements in the Sierra Madre, located along the old trail between the towns of San Mariano
and Palanan. The narrow, slippery road between Dinuman and San Mariano, which repeatedly crosses creeks
and tributaries of the Cagayan River, served as a logging road in the 1970s and has now become the artery of
economie and social contacts between the Centro of San Mariano and its scattered upland barangays.
Occasionally scraped and gravelled, only logging tracks ply this road, and only during part of the year.
After arriving in the barangay of Dinuman, sitio Laginday is only reached after a one hour hike. Most people
who stay here originate from Kaingan, Ifugao and arrived in the early 1980s. Relatives, who left Kiangan
in 1965 as logging company employees, invited them to follow and develop their own farms here, too. The
early migrants had first settled in Dinuman, an older forest settlement 6 km South of Laginday, but shifted
when they found good farm lands and springs there. Using their traditional skills from Ifugao, they constructed
water-conveyance structures, bunds and canals there, enabling them to develop irrigated farmlands ('talon')
here. Around these fields of green, the landscape is dominated by bamboo stands, grasslands and bumt
residual forest stands, created by those who followed the early migrants. Since the last corporate logging
operations ceased in this area, in 1985, agriculture has gained in importance for the livelihood of these
migrants. Once an uma has been made, two crops per yearcan be grown there for a period of two to three
years: the first erop is upland rice, after that a mixture of mung bean, peanuts and hybrid com is planted. Fields j
with annuals are surrounded by a patchwork of heavily degraded residual forest and recovering uma, or ublag \
(fallow) lands. These ublags are planted with perennials, such as banana and coffee.
Box E3 Barangay Dimatan, Tumauini, Isabela
60 (l990 pop. = 346)
1957
1972 - 1991





in bangkag, with external inputs, two crops per year
N° of households
Year of arrival pioneer migrants
Corporate logging period
Mode of access
Distance to residual forest
Distance to logging road




In 1957, the six founding fathers (Adasen), migrants from indigenous uplandtribe in Abra who were
accompanied by an llokano, walked barefoot from Abra province into the Sierra Madre, where they occupied
a fertile valley floor in the Sierra Madre. They developed rice lands, upland farms and tree-plantations here.
llokano and Ybanag migrants followed in the 1970s, when commercial legging starled in the area. In 1988,
after several years politica! pressure by political leaders, advising them to leave the forest in order to avoid
being mistaken for supporters, or members of the New People's Army, they abandoned their first settlement
and settled in the grasslands on the foothills of the Sierra Madre. As part of the resettlement programme, all
households were granted a Certifïcate of Stewardship Contract (CSC) to 7 ha of lands, sorne inside a ranch
which used to be owned by relative of the Marcos family and was confiscated by the Presidential Commission
on Good Govemance after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, and some in the adjacent lands of the Laredo family, a
well-to do trader in Tumauini. These lands now produce two crops of yellow corn per year. In addition,
the migrants continue to cultivate their original fields inside the forest. These lands are used for the production
of upland rice and a mix of other subsistence crops. Families, who became chainsaw owners during their
employment with the logging company, still derive substantial revenues from carabao logging; there are more
than 80 carabaos in this barangay. The increasing scarcity of premium species within the action radius of
the carabao prompts migrants to shift to the extraction of softwoods. The flitches and farm products are
icoltected_by trucks plying daily between Dimatan and the lowland town of Tumauini. ____^__
References
Abesamis, T.S and L.J. Angelo (1995) "Program context: Power to the people - again." In: Abesamis,
T.S (ed.) Technical cooperation for the management ofchange: The case of the Local Development
Assistance Program and its strategie contributions to meaningful decentralization in the Philip-
pines. Quezon City: National Economie Development Authoriry.
ADB (1988) Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board ofDirectors on the proposed
loans and technical assistance to the Republic of the Philippines for a Forestry Sector Program.
Report N° 853:PHI. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
ADB(1994) Forestry Sector Study of the Philippines. Manila: Agriculture Department, Asian Develop-
ment Bank.
Adams, M. (1996) "Timber trends; a look back over the last year of trading." In: 1TTO Tropical Forest
Update 6 (4): 18-19.
Agabin. M. (1988) A review ofpolicies impinging on the informal credit markets in the Philippines.
PIDS Working paper Series N° 88-12. Makati: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
Aggabao, E. (1993) The role of the Chinese in the extraction and trade of wood products in Cagayan
Valley. MF thesis. Cabagan: Isabela State University.
Agrawal, A. (1995) "Dismantling the divide between indigenous and scientific knowledge.". In:
Development and Change, 26: 413-439.
Aguilar, F.V. (1994) "Of cocks and bets: gambling, class structuring and state formation in the
Philippines." In: Eder, J.E. and R.L. Youngblood (eds.) (op. af.): 147-196.
Aguinaldo, R.E. (1988) Proposalfor a rational andjudicious utilization and management of forest
resources in the province of Cagayan. Tuguegarao (ms).
Aken, B. van (1997) "Changing labour allocation in kaingin agriculture in Maddela, Quirino." In:
Guzman and de Groot (eds.) (op. df.):79-84.
Alejo, M.J., Ma. E. P. Rivera and N. I. P. Valencia (1996) (Des)cribing elections. A study ofelections
in the lifeworld of San Isidro. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.
Angeles M.S. de los (1982) Research on forestpolicies for Philippine developmentplanning; A survey.
Manila: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
Anderson, B. (1988) "Cacique democracy in the Philippines: Origins and dreams." In: New Left
Review 160:3-31.
Andriesse, J.P. (1987) A monitoring project of nutriënt cycling in soils usedfor shifting cultivation
under various climatic conditions in tropical Asia. Pan I (Text). Research Report. Amsterdam:
Royal Tropical Institute (KIT).
Angier, N. (1994) "De tyrannie van het regenwoud." [the tyranny of the rainforest] In: Volkskrant, 17
Dec 1994.
Aquino, B.A. (1996) "EDSA as vision and liberation". In: Kalaw-Tirol, L. (ed.) Duet for EDSA 1996:
Looking back, looking forward. Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc.
Aquino, D. M. (1991) Analysis of Non Timber Forest Products utilization in San Mariano, Isabela.
MSc thesis. Los Banos: University of the Philippines
Aquino, D. M. (1994) The remaining Philippine forests: Problems and solutions. Paper presented at
the 2"" European Conference on Philippine Studies, 13-15 April 1994, London: School of Oriental
and African Studies.
Arizpe, L. and M. Velasquez (1994) The social dimensions of population. In: Arizpe, L. et al. (eds.)
(op. dr.): 15-40
Arizpe, L., M.P. Stone and D.C. Major (eds.) (1994) Population & environment; rethinking the
debate. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press.
ASS (1983) The Philippines: authoritarian government, multinationals and ancestral lands. London:
Anti Slavery Society.
Bain, D.H. (1984) Sitting in darkness. Americans in the Philippines. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company.
Bankoff, G. (undated manuscript, received 1998) A history ofpoverty: The politics ofnatural disasters
in the Philippines 1950-1995. Auckland: University of Auckland.
416 references
Bakker, J.M. (1995) Farmers in the forestfringe: a study on income generating activities for upland
households in the Northern Sierra Madre, Philippines. CML student report N° 45. Leiden and
Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Baldi, M. (in prep.) Report of field research among Agta groups in Bolos Point and Gattaran,
Cagayan. CML student report. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Barbier, E., J. Burgess, J. Bishop and B. Aylward (1994) "Deforestation: the role of the international
trade in tropical timber." In: Brown and Pearce (op. cir.):271-297
Basilacan, A.(1992) "Rural poverty in the Philippines; Incidence, determinants and policies." In: Asian
Development Review, 10( l): 125-163
Balisacan, A.M., R.E. Evenson, T.N. Srinivasan, Ma. C. L. Bantilan, G.T. Castillo, C.A Florencio,
P.S. Intal Jr, M.Mangahas and A. Quisumbing (1993) Perspectives on Philippine poverty. Quezon
City: Centre for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines and The
Council of Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University.
Bautista, G.M. (1990) "The forestry crisis in the Philippines: Nature, causes and issues." In: The
Developing Economies, 28 (l):67-94.
Bautista, G.M. (1991) "A critique of the Master Plan for Forestry Development." In: Enviroscope l 7
(6): 6-13. Manila: Haribon.
Bautista, G.M. (1994a) Data from an aerial reconnaissance, carried out in September 1992 by the
Natural Resources Management Project, presented during a Regional Forest Policy Workshop, 27-
28 October 1994, Santiago, Isabela, Philippines.
Bautista, G.M. (1994b) Natural resources, economie development and the state; The Philippine
experience. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Bee, Ooi Jin (1987) Depletion of forest resources in the Philippines. Field report series n° 18.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Beer, J.H. de and M.J. McDermott (1989) The economie value ofNon-Timber Forest Products in
Southeast Asia (with emphasis on Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand). Amsterdam: Netherlands
Committee for IUCN.
Bellwood, P. (1985) Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian archipelago. Sydney: ANU Academie Press.
Belsky, J.M. (1993) "Household food security, farm trees and agroforestry: a comparative study in
Indonesia and the Philippines" in: Human Organization Vol.52, N° 2:130-141.
Bernstem, H. (1979) "African peasantries: A theoretical framework." In: Journal of Peasant Studies 6
(4):421-443.
BFD (1984) ASEANforests: A world heritage. Proceedings of the first ASEAN Forestry Congress 10-
15 October 1983, Paris. Vol. 1-3. Manila: Bureau of Forest Development.
BFD (1987) Forest resources ofRegion 02. Report of the RP-German Forest Resources Inventory
Project. Manila: Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Agnculture and Natural Re-
sources.
Billsborrow, R E. and M. Geores (1994a) "Population change and agricultural intensification in
Developing Countries." In: Arizpe, L. et al. (op. dr.): 171-207.
Billsborrow, R E. and M. Geores (1994b) "Population, land use and the environment in developing
countries; what can we learn from cross-national data?" In: Brown and Pearce (op. cit.): 106-133
Billsborrow, R.E (1997) KNAW Hofstee Lezing, 5 June 1997, Amsterdam.
Binzwanger, H.P. and M.R. Rosenzweig (1986) "Behavioral and material determinants of production
relations in agriculture." In: Journal of Development Studies 22: 504-539.
Blaikie, P.M. (1985) The political economy ofsoil erosion m developing countries. Harlow (UK):
Longman.
Blair, E.H. and J.A. Robertsen (eds.) (1903-1909) The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803 (55 volumes)
Cleveland: A.H. Clark.
Blok, A. (1969) "Variations in patronage." In: Sociologische Gids 16 (6):365-378.
Boado, E.L. (1988) "Incentive policies and forest use in the Philippines." In: Repetto and Gillis (op.
ar.).-l 65-205.
Boerboom, J.H.A. (1982) Tropische bosformaties. Inleiding op het College Tropische bossenteelt.
Tropical Forest Formations, introduction to the lecture series Tropical Forestry] Wageningen:
Vakgroep Bosteelt, Landbouw Universiteit.
Boersema, J.J, J.W Copms Peereboom and W.T de Groot (eds.) (1989) Basisboek Milieukunde: over
de analyse en oplossing van milieuproblemen. Amsterdam & Meppel: Boom.
Boissevain, J. (1969) "Patrons as brokers." In: Sociologische Gids 16 (6):379-386.
references 417
Bootsma, N. A. (1986) Buren in de koloniale tijd. De Filippijnen onder Amerikaans bewind en de
Nederlandse, Indische en Indonesische reacties daarop, 1898-1942. [Neighbours in colonial times
The Philippines under American rule and the Dutch and Indonesian reactions to this, 1898-1942].
Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, Land en Volkenkunde (KITLV).
Boserup, E. (1965) The conditions of agricultural growth. The economics ofagrarian change under
population pressure. London: Allen&Unwin.
Bourke, I.J. (1997) "International trade in forest products and the environment."In: Unasylva 46 (183).
Boyce, J.K. (1993) Thepolitical economy of growth and impoverishment in the Marcos era. Quezon
City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Boyce, W.D. (n.d.) The Philippine Islands illustrated. Chicago and New York: Rand McNally &
Company.
Braadbaard, O. (1994) "Business contracts in Javanese vegetable marketing." In: Human Organiza-
tion, 53 (2) 143-149. Society for Applied Anthropology.
Braam, A. van (1986) Leerboek Bestuurskunde [Textbook Public Administration]. Muiderberg:
Coutinho.
Brandon, K.E. and M. Wells (1992) "Planning for people and parks: Design dilemmas." In: World
Development, 20 (4) 557 - 570.
Brillantes, A.B. (1997) Decentralized democratie govemment under the Local Government Code: A
governmental perspective. Paper presented at the 3rd European Conference on Philippine Studies,
27-30 April 1997, IRSEA, Aix en Provence.
Broad, R. and J. Cavanagh (1993) Plunderingparadise. The strugglefor the environment in the
Philippines. Quezon City: University of California Press and Anvil Publishing.
Brosius, J. P. (1996) Dispatches from Penang; discursive production and praxis in Malaysian
rainforest politics. Draft Paper presented during the annual meeting of the Association of Asian
Studies, 11-14 April, Honolulu.
Brown, E.C. (1994) "Grounds at stake in ancestral domains." In: Eder, J.E. and R.L. Youngblood
(eds.) (op.df.):43-76.
Brown, K. and D.W. Pearce (eds.) (1994) The causes oftropical deforestation. The economie and
statistical analysis of factors giving rise to the loss of tropical forests. London: University
College London Press.
Brown, K. and D.W. Pearce (eds.) (1994) "Saving the world's tropical forests." In: Brown and
Pearce (op. dr.):2-26.
Brown, L. (1991) Forword in Perlin (op. cit.).
Bruijnzeel, L. A. (1986) "Environmental impacts of (de)forestation in the humid tropics. A watershed
perspective." In: Wallaceana, 46:3-13.
Bruijnzeel, L. A (1990) Hydrology ofmoist tropical forests and the effects of conversion: A state of
knowledge review. Paris: UNESCO and Amsterdam: Free University.
Bruijnzeel, L.A and W.R.S. Critchley (1994) Environmental impacts of logging moist tropical
Forests. Paris: UNESCO.
Buis, J. (1985) Historiaforestis. Nederlandse bosgeschiedenis, deel I & II. [Dutch forest history,
part I and II]. Utrecht: HES Uitgevers.
Buizer, I.M. (1994) Interactions between field officials and localpeople; field officials and the local
people at the forest fringe in the Sierra Madre, Philippines. CML student report N° 27. Leiden,
and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Bureau of Agriculture (1927) Philippine tobacco. Manila: Bureau of Printing.
Bureau of Forestry (1970) Handbook on selective logging (Second Edition) Manila: Bureau of
Forestry.
Button, J.W. (1996) "Bntish interests in the Philippine American War." Paper presented at the 5*
International Conference on Philippine Studies, April 14-16, 1996, University of Manoa,
Honolulu.
Carroll, J.J., S.J. (1994) "Glimpses into Philippine political culture: gleanings from Ateneo Public
Opinion Survey Data." In: Pilipinas 22 (Spring 1994):47-61.
Caufield, C. (1982) Tropical moist forests; Te resource, the people, the threat. London: Earthscan
and IIED.
Chambers, Robert (1988) "Sustainable rural Livelihoods: a key strategy for people, environment and
eevelopment." In: Conroy C. and M. Ltivinoff (eds.) The Greening of Aid - Sustainable
Livelihoods in Practice. London: Earthscan.
418 references
Chrispijn, R. (1995) Politics, policies and the environment. A study on the role of politics at the
implementation of environmental policies and those policies themselves as a preparation for the
CVPED Environmental Management Plan Scenario for the Northern Sierra Madre Biogeographic
Zone, Region 2, Philippines. CML student report N° 39. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Cl (1991) Initial Glimpses: The Palanan Wildemess. Washington, D.C.: Conservation International.
Cl (1996) List of biodiversity conservation pnority sites. Washington, D.C.: Conservation Interna-
tional.
Clad, J. (1988) "The fragile forests. Church pastoral letter against despoilation." In: Far Eastern
Economie Review, 25 Feb. 1988.
Clarke, G. (1993) "People Power? Non Governmental Organizations and Philippine politics since
1986." In: Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society (21):231-256.
Clarke, G. (1995) "Non governmental organizations and the Philippine state: 1986-93." In: South East
Asia Research (3)1:67-9. London: School of Oriental and African Studies.
Chua, D. (1996) "Helicopter logging lifts off in Sarawak." In: ITTO Tropical Forest Update 6 (3):2-4
Clement. P. and B. van Dijk (1995) Forest quality change in the northem Sierra Madre, Cagayan
Valley, Philippines. Preliminary student report. Leiden: CML. (ms).
Colchester, M. and L. Lohmann (1990) The Tropical Forestry Action Plan: What progress? Penang:
World Rainforest Movement, the Ecologist and Friends of the Earth
Colchester, M. and L. Lohmann (eds.) (1993) The struggle for land and thefate oftheforest. Penang:
World Rainforest Movement, The Ecologist and Zed Books.
Colchester, M. (1995) Forest politics in Suriname. Utrecht and Chadlington: International Books and
the World Rainforest Movement
Collins. N.M., J .A. Sayer, and T.C. Whitmore (1991) The conservation atlas of tropicalforests: Asia
and the Pacific. Gland: IUCN.
Committee on Insular Affair of the House of Representatives (1910) Hearings on the question of the
investigation of the Interior Department of the Philippine Government touching the administration
of Philippine lands, in pursuance of House Resolution n" 795. Washington: Government Printing
Office
Commonwealth of the Philippines (Bureau of Commerce and Industry) (1924) An economie map of the
Philippines. Manila: Bureau of Printing.
Commonwealth of the Philippines (Department of Agriculture and Commerce) (1939) Forest
resources of the Philippines. Manila: Bureau of Printing.
Commonwealth of the Philippines (1939) Land resources of the Philippines. Manila: Bureau of
Pnnting.
Comyn, de T. (1969, or. 1820) State of the Philippines in 1810 [English translation of "estado de las
islas Filipinas en 1810, brevemente descrito por Tomas de Comyn"]. Manila: Filipiana Book
Guild.
Conelly, T.W. (1992) "Agricultural intensification in a Philippine frontier community: impact on
labour efficiency and farm diversity." In: Human Ecology 20: 203-223.
Conolly, M.J. (1992) Church lands andpeasant unrest in the Philippines. Agrarian conflict in 20
century Luzon. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Conklin, H.C. (1957) Hanunóo agriculture; A report on an integral system of shifting cultivation in
the Philippines. Rome: FAO.
Constantmo, R. (1991) "The centennials (1)." In: Daily Globe, 27 aug 1991.
Cornista, L.B. and E. F. Escueta (1990) Communal forest leases as a tenurial option in the Philipp'116
uplands. In: Poffenberger (op.cit.): 134-144.
Coronel, S.S. (1998) "Party time: Most politica! parties are vote getting machines and alliances of
convenience." In: i The fnvestigative Reporting Magazine 4 (1&2):56-61. Quezon City: Philipp'ne
Centre for Investigative Journalism.
Corpus, O.D. (1997) An economie history of the Philippines. Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Press.
Costanza, R., R.d'Arge, R. de Groot, S. Farber, M. Grasso, B Hannon, K Limburg, S. Naeem.
R. V O'Neill, J Paruelo, R.G. Raskin, P Sutton and M van den Belt (1997) "The value of the
world's ecosystem services and natural capital." In: Nature 387 (May 1997): 253-260.
Coumans, C. (1995) "Ideology and idealism in the struggle of Maridiqueflos against Marcopper." In:
Pilipinas N° 24 (Spring 1995):37-74.
Critchley, W.R.S and L. A. Bruijnzeel (19%) Environmental impacts ofconverting moist tropical
forest to agriculture andplantations. Paris: Unesco.
references 419
Cruz, C. A. (1982) Economie efficiency of the Selective Logging System in selected areas in the
Philippines. Los Banos, University of the Philippines: PhD Dissertation.
Cruz, Ma C. (1986) Integrated summary report: Population and migration, implications for upland
development. PIDS working paper 86-07. Manila: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
Cruz, Ma. C., C. Meyer, R. Repetto and R. Woodward (1992) Population growth, poverty and
environmental stress. Frontier migration in the Philippines and Costa Rica. Washington, D.C:
World Resources Institute.
Cruz, W. and R. Repetto (1992) The environmental effects of stabilization and structural adjustment
Programs. The Philippines Case. Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute.
CVPED (1992) Forestry for people and nature; field research and theory on environment and
development in the Cagayan Valley, Philippines. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
CVPED Team IV (1994) Internat interim report, Environmental Management Plan preparation.
Unpublished student report. Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Cushner, N.P. (1976) Landed estates in the colonial Philippines. New Haven: Yale University.
Danielsen, F., D.S. Balete, T.D. Christensen, M. Heegaard, O.F. Jakobsen, A. Jensen, T. Lund and
M.K. Poulsen (1994) Conservation ofbiological diversity in the Sierra Madre mountains of
Isabela and southern Cagayan province, The Philippines. Copenhagen: DENR/Birdlife
International/Copenhagen University/Danish Ornithological Society.
Dans, J.P. (1940) "Land for the asking." In: The Philippine Herald Midweek Magazine 10 (41): 1-2.
DA (1995) Six year medium term development plan. Tuguegarao, Cagayan: Department of Agriculture.
Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) (1995) A development strategyfor the DENR decentralization in
the medium term: the issue of increased LGUparticipation inforest management. Quezon City:
DAI Natural Resources Management Program.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (1995) Accomplishment report for 1994 (Vol l and 2).
Manila, DAR Central Office.
DENR (1990) Master Plan for Forestry Development (main report). Quezon City: Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
DENR (1991) Regional Master Plan for Forestry Development (Cagayan Valley Region). Tuguega-
rao, Cagayan: Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region II.
DENR (1993) The Integrated Social Forestry Program; A primer. Quezon City: Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
Diemer, G (1990) Irrigatie in Afrika. Boeren en ingenieurs, techniek en cultuur. [Irrigation in Africa:
Farmers and Engineers, technology and culture.] Leiden University: PhD Dissertation.
Dirkx, E.J. (1995) Shifting cultivation and farmers' decision making in the Sierra Madre uplands, the
Philippines. CML student report N° 59. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Doedens, Bert (1992) Sustainable land use and destruction along theforestfringe. A Research on land
use in an Ifugao migrant settlement in the uplands of the Sierra Madre, Philippines. CML student
report N" 14. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Dorner, P. and W.C. Thiesenhusen (1992) Land tenure and deforestation. UNRISD Discussion paper
34:6-26. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
Dove, M.R. (1983) "Theories of swidden agriculture and the political economy of ignorance." In:
Agroforestry Systems 1: 85-99.
Dove, M.R (1985) "Swidden agnculture in Indonesia: The subsistence strategies of the Kalimantan
Kantu". New Babyion Studies in the Social Sciences. New York: Mouton.
Dove, M.R.(1992) "Foresters' beliefs about farmers: a priority for social science research in social
forestry." In: Agroforestry Systems 17:13-42.
Dove, M.R. and J. Nickum (1996) "Re-thinking 'Thinking Globally and Acting Locally': a critical
look at north-south environmental rhetoric." Draft paper presented during the annual meeting of
the Association of Asian Studies, 11-14 April 1996, Honolulu.
Dros, J.M. (1995) Sustainable farming in the tropical rainforest: the controversy of sustainability and
productivity. CML student report N" 49. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Dykstra, D.P (1992) untitled publication, cited in Eurofor (1993):29-30.
Eccleston, B. (1996) "NGOs and competmg representations of deforestation as an environmental issue
in Malaysia." In: Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 34 (March 1996): 1-25
Ecologist, the (1993) Whose Common Future? Reclaiming the commons. London: Earthscan.
Eder, J.F. (1974) Who shall succeed? Agncultural development and social inequality on a Philippine
frontier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eder, J.F. (1981) "From grain crops to tree crops in the Cayunan swidden system." In: Pacific
Viewpomt 1-21.
420 references
Eder, J.F. (1989) Review of Ooi Jin Bee (op. cit.) In: Journal ofAsian Studies 679-81.
Eder, J.F. (1996) "After deforestation: Migrant lowland farmers in the Philippine uplands." In:
Sponsel. L.L, T. N. Headland and R.C. Bailey (eds.) Tropical Deforestation: The Human
Dimension: 253-271. New York: Colombia University Press.
Eder, J.F. and R. L. Youngblood (eds.) (1994) Patterns of Power and Politics in the Philippines;
implications for development. Tempe: Arizona State University Centre for Southeast Asian
Studies.
Eggink, J. W. and J. Ubels (1984) Irrigation, peasants and development. Wageningen: Wageningen
Agricultural University.
EI A (1996) Corporate power, corruption & the destruction of the world's forests; the case for a new
globalforest agreement. London and Washington, D.C.: Environmental Investigation Agency.
Esguerra, E.F. and R.L. Meyer (1992) "Collateral substitutes in rural informal markets in the
Philippines." In: Adams, D.W. and D.A Fitchett (eds.) Informal finance in low income countries.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Esguerra, E.F. (1993) From trader to tender: Interlinked contracts from a credit marketperspective.
Discussion paper n° 9303. Diliman: School of Economics, University of the Philippines.
EUROFOR (1993) Une strategie Communautaire globale dans Ie secteur forestier, Vol. l-3. Luxem-
bourg: European Parliament, Direction Générale des Etudes, Direction de l'Agriculture, de la
Pêche, des Forêts et du Developpement Rural.
FAO/WHO (1973) Energy and protem requirements, report of a joint FAO/WHO ad hoc expert
committee. Nutrition meetings report series N" 52. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
FAO (1987) Assessment of forest resources in six countries. FAO Special study on Forest manage-
ment. Bangkok: Food and Agriculture Organization.
FAO (1992) Forest Resources Assessment, tropical countries (Draft). Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization.
FAO (1994) Forest development andpolicy dilemmas. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
FAO (1997) State of the world's forests 1997. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
FAPE (1975) Philippine Atlas: A historical, economie and educational profile of the Philippines (Vol
1) Manila: Fund for Assistance to Private Education.
FEBTC (1998) Website, quoting data on the Philippine economy from the National Statistical
Coordination Board (May 1996). Metro Manila: Far East Bank and Trust Company.
Fegan, B. (1993) "Entrepreneurs in votes and violence; Three generations of a peasant politica!
family." in: Mc Coy (ed.) (op.dr):33-107.
Fiselier, J.F. (1990) Living off the Tides. Strategies for the integration of conservation and sustainable
resource utilization in mangroves. Leiden, Environmental Database on Weiland Interventions.
Fittkau E.J. (ed.) (1983) "Festschrift zu Ehren von Dr. Johann Baptist Ritter von Spix." In: Spixiana,
Suppl. 9:1-441.
Floro, S.L. (1987) Credit relations and market interlinkage in Philippine agnculture. Stanford,
Califorma, Stanford University: PhD dissertation.
Floro, S.L. and P. Yotopoulos (1991) Informal credit markets and the new institutional economics;
The case of Philippine agnculture. Boulder: Westview Press.
Frel. T. de (1993) The Liwanag reforestation project. A study of reforestation and deforestation in
N.E. Luzon, Philippines. CML student report N° 21. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
FRI (RP-German Forest Resource Inventory) (1987) Forest resources ofRegion 02. Manila: Depart-
ment of Environment and Natural Resources.
FRI (RP-German Forest Resource Inventory) (1988) RP-German Forest Resources Inventory.
Applications ofresults to forest policy. Proceedings of a seminar held 15-19 February. Manila:
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Fujisaka, S., P. Sajise and R. Del Castillo (eds.) (1986) Man, agnculture and the tropical forest.
Change and Development in the Philippine Uplands. Bangkok: Winrock International.
Fujisaka, S. and E. Wollenberg (1991) "From forest to agroforest and logger to agroforester." In:
Agroforestry Systems (14): 113-129.
Gadakhar, R. (1992) "World's biodiversity needs to be preserved." In: Down to Earth (Oct 1992):43-
44.
Galang, Z.M. (1949) Encyclopedia of the Philippines Vol. 6: Commerce and industry. Manila:
Exequiel Floro.
Gamalinda, E. and S. Coronel (1993) Saving the earih; the Philippine experience. Makati: Philippine
Centre for Investigative Journal ism
Garrity, D.P, D M Kummer and E.S. Guiang (1993) "The Philippines." In: National Research
references 421
Council (op. cit.):549-624.
Geron, P. (1988) Philippine informal rural credit markets. Efficiency and equity issues. Seminar
Paper, Manila.
Gibbs, C. Payuan E. and R. del Castillo (1990) "The growth of the Philippine Social Forestry
Program." In: Poffenberger, M. (ed.) (op.cit.)-.253-265.
Gillis, M. (1980) Fiscal andfinancial issues in tropical hardwood concessions. Development
Discussion paper N° 142. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for International Development.
Gillis, M. (1988) "Indonesia: public policies, resource management and the tropical forest." In:
Repetto and Gillis (op. c;/.):43-114.
Gleeck, L.E. Jr. (1993) The third Philippine Republic 1946-1972. Quezon City: New Day.
Gloria, G. (1997) "Politics, RP style: Gaudy, gushy, gothic." In: Manila Times, 15/16 April 1997.
Goertzen, D. (1991) "Agents for change: NGOs take the lead in development process." In: Far
Eastern Economie Review, 8 Aug 1991.
Gomez, E.D, P.M. Alino, H.T. Yap and W.Y. Licuanan (1994). "A review of the status of Philippine
Reefs." In: Marine Poliution Bulletin, 29:62-68.
Graaf, N.R de (1991) "Managing natura! regeneration for sustamed timber production in Suriname:
the Celos sylvicultural and harvesting system.". In: A. Gomez-Pompa et al. (eds) Rainforest
regeneration and -management: 393-405. UNESCO Man and the Biosphere series, Vol. 6 Paris:.
UNESCO & Parthenon.
Graaf, N.R de (1996) "Het gebruik van natuurlijke processen bij duurzaam bosbeheer in de vochtige
tropen volgens CELOS management systeem." [using natural processes in sustainable forest
management in the humid tropics] In: Nederlands Bosbouw Tijdschrift (68): 235-242
Graeber, B. (1993) / leave the trees in the backyard for my children. Optionsfor sustainable local
forest management in the Sierra Madre, Phüippines.CML student report N° 32. Leiden and
Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Grainger, A. (1990) "Modelling deforestation in the humid tropics." In: Palo, M. and G. Mery (eds.)
(op.cit.): 51-67.
Grainger, A. (1993a) Controlling Tropical Deforestation. London: Earthscan.
Grainger, A. (1993b) "Population as concept and parameter in the modeling of deforestation. In:
Ness, G. et al. (op.cit.) 1993:71-101.
Grainger, A. (1995) "Changes in land use and forest management in Southeast Asia: an evolutionary
perspective." In: Sandbukt, 0. (op. cit.): 3-18.
Griffm, P. B. (1985) "Population movements and socio-economic change in the Sierra Madre." In:
Griffin, P. B. and A. Estioko Griffm (eds.) The Agta of Northeastem Luzon; recent studies. Cebu
City: University of San Carlos.
Griffin, P.B. (1988) "National policy on minority cultural communities: The Philippine case.": In;
Southeast Asian Journal of Social Studies 16 (2): 5-16.
Griffin, M.B (1996) "The cultural identity of foragers and the Agta of Palanan, Isabela, the Phüip-
pines." In: Anthropos 91:111-123.
Grindle, M.S. (1977) Bureaucrats, politicians andpeasants in Mexico: a case study in public policy.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gnndle, M.S. (1980) "The implementor: Political constraints on rural development in Mexico". In
Grindle (ed.) Politics and policy implementation in the third world. Princeton, N. J: Princeton
University Press.
Groot, W.T de (1992) Environmental science theory; Concepts and methods in a one-worldproblem
oriented paradigm. Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier Science Publishers.
Groot, W.T de and E.M. Kamminga (1995) Forest, people, government. A policy oriented analysis of
the social dynamics of tropical deforestation. CML Report N° 120. Leiden, Centre of Environ-
mental Science.
GTZ (1990) Sierra Madre results of the RP German "Inventory of Forest Occupants" project (1987).
Manila: Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Gutierrez, E.U. (1994) The ties that bind. A guide tofamily, business and other interests in the Ninth
House of Representatives. Pasig, Metro Manila: Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism and
Institute for Popular Democracy.
Gutierrez, E.U. (1997) "Making the Grade: comparative strengths in the 1998 elections." In: Political
brief, 5 (3, July 1997). Manila, Institute of Popular Democracy.
Guzman. R.P. de and M.A. Reforma (eds.) (1988) Government and politics of the Philippines.
422 references
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Oxford University Press, Quezon City:
College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.
Guzman, Ma. V. P. De (1992) Land/Resource tenure, Legal andpolicy framework. Natural Resources
Management Program, Policy Studies Report N° 92-10. Manila: Louis Berger International Inc.
Guzman, R.S. and W.T. de Groot (eds.) (1997) Research for the Sierra Madreforest. Proceedings of
the second CVPED Conference, August 23-26, Cabagan, Isabela, Philippines. Leiden and
Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Hainsworth, R.G. and R.T. Moyer (1945) Agricultural geography of the Philippine Islands Washing-
ton, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations.
Hamilton, L.S and A.J. Pearce (1987) "What are the soil and water benefits of planting trees in
developing country watersheds?" In: Southgate D.D and J.F. Disinger (eds.) Sustainable resource
development in the Third World: 40-58. London: Westview Press.
Hardin, G. (1968) "The tragedy of the commons" In: Science: 1243-8.
Hayama, A. (1996) Up land farmers and institutional reforestation: A case study in an immigrant
upland community in Mindanao, Philippines. Paper presented at the 5* International Conference
on Philippine Studies, April 14-16, Honolulu.
Hayama, A. (1997) The transformation of interaction of the landless with the uplands in southeastem
Nueva Ecija. Paper presented during the 3"1 European Conference on Philippine Studies, April 27-
30, 1997, IRSEA, Aix en Provence.
Hayami, Y , Ma A. R. Quisumbing and L.S. Adriano (1990) Toward an alternative land reform
paradigm; a Philippine perspective. Manila, Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Headland, T.N. (1986) Why foragers do not become farmers: A historical study of a changing
ecosystem and its effects on a Negrito hunter-gatherer group in the Philippines. Hawaii, Univer-
sity of Hawaii, [PhD dissertation].
Headland, T.N and J.D. Headland (1997) "Limitation of human rights, rand exclusion and tribal
extinction: the Agta Negritos of the Philippines." In: Human Organization (58) 1:79-90.
Hedman, E.L (1994) Beyond boycott: the Philippine left and electoral politics after 1986. Paper
presented at the 2™1 European Conference on Philippine Studies, April 13-15, London: SOAS.
Hendriks, M. (1997) Vegetable trade in the Central Philippines. An anthropological study of exchange
and credit in a modemizing economy. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. PhD dissertation.
Henkemans, A. (1994) Towards appropriate upland farming technologies. A study on agroforestry-
related farming techniques for upland farm development at the for est fringe in the Sierra Madre,
Philippines. CML student report N" 26. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Herrin, A. (ed.) (1994) Population. human resources and development. (Vol. 1). Quezon City: Centre
for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines.
Hill, P. (1986) Development economics on trial; the anthropological case for a prosecution. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hoekstra, S.P. (1992) Grassroot Politics. The implementation of environmental policies regarding
grasslands in N.E Luzon, Philippines. CML student report N" 11. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela:
CVPED
Holleman, Mr. F.D. (1990, or. 1931) Philippijnsch Dagboek Volksrecht in de Filippijnen; een
moeizame verkenning, april-juli 1931. [Philippine diary on indigenous law in the Philippines; an
arduous exploration] Leiden: Van Vollenhove Instituut
Hoogmoed, M.S. and R. De Jong (eds.) (1992) Tropisch regenwoud. Schatkamer van biodiversiteit.
Leiden: National Museum of Natural History.
Homberg, H. van den (1993) tThapter 1: Introduction. "In: Gender, environment and development; a
guide to the literature. Amsterdam: InDRA/International Books.
Horne, P. and M. Palo (1995) "Benefits and cost of deforestation: the case of the Philippines." In:
Sandbukt, 0. (ed.) (1995): 19-35.
Houghton, R. A (1995) "Emissions of carbon from deforestation in Southeast Asia." In: Primack,
R.B. and T.E. Lovejoy (eds.):263-289.
Huke, R E. (ed.) (1965) Shadows on the Land. An Economie Geography of the Philippines. Manila:
Bookmark, Inc.
Huijbregts, B. (1996) Pushing the forest fringe. Activities in the forest fringe of a migrant community,
Sierra Madre mountains, Quirino, Philippines. CVPED/CML student report N" 55. Leiden and
Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
references 423
Huigen, M. (1997) Standard operating procedures with special operation payments. A study onforest
policy distortions in a local fümiture industry in the Philippines. CVPED/CML student report N°
71. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela CVPED.
Hurst, P. (1990) Rainforest politics, ecological destruction in Southeast Asia. London and New
Jersey: Zed Books.
Hutchcroft, P. (1994) "Predatory oligarchy, patrimonial state: The politics of banking in the Philip-
pines." In: Eder, J.F and RL. Youngblood (eds.) (op. ar.):75-102.
Hyden, Goran (1980) Beyond ujamaa in Tanzania. Underdevelopment and an uncaptured peasantry.
London: Heinemann.
Ibon Databank (1988) Land reform in the Philippines. Manila: Ibon.
ICCO (in press) Hulp en handel in de praktijk [Aid and trade in practice]. Report on the consultative
meeting on the production and marketing of sustainably produced forest products, 8-16 May 1998,
Gurupa, Brazil.
Inman, K. (1991) Population, development, debt and the international decline offorests. MA thesis,
Department of Sociology, University of Georgia.
ITTO (1993) Tropical Forest Update 3 (4).
ITTO (1997) Annual review and assessment of the world tropical timber situation, 1996. Yokohama:
International Tropical Timber Organization.
Jepma, C.J. (1995) Tropical deforestation; A socio economie approach. London: Earthscan.
Jesus, Ed. C. de (1980) The Tobacco Monopoly in the Philippines. Bureaucratie enterprise and social
change. 1766-1880. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Jesus, Ed. C. de (1982) "Control and compromise in the Cagayan Valley". In: McCoy and De Jesus
(op.df.):21-37.
Johnson, B (1991) Responding to tropical deforestation. Research paper. Washington, D.C.: WWF,
Osborne Centre.
Johnson, S. (1995) "Production and trade of tropical logs." In: ITTO Tropical Forest Update, 5(1): 21-
23. Canberra: ANUTECH.
Johnson, S. (1996) "Production and trade of tropical sawnwood. Summary of sawnwood production
and trade statistics from ITTO's 1995 Annual Review." In: ITTO Tropical Forest Update 6
(2):20-22.
Jones, G.R. (1989) Red revolution. Inside the Philippine guerilla movement. Boulder: Westview
Press
Jordan, C.F. (1985) Nutriënt cycling in tropical forest ecosystems. London: Wiley & Sons.
Jordana y Morera, R. (1874) Memoria sobre la produccion de los montespublicos de Filipinas en el
ano economico de 1871-1872 por el ingeniero Inspector de ramo en acquellas Islas. [production
report on the Philippine public forests in the economie year 1871-1872, by the government's
engineer inspector in these islands] Madrid. Ministerie de Ultramar.
Jordana y Morera, R. (1876) Memoria sobre la produccion de los montes publicos de Filipinas en el
ano economico de 1873-1874 por el ingeniero Inspector de ramo en acquellas Islas. Madrid,
Ministerie de Ultramar.
Kahn, J.R. and J .A. McDonald (1995) "Third world debt and tropical deforestation." In: Ecological
Economics (12), 107-123.
Karnow, S. (1989) In our image; America's empire in the Philippines. New York: Random House.
Kartanawata, K. and A.P. Vayda (1984) Forest conversion in East Kalimantan, Indonesia: the
activities and impact of timber companies, shifting cultivators, migrant pepper cultivators and
others. In: Di Castri, F., F.W.G. Baker and M. Hadley (eds.) Ecology in practice, part I:
Ecosystem management: 98-126. Dublin: Tycooli.
Keesing, F.M. (1962) The Ethnohistory of Northern Luzon, Stanford Anthropological Series N" 4.
Stanford: California University Press.
Kerbert, H.J. (1908) "Amerikaans boschbeheer op de Filippijnen." [American forest management in
the Philippines] in: Tectona, l (l908-1909):377-394.
Kerbert, H.J. (1909) "Publicaties betreffende het Boschwezen in de Philippijnen van het jaar 1908."
[Publications concerning the forestry sector in the Philippines of the year 1908]. In: Tectona, 2
(1909-1910): 15-21.
Kerkvliet, B.J.T (1991) Every day politics in the Philippines. Class and status relations in a Central
Luzon village. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.
Klein, M. & M. van der Wal (1997) "About tropical hardwood, chocolate and gorilla's. Conservation
of forest fauna in south Cameroon." In: BOS NiEuWSLEJTER 16 (3) 37:50-58.
Kleinman, P.J.A., D Pimentel and R.B. Bryant (1995) "The ecological sustainability of slash and
424 references
burn agriculture." In: Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 52: 235-249.
Kloek, J.S. (1995) "Agricultural and forest policies of the American colonial regime in Ifugao
terntory, Luzon, Philippines, 1901-1945." In: Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society 23:3-19.
Kroonenberg, S.B. (1992), "Hoe eeuwig zingen de bossen: tropisch regenwoud, klimaatsveranderingen
en biodiversiteit." [How eternally do the forests sing: tropical rainforest, climate change and
biodiversity] In: Hoogmoed and De Jong (eds.) (op. crt.):53-60.
Kummer, D.M. (1992a) Deforestation in the postwar Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila
University Press.
Kummer, D.M. (1992b) "Measuring forest decline in the Philippines; an exercise in historiography".
In: Forest and Conservation History 36:185-191.
Kummer, D.M. (1992e) "Upland agriculture, the land frontier and forest decline in the Philippines" In:
Agroforestry Systems N° 18: 31-46.
Kummer, D.M. (1995) "The political use of Philippine forestry statistics in the postwar penod." In:
Crime, Law & Social Change 22:163-180.
Kummer, D.M, and B.L. Turner (nd), Deforestation m Southeast Asia: exploring the human causes of
land-use cover change. Clark University.(ms)
La Vina, A.G.M. (1991) Law and ecology. A compilation of Philippine laws and international
documents pertaining to ecology. Legal rights and natural resource centre, Manila: Cacho
Publishing House.
Laarman, Jan G. (1988) "Export of tropical hardwoods in the twentieth century." In: Richards and
Tucker(eds.)(op. cit.): 147-166.
Laarman, J.G, E.J. Steward and P.C. Dugan (1995) "The economics of extraction in Philippine
forests: when timber turns to gold." In: Mountain Research and Development, 15 (2): 153-164.
Lacaba, J.F. (ed.) (1995) Boss. Five case studies of localpolitics in the Philippines. Pasig: Philippine
Centre for Investigative Journalism and the Institute for Popular Democracy.
Lande, C.H. (1964) Leaders, factions and porties; the structure of Philippine politics. Southeast Asia
Studies Monograph N" 6. New Haven: Yale University.
Lande, C.H. (1996) Post Marcos politics: a geographical and statistical analysis of the 1992 presiden-
tial elections. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Lanly, J.P. (ed.) (1981), Tropical Forest Resources Assessment Project (GEMS), Tropical Africa,
Tropical Asia, Tropical Amenca, 4 Volumes. Rome: FAO/UNEP.
Lanly, L.P. (1982), Tropical Forest Resources, FAO Forestry Paper N" 30, Rome: FAO.
Lanly, L.P. (1983) "Assessment of forest resources in the tropics" In: Forestry Abstracts. Common-
wealth Forestry Bureau 44 (6) 287-318.
Larkin, J.A. (1982) "Philippine History Reconsidered" In: Amencan History Review, 87 (3):595-628
Larson, D. (1988) Marketing and credit linkages; The case ofcom traders m the southem Philippines.
DAERS, Ohio State University. ESO paper N°l
Local Development Assistance Program (LDAP) (1994) Interna! Revenue Allotment System in the
Philippines: trends, pattems, and effects. Makati: Associates in Rural Development and LDAP.
Leonen, M.V.F. (1993) "The Philippines. dwindhng forests and agrarian reform". In Colchester and
Lonmann (op. cit.)-.264-290.
Lewis, H.T. (1991) Ilokano irrigation, the corporate resolution. Asian Studies at Hawaii N" 37.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Lipsky, M. (1980) Street-level bureaucracy. Düemmas of the individual in public services. New York:
Russel Sage.
Liu, D.S., L.R. Iverson and S. Brown (1993) "Rates and patterns of deforestation in the Philippines:
application of Geographic Information System analysis." In: Forest Ecology and Management, 57:
1-16.
Lopez, A. (1994) "Running a revolution." In: Asiaweek 20 (10): 28-41.
Lu, F. (1994) Impact of area-specific loggmg moratorium. Paper presented at the Regional NRMP-
/DENR Forest policy workshop, 26-28 October 1994, Santiago, Isabela.
Lynch, O.J. (1986) "Philippine law and upland tenure." In: Fujisaka, S. et al. (op. dr.): 269-292.
Lynch, O.J. (1992) "Securing commumty-based tenurial rights in the tropical forests of Asia. An
overview of.current and prospective strategies." In: Issues in Development (Nov. 1992) Washing-
ton, D.C.: World Resources Institute
Lynch, O.J. and K. Talbott with Marshall S. Berdan (1995) Balancing acts: community basedforest
management and the national law in Asia and the Pacific. Washington, D.C: World Resources
Institute.
Magno, F. A (1996) Forest regeneration in the environmental transition. Paper presented at the 5*
references 425
International Conference on Philippine Studies, April 14-16, 1996, Honolulu.
Mallat, J. (1846) Les Philippines; histoire, geographie, moeurs, agriculture, industrie, commerce des
colonies Espagnoles dans l' Oceanie. Paris: Arthus Bertrand.
Malumbres, Fr. J. , O.P. (1918) Historia de Cagayan. Manila: University of Santo Thomas.
Mangahas, M, V.A, Miralao and R.P. de los Reyes (1976) Tenants, lessees, owners; welfare
implications oftenure change. Quezon City: Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila
University Press.
Maus, J. and R.E.F.F. Schieferli Malix (1989) Environmentalproblems in north-east Luzon. CML
student report N° 1. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela, Philippines: CVPED.
May, G.A. (1989) "Civic ritual and political reality: Municipal elections in the late nineteenth
century." in: Paredes, R.R. (ed.j\ (op.cit.): 13-40.
McCoy, A. and Ed. de Jesus (eds.) (1982) Philippine social history: Global trade and local transfor-
mations. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
McCoy, A. W. (ed.) (1993) An anarchy of families. State andfamily in the Philippines. Madison,
Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin and Ateneo de Manila University
Press.
McKenzie., D. (1988) "Uphill battle to save Filipino trees." In: New Scientist 118: 1619.
Mc Neely, J.A., K.R. Miller, W.V. Reid, R A. Mittermeier and T.B. Werner (1990) Conserving the
world's biological diversity. Gland, Swizerland: IUCN and Washington, D.C: WRI, Cl, WWF-
US and the World Bank.
McNicoll, G.(1990) "Social organization and ecological stability under demographic stress." In: G.
McNicoll and M McCain (eds.) Rural development andpopulation: Institutions andpolicy.
Population and Development Review 15, supplement, 1989/1990: 147-167.
Migdal, J. (1988) Strong societies and weak States. State-society relations and state capabilities in the
third world. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Millan, M.M. and A.T. Macadangdang (1994) Carabao logging in Mansarong, Baggao, Cagayan.
Paper presented at the 2"" CVPED Work Conference, Cabagan, Isabela, 26-29 August 1994.
Millan, M.M. and J.M. Dros (1997) "Carabao logging, kaingin farming and their environmental
impacts". In: Guzman and de Groot (eds.) (l997):65-77.
Moonen, E.M.B. (1998) "Land use strategies in the Sierra Madre." In: King, V.T. (ed.) Environmental
challenges in Southeast Asia. 231- 258.Oslo: NIAS and Richmond: Curzon Press.
Moore, B. (1910) "Forest problems in the Philippines" In: American forestry; An illustrated magazine
aboutforestry andkindredsubjects. Washington, D.C.: American Forestry Association.
Muijzenberg, O.D. van den (1973) Horizontale mobiliteit in Centraal Luzon. Kenmerken en achter-
gronden. [Horizontal mobility in Central Luzon: charactenstics and background]. PhD disserta-
tion. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.
Muijzenberg, O.D. van den (1975) "Involution or evolution in Central Luzon?" In: Kloos, P. and
H.J.M. Claessen (eds.) Current Anthropology in the Netherlands: 141-155. The Hague: Anthropo-
logical branch of the Netherlands Sociological and Anthropological Society.
Muijzenberg, O.D. van den (1991) "Tenant emancipation, diversification and social differentiation in
Central Luzon." In: Breman, J. and S. Mundle (eds.) Rural transformations in Asia. 317-37.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Myers, N. (1980) Converswn oftropical moistforests. Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Research
Council.
Myers, N. (1984) The primary source. Tropical forests and ourfuture. London: W.W. Norton and
Company, Inc.
Myers, N. (1991) "Tropical forests: present status and future outlook." In: Climate Change (19)
(September): 3-32.
Myers, N. (1994) "Tropical Deforestation: rates and patterns." In: Brown, K. and D.W.Pearce
(0p.c/f.):27-40.
Myers, N. (1996) "The world's forests: problems and potentials." In: Environmental Conservation 23
(2): 156-168. Foundation for Environmental Conservation.
Nakano, S. (1996) 'Windfall' revenue controversy (1937-1941) A view on Commonwealth history.
Paper presented at the 5"1 International Conference on Philippine Studies, April 14-16, 1996,
Honolulu.
National Research Council (1993) Sustainable Agriculture and the Environment in the Humid Tropics.
Washington, D.C., National Academy Press.
Nectoux, F. and Y. Kuroda (1989) Timberfrom the South Seas: and analysis ofJapan's tropical
timber trade and its environmental impacts Gland: World Wildlife Fund for Nature.
426 references
NEDA (1989) Technical Notes on Poverty. Inequality and Employment. NEDA Staff Paper Series
(1):1, Manila: National Economie and Development Authority.
NEDA (1990) Economie and social indicators for 1988. Manila, National Statistics Coordination
Board, National Economie and Development Authority.
NEDA (1991) Regional physical framework plan, Cagayan Valley. Tuguegarao, Cagayan: National
Economie Development Authority, Regional Office.
NEDA (1995) Development Information, Cagayan Valley. Tuguegarao, Cagayan: National Economie
and Development Authority, Region II.
Ness G., W.D. Drake and S.R. Brechin (1993) Population environment dynamics; ideas and observa-
tions Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
Nilsson, S. (1996) (ed.) Borealforests: the role of research. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis.
Noblejas, A.H. (1961) Philippine law on natural resources (revised edition) Manila: Central Book
Supply.
Nolledo, J.N. (1991) The Local Government Code of 1991, with introductory features. Manila: Rex
Bookstore and Kalookan City: Philippine Graphic Arts.
Noordhuizen, J. (1996) Top-down andbottom up analyses of the integrated social forestry program;
see how things shape. CML student report N" 68. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
NSO (1990) 1990 Census ofpopulation and housing (Isabela, Cagayan, Nueva Viscaya, Quirino,
Batanes). Manila: National Statistics Office.
NSO (1995) Philippine statistical yearbook, 1994. Manila: National Statistics Office.
Numan, D. (1995) Time is money? The allocation offamily labour in two northern Sierra Madre
communities, the Philippines. CML student report N°48. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Olofson, H. (ed.) Adaptive strategies and change m Philippine swidden based societi.es. College,
Laguna: Forest Research Institute.
Oosterberg, W. (1997) Approximation of the effect of deforestation on the extent offloods in Cagayan
Valley, Philippines. CML Report N" 140. Leiden: Centre of Environmental Science.
OIDCI (1992) ENR-SECAL Regional Resources Management Program, mam report (Vol. 1). Manila:
Oriënt Integrated Development Consultants Inc.
Orstom, E. (1990) Goveming the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Otsuka, K. and E. Marciano (1988) Permanent labour contract in Central Luzon: a study on tenancy
and labor contracts under land reform regulation". Los Banos, Philippines, International Rice
Research Institute.
Overhoff, M. (1997)"Wereldbank en bosbeschermmg." [the World Bank and forest protection] In:
Ecologie en Ontwikkeling 5 (2):22-23. Amsterdam, Netherlands Committee for IUCN
Paguirigan, D.B. and U. V. Madamba (1927) "A study of the cost of production of tobacco in the
Cagayan Valley". In: Bureau of Agriculture (1927) Philippine tobacco, Manila: Bureau of
Printing.
Pallom, A. (1994) "The relation between population and deforestation: Methods for drawing causal
inferences from macro and micro Studies". In: Arizpe, L. et al. (op. cz/.):87-124.
Palo, M. (1987) "Deforestation Perspectives for the Tropics; A provisional theory with pilot Applica-
tions". In: Dykstra, D., M. Kallio and C. Binkley (eds.) The globalforest sector: An analytical
perspective. Chapter 3:57-89. London: IIASA & John Wiley.
Palo, M, G. Mery and J. Salmi (1987) "Deforestation in the tropics: pilot scenarios based on quantita-
tive analyses." In: Palo, M. and J. Salmi (eds.), Deforestation or development in the third world,
Vol.l: 53-106 Helsinki: Finnish Forest Research Institute.
Palo, M. (1990), "Deforestation or development m the third world: roles of system causality and
population". In: Palo, M. and G. Mery (eds.) (1990) Deforestation or development in the third
world. Vol.3: 155-174. Helsinki: Finnish Forest Research Institute
Palo, M (1994) "Population and deforestation." In. Brown, K. and D.W. Pearce (op. «r.):42-56.
Palte, J.G.L. (1989) Uplandfarmmg in Java, Indonesia, a socio-economic study on upland agriculture
and subsistence under population pressure. Faculty of Geographical Sciences, Univ. of Utrecht.
Paredes, R.R. (ed.) Philippine colomal democracy. Manila, Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Paredes, R R (1989) "The origins of national politics: Taft and the Partido Federal. "in: Paredes, R R
(ed.)(<?p.ctf.). 41-69.
Pasicolan, P.N. (1996) Tree growing on different grounds. An analysis of localparticipation in
contract reforestation in the Philippines. Leiden, Centre of Environmental Science PhD Disserta-
tion.
references 427
PC AC (1981) A Study on the informal rurai markets in three selected provinces of the Philippines.
Manila, Presidential Committee on Agricultural Credit
PCLI (1990) Saving the earth: The Philippine experience. A folio of repons writtenfor the Phitippine
Center for Investigative Joumalism. Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.
PDI (various dates) Articles clipped from the Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Pearce, D., N. Adger, D. Maddison and D. Moran (1995) "Debt and the environment". In- Scientific
American 272 (6):28-32.
Peluso, N.L. (1992) Richforests, poorpeople. Resource control and resistance in Java. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Perlin, J. (1991) A Forest Journey. The role ofwood in the development ofcivilization. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press
Peplow, E. (1991) Introduction to the Philippines. Hong Kong: The Guidebook Company.
Peters, L (1995) Shifting Cultivation in the uplands ofMaddela, Quirino, the Philippines. CML student
report N° 54. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED
Persoon, G.A. (1997) "'It's all the same!' Veldwerk en kennisvorming bij het begrijpen en oplossen
van milieuproblemen in de Filippijnen."[Fieldwork and knowledge formation in the analysis and
solution of environmental problems in the Philipines]. In: Claessen, H.J.M and H.F. Vermeulen
(eds.) Veertig jaren onderweg.. 109-124. Leiden: DSWO Press.
Persoon, G.A and H.H. de longh (1997) Pigs across ethnic boundaries: a wild animal in three
Southeast Asian contexts. Paper presented at the HAS Conference Animals in Asia, Leiden, 15-16
Sep 1997. International Institute for Asia Studies.
Philippine Commission (various issues. 1904-1931) Repons of the civil government of the Philippine
Islands. Manila: Bureau of Printing
Pinches, M. (1992) "The working class experience of shame, inequality and people power in Tatalon,
Manila." In: B. Kerkvliet, and R. Mojares (eds.) From Marcos to Aquino: localperspectives on
political transition in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Pinkerton, J. (1807) Modem geography, a description of the empires, kingdoms, states and colonies,
oceans, seas and isles in all parts of the \vorld. Vol. 2, Asia: 555-568.
Plugge, I. (1992) Patience is a virtue; the question of sustainability and land insecurity in the
Philippines. CML student report N° 15. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Plumwood, V. and R. Routley (1982) "World rainforest destruction - The social factors." In: The
Ecologist (12):4-22.
PNA (various dates) News releases by the Philippine News Agency, distributed on electronic mail by
Balita News Service.
Poffenberger, M. (1990) Keepers oftheforest. Land management alternatives in Southeast Asia.
Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Polet, G. (1991) Rattan and bamboo utilization in a Sierra Madre community. CML student report N°
3. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Porio, E. and B.R.Taylor (1995) "Popular environmentalists in the Philippines: People's claims to
natural resources". In: Taylor, B.R. (ed.) Ecological resistance movements; The global emergence
ofradical andpopular environmentalism. New York: State University of New York Press.
Porter, G. and D. J. Ganapin (1988) Resources, population and the Philippines'future. A case study.
World Resources Institute Paper N" 4. Washington: the World Resources Institute.
Primack, R.B. and Lovejoy, Th.E. (eds.) (1995) Ecology, conservation and management of Southeast
Asian rainforests. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Province of Isabela (1993) Isabela Provincial Profile Ilagan, Isabela: Provincial Planning and
Development Office, Province of Isabela.
Putzel, J. (1990) "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme; why it mattered little who was in
charge". In: Arcilla, G. (ed.), Lupa at buhay: Agrarian reform in the Philippines. Amsterdam:
Philippine Development Forum.
Putzel, J. (1992a) Agrarian reform, the state and environmental crisis in the Philippines. In: Proceed-
ings of the CIIR Seminar on Agrarian Reform and the Environment in Southeast Asia, London.
Putzel, J. (1992b) A captive land. The politics ofagrarian reform in the Philippines. Quezon City:
Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Rai. N.K. (1990) Living in a lean-to. Philippine Negritoforagers in transition. Ann Arbor: Museum of
Anthropology, University of Michigan.
Querijero, C.T. (1997) "The Philippine political party system: a sad, bad tale". In: Politik 3 (3,
Feb.1997): 42-47 Quezon City: Ateneo Centre for Social Policy.
Raintree, J.B. (1986) "Agro-forestry pathways" In: Unasylva 38 (4):2-15. Rome: FAO.
428 references
Rao, Y.S (1992) "Forestry profile: Philippines" In: FAO Tigerpaper 19 (4): 13-14.
Reid, A. (1996) Inside out: The colonial displacement of Sumatra's population. Paper presented at the
KITLV/EDEN workshop on Man and Environment in Indonesia, 1500-1950. 27-29 June 1996,
Leiden.
Reid, W.V. and K.R. Miller (1989), Keeping options alive; The scientific basis for conserving
biodiversity. Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute.
Remtjes, C, B. Haverkort and A.Waters-Bayer (1992) Farmingfor the future. An introduction to Low
External Input Agnculture. Leusden: ETC/ILEIA and London/Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Repetto, R. and M. Gillis (eds.) (1988) Publicpolicy and the misuse offorest resources. World
Resources Institute, Washington.
Repetto, R. (1990), 'Deforestation in the tropics" In: Scientific American, 262 (4): 18-24.
Reyes, M. (1989) "Logging ban to save forests?" In: Philippme Lumberman, 24 (3): 10-13.
Richards, John F and Richard P. Tucker (eds.) (1988) World deforestation in the twentieth century.
Duke Press Policy Studies. Durham & London: Duke University Press.
Rice, Rev. T. (1994) Forest farms: meeting national timber needs through community-basedforestry.
Imugan, Sta Fe, Nueva Viscaya: Ikalahan Foundation.
Rice, T. and S. Counsell (1993) Forestsforegone. The European Commumty's trade in tropical
timbers and the destruction of the rainforests. London: Friends of the Earth.
Rice, R.E., R.E. Gullison and J.W Reid (1997) "Can sustainable management save tropical forests?"
In: Scientific American, 276 (4):34-39.
Ridsdale, C.E (1991) Preliminary report Palanan vegetation.Leiden: Rijksherbarium.(ms)
Riggs, F.W. (1964) Administration in developmg countries: The theory of prismatic society. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
Rivera Castillet, Ed. de (1960) Cagayan provmce and her people. Manila: Community publishers.
Robinson, J.G. (1993) "The limits to caring: Sustainable living and the loss of biodiversity." In:
Conservation Biology 7 (1) 20-28.
Rocamora, J. (1995) Classes, bosses, goons and guns. Re-imagining Philippinepolitical culture. In
Lacaba, J.F. (ed.) (op.at.): vii-xxxi.
Rocamora, J. (1998) Philippine political porties: Continuity and change. Quezon City, Institute for
Popular Democracy.
Rocero, M. (1982) Ethnobotany of the Itawis of Cagayan province, Philippines. Anthropological
Papers N° 14. Manila: National Museum.
Rocheleau. D.E. (1995) "Gender and biodiversity: a feminist political ecology perspective." In: IDS
Bulletin, 26 (1):9-16.
Roest, F. (1996) Patternsfrom above. A GIS based research onforest quality in the Sierra Madre
(1950-1990). CML student report N° 61 Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Romero, M.R. (1991) Watershed management impacts on the Tumauim Irrigation System, Tumauini,
Isabela. Los Banos, Laguna: University of the Philippines. MSc Thesis.
Rommelse, R. (1996) The design of a sustainable land use plan for the secondary forest zone of the
Sierra Madre mountains in the Philippines. CML student report N° 44. Leiden and Cabagan,
Isabela: CVPED
Rood, S. (1997) An assessment of the state ofknowledge concermng decentralized govemance under
the 1991 Local Government Code. Paper presented at the 3"1 European Conference on Philippine
Studies, 27-30 April 1997, IRSEA, Aix en Provence.
Rosaldo, R. (1980) Ilongot headhunting, 1883-1974. A study in society and history. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Roth, D.M. (1977) Thefnar estates of the Philippines. Alberquerque: University of New Mexico
Press.
Roth, D.M. (1983) Philippine forests and forestry: 1565-1920 In: Tucker, R.P and J.F. Richards
(eds.) Global deforestation and the nmeteenth century \vorld economy. 30-49. Durham: Duke
University Press.
Rotmensen, G.J. A future for shifting cultivation? A literature review on incorporation and ecology.
CML papers on environment and development. N" 11. Leiden: Centre of Environmental Science.
Rudel, T.K., with B. Horowitz (1993) Tropical deforestation. Smallfarmers and land clearing in the
Ecuadonan Amazon. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rudel, T.K. (1994) "Population, development and tropical deforestation". In: Brown and Pearce
(op.cïr.):96-105.
references 429
Kutten, R. (1994) "Courting the workers' vote in a Hacienda Region: Rhetoric and response in the
1992 Philippine elections." In: Pilipinas, N° 22: 1-34.
Rush, J. (1991) The last tree; Reclaiming the environment in tropical Asia. New York: Asia Society
and Westview Press.
Sacay, O.J., M. Aggabin and Ch.I.E. Tanchoco (1985) The small farmer credit dilemma. Manila:
Technical Board for Agricultural Credit.
Sajise, P.E. (1986) "The Changing Upland Landscape" in: Fujisaka, S. et al. (op.rir.):13-41.
Sajor, E. (1996) Indigenous social security, state market incorporation and environmental changes in a
northern Philippine upland. Paper presented at the 3"1 European Conference on Philippine Studies,
Aix en Provence, 27-30 April 1997.
Salazar, W. (1997a) The German community in the Philippines in the late 19" and early 20" centuries.
Paper presented at the 3"1 European Conference on Philippine Studies, 27-30 April 1997, Aix en
Provence.
Salazar, W. (1997b) 'British and German passivity in the face of the Spanish neo-mercantilist
resurgence in the Philippines, c. 1883-1898' In: Itinerano, 21 (2).
Salverda, A. Th. L (1910) Reaction to the report of forester Kerbert on his inspection tour of timber
concessions in the Philippines. In: Tectona, 2 (1909-1910): 523-533.
Samangun, H. (1996) Deforestation on Yamdena hland; The reasons for our protest and campaign
from 1991 to the present. Pamphlet.
Sandbukt, 0. (ed.) (1995) Management of tropical forests: towards an integratedperspective. Oslo:
Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo.
Sargent, C. and S. Bass (1992) Plantation Politics. London: Earthscan.
Sarre, A. (1993) "Country profile - Philippines." In: ITTO Tropical Forest Update, 3(4).
Sarre, A. M. Sobral Filho and M. Reis (1996) "The amazing Amazon. Is the Amazon poised for a new
era of development?" in: ITTO Tropical Forest Update 6(4):3-7.
Savenije, H. and A. Huisman (eds.) (1991) Making hoste slowly. Strengthening local environmental
management in agricultural development. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute (KIT).
Sayer, J. A. (1995) Science and international nature conservation. Inaugural lecture for the Prince
Bernhard Chair. Utrecht: University of Utrecht.
Schmink, M. (1994) "The socio economie matrix of deforestation". In: Arizpe, L. et al. (eds.)
(op.cit.). 253-276.
Schücking, H. and P. Anderson (1991) "Voices unheard and unheeded". In: Shiva (ed.) Biodiversity.
Social and ecological perspectives: 13-41. London: Zed Books and the World Rainforest Move-
ment.
Schwartz, A. and J. Friedland (1992) "Green fmgers; Indonesia's Prajogo proves that money grows on
trees." In: Far Eastern Economie Review, 12 March 1992: 42-45.
Scott, J.C. (1976) The moral economy of the peasant. Rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia.
New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Scott, J.C. (1986) Weapons of the weak. Everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven and
London: Yale University Press.
Scott, J.C. (1998) Seeing like a state. How certain schemes to improve the human condition have
failed. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Scott, W.H. (1981) Pre-Hispanic source materialsfor the study of Philippine history. Quezon City:
New Day.
Scott, W.H. (1982) Cracks in theparchment curtain and other essays in Philippine history. Quezon
City: New Day.
Scott, W.H. (1994) Barangay. Sixteenth century Philippine culture and society. Quezon City: Ateneo
de Manila University Press.
Serrano, R. (1985) "Lessons learned from oldest, one of biggest timber concessions in country." In:
Philippine Lumberman (May 1985):20-21,30.
Seraspi, E. (1994) "Community Forest Management Agreement. A socialized tenure instrument for
upland development." Paper presented at the Regional NRMP/DENR Forest policy workshop, 26-
28 October 1994, Santiago, Isabela, Philippines.
Seve, J. (1996) Brainstorming thoughts on size ofCBFM size ofoperation & on CBFM pre-implemen-
tation funding. Internal, non-official working documents.
Siebert, S.F. and J.M. Belsky (1985) "Some socio economie and environmental aspects of forest use
by lowland farmers in Leyte, Philippines and their imphcations for agricultural development and
forest management". In: Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society (l3):282-296.
430 references
Simons. H. (1992) 'Kanya Kanya '; The environmental impact offorest utilization in the Antagan
Watershed. CML student repon N° 18. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela CVPED.
Singh, K. D. (1993) "The Tropical Forest Resources Assessment" in: Unasylva, 44 (174): 10-19.
Siriwardena, S. S. A. L. (1989) From planned Intervention to negotiated development. The struggle of
bureaucrats, farmers and traders in the Mahaweli irrigation scheme in Sri Lanka. Wageningen
Agricultural University. PhD Dissertation.
Sommer, A. (1976) "Attempt at an assessment of the world's tropical forests." In: Unasylva 28
S0rensen, K. W. (1994) "Climate change and biodiversity." In: Tropical Forest Update 4 (1): 4-5.
Sorogon, A. P. (1955) A special study on landed estates in the Philippines. Anafysis andfindings.
Manila: United States of America Operations mission to the Philippines. International Cooperation
Administration.
Southgate, D. (1989) How to promote tropical deforestation: the case ofEcuador. Columbus Ohio,
Ohio State University. (ms).
Srinivasan, T.N. (1993) Poverty in the Philippines; A comparative perspective . In: Balisacan. A.M. et
al. (op. dr.): 1-15.
Sullivan, R. J. (1992) Exemplar of americanism, the Philippine career of Dean C. Worcester. Quezon
City: New Day.
Sy, M. and V. Lasmarias (1983) "the Philippine dipterocarp forest: a post harvest scenario." In:
Philippine Lumberman :36. Los Banos, Laguna.
Tamesis, F. (1963) "Philippine forests and the lumber industry" In: Huke (op.cit.): 73-95.
Thompson, M. R. (1994) A risk-prone consolidation aftera troubled transition; Philippine democratizo-
tion in a comparative perspective. Paper presented at the 2™1 European Conference on Philippine
Studies, April 13-15, London: SOAS.
TNI (1987) Europe and the Philippines; towards a new relationship . Amsterdam: Trans National
Instirute.
Tolentino, B. J. (1987) Current imperatives and developments in Philippine agricultural credit policy .
Unpublished paper, prepared for the Philippine Department of Agriculture and Food and the
Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the Philippines.
Top, G.M van den and R. R. Arano (1992) "The chemistry of joint research." In: CVPED (op.cit.): 83-
91.
Top, G.M. van den (1994) Deforestation in the northem Sierra Madre, Philippines. Explanation,
political choices and solution design. Paper presented at the 2™1 European Conference on Philip-
pine Studies, April 13-15, 1994, London: SOAS.
Top, G.M. van den (1997) "The deforestation of the northern Sierra Madre, Philippines. Historie roots
of a contemporary environmental problem". In: Pilipinas 26: 97-119. Tempe: Program for
Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University.
Top, G.M van den, R. R. Arano, M. D. Masipiquena, M. Buizer and D.M Boersma (1997) "Working
towards a model for sustamable land use in the Sierra Madre". In: Guzman and De Groot (eds.)
(op. d/.):7-14.
Top, G.M. van den (1998) Public forests, private stakes and government. The deforestation of the
northern Sierra Madre, Philippines. In: V. T. King (ed.) Environmental Challenges m South-East
Asia. 193-230. Oslo: NIAS and Richmond Curzon Press.
Top, G.M. van den and G. A. Persoon (in prep) "Dissolving state responsibilities for forests: The
cooperation between international and local actors in Northeast Luzon". In: Proceedings of the 3
European Conference on Philippine Studies, 27-30 April 1997. Manila and Aix en Provence
Ateneo University Press and IRSEA Presse.
Tucker, R. P. (1992) "Managing subsistence use of the forest; the Philippine Bureau of Forestry, 1904-
60". In: J. Dargavall, (ed.) Changing Pacific Forests: Historical Perspectives on the Forest
Economy of the Pacific Basin (Proceedings) Durham: Forest History Society, Duke University
Press
Tumaliuan, B. T. (1994) Interagency approach in forest protection in Region 2. Paper presented at the
NRMP workshop on Forest Policies in Cagayan Valley, 27-28 Oct, 1994, Santiago, Isabela.
U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (1900) Atlas of the Philippine Islands. Washington: Government
Pnnting Office.
Udanga, R. E. (1991) Recent developments in the timber markets and their effects on the timber
industries of the ASEAN region Paper presented at the ASEAN workmg group on trade (timber).
ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 29 July 1991, Manila.
references 431
Udo de Haes, H. A. (1987) Persoonlijk voordeel; van vijand tot bondgenoot in het milieubeheer.
Inaugural speech. Leiden University.
Udo de Haes, H,A. (1989) "Algemene aspecten van de Milieukunde". In: Boersema et al (op cit V17-
30.
Uiting, P. (1994) Social and political dimensions of environmental protection in Central America. In:
Development and Change, 25 (1): 231-259. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.
Vayda, A.P. (1983) Trogressive contextualization; methods for research in human ecology. "In:
Human Ecology, 11 (3): 265 - 281.
Vayda, A.P. , C.J.P. Pierce Golfer and M.Brotokusomo (1980) "Interactions between people and
forests in East Kalimantan." In: Impact of Science on Society 30 (3): 179-190. Paris: UNESCO.
Veen, A. van der (1997) Deforestatlon and chemical effects ofshifting cultivation. Barangay Cabua 'an
and Villa Gracia, Maddela, Quirino, the Philippines. CML student report N" 70. Leiden and
Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Velde, A. te (1994) The ethnic Chinese in Cagayan Valley, Philippines. CML student report N°33.
Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Vellema, S. (1994) It's a deal. Transnational corporations, contract growers and Pioneer com seeds.
Wageningen: working group on Technology and Agrarian Development, Wageningen Agricultural
University.Unpublished paper
Vermeulen, J.C (1991) Land degradation and farmers in Ifugao. MSc thesis, Wageningen Agricultural
University and Leiden University..
Vidal y Soler, Don S.(l874) Breve descnpcwn de alguna de las maderas importantes y mejor
conocidos de las Islas Filipinas. Madrid.
Vincent, J.E. (1994) "The tropical timber trade and sustainable development." In: Brown, K. and
D.W. Pearce (eds.):298-308
Vincent, J.E. (1995) "Timber trade, economics and tropical forest management." In: Primack and
Lovejoy (op. cit.): 241-262.
Vitug, M.D. (1992) "Faith in the forest. A new breed of activist priests push a green version of
liberation theology." In: Par Eastern Economie Review, 155 (23 April ):36-7.
Vitug, M. D. (1993) Power from the Forest. The Politics of Logging. Manila: Philippine Centre for
Investigative Journalism.
Wakker, E.J. (1991) From Cane to Cory Set; the economie value and sustainability ofrattan trade in
Region 02, the Philippines. CML student report N" 8. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Warner, K. (1991) Shifting cultivators. Local technical knowledge and natural resource management
in the humid tropics. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
Weber, M.(1984) 'Bureaucracy. "In: Fisher, F. and C. Siranni (eds.) Critical studies in organization
and bureaucracy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press
Werf, van der I. (1994) The administrative context ofan environmental management plan. The impact
ofpolicies, policy actors and their interactions on the management of natural resources in Cagayan
Valley, the Philippines. CML student report N" 38. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Wernstedt, F. and J. Spencer (1967) The Philippine island world: aphysical, cultural and regional
geography. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wickberg E.B. (1965), The Chinese m Philippine life. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Wiersum, K.F. (1997) Normative plurifomuty m forest management: professional and community
perspectives. Paper presented at FAO workshop on pluralism and sustainable forestry and rural
development, Rome, 9-12 December 1997.
Whitmore, T.C. (1995) "Comparing Southeast Asian and other tropical rainforests." In: Primack and
Lovejoy (cp.c«/.):5-15.
Wolters, W.G (1984) Politics, patronage and class conflict in Central Luzon. Quezon City: New Day.
Wolters, W.G. (1989) Poverty and ecological degradation in the Philippine uplands: Conflicting
interests in the last frontier. Paper presented to the fourth Passau-Symposium on southeast Asia:
economy and politics in the Philippines under Cory Aquino, Passau, 15-17 June 1989.
Wolters, W.G; V. Fitzgerald, R Vos and H.G.T. Van Raay (1989): The Philippines' background
document; development trends and needs. The Hague/Nijmegen (ms).
Worcester, Dean C. (1914) The Philippines, Past and Present (Vol 1). New York: Macmillan.
World Bank (1988), Philippines Forestry, Fisheries and Agricultural Resource Management study
(FFARMstudy) Report No. 7388-PH Washington, D.C: World Bank.
World Bank (1990) Philippines Environment and Natural Resource Management study World Bank
country study, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
432 references
World Bank (1994a) Conservation of Protected Areas Project document. Washington, D.C: World
Bank.
World Bank (1994b), Making Development Sustainable. The World Bank Group and the Environment,
Washington, D.C: World Bank.
WRM (1990); Rainforest destruction. Causes, effects andfalse solutions. Penang: World Rainforest
Movement.
World Resources Institute (1996) World Resources; a guide to the global environment 1996-1997.
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
WWF/IUCN (1996) Forestsfor life. The WWF/IUCNforestpolicy book. Gland: World Wildlife Fund
and the International Union for the Conservation of nature and Natura! Resources.
Wurfel, D. (1988) Filipino politics; development and decay. Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press.
Wyatt-Smith, J. (1987) The management oftropical moist forest; some issues. IUCN/IIED Tropical
Forest Policy Paper N° 4.
Yoshihara, K. (1988) The rise of ersatz capitalism in SoutheastAsia. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila
University Press.
Ypma, D. (1994) Dy 's people ofAbra and the story of a project in context. CML student report N" 23.
Leiden, Netherlands and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Zamora, M.D. (1967) Studies in Philippine anthropology. In honorofH. Otley Beyer. Quezon City,
Alemar Publishers.
Zorge, R. van (1995) Designing participation m environmental action; two case studies in the northern
Sierra Madre, Philippines. CML student report N° 50. Leiden and Cabagan, Isabela: CVPED.
Zosa-Feranil, I. (1994) "Persisting and changing patterns of population redistribution in the Philip-
pines". In: Herrin, A. (ed.) (op.cit.): 325-374.
Zuniga, Joaquin Martines (1973, org. 1983) Status of the Philippines in 1800. English translation of
"Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas ó mis viajes por este pais por el padre." Manila: Filipiana Book
Guild.
Samenvatting
Het Sierra Madre gebergte in noordoost Luzon is een van de laatste grote aaneengesloten
regenwoudgebieden van de Filippijnen. Nadat de Verenigde Staten aan het begin van de
20e eeuw de grootschalige, gemechaniseerde houtkap introduceerden in de archipel,
ontwikkelde deze zich tot grootste houtexporteur van Zuidoost Azië in de jaren vijftig.
Veertig jaar later was het land tevens de eerste producent in de regio die, door uitputting
van haar eigen natuurlijke bossenvoorraad, voor haar industriële hout-toevoer afhankelijk
werd van grootschalige hout-importen. Van de naar schatting 16 miljoen hectare aan
tropisch regenwoud die het land rijk was bij haar onafhankelijkheid (in 1946), was in 1992
nog ruim een vierde deel over, en nog slechts 3% in ongerepte staat.
De noordelijke Sierra Madre, het gebied waarop deze studie zich concentreert, beslaat
in totaal l miljoen hectare aan natuurlijk bos, waarvan 25% uit zogenaamd 'old growth',
niet uitgekapt oerbos bestaat. Het aandeel van bos met een kroondek van 80% of meer
daalde van 35 naar 14 procent tussen 1950 en 1990. Het grootste gedeelte van dit oerbos,
alsmede van goed hersteld uitgekapt bos bevind zich aan de oostzijde van deze bergketen.
Het aandeel van bos met een kroondek van 10 tot 60% verdubbelde van 20 tot 40% in
dezelfde periode. Slechts vijf procent van het bosareaal werd omgezet in een ander
landgebruik. Hoewel de Noordelijke Sierra Madre een relatief gunstige uitzondering is op
de algemene ontbossingstrend in de Filippijnen, is er dus wel degelijk sprake geweest van
een significante achteruitgang in natuurlijk kroondek, de variabele die in deze studie als
maat voor ontbossing wordt gehanteerd. De afname in areaal ongerept oerbos volgt
ongeveer de nationale trend, terwijl een relatief kleiner gedeelte van het uitgekapte bos is
omgezet in een andere landgebruik.
Deze studie richt zich op de vraag welke verklaringen voor dit specifieke patroon van
ontbossing er te vinden zijn in de sociaal-economische context van de Cagayan Vallei. Na
een verkenning van de feitelijke en normatieve dimensies van de mondiale ontbossings-
problematiek, in hoofdstuk l, wordt deze brede vraagstelling in hoofdstuk 2 uitgewerkt
naar een aantal deelvragen, met gebruikmaking van het Problem-in-Context raamwerk van
De Groot (1992). Na een korte verkenning van land en regio, in hoofdstuk 3, wordt eerst
ingegaan op de zogenaamde primaire activiteiten en actoren: het menselijk handelen in de
Sierra Madre dat direct tot ontbossing leidt. Het vierde hoofdstuk behandelt,
achtereenvolgens, de grootschalige kap door concessie-houders, kleinschalige kap en
landbouw door bosmigranten. Een belangrijke conclusie van dit hoofdstuk is dat de
selectieve houtkap grotendeels verantwoordelijk is voor de teruggang in bosdek tot 1990.
Overheidsvoorschriften voor een duurzaam beheer van de kapconcessies werden
stelselmatig overtreden, zowel door de kapbedrijven zelf, als door andere actoren,
waartegen deze bedrijven de aan hen toevertrouwde publieke bossen onvoldoende be-
schermden. Daar alle politieke en economische centra van de Cagayan Vallei aan de
westzijde van het gebergte liggen, volgde het ontbossingspatroon de aanleg van wegen in
oostelijke richting: het feit dat er tot het midden van de jaren '90 geen enkele weg geheel
was doorgetrokken naar de oostkust verklaart waarom in deze context van gebrekkige
overheidscontrole het ongerepte en goed herstelde bos grotendeels op de ontoegankelijke
oostflanken van de Sierra Madre bevond. Bosmigratie, kleinschalige houtkap, en de
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extensieve verbouw van landbouw-gewassen, alle eveneens illegaal tot het einde van de
jaren '80, hadden een relatief klein aandeel in de ontbossing in deze periode.
Het vijfde en zesde hoofstuk bieden een beschrijving en analyse van de rol van de
Filippijnse overheid in het ontbossingsproces. Na een uiteenzetting van de belangrijkste
beleidslijnen die de overheid sinds de jaren '50 volgde ten aanzien van de publieke
bosgronden, volgt een inventarisatie van andere actoren die invloed uitoefenen op de
formulering van bosbeleid, zoals niet-gouvernementele organisaties, internationale
organisaties en de leden van de verschillende verkozen lagen van het publieke bestuur. Een
gedifferentieerd beeld van de overheid is nodig om te kunnen begrijpen waarom de
Filippijnse overheidsdienst belast met het toezicht op de publieke bossen (het Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, DENR) de activiteiten van kapbedrijven en
migranten niet beter wist te beteugelen. Het zesde hoofdstuk poogt deze vraag te
beantwoorden aan de hand van een aantal voorbeelden van verstoorde beleidsimplementatie
als gevolg van een belangenconflict tussen de nationale bosdienst en lokaal verkozen
politici. Laatstgenoemden ontlenen een belangrijk deel van hun politieke legitimiteit aan de
effectiviteit waarmee zij de directe economische belangen van hun achterban weten te
beschermen. Door middel van zogenaamde 'mutual accomodation networks' ontwikkelen
privé-actoren, hen vertegenwoordigende politici en ambtenaren opties waarmee deze
belangentegenstelling op ad hoc basis wordt overbrugd. De samenwerking in de totstand-
koming van deze vormen van geaccommodeerde toegang functioneert op basis van de
uitgangspunten dat zij 1) alle deelnemers in staat stellen zich tijdelijk te onttrekken aan
sancties voortvloeiend uit het niet implementeren, of doelbewust onjuist interpreteren van
bosbeleid en 2) dat alle deelnemers voordeel behalen, financieel of anderszins, uit hun
deelname hieraan. Een ambtenaar die zich niet flexibel opstelt ten aanzien van dergelijke
externe verzoeken moet, daarentegen, niet alleen in staat zijn zich de financiële en andere
uit medewerking voortvloeiende voordelen te ontzeggen, maar tevens rekening houden met
informele sancties, zoals overplaatsing naar een andere afdeling of Regio, gepasseerd
worden voor promoties, of zelfs het gebruik van fysiek geweld tegen hem of haar zelf en
zijn of haar familieleden.
Hoofdstuk 7 onderzoekt de oorsprong van het gebrekkige overheidstoezicht op de
toegang tot de publieke bosgronden nader, door in te gaan op de geschiedenis van de
commerciële houtkap in de Filippijnen. Vanaf de oprichting van de eerste Inspeccion de
Montes, in 1863, is het functioneren van de nationale bosdienst sterk beïnvloed geweest
door leden van de nationale politieke elite. Als gevolg van het, door de Amerikaanse
koloniale overheid in de Filippijnen geïntroduceerde districtenstelsel, kregen lokale politici,
wiens legitimiteit traditioneel voor een belangrijk deel op patronage-diensten was
gebaseerd, zeggenschap over natuurlijke hulpbronnen, in staatsbezit sinds de Spaanse
koloniale periode. Dit bood hen een nieuwe mogelijkheid om middels wetgeving en
contacten in de bureaucratie te bemiddelen in de privé-toegang tot deze publieke
hulpbronnen. Deze diensten, alsmede een aandeel in het financieel gewin die ermee te
behalen waren, boden lokale leiders nieuwe middelen om een groeiend electoraat aan zich
te verplichten. Na de onafhankelijkheid van 1946 werd, op grond van de officiële doelstel-
ling natuurlijke hulpbronnen in te zetten voor de opbouw van het land, het natuurlijke bos
van de Filippijnen in versneld tempo omgezet in privé kapitaal. Het geringe tegenspel dat
de bosdienst tegen deze snelle openlegging bood was niet alleen te verklaren uit de grote
invloed van de politiek op de bosdienst, maar ook uit de visie waarmee de bos ambtenaren
in hun opleiding werden toegerust. Door de Verenigde Staten opgezet aan het begin van de
twintigste eeuw, gelijktijdig met de introductie van de gemechaniseerde grootschalige
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houtkap, waren de Filippijnse bosbouw opleidingen tot aan het begin van de jaren '90 sterk
technisch georiënteerd. Bosbouwers leerden oerbossen te zien als onbevolkte en
economisch onproductieve climax vegetaties, die productiever konden worden gemaakt
door cyclische, selectieve kap. Hierin kwam slechts verandering tegen het einde van de
jaren '80, in samenhang met een bredere her-definitie van de rol van inheemse bosvolken
en migranten in het bosbeheer.
Ondanks de gebrekkige bescherming van de publieke bosgronden door de overheid, en
de constructie van een dichtvertakt wegen-netwerk door de kapbedrijven, had de openleg-
ging van de Sierra Madre tot 1990 slechts een relatief beperkte bosmigratie tot gevolg. Aan
de hand van de geschiedenis van de bewoning en landbouwontwikkeling in de laaglanden
van de Cagayan Vallei, zoekt het achtste hoofdstuk verklaringen voor deze afwijking van
het landelijke patroon. Op het eerste gezicht lijkt de relatief lage bevolkingsdichtheid van de
Vallei een voor de hand liggende verklaring; met minder dan de helft van het landelijk
gemiddelde van 220 mensen per km2 heeft Noordoost Luzon haar historische positie als een
van de dunst bevolkte delen van de Filippijnen nog altijd gehandhaafd. Met uitzondering
van korte immigratie-episodes rond de jaren '30 en na de onafhankelijkheid, was er in deze
regio sprake van slechts een beperkte in-migratie en een negatieve migratiebalans. De groei
in landbouwareaal na 1960 was dan ook geen gevolg van in-migratie uit de omringende,
dichtst bevolkte regio's van de Filippijnen, maar werd aangestuurd door intra-regionale
bevolkingsgroei en -migratie. Gelet op het hoge percentage van de bevolking dat
afhankelijk is van de landbouw blijkt dat de gemiddelde hoeveelheid landbouwareaal per
ruraal huishouden rond het landelijke gemiddelde bleef. De beperkte bosmigratie tot 1990
is ten dele te verklaren uit de mogelijkheden die het laagland nog bood tot uitbreiding van
het landbouw-areaal. Naast een aantal andere oorzaken, waaronder verwachtingen van twee
ambitieuze landhervormingsprogramma's in het laagland, speelde ook de historische
reputatie van de Sierra Madre als schuilplaats voor tribalen, niet-Christenen, geesten, geest-
bezweerders en, meest recentelijk, rebellen van de New People's Army (NPA), een rol in
het beteugelen van de bosmigratie tot 1990. Het gewapend conflict nissen de NPA en het
Filippijnse leger intensiveerde sterk tijdens de regeerperiode van voormalig President
Marcos, toen ook de commerciële houtkap in de Sierra Madre haar hoogtijdagen beleefde.
In jaren '70 en '80 bleef de aanwezigheid van laaglanders in de boslanden grotendeels
beperkt tot tijdelijke werkzaamheden van arbeiders van de kapmaatschappijen. Wie zich
anders dan als kaparbeider in de boslanden waagde liep een reëel risico in het conflict
betrokken te raken.
De EDSA revolutie in februari 1986, waarbij President Marcos, zijn familie en een
aantal door zijn bewind beschermde zakenlieden gedwongen werden het land te verlaten,
had een aantal gevolgen die de integratie van de Sierra Madre boslanden in de economie
van de Cagayan Valley in een stroomversnelling brachten. Het systeem van de groot-
schalige privé kapconcessies, dat sterk geassocieerd werd met het Marcos regime, verloor
haar politieke legitimiteit. Nationale politici en het nieuwe milieuministerie, waarin de
bosdienst werd geïntegreerd, ontwikkelden nieuw beleid dat - evenals de nieuwe curricula
in bosbouwopleidingen - beter aansloot bij de nationale geest van democratisch herstel.
Inheemse bosbewoners en migranten werden niet langer genegeerd, en gecriminaliseerd,
maar juist ingeschakeld bij het beheer van de uitgekapte publieke bossen en bos-landen; het
zogenaamde 'Community-Based Resource Management' werd de nieuwe hoeksteen van het
Filippijnse bosbeleid. Deze heroriëntatie werd echter onvoldoende vergezeld van aandacht
voor de capaciteit die het milieuministerie nodig had om dit proces te begeleiden, of van
een analyse van de oorzaken van de gebrekkige controle die de bosdienst in de voorgaande
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jaren had op privé toegang tot de boslanden. Een tegenovergestelde beweging lijkt ingezet
met de Local Government Code van 1991, die een deel van voormalige verant-
woordelijkheden van de nationale bosdienst onderbrengt bij de provinciale en gemeentelijke
overheden. Het staat te bezien of deze bestuurlijke maatregel tot een duurzamer bosbeheer
zal leiden. Immers, de gekozen leiders van deze bestuurslagen, alsmede hun politieke
achterban van een klein aantal rijke ondernemers en een overwegend arme,
ongeorganiseerde bevolking, beschouwen de bossen en boslanden in eerste instantie als
economische hulpbronnen voor de korte termijn. De NPA, tijdens de jaren van de
commerciële houtkap de onofficiële wachters van de Sierra Madre, raakte met de
kapbedrijven een van haar belangrijkste financieringsbronnen kwijt, en bovendien intern
ideologisch verdeeld door een beleid van nationale verzoening, her-integratie en infiltratie.
Tegen het midden van de jaren '90 is de hele Sierra Madre de facto geworden tot een
zogenaamde 'open access resource': een grote, toegankelijke, onbeheerde kapconcessie,
verlaten door de voormalige gebruikers, en ineffectief beschermd door de eigenaar, c.q. de
Filippijnse staat.
In deze context komt in de vroege jaren '90 de introductie van handelsgewassen, met
name hybride mais, in de boslanden op gang. In combinatie met de te verwachten groeiende
bosmigratie uit de laaglanden, en uit het nabijgelegen Cordillera gebergte, moet deze
ontwikkeling worden gezien als een belangrijke nieuwe bedreiging voor de bossen van de
Sierra Madre. Hoofdstuk 9 bespreekt een aantal indicaties van dit proces, en poogt te
verklaren waarom bosmigranten dit gewas in toenemende mate verbouwen, ondanks een
zwakke prijs stabiliteit. Informele krediet relaties lijken een belangrijke rol te spelen;
handelaren bieden zowel laagland boeren als bosmigranten krediet in ruil voor de
verzekerde aflevering van een door hen te specificeren handelsgewas. Mais is een
alternatief onderpand bij ontstentenis van landeigendom (de boslanden zijn immers staats-
eigendom), of van een ander kapitaal onderpand. Daarnaast biedt het handelaren aan aantal
andere voordelen. Land is voor informele kredietverschaffers een relatief onaantrekkelijk
onderpand, ook in het laagland. Het is noch mobiel, noch vrij verhandelbaar doordat
landhervorming een maximum stelt aan het areaal per persoon. Een verzekerde aflevering
van een met enige zekerheid te verwachten bulk hoeveelheid graan stelt handelaren in staat
op hun beurt lucratieve contracten aan te gaan met zogenaamde 'integrators', corporaties
die het gehele productie proces van hybride zaden, de kunstmest en bestrijdingsmiddelen
die deze behoeven, tot en met de op basis van mais te produceren vlees en melkproducten
integreren. Onder invloed van de recente economische vooruitgang in de Filippijnen is er
een grote binnenlandse vraag naar mais, en herstelt de marktprijs zich geleidelijk aan na de
oogstmaanden maart en augustus. Doordat kleine boeren echter veelal niet over de
faciliteiten beschikken om dit bederfelijke gewas na de oogst op te kunnen slaan, hebben zij
geen andere mogelijkheid dan het gewas snel naar de handelaar te brengen. Daar zij hun
lening slechts in graan kunnen afbetalen, hebben ze bovendien niet de mogelijkheid het
gewas op de markt aan de hoogst biedende te verkopen. Bij de aflevering van het gewas
kan de handelaar eenzijdig de waarde van de oogst vaststellen, alsmede de kosten van op
krediet verkregen geld en goederen. Deze nadelen wegen voor veel boeren kennelijk niet op
tegen de wens toegang te hebben tot een informele bron van krediet.
De geschiedenis van de Cagayan Vallei laat een toenemende economische integratie zien
van dit gebied in de nationale en internationale economie. Als gevolg van de sociale context
waarbinnen deze integratie plaats vond, heeft het merendeel van de bewoners van de vallei
relatief weinig baat gehad bij dit proces. Na twee eeuwen te hebben gefunctioneerd als
leverancier van tabak, hardhout en graan voor de nationale economie, behoort de Cagayan
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Vallei nog altijd tot de armste regio's van de Filippijnen. Vanaf de vroege jaren '90, na
twee decennia van openlegging en exploitatie, verliezen nu ook de boslanden hun
traditionele, voornamelijk op afschrikking gebaseerde isolement van de vallei en
omringende provincies. Een groeiend aantal migranten en inheemse bosbewoners zal de
komende jaren dan ook de exploitatie van het uitgekapte bos voortzetten. De omvang van
de migratiestroom is in hoge mate bepalend voor de snelheid waarmee natuurlijk bos naar
andere vormen van landgebruik zal worden omgezet. De milieu-impact van dit proces
wordt in hoge mate bepaald door het type landgebruik dat de huidige en toekomstige
bewoners van de Sierra Madre verkiezen. Ruraal krediet speelt een belangrijke rol in deze
keuze, in mogelijkheden voor kapitaalopbouw op het niveau van huishoudens, of
leefgemeenschappen. Hier, alsmede in het stimuleren van horizontale organisatie, en het
herstel van de politieke onafhankelijkheid van het Filippijnse openbaar bestuur, liggen de
sleutels voor een alternatief duurzaam proces van economische integratie. En voor de
toekomst van Luzon's laatste grote bosgebied.
